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Politick DISCOURSES;

Written in *ITALIAN*

BY

PAOLO PARUTA

A Noble *VENETIAN*,

Cavalier and Procurator

of *S^t. MARK*.

Whereunto is added, A short

SOLFLOQUY,

In which the Author briefly examines the whole
Course of his Life.



Rendred into *ENGLISH*

By the Right Honorable,

HENRY

EARL OF MONMOUTH.

LONDON,

Printed for *H. Moseley*, and are to be sold at the *Prince's Arms*
in *St. Paul's Church-yard*. 1657.

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WARS, brought home to the Enemies own doors, how advantagious — 28. When it ought to be carried on with protracting of time — 31. War, and not Peace, was the cause of Romes ruine — 46. It is subject to divers successes and chances, more then any other action of ours — 31-183-185. Wars, made by the Romans after the subduing of Carthage — 48. Made and maintained by them in many places at once — 65. Particulars most necessary for them — 149. The manner of Wars now used, is the chiefeſt cause why the enterprises of modern Princes prove not equal to those of the Antients — 148.

The end of the second Table.

ERRATA.

Pag. lin.

A After nor read only.
4-45 Delete not.
5-7 For licence read licentiousness.
8-17 For temperance read temper.
10-27 For them read those.
11-38 Before what insert do.
15-35 Delete more.
19-19 For of read and, for and read of.
25-38 Delete only.
26-36 After obedience insert is.
35-26 After fighting read they.
37-43 After theſt insert rather.
38-14 After of insert all this.
39- Before the insert to.
43-pen. After as insert if.
53-12 After much insert the left.
55-31 After nor insert only.
60-3 After nor insert only
73-17 Delete and (the first.)

Pag. lin.

74-27 Before Goth; insert great valor of the
ibid. 31 For Commanders read Soldiers.
81-50 For Rhodofius read Rhodanus.
89-30 For Soldiers read Commanders.
112-30 For where read were.
113-48 Delete then by.
116-20 For a read the.
124-7 For them into his, read him into their
126-34 After mens insert thoughts.
152-25 Before Pope, insert with Francis
King of France;
157-5 After if insert we.
158-45 For sadly read easily.
159-26 For Corſir read Corſk.
ibid.29 For Corſee read Corſk
176-47 After thereof insert more.
199-2 Before nor insert it.
ibid. 3 Delete it.
203-19 Delete be.

АТАЯЗЫ

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THE FIRST BOOK.

The First DISCOURSE.

What was the true and proper Form of Government observed in the Commonwealth of Rome; and whether she could be better ordered in Civil affairs, having Armed people on foot.



Here are many, who reflecting upon the Greatness of the Commonwealth of *Rome*, wonder at her so many prosperities, by which she flourished a long time, and at last obtained the mastery of all other Monarchies: And thinking that it is enough to admire her fears of Arms, and management in Peace, do not care for enquiring into the reason thereof; so as ballancing thereby every of her several operations, they may know what they were that were truly worth praise and imitation, and what blame-worthy and to be avoided. But certainly these men seem not to know, to how

many and how great and various accidents all humane works are subject, and what the true rule and measure is whereby the perfection of States is comprehended: For that is not simply the greatness of an Empire, to which she at the beginning riseth by Fortune, and which is increased by Injustice; but that may well be said to be the true Form of Government, by which people living in peace and union, may work righteously, and obtain Civil felicity. He therefore who will judge aright of the actions of that Commonwealth, without suffering his eyes to be dazeled with the splendor of the Roman greatness, let him consider them nakedly, as void of that reputation which Antiquity and the power of Empire purchased them, and he will find some things peradventure amongst the many for which she worthily deserved to be cryed up by all men, which are more to be observed for the amendment of present Governments by their example, than for imitation, out of hopes of attaining

ing any true praise or apparent good. But as there is nothing of greater importance in a City, then the Form of Government, by which, as by the soul thereof, every good act is produced ; so of all other observations which may be had of the City of *Rome*, there is not any more worthy, or of more use, then to examine what was the truest Form of her Government, that we may afterwards see whether she might have been better ordered in Civil affairs then she was, without disordering her *Militia* ; and whether she could keep together the People armed, and obedient to the Laws. To know then what the condition of her Government was, and thence to comprehend whether that supreme excellencie were in it, as hath been thought by some men ; following the Rule which Philosophy teacheth us, which says, that every Form of Republick is not convenient for every City, but that they must be varied according to the divers natures of the people, and according to other accidents ; we must examine what that State was in it self, and then what proportion it held with that City. But because it would be too difficult a busines to assign any certain condition unto her, which may equally correspond to all times, she not having so punctually observed one and the same Form continually, but varied it somewhat accordingly as it inclined more or less to a Popular State ; we must have our eys most fixt upon that Age, wherein the glory of that Commonwealth did most flourish ; not forbearing notwithstanding to touch upon such things in other times, as may conduce to our purpose.

He who would diligently consider all the parts of the Republick, will find not only so much diversity, but even contrariety in them, as he will not be able easily to resolve which was her properst Form of Government : For if respect be had to the great Authority of Consuls, especially in Armies, we may, not without reason, believe, that that City under the name of a Commonwealth, was governed with Laws befitting a Kingdom ; since that Form of Magistracie did use such Authority in managing of Arms, in concluding Peace, and in agreeing differences between potent Kings, as one onely Prince could hardly have treated of those things with more absolute power : differing from Monarchy only in this, that they kept this Authority but for a short time, and did acknowledg it to proceed from the will and favor of the People. But he who will consider what a share of the most important resolutions of the Commonwealth the Senate had, as that which governed the publick Treasury, the chief foundation of a State, and to which the priviledg did belong first to treat of, and then to resolve of such things as were to be propounded to the people, will be of opinion, that such a Commonwealth did lean more towards Aristocracie, then any other Government. Yet passing on to further Considerations, and finding the Authority of Consuls, Senate and Tribunes to be so often baffled and nullified, and the Supreme Magistracies oftentimes contaminated by the meanness of popular men who have had the exercise thereof, will vote otherwise, and think the Government to have been meerly Popular. Wherefore *Polybius* being willing, in the sixth Book of his Histories, to assign some certain Form of Government to the City of *Rome*, would not restrain it under any one particular Form, but called it a mixt Republick, as was that of *Sparta*. Which opinion is sithence followed by some modern Writers, who treating of the differing Forms of Commonwealths, and particularly of that of *Rome*, do punctually agree with *Polybius*. And certainly they were thus far all in the right, to wit, That the divers manners of Rule by which that City was governed, could not be expressed by any one name. For what gives the true Form to a City, but the communication of Government ? which as it is participated by Citizens, makes such alteration or mutation in a State, as the Philosopher was of opinion, that though the City did totally remain the same, the variation of this only was able so to metamorphose it, as it cannot be said to be what it was before : For it is not the Walls, nor the Inhabitants,

bitants, but the Form of Government which makes it be so. Therefore he who will determine the Form of a City, must have respect to whatsoever doth therein help to the attaining of Magistracie, that he may infold all parts that belong to the managing of a Commonwealth. So as since men of all conditions, according to the divers respects either of Liberty, Nobility, Wealth or Werth, were admitted into Government, these divers communications will not admit the ascription of any peculiar or particular form.

Agreeing therefore herein with *Polybius*, we will now endeavour to find out what is more hard to know, and is better worth knowledg, to wit what sort of mixture this was. For though a man xi Commonwealth may be perfect, it follows not, that all mixtures may make her so; nay rather where several differing parts are wound up together, so as a third kind of nature is produced by their connexion, such a composition will rather increase the imperfection of the State, and be the reason why it cannot long continue under such a disproportionate mixture. And as it falls out in our bodies, which being compounded of four Elements, continue so long in life, as that proportion is maintained, which when it is destroyed, they are likewise wasted and corrupted; (For that part which becomes too prevalent, changeth the rest into its self, and dissolves the form which they made when all together:) So that Commonwealth which is composed of divers parts, may continue in one and the same State, as long as the Authority of Government is proportioned with equal temperament, as it ought to be, to each part. But as soon as any one part begins to domineer too much, it is apparent that she grows towards corruption: For the prevalent part by consuming the rest, doth by little and little reduce them all into its self, and alters the aspect of the City. Therefore such a disposition is required to this Form of Government, as no disorder may be therein found whereby that mixture may be broken or confused. Wherefore as divers Faculties concur together to the forming of Man, but are notwithstanding so well ordered in that union, as all of them partaking of some office or other, they have their several degrees of dignity; so divers Citizens reduced to live together in one City, though all of them may in some sort participate of Government, yet the imployments must be diversly disposed of, so as some of them may hold the first place, and as certain primary Causes, must give motion to other things which are done in the Commonwealth.

These considerations being applied to the City of *Rome*, will make it appear clearly that there was no such equality nor order in her, as is to be desired in a mixt Commonwealth to render it excellent, and long lived. For the immoderate Authority, which was by the Laws granted to divers Magistrates, but much more the extraordinary power which was intrusted in many Citizens, shews how ill that so necessary proportion was observed in her: And on the other side, the Peoples power, and the admittance thereof without any difference to all manner of Negotiations, gives manifest tokens of a confused disposition, all Orders being mixt together without distinction either of Office or Degree, and the baser sort being oftentimes exalted above the more worthy. Hence it was, that amongst such confusion, many customs might be introduced, which were not only corrupt, but even contrary one to another; as was that of prolonging the time of Magistrates, which was repugnant to the great Authority which was reserved to the people; and that other of suffering the wealth of private men to increase to such a height in a City, where there was no prefixed boundour of wealth appointed by the Laws for being a Citizen. Which Laws or Customs do some of them tend to the power of a few, and other some of them are proper for a Popular State. But if we proceed further, we shall find their disorders so far advanced, as not being able to consist together in one subject, they were the occasion of that Commonwealths dissolution

dissolution. The confirming of their Authority, whose Magistracy was by the usual time appointed by the Laws expired, was introduced at first with some appearance of advantage, but with very bad example, for that having begun important affairs in Countries far off, they might finish them, and weaken the Enemy before their return home. Thus was the charge of the Province left to *Marcus Fulvius*, who fought in *Asia* against *Antiochus*, after he was out of the Consulship; the which was done likewise to *Cneus Manlius* to bridle the daring *Aetolians*, and to appease the affairs in *Greece*, and the like upon many occasions was done to divers others, and very long in ensuing times, with very pernicious example, but the disorder ceased not here, for, without need, the City Magistrates were so far prolonged, as the same were seen to return ten times to be the peoples Tribunes. Which made the Citizens infinitely ambitious, and afforded them occasion by being so long in Power, of plotting many things, and of molesting the Commonwealth divers waies by the peoples Insurrections. Nor was it les prejudicial to permit private men to grow to such immoderate riches, as equalling therein the most Potent Kings; there was a Citizen of *Rome* who arrived to such greatness, as he said, He ought not to be esteemed rich who could not out of his own Revenue maintain an Army: Whence it arose that the Nobility, being much envied and suspected by the people, the way was opened to the *Gracchi* to excite those heinous disorders which ended not but with the utter ruin of the Commonwealth.

Provision was long before hand by the Law against such disorders, *Licineus* the Tribune having instituted, so to curb the Avarice and Ambition of the Nobility, that no Citizen should posesse above Five hundred Acres of Land; But these Orders in Civil Affairs were so weak and imperfect, as one Law might easily be broken, by introducing a contrary custom: The Nobles therefore little esteeming the Licinean Law, did very much increase their wealth, and fraudulently usurping the publick Territories, which were wont to be kept for the benefit of the people, brought in Forainers to manure them; so as the people being become very poor, and seeing the Nobility injoy all the fruits of the common labor of the Militia, did very unwillingly suffer such an injury, and did very willingly listen and adhere unto any one who would seed them with hopes of bringing things to a just equality; wherefore such as were seditious took occasion to try Novelties, so as at last in the times of the *Gracchi*, recourse must be had unto Arms, and civil Differences must be thereby decided: which (as shall by and by be more clearly shewn) might have been long before foreseen; for such Customs did much disorder the Commonwealth, not onely in that they partook not of civil modesty, but by their being clean contrary to the Laws of that City, which lent most towards a Popular State, all Authority being given by them to the People in their suffrages, and also in the most important State-resolutions. So as it seemed respect was only had to the liberty of dividing the Government amongst Citizens: All places of Magistracie were equally common to all, and small means kept not any one far from the Commonwealth; they might marry together, Forainers were easily made Free Denizens; the Tribunes had power to nominate all Magistrates; the manner of living was not free, but very licentious: And the supreme Authority of the Tribunes cloth of all other things most clearly shew what that Government was, who being greatly respected and reverenced by all men, and called by the superstitious title of *Sacrosancti*, they were so insolent in their office, as a Tyrant could hardly have used more severity in his commands. See how boldly a Tribune of the People made *Marius Violanus*, a Nobleman, be seised on, commanding that he should be suddenly thrown head-long down the *Tarpeian Rock*, for no other reason, but that in a Speech which he had made, he used some harsh words against the People. But the Tribune *Sulpitius* using

using more violence, came one morning into the *Piazza* with many armed men and driving away the Consuls who would have opposed such an action, made *Marius* be decreed for the undertaking against *Sertorius*, not caring though therein he went against the Laws, which not being in any thing observed, all good Institutions were made in vain, whilst the Laws were violated and destroyed by the Tribunes too great power. He then who shall consider these things, will not say that they tended not to the making of a Commonwealth totally Popular; yet many things were contrary to those, as hath been considered in perpetuating the Government of the Armies, and in the excessive Riches of some Citizens. Some Popular Commonwealths, as that of *Athens*, used by a quite contrary advice, to banish such Citizens ten years from the City, who did for some excellent quality far exceed the rest; In some others, because they did in some sort partake of popularity, the equality of means, or levelling was introduced, so to content, and please the people, as in *Sparta*; and certainly to grant but a limited power, and but for a short time, to Magistrates are excellent precepts of such Legislators as will constitute a free City; For so all the Citizens may have their share of Government, but none freely dispose thereof, to his own proper use, and then indeavour to bring things to an equality, or at least provide so, as they may not increase so immoderately, as any one Citizen may be envied or suspected by the rest, for his too great Power.

It is then no wonder, if *Rome* were much divided, since these things were not observed in her; for by such a diversity of Orders she became a Body with two Heads, and of two several shapes, which occasioned continual domestick disorders in her. For the Nobility glorying in the dignity of Consulship, wherein they used great Authority, and which they for the most part kept amongst themselves, and being also proud of their wealth, would usurp all the Government to themselves: And on the other side, the people, bearing so great a sway in all things, and relying much upon the Magistracy of the Tribunes were so insolent, as they would acknowledge no obedience, nor bear any respect to the Laws, or to the Magistrates thereof; but would resolve all things according to their own fancy, and as made most for their advantage; which made that City, which was so potent in Military and Foraign Affairs, very weak in such as were Civil and Domestick; for such a division of power in men of contrary minds, keeps the forces of the City, with much prejudice divided; whilst the one of them contesting with the other, they hinder the resolutions and executions of important Affairs, as it often fell out in *Rome*, for necessity urging to list Forces to march against the Enemy, the Tribunes were prelently ready to incense the people, so as there was none that would give a name to the Militia, which Insolencies were increased by the peoples being able to do it safely. For, the Tribunes minding nothing else but how to make their Faction powerful, accepted of the Appeals of every popular man, though in unjust causes, to the end that the people might be the more respected by the Nobility, and more ready and bold to raise seditions, whereby they did always increase their power, and had by these means obtained many things from the Senate. The Nobles likewise, no less sollicitous to increase their authority, that they might keep back the Peoples insolencie, sought always to keep them low, and did with like endeavours maintain those of their own Order in all Judgments. So as in punishing or in absolving of faults, it was often times a thing of greater consideration, whether the party concerned were a Nobleman or a Plebeian, then whether he were guilty or innocent: And hence great prejudice arose unto the Commonwealth; for all Justice was soon corrupted, without which no good Order can be kept; and each Party, valuing the publick welfare but a little out of a desire of their own greatness, the City was reduced

duced oftentimes into eminent dangers. Thus the Roman Plebeians, thinking almost that they had not a common Country, but that it did only belong unto the Nobility, forsook it, and retired into the *Aventine*, valuing more the increase of their own power, by necessitating the Senate to yield to their desires, then their putting the City into such a disorder. The Nobles likewise more solicitous to abase the People, and to increase their own fortunes, then to preserve peace and union in the City, did nourish Civil discord by usurping the Common goods, and by reducing the People to great Poverty through Usury.

By this discourse it may be comprehended, how badly proportioned the Orders were in that mixt Government : But it may be more clearly seen, by comparing this Commonwealth with that of *Sparta*, which proved more excellent then any other in that mixt Government, and preserved it a long time free from all discord, by virtue of her most excellent Laws. In *Sparta*, the Princes power ended not but with his life, to the end that he being preferred before all others for making the Laws be observed, he might the better do it, being detained by no self-respect from deposing of Magistrates, or from being judged by the People. But his Authority was notwithstanding so limited, as he was rather a *Custos* of the Common Liberty, then a true Prince in the City. The People had as great a share in Government, as their condition required : For it being they who were to make use of the Magistrates, it seemed they might better know their abilities ; as we see it falls out in other Trades, that the excellencie of the work is better known by him that is to use it, then by the maker thereof. The People had the power given them of choosing and of correcting Magistrates ; but greater authority was granted to the Senate, which was placed as in the midst to defend the Commonwealth from the Princes power, and from the peoples insolence, to the end that thereby it might the better temper the one and the other. Now let us see how in the joint union of these three Governments, certain Conditions were appropriated unto every of them ; but neither so many, nor yet such as made them of clean contrary qualities, but so as they might very well be united in one and the same person. The Prince had perpetuity of power ; but this stood so corrected by the Laws, as it might easily consist with the other-States. The Senate, which was made up of Forty eight of the prime Citizens, represented a true Aristocratical Commonwealth ; but because they acknowledged their Dignity from the People, their power was not such as bereft others of their Liberty. But the Peoples authority in ordering rewards and punishments, as it was not dangerous, so it afforded place for a modest Popular State, and rendered that Government more perfect, by mixture of all the three best. But above all things else, there was a miraculous proportion observed in *Sparta*, in sharing out those things, which use to cause Civil dissensions amongst Citizens : For the Noblemen had the greatest part in Honors, but the People were equal to them in Wealth, all the Revenues being in common ; so as the ambition of the one, and the necessities of the other were satisfied, and all of them being content, they enjoyed much Peace and Tranquility, so as that Commonwealth may endure longer then any of the antient Republicks. And if at the first she had been a little more large in communicating her Government, by increasing the number of her Senators, so as there had been no occasion in *Theopompos* his time, for the better regulating their too great Authority, of introducing the Magistracy of the *Ephori*, whereby the City began to be a little too popular, and leaving *Licurgus* his antient Institutions, gave it self over to licentiousness, nothing could have been desired in that City to have reduced her to the highest pitch of perfection. Therefore as far as the Roman Government differed from this, it must be confess it fell so far short of true excellencie. The Consuls of *Rome* had great Authority, and it may be more free then became any Magistracy in a Commonwealth, but the little durance thereof made it

it less beneficial to the the Republick : For their Power being soon to be given over, made them less diligent, and less bold in undertaking Publick Affairs : For Consulship being laid aside, the way was opened of revenging private Injuries by the Tribunes. So *Cicero*, who freed his Country from *Catilins* Conspiracy, when he was out of Place, was banished. But the Senate, because it had not any Ordinary Magistracy, from whence no Appeal might be made, by which it might curb the Peoples Insolency, had not that respect given to it, by which the ignorant common people is Governed : So as the people, not being held back by this Bridle, ran into such licentiousness, as they dared to commit divers Indignities even against the chief Magistracy of Counsulship; as they did when they plucked the Consul *Camillus Hestare* from the Tribunal, that they might by force obtain admittance to that Supream Magistracy. The weakness of the Senate was likewise the occasion of the increase of the power of some Citizens, for the peoples resolutions prevailing over the like of the Senate, the way of ariving at great power by the favour of the people, in despite of the Senate, was opened to such as were ambitious. Thus did *Marius* cause himself to be declared Consul, contrary to the Laws, and *Cesar* to be confirmed in his Province : And to suppress these mens immoderate greatness, which tended towards Tyranny, it was requisite (since the Commonwealth had no usual means to do it) to prefer other Citizens of the Nobilities side, whose greatness proved afterwards no less pernicious, than that of those whom they thought through their Authority to suppress, wherefore the City became wholly divided; so that private injuries were with horrid cruelties revenged by *Sylla*, though he professed to vindicate the Common welfare : And *Pompey*, to maintain his Greatness put rubs in the Treaty of Agreement with *Cesar* : Wherefore betaking themselves to Arms, the Commonwealth could not at last but fall.

These disorders were occasioned through the weakness of the Senate : But the people, posseſſing themselves of other mens Places, usurp the best imployments of the Commonwealth, and being equal to the Nobility in point of liberty, would without any respect to other things partake equally of Government. So the right disposure of the Honors and Orders of the City were confused, which require Geometrical, and not Arithmetical proportion, in such sort, as the same things be not granted to all men, but to every one that which is most convenient for him. And certainly to constitute a City of that form, as all her Citizens should be equal, would be no better then to make a Consort of Musick consisting all of the same voyces; for as the latter produceth no true Harmony, so doth no good concord result from the former. Therefore care must be had, that every Order may keep its own state, and be neither too much exalted, nor too much abased, lest the too flat, or too sharp Tone occasion dissonance, as it was seen to fall out in *Rome*, where this just proportion was but badly kept, people of unequal condition and worth, being oft times made equal in Dignity, which caused a Government full of confusion and disorder, not bounded in any one Form, but disposed to receive all Forms.

But if we will assign any particular State to the mixt body of this City, as predominate over the rest, there can be none more properly given her then popularity. Which though it may be already comprehended, yet it will be better known by passing to some other more particular considerations. The state of the Commonwealth is known by observing in whom the chief command is found, but the majesty thereof appears clearly in the creating of Magistrates, in making new Laws, or repealing old ones, in making War, in disposing of Rewards or Punishment : All which things being by many examples seen to lie in the power of the People, do evidently witness that

that the State of this Commonwealth was Popular. The People were they who gave authority to Magistrates, nay even to the Senate it self, by authenticating and invigorating the Resolves thereof; and as the soul of that Government, they did in divers manners move the other parts of the Commonwealth in their operations. So as her truest and properest Form can only be taken from them; nay, it was seen that the resolutions of the Republick did bind the Senate, and were of equal force with the Peoples commands, prolonging Magistrates in their places, and by the authority thereof putting a period to begun Wars. Wherefore the corruption of a Popular State may be further seen, by the immoderate power of the meanest Citizens.

Let us next view the ultimate end of that Commonwealth, which by a certain ordinary, and as it were natural change of condition, will shew us what her first Form was. For it being changed into Tyranny, which usually ariseth from a Popular State, it appears that that City was formerly governed by the People, and had by corrupt manners opened the way to Tyranny; so as this Transition was easily made by the likeness of State: For, that City where the People commands with licence, may be said to be subject to many Tyrants; nor admits it of any change, saving that one man becomes the master of those disorders, which a multitude were masters of. There were likewise always many popular Pick-thanks in *Rome*, who, like the Flatterers of Tyrants, tracing the People in their humors, went a birding after favors, whereby they won credit and preferment. Which, as the Philosopher says, is a manifest sign, that in such a City the People command, not the Laws. Which is seen by many experiences, of which *Marius* was an evident example; who being born of very mean parents, and applying himself from the begining to the Government of the Commonwealth, not guided by the glory of his Predecessors, or any noble action of his own which might first introduce him thereto, but confiding in a certain greatness of spirit, began to think of acquiring great power, so as being become Tribune of the People, he betook himself wholly to abase the authority of the Nobles, as he did in publishing the Law of Suffrages, threatening Consul *Cotta* to imprison him, if he forbore not to oppose him. By which boldnes he won so much favor with the People, as he was able to dispose of them afterwards as he listed in any affair, how unjust soever, or in working revenge upon his Enemies (as he did in banishing innocent *Metellus*) or to aggrandise himself; insomuch as he, contrary to the Laws, was created Consul, against the *Cimbrians*, being absent, and in a contumacious time; and lastly in making the Province be assigned unto him, which belonged to *Sylla*. By such means the way was opened to the immoderate power of Citizens, which in the height of their prosperity brought that Commonwealth to its final ruine. For these disorders being long before begun, were afterwards by the spaciousnes of the City so increased, as the People being become powerful by reason of the numerousnes of the Citizens, and growing more free and bold by their so many prosperities, not content to be equal to the Nobility, would become greater then the Laws. They banish'd many Citizens without hearing the cause; they granted places of Magistracie before the usual time; they confirm'd the Authority of those that were already out of it, and disposed of all things, not according to civil equity, but as they liked best. Which things do sufficiently manifest the imperfections of that Government: For the Philosopher says, that that State where the People command, and not the Laws, is so corrupt, as it deserves not the name of a Commonwealth, no sort of Government being to be thereunto assigned. Which easily happens in Cities which are very great and powerful, as was that of *Rome*. But if we shall then consider the Conditions of those men into whose hands that Government was put, we shall thereby likewise find, that amongst the several Forms of Popular States, this may be thought the most corrupt,

corrupt, as that whereto even Artificers were admitted : which being usually but ill conditioned, and frequent ng Asseniblies only that they may talk together, do constitute an imperfect State, and subject to alterations. And hence it may be deduced, that this part being most prevalent in that so corrupt and imperfect Commonwealth, the others must partake of the same imperfection : For no such union can be framed out of two good Governments, and one very bad one, as is requisite to give form to a good Government; neither could they continue together for never so small a time. Whence it may be likewise inferred, that those other parts of the Commonwealth, which may seem to resemble Monarchy and Aristocracy, as the Consuls and Senate, came short of such perfection as is proper to those States, declining to the contrary party. For many things may be observed to have been done by Consuls with more authority and boldness, than what became a Commonwealth. To pass by many other examples, *Cesar* being confirmed in that power which he had received as Consul, usurped the Liberty of the Commonwealth. There were likewise many corruptions in the Senate, which shew how subject that part was likewise to various disorders : For when the Commonwealth was at the very height of her perfection, Senators were become so mercenary, as *Jugurth* having corrupted many of them, and purchased his own safety by monies, it may well be said, that the Citizens of *Rome* would have sold their City, if they could have met with a Chapman for it. Another Consideration may be added, to wit, That that Commonwealth cannot be said to be well ordered even in the very Popular State which she so much affected : For it is easie to frame any Government for a short time in any whatsoever Estate ; but the sufficiencie of a Law-maker, and the excellencie of Laws, is found by the long continuance thereof. Therefore those Orders by which the Peoples authority was too much increased, cannot be said to be truly Popular ; but such may be so esteemed, whereby the State is long preserved. Wherefore many things being ordered in *Rome* without this temperance, in favor of the People, they of themselves bereft the State of all solidity. Thus Licentiousnes of living, frequent Meetings, Appeals to the Tribunes, Freedom in accusing, and other such things as seemed to be done in favor of the People, served for the building up of Tyranny, and wrought *Romes* final ruine. Which was formerly seen in *Athens* ; which being constituted by *Solon* in a too Popular condition soon lost her Liberty, and was possest by a Citizen of hers named *Pisistratus*, who followed the same way which the Legislator himself had opened unto him, by attributing too much to the People. So what is intended for good, proves often fatal, if not well understood.

But having discoursed sufficiently of the Form of the Government, it will not be amiss to examine some other more general Conditions, by which the perfection of every State may be the better known. In ordering a City, respect is to be had to two things ; to what belongs to War, to what belongs to Peace ; to the end that she may not be governed by Chance in either of them, but by certain Laws, and may be equallly preserved from forein plots, and from home discords ; and to endeavour, that as she cannot always enjoy Peace, so she should not be continually molested with War. But he who will consider the Actions of the *Romans*, and the Institutions of their City, will find them so seriously addr st to Military affirs, as he may easily judge that they proposed no other things to themselves, then how to increase Empire, by making one War beget another : wherefore many Armies were instituted, and many rewards for military valor, to make men bold and valiant against the Enemy ; but not any thing whereby to accustom them to Justice, Temperance, and to other civil vertues, whereby the City might be maintained in peace and unity. 'Tis therefore no wonder if that Commonwealth won so much Empire, and such Glory in times of War ; and in times of Peace, like rusty Iron, lost all her

her lustre : So as troubles from Enemies abroad were no sooner ceased, but much greater were excited at home by dissents amongst the Citizens, which did not terminate till things were recalled by occasion of War to the same Warlike order and discipline in which the City was excellently well instituted : Which might for a while preserve her ; but when through the want of occasion of War, she could not by that means correct her many disorders, nor reduce herself to any settled condition for any space of time, being still agitated by storms of Civil sedition, she must at last be miserably lost, when it was time to begin to enjoy her greatness and prosperity. For this cause *Scipio Nasica*, a very wise man, would not consent to the destruction of *Carthage*, knowing that that Commonwealth which was ordered only for war, could not last long in idleness. How can that Government then be termed Good, which is so ill disposed towards the attainment of a Cities chief end ? And who can doubt but that the true end of a City is to have her Citizens live virtuously, not the inlarging of her Empire ? Therefore the Philosopher said well, *That true civil Felicity was not to be expected from actions which relate to things abroad, but from those which are used amongst Citizens.* It argues not then an excellent Government in that Commonwealth, that she overcame the whole world, since the perfection of Government lies in making a City virtuous, not in making her Mistress of many Countries. Nay the increasing of Territories, as it is commonly coupled with some injustice, so is it remote from the true end of good Laws, which never part from what is honest. Governments which aim at Empire are usually short lived ; which denotes their imperfection : Which happens not only because they were not better accommodated in times of Peace, but that for the great inlarging of Confines, it is necessary to nourish ambitious thoughts in Citizens, and such as are too desirous to domineer, which are easily turned to the prejudice of the Commonwealth its self. For it is not to be affirmed that the same thing can be good in respect of the publick, and bad in private Affairs. For the general felicity of the whole City, and the particular good of every Citizen, is one and the same thing, they onely differ in some certain respects. Then taking ones argument from these things, the end of this great Commonwealth might easily be conjectured, which (as one said well) *was overthrown by the weight of its own bulk.* But grant, that the lives of such States may be prolonged, it cannot certainly be done without falling upon many other troubles and dangers. Let *Marius* his example serve us to see what advantage Citizens got by the immoderate desire of Glory and Dominion ; who being alwaises bred up in Arms, and having wone Credit and Preferment thereby, finding that his antient Reputation began to fail by ensuing Peace, raised *Mithridates* King of *Pontus*, against the Commonwealth, to the end, that being to make use of his Vallor, he might recover his former Repute. Thus *Athens* who once enjoyed a peaceful condition, under *Pericles* his good Government, when she turned her endeavours of Peace and Quiet, to Arms and Dominion, and would change her manner of life, she reaped the like Fruits of Ambition, which by such Orders she had sowed in the minds of her Citizens. For *Alcibiades* out of too immense a desire of Glory, was he, who of himself did incite the *Lacedemonians* against his Country, by whom she was afterwards robbed of her Liberty and Empire. For all this, you hear me not say, that the study of Arms ought to be neglected, which are very necessary in what soever State, to defend ones self against the Injuries of Neighbors, and to preserve Freedom and Liberty : Nay, *Aristotle* reprehends *Plato*, for that he thought Cities had no need of Arms at the first ; but onely when they began to have Dominion. But though they may be useful for some other respects, Citizens ought not to fix their studies so much upon Military Exercises, as not to know nor value any other praise but that of the Militia, and to place their greatest and chiefest Good,

Good, and the welfare of their City therein; But they must know, that a man must travel further to find out felicity, which is derived only from virtuous actions, reserved in Peace, as the true fruits of the labours of War. Let us then conclude, that this part which was very excellent in *Rome*, lost much of that praise, which otherwise it might have deserved for the exsistencies of its Orders, because true use was not made thereof, as a means to obtain the true intent of the City. For if *Aristotle* laught at those who praised the *Lacedemonian Commonwealth*, because she had made her Citizens so valiant in War, by her excellent Military Discipline, because she exceeded the other Cities of *Greece* in the largeness of her Confines; What would he have said of the Commonwealth of *Rome*, where certainly Military Exercises were studied much more, to the end, that she might vanquish the furthest distant Nations: For in *Sparta*, too boot with such Institutions as appertained to the Militia, there were excellent customs for the breeding of Citizens in Civil Virtues: And it is seen that *Licurgus* his intention aimed not so much at Empire as did that of *Romulus*; the former much more respecting the peace of the City, and the agreement among Citizens, minding Military Affairs only so far forth as they are necessary for the preservation of Liberty against Foreign Forces. Another consideration to be had in regard no less then these, is, that in a well-ordered City, the Laws ought to be confirmed by the Manners and Educations of the Citizens, the which is of more force to make men honest, then is the fear of punishment; nay, from hence Actions arise according to true Honesty and Virtue; for they proceed from a virtuous Habit, which is only acquired by Exercise. Therefore where good Institutions of life are wanting, the severity of Magistrates is not sufficient to make Citizens obedient to the Laws. For when the appetite hath already gotten power, and is accustomed to vice, 'tis too hard a matter to overcome her by force. Therefore *Aristotle* said, *That Laws, though very useful, do but little good, if men be not endued with such Customs and Discipline as fits with the state of the City.* Wherefore teaching in the eighth of his *Politicks*, how Citizens are to be made good and honest, he proposed three things requireable, joyning Reason and Custom to Nature. But Custom may be thought so much more necessary then the other two, as that a mans natural inclination to Virtue, makes him not virtuous, unless he confirm his natural disposition by habit, accustoming himself to do well. Nor can Reason force Appetite, but must first find it well reduced by good Education, if she will make use thereof in virtuous operations. As much more then, as this part is necessary, so much more failing will be found in that Commonwealth, where such orders were not taken by a civil way, for the good Education of Citizens: Whence it arose that their Laws met not with such due observance, as did them of *Sparta*, not written in paper, but (as it were) engraven in the hearts of every one by the force of custom; wherefore she proved truly miraculous, by reason of the excellent customs introduced by *Licurgus*, to breed up Citizens in a virtuous and civil life. Therefore *Plutarch* comparing *Licurgus* with *Numa*, preferred *Licurgus*, for that his having confirmed Citizens by good customs in those orders which he had introduced into the City, was the reason why they were long observed; Whereas *Numa*, contenting himself with bare written Laws, though good, and tending to peace, not taking any further care for the education of Citizens, could not make them be observed for so short a time, but that they terminated together with his life. And it is found by experience, that *Licurgus* his Orders were of such force, as they preserved the Liberty of *Sparta* longer then the like of any other of the antient Commonwealths. Wherefore *Philoponenes* having overcome the *Lacedemonians*, yet would he not totally tame them, and reduce them under the *Achaean Commonwealth*, till he had cancelled all the antient Institutions of their City, wherein whilst young, they were

so bred up to Liberty, as they could by no means be brought to undergo servitude.

From this discourse it may then be concluded, That the Government of the *Roman Commonwealth* was of a mixt Form, but ill proportioned within its self, too much inclining towards the corruption of a Popular State, and that she came short of the *Spartans* in three things: In the excellencie of Government, in the endeavours of Peace, and in good Customs. The other part remains now to be discussed; Whether the City of *Rome* might have received a better Form of State? For the good Orders of a City depend not always upon the Legislators wisdom, but upon many other joint Accidents. The first thing to be had in respect, is the Nature of the People, with which the Form of Government ought to have a just proportion. Wherefore Polititians say, that the Legislator ought not only to consider which is the best Form of Government, but what best befits every City, and such other Accidents which make so many alterations in States, as it cannot be denied but that Fortune hath a share therein. *Lycurgus*, was justly esteemed an excellent Legislator; but many things concurr'd in him which helped him very much to put his thoughts in effect: He was a King, and using force at first, as it was fit to do, he might introduce such a Form of Government as would bridle the Peoples insolencie, and increase the authority of the Senate; it made likewise much for his purpose, that wealth of the City lay but in a few mens hands, so as by bestowing Honors upon them, he could as it were by the way of bartering the easilier dispose them to content themselves with an equality of Goods, whereby he satisfied the people of *Sparta's* desire, who were but few in number, and consequently but weak, and the more easie to be ordered in any sort of Government. Hence it was that the Legislators of other Cities, though they were wise men, could not notwithstanding form a Republick throughout so well ordered as did *Lycurgus*, because they found not a Subject apt to receive such a Form, and because they wanted that authority and power which was thereunto needful, or for other such like accidents, which did not correspond well with what they did. Therefore *Solon*, though he had had the same intents, could not have introduced such a Government in *Athens*; because he was a private Citizen, chosen by the Nobility, and consent of the People, to reform the City; so as it behoved him to comply in many things with the one and the other, and his small Authority took much of that respect and reverence from the Laws ordained by him, which ought to have been given them. Wherefore many blamed him and his Institutions; so as at last, to shun such vexation, he was forced to part from his ungrateful Country. He met also with another difficulty; He found the City divided, the People much accustomed to enjoy Liberty, and at that time much incensed against the Nobility by the oppressions of Usury under which they suffered; so as he was compell'd, to the end that they might rest content with their new Government, to ease them in their Debts, and give them a share in the Government; which he could not do without much injury to the Nobility.

The Commonwealth of *Venice* hath gotten an excellent Government; but was not at first governed by those Laws which she now is: But diversity of Occasions have opened the way to the wisdom of many of her Citizens, who adding new Orders to the old, have brought her to such a height of perfection. Which might the easilier be done, because that City was free-born, and was from the very beginning ordered according to the true Civilend, to wit, to Peace and Concord, and to the Union of her Citizens. But on the contrary, other modern Republicks, the Cities wherein such Governments were formed, having been formerly long accustomed to obey Emperors, since they got their Liberty by many Accidents, they knew not, as not being well acquainted therewith, how to use it, by reason of the

the Citizens various dispositions of mind : So as wheeling often about with an uncertain Form of Government, they in process of time return'd under the command of one.

These Considerations being applied to the City of *Rome*, will prove that the prudence of her Citizens, though they were very wise and valiant men, was not sufficient to reduce her to a perfect Form of Commonwealth ; but they might have amended many great disorders in her, which did much shorten her life. For he who will consider the conditions of the people of *Rome*, will find them to be such, as no Form of Government could better agree with them than a Popular State ; for they were all warlike men, bred up even from the very first foundation of the City in the exercise of Arms. And though a Commonwealth may be formed amongst these, which may have a certain similitude to an Aristocratical State, when the Citizens being governed by certain Laws, partake every man more or less of that Government according to their worth ; (For, Military discipline hath a certain species of Virtue, though it be none of those that do immediately serve to purchase the ultimate end of a City) yet this Government is very seldom met with ; and though it want the true and proper Form, is commonly called by the usual name of a Commonwealth. So as though at first the City of *Rome* leaned much thereunto, in a short time the People had a great share therein ; who not knowing how to moderate themselves, made it grow licentious. But he who will look back even to her first beginning, will find that the Peoples authority did thereby ever increase together with the City : For the Peoples power and liberty was great, not only after the driving out of the *Tarquins*, but even when it was commanded by Kings ; that City seeming even from that time to be naturally more disposed to the Form of a Commonwealth, than of a Kingdom. For, after the death of *Romulus*, the People being powerful, as having the weapons in their hand, and as being the first Founders of that City, usurped the authority of choosing Kings : who on the contrary side, that they might the better confirm themselves in their new Kingdom, endeavoured to accommodate themselves to the nature of the People, and to purchase their love by granting them many considerable things. So as even under the Kingly government it had the power of Appeals, as appeared in *Horatius* his case, who being condemned by the Magistrates for his Sisters death, appealed to the People, and was by them freed. In favor of them likewise the City was divided into Centuries, with a certain Order of a very small Tax, according to which the Degrees of the Militia, and the Authority of the Publick Courts (things which did all of them appertain to a Popular State) were to be distributed.

To boot with these Laws, the great number of Citizens, which did even then arise to One hundred and thirty thousand, made the Peoples party very powerful ; as also their having been so ready and so successful in engaging themselves in so many enterprises for the Commonwealth, without receiving any pay for their pains. But the Nobility was a long time very weak, and in but little esteem : For the first Founders of the City being Shepherds, and all of the same condition, there was no distinction of degree amongst them, save what was soon after brought in by *Romulus* ; who choosing the Senate out of all that former number, that they might be assistant to the King in providing for things requisite for the State, by this order he divided some of the worthiest of the People in this new City from the rest, who gave the rise to the Roman Nobility. But even this Order was very weak ; for it was at first instituted by *Romulus* but of a small number of men ; and though others were afterwards added thereunto, yet till such time as the City got her liberty, it never exceeded the number of Two hundred Senators ; nay, even these were much lessened by the cruelty of *Tarquinus Superbus*, and their Authority narrowly bounded by the Counterpoise of Regal power. So as when the City put herself into

into Liberty, there were not Noblemen enough to form a State of *Optimati*: in this case did *Publius Valerius* find the City of *Rome*, after the driving out of the *Tarquins*, when he through *Brutus* his death, remaining sole *Consul*, was to constitute Laws, and new mould the Commonwealth. Wherefore desirous to introduce a State differing from the former, under the name of Liberty, it behoved him not to lessen, but to encrease the Authority of the People: For else they would not have indured it; and by siding with the *Tarquins*, they might easily have confounded that Government, and reduced the City again under the power of Kings. For which reason also, *Brutus*, though he was first created *Consul*, not willing to lose the favor and assistance of the people, without which he thought the new Orders of the City could not be well established, perswaded his Colleague *Tarquinius Collatinus*, that to give satisfaction to the People, to whom the name of *Tarquin* was become odious, and suspitious, to lay down his Consulship: By these Reasons it appears, that *Valerius* was compelled to ordain many things in favour of the People, as were the Appeals from the *Consuls*; The order, that upon pain of death no man should enter into any place of Magistracy without the Peoples approbation; the petty punishment appointed for them who should not obey the *Consuls* commands, which was no more but to pay five Oxen and two Sheep. Moreover he eased the poor of many grievances, and made many other very Popular Laws, whence he purchased the name of *rubricola*.

By which 'tis understood, that in ordering of the Commonwealth, respect was to be had in many things to necessity and to the condition of those times: yet if we shall consider other Accidents, we shall find them much contrary to such a necessity; for the new Legislator was not Prince, as was *Licurgus*, but possess a place of Magistracy for a short time, the Authority whereof was hardly yet well known, and not much valued: So as he could not use force to withdraw the people from a Popular State, as it would have been needful, finding the People so disposed, as hath been said. Therefore the City being after a while to be reformed again, the Magistracy of Ten was chosen, with greater Authority then was that of the *Consuls*, which took away all Appeals, to the end that being more feared and reverenced by all, it might without any respect constitute new Laws with great firmness. And if *Appius* his ambition had not ruined the busines, that Commonwealth might perhaps have been reduced to some better condition: but yet not to any very perfect one, it being too hard a thing to order Cities well, which are already much augmented; just as we see it falls out in every particular man, who in his tender years may be easily made to undertake any manner of life, but when by practise he is settled in, as it were, a certain proper nature of his own, he cannot easily be altered from it. And if there have been any one, who hath been able to order a City already well grown, yet we shall find that that City was not so great nor potent, as was the City of *Rome*, at this time of the new Reformation; and therefore the difficulties were much less, it being a very hard thing, and which, as saith the Philosopher, doth almost exceed humane power, to dispose of a great multitude in an excellent Form of Government. Then as these things were the reason why this Commonwealth was not well ordered at first, so did they in time bring her to great disorders and seditions, and finally to her destruction. For it is usual, that the further he advanceth that is once out of the way, so much doth he return backwards, is so much the more pusled, and the further from the place he intended to go to. So the Authority of the people being by these new Institutions alwaies to increase together with the greatness of the City, she swerved the further from the end, true Liberty, to which she seemed to address her self. And because this Commonwealth was born with this infirmity, the worth of none of her Citizens, though it were

were never so great, was sufficient to cure her thereof, or to prolong her life: As it happens in our humane bodies, which contracting some ill disposition of humours at their first entring into the World, are soon thereby opprest and brought to death, no natural vertue, though of force for other things, being able to afford any cure. 'Tis notwithstanding very true, that though such like accidents rendered the City uncapable of any excellent Government, by inclining her to a Popular State, yet had they not so determinately disposed of her, but that she might have freed her self of many of her bad qualities, had not the ambition of her Citizens by increasing these her natural imperfections, made her fall into greater disorders.

Let us begin to consider what *Publicola*'s actions were from the very beginning of the Commonwealth, and we shall easilie discover his ambitious thoughts by which he was moved to study so over-much how to please the peoples appetite in every thing. These his intentions were apparently seen, by taking his being refused in the Election of the Consuls so heinously, as that he kept a good while from the Republick, as if he had put his hand to the Government, for his own Greatnes, not for the common Good: But much more for that having compast that Degree, and finding the People jealous of him, for having built his house in a high and strong scituation, fearing lest together with the Peoples Love he might loose his own Authority and Power, he chose so to humble himself, as forgetting the dignity which belonged to the Supreme Magistrate of so great a City; he made the Fasces, the ensigns of Consulship, be held in a posture of Homage, whilst he made his Oration, to shew, (as he himself said) That the Authority of the Consuls was subject to the Authority and Dignity of the People. This his desire of being esteemed Popular, was the reason why in this new Reformation, he went not about to what was very necessary; to amend in part those defects which could not totally be taken away; to wit, to give a just counterpoise to the Authority of the people, tempering it with that of the Senate, by very much increasing the number of the Senators, and by apropriating the weightiest affairs of State, to that Order, which how necessary it was, was afterwards seen, but too late put in execution; to wit, in *Sylla*'s time, by whom the first number of Senators was doubled, yet but to little purpose, the Peoples Authority being already too mightily increased, and many seeds of corruption being by this means sown abroad in the minds of the people. But *Valerius* added but one hundred to the umbea of the Senate, neither did make any Law in favour of them, both of which he might at that time easily have done. For being at the time of the new Reformation to chuse new Senators of the Equestral Order, or of some other of the people, he would not onely have been content, but would have wone much honour, by exalting many of his Friends to that Dignity, as it was seen he did by those few that were chosen: And the People would have had sufficient power in the Commonwealth, if without communicating the weightiest Affairs of the Kingdom unto them, the indemptnity of chusing and of correct ng Magistrates had been reserved to them: And then that Appeals might have been granted them, by which means they would not onely have had a hand in the City Affairs, but likewise they might have secured themselves from being injured by the Nobility (a thing much desired by the People) and from danger of loosing their Liberties. And the Authority and Reputation of the Senate being by this means augmented, the Peoples Insolency might the more easily have been moderated in those accidents which afterward happened. Which though it seemed (as hath been said) more harder to have been done in that City, for another respect, yet the revolutions of Government in the first birth of this Republick, did a little lissen ordinary Difficulties. For passing from Monarchy (which in the *Tarquins* time was almost become Tyranny) to a new condition, the Legislator might have made it an Aristocracie; it being as it were natural

natural in the change of States, that the Government which had wont to be in the power of a Tyrant, passes into the hands of the Nobility, who are usually the first who lay hold in pulling down Tyranny, as in *Rome*, where *Tarquin* and *Brutus* were the first Founders of Liberty.

Therefore if the People deserved to be made partaker in the new Government, for having assisted herein, much more ought the Nobility to have their dignities and privileges increased, this common benefit of the City having had its chief rise from them; nor would the People have had any reason to complain thereof. But *Publicola*, in stead of increasing the honor of the Senate, introduced by a very pernicious example, small respect to the Magistracie of Consuls; which occasioned many disorders, which might easily have been corrected by a just fear, as is clearly seen by many examples, but chiefly by this; that the People being in insurrection, and contumacious against the power of Consulship, the creating of a Dictator, a Magistracie of supreme authority and reverence, proved a sure remedy to asswage the *Tumult*. And what more manifest sign could there be given, that the people might have been tamed and made obedient by fear and by respect unto the Magistrates, then that which was given upon the occasion of *Appius* his Decemvirate? For being so ill dealt with by him and by his Colleagues, as they wanted not reason to apprehend Tyranny; yet the authority of this Magistracie, from which there was no Appeal to be made, and the severity wherewith it was administered did so bridle the people, as they patiently endured all injuries; nor durst they go about to shake off that slavery, 'till the Senate interposed 't self, and that *Horatius* and *Valerius* declare i themselves Heads of the Insurrection against the *Decemviri*. There ought therefore either greater respect to have been given to the Consulary Authority; or else, if the more severe and free power of an ordinary Magistrate seemed not to be convenient for the state of that Commonwealth, the respect and reverence due to the person of the Magistrate ought to have been transferred to the authority of certain Laws, of which the Magistrate should have been chief Guardian, inflicting severe punishment upon the not observers thereof: For by this means the People would have had no occasion to be offended with the Nobles, when their insolencie should be punished by virtue of the Laws; this arising amongst many other benefits from the Laws, that he who is punished for his faults cannot complain of any one, being condemned by order of Law, not by the Judge his will.

But what hath been noted of *Publicola* in this first beginning, may also be known at ali other times, and in many other of the chief Roman Citizens; who through ambition siding with the People, were the caue of their pride and insolencie. So the Consuls *Valerius* and *Horatius*, not being able to obtain Triumph from the Senate, sought to have it from the People; and the whole Senate (not to multiply examples) by creating a Dictator to suppress the authority of the Consuls *Titus Quintus Cincinnatus*, and *Cneus Julius Mento*, who opposed them therein, had recourse unto the Tribunes, who by threatening imprisonment forc'd them to give way to the resolution: And those Noblemen did usually take another course then what is to be held with the People, with whom grave and severe proceeding doth avail more then humble and mild demeanor. But they were so blinded by Ambition, as not knowing, or not caring for such errors, they strove who should most ingratiate themselvs with the the People, by Presents, Shews, and submiss comportment. And this instruction might be learn'd by the example of the People of *Rome* themselvs: For it was oftentimes seen, that greater respect was given to those few who had known how to use severity to the People, then to those who carried themselves submissly unto them. And certainly, amongst other things, the Judgment which followed upon the cause between *Mentius* and *Spurius Servilins*, was very remarkable;

able: who being both of them accused of the same fault by the Tribunes, to wit, that being Consuls they had opposed the *Agrarian* Law; *Menimius*, who by intricacies and submiss carriage endeavoured absolution, was condemned; but *Surius Servilius* stoutly notwithstanding the Tribunes fury, and speaking severely to the People, was acquitted. And *Furius* and *Manilius*, who had both of them been Consuls, being not long after accused, the Nobles being willing totally to free them from such danger, kill'd the Tribune in his own house who had impeached them; which did so affright his Colleagues, and the People, as none of the Tribunes would afterwards reassume the same cause: And all the Insurrections which were then in the City being suddenly appeased, all of them did willingly subscribe the *Militia*.

Appius Claudius was always very severe against the People; and amongst other of his actions, the punishment which he took upon the Armies insolencie was very observable, for he made them be decimated, every tenth man be put to death; which was submitted unto without any the least tumult, by reason of the antient opinion of the Captains severity, and for the fear infused into the Soldiers by the sentence of death against some Centurions who were accused for having been Authors of that Insurrection. Which was sufficient so far to curb them all, as though they were all of them then in Arms, every of them stood peacefully spectators of the death of so many Kinsmen and Friends, and of their own doubtful chance; and (which peradventure is a greater wonder, and doth the better confirm this truth) *Appius* being accused for this sentence by the Tribunes, after he had laid down the Consulship, using the same severity in defending himself, he was not held less guilty for having becu formerly *Contul*: So as the People neither willing to absolve him, nor daring to condemn him, the cause was put off, and he suffered to depart. And in the latter times, when the Peoples power was greatest, *Tiberius Gracchus* endeavouring to propound the observance of the *Licinian* Law, the Nobles, changing their habits, and shewing great humility, labored to win favor from the People; but since they saw they could do no good by this means, they resolved for their last refuge to use force, and kill'd the Author of those seditions. Which action of theirs did to astonish the People, as they suffered the Tribunes death, whom they had so dearly loved, and who had lost his life in defence of their cause, to go unrevenged. And soon after, *Caius Gracchus* reassuming the cause which his Brother had in vain endeavoured, the Nobles, using the same cunning, sought first by fair means to deprive him of Popular favor, making use of another Tribune to this purpose, by causing other popular Laws to be propounded by consent of the Senate. But humility avail'd no more at this time, then it had done formerly; so as it behoving them to betake themselves again to Arms, they flew *Caius Gracchus* in the *Aventine*, and after the death of two Brothers, annull'd all the Laws made by them; nor did the People ever seem to resent it. Which if it might have been done by an usual way of a Magistrate, as hath been touched upon, doubtless these ruder remedies, as better suiting with the infirmities of that Commonwealth, might have freed her from many mischiefs.

This is likewise confirmed by many other experiences: For as long as the Senate kept up the authority thereof, threatening to create a Dictator, it kept the *Terentilla* Law from being made, of creating a Magistracie of five men, who were to correct the Consuls power. But when it chose to appease the People by giving way to their importunitics, it did only invite them to endeavour more novelties; so as Humility made them not more quiet, but more insolent. Wherefore having obtained Appeals, they would have a Magistrate of their own, endowed with supreme authority; and having gotten the power of the Tribunes, they could not stop there, but would be admitted into the Consulship, into the Dictatorship, and to all

other sort of Dignities ; and having obtained all sort of Honors, they began to aspire to the Estates of the Nobles ; who being too late aware of their Error, to keep themselves from being quite dis-robed of every thing, and not being able to remedy themselves by the Laws, or by Magistracy, they were forced to have recourse to Arms, to moderate the Peoples Insolencie.

Whence it may be concluded that the *Romans* not having used those means, neither at the first making of their Laws, nor almost at any other time, in any of their Actions, which were proper to overcome certain bad qualities, which they had contracted even from the birth of the Commonwealth, was the reason why, remaining alwaies, as it were a distempered body, wherein ill humours did continually encrease, she was alwaies sickly, perplexed by so many civil Discords, and came to a shorter period of life, then she ought to have done for many other of her most noble conditions. The example of this powerful and famous Republick, if we will well obserue her civil Orders, and what proceeded from thence, and if they shall be measured by truer and more general Rules, may instruct us excellently well, how to discern the perfections and imperfections of Modern States. And say it will not serve to correct Errors, already too much confirmed by corrupt Customs ; it will at least be of use to know what value ought to be put upon every Government, and what length of daies may in reason be allotted thereunto, holding notwithstanding that Disorder, for a truer Rule then all Orders, which is oft times introduced by various and unthought of Acciden:ts ; upon which our civil Actions do depend, not onely regulated by humane wisdom, but subje:ct (for ought that appears to us) in many things to a certain casualty ; though they be indeed directed by assured, though hidden causes, referred in the bosom of Divine Providence, whereunto our Reason cannot reach. Therefore if following the usual manner of speech, we shall in these our Discourses, make often use of the names of Chance and Fortune, let them be understood in this true and pious manner.

The Second DISCOURSE,

What Success the Roman Affairs would have had if Alexander the Great had turned with his Victorious Army into Italy.

THE Republick proved more fortunate then any other State in many things, so as he had reason on his side, who said ; That Fortune, who was usually an Enemy to vertue, had made Truce with her, that she might exalt that City to the highest pitch of Greatness. But this may chiefly be acknowledged from her, being freed from the necessity into which the course of time had brought her, of making trial of her Forces, against those of *Alexander the Great*, who after having conquered *Darius*, and subjugated *Perisia*, together with other Nations, did not bethink himself of turning into *Europe*, and chiefly into *Italy*, rather then into the utmost parts of the East : Or that from having accomplished so many famous Interprizes in *Arabia*, and in the *Indies*, being as yet but in his youth, he lived no longer to carry

carry his Victories over the other parts of the world, not as yet concerned in his Forces, though invaded by his immense desire of Dominion. It will certainly be worth the consideration, whether if *Alexander* had at first had any such thought, or that he had had time afterwards to put it in effect, to think what influence he would have had upon the Affairs of *Rome*. This doubt was put by *Livy*, who in the Ninth Book of the first Decade of his Histories, betook himself to discourse of what might have happened, if the *Roman* Commanders had been to have made War against *Alexander*. But without considering any thing which might make against his opinion, he bends all his reasons to prove that the *Roman* Forces would have proved Victorious if they had chanced to have fought against those of *Alexander* the Great; which he resolves for as great a certainty, as if the effect had ensued. Yet many Arguments to the contrary may be taken out of divers of those things, which *Livy* relates of his *Romans*. We can take no surer way to know what would have been the success of things not done, then to consider what hath been done; which may guide us by conjecture to penetrate into what might have happened in other things, if occasion should have served. Let us then cast an eye upon what *Alexanders* actions were in those times, and what those of the *Roman* Commonwealth; and we shall see what might have been expected from the worth of Force, and either of them, if trial had been made thereof.

Alexanders Enterprizes were sufficiently famous, and known to all men, since the recounting of them hath wearied so many Writers. And *Plutarch* who writ the Lives of the valiantest, and most magnanimous men of so many ages; In his Preface to that of *Alexander*, excuseth himself (with he doth not in relating the lives of any others) if he be not able sufficiently to write all his actions, by reason of their number and worth. But the *Romans* Enterprizes in that age, were not in themselves very great, nor very greatly cried up by others. Though those which they afterwards performed, did for glory out-do, what ever was done by any other Potentate; So as Reputation and Fame (which bear so great a sway in all our operations, but chiefly in what belongs to War) was without all doubt greater in *Alexander*, then in those *Roman* Captains who flourished in his time, when the greatness of the *Roman* Commonwealth was but in its rise, and first beginning. But let us come to some further particular.

The Commonwealth had not as then enlarged her Confines, further then into *Latium*, into some parts of *Umbria*, and into *Picenum*, amongst people who were very near the *Volsci*, and the *Æqui*. Their Armies were not yet marched out of *Italy*; which they did not till they made War with the *Carthaginians*. Whence it is to be gathered, that the Commonwealth was as yet but weak, and not accustomed to those more weighty and important Actions of War, wherein in after Ages it must be confess she did great and wonderful things. But at this time many virtues in the Citizens of *Rome*, and the customs of the City, not as yet corrupted, were more to be exalted then their Military valour, which though their souls might be full of, yet they wanted illustrious occasions to exercise it. And those so many famous Commanders, which as *Livy* says, may be paralleled with *Alexander*; *Fabius Maximus*, *Valerius Corvinus*, *Lucius Papirius*, *Titus Manlius*, *Torquatus*, and others of that Age, what great Feats of Arms did they? The War was as yet made, as it were, underneath the City Gates; Nor did these as Consuls, or Dictators lead Armies to fight against any save the *Æqui*, *Sanniti*, *Toscani*, and other neighbouring Nations, which were but weak Commonwealths, whose Dominions extended no further then their own Cities, and the Territories thereof: None of all those Countries being as then reduced under the power of any one Lord. Yet *Livies* words, and the deed it self, of having had recourse so often to the Dictator, and having had War so many years with the same

Nations, shews how much so weak Potentates were feared by the *Romans*,⁵ who cannot notwithstanding be said to have been much superior to them, either for strength, and worth of their *Militia*; since it behoved to fight so often with them, and hardly could they after so many dangers, and a long course of time extinguish them, or rather make them their Companions and Friends.

Who can then justly compare these things to *Alexanders* great achievements, to his so many Victories won over the greatest and most potent Kings of *Asia*? What though *Darius* his men may be said to have been rude and base? it cannot be denied but that they were Three hundred thousand armed men, and of that Nation wherein the Monarchy had long been: And *Alexanders* victorious Forces overran more Countries in little more than ten years, then did the *Romans* in a much longer time, when they were at their greatest. The before-named Roman Commanders are deservedly praised for divers vertues: But what could there be desired more in *Alexander*, to make him be an excellent Commander? Who had his share in more Battels then he? Who shewed more boldness in undertaking enterprises, greater constancie in prosecuting them, more hopes in effecting them? What other Commander was ever more highly esteemed, and dearly beloved by his Soldiers? Those vertues which divided amongst many men, have made many Captains worthy to be praised, met all of them abundantly in him. Would *Alexander* peradventure have been afraid to pass into *Italy*, who shewed his undauntedness in entring into the Desarts of *Arabia*, without any other hope of bringing himself and his Army safe back, save what his courage and his happy Genius promis'd him? But how easily might he have passed into *Italy*; *Greece*, which was formerly conquered by his Father King *Philip*, being at his devotion; and to boot with the abounding commodities which that Country and his own Forces might have afforded him, might not he have hoped to be received and assisted by so many people who were express enemies to the Roman Commonwealth? who would not have refused to have obeyed so great a Prince as was *Alexander*, so to avoid submitting themselves to the Dominion of a City like to one of theirs, and with which they had long and grievous contestations: Nay, the hatred and envy, which they bore to the *Romans* greatness, would have made them all have sided with *Alexander* against them. Was not *Pyrrhus* invited into *Italy* for this purpose by the *Sanniti* and *Latentini*? and did not many of the Cities which were under the *Romans* obedience, put themselves for the same reason under the power of *Hannibal*, being thereunto moved rather out of their hatred to be commanded by the *Romans*, then their fear of being supprest by the *Carthaginian* Forces?

It now remains, that we consider some things of *Alexanders* Milicia, and of that of the *Romans*. By which it will not be hard for him who will not willingly be deceived, to know on which side the advantage, and the disadvantage might have been: Since, if the number of Combatants be to be valued, who can doubt but that the Armies of which he was Lord, who was Lord of so many Provinces as was *Alexander*, were much to exceed those which one only City, though very populous, and very warlike, as was that of *Rome*, could put together: And if *Alexander* would do most of his famous Actions with his *Macedonians* only, it was out of his choice and judgment, not out of any weakness; for he thought an Army of a few valiant and expert Soldiers fitter to undertake a great enterprise, then a great multitude, which oftentimes bring more confusion then aid. So as having, when he had overcome *Darius*, made that so memorable Order of his Soldiers of Thirty thousand young men, chosen out of the Flower of many subjugated Provinces, and made them be instructed in the *Macedonian* Militia, he little regarded his own *Macedonians*; whom (as it is written) he permitted out of favor, and in reward of their former service, and at their own requests to follow his Ensigns, and to pass with

with him into *India* to new undertakings. But the so many Battles which he so successfully made, may sufficiently witness the excellencie of his Discipline in the Militia, as also his taking of so many Cities, his long Voyages, the perpetual exercise in military works: By which things it may be conceived, that no more Veteran Army could be found in those times, which was more expert in all that belonged to the Militia, more obedient to their Captains, and more observant of all Military order then then was that of *Alexanders*. The ordering of Soldiers used by *Alexander*, which was called *Phalanx*, is at this day celebrated; in which the Ranks of Soldiers standing close, being as it were woven together, and covered over with great shields, they made a solid and safe body of an Army, able to sustain whatsoever charge of the Enemy.

Livy does afterwards consider, that the Counsel of a wise Senate, as was that of *Rome*, would have prevailed over any one mans Resolves, such as was *Alexander*; but he considers not on the contrary side, how that in affairs of importancie, and chiefly in matters of War, the supreme authority and command of one alone is requisite. The *Romans* themselves were of this opinion, who in cases of great difficulty had recourse to a Dictator, whose Commissions were not limited, but he was only charged to take such care as that the Commonwealth might undergo no loss nor prejudice. Nor for all this is the authority or reverence due to a Dictator, who is Magistrate but for a short time, and subject to give an account for what he does, in this to be compared with the majesty of a Kings command, and of so great and so esteemed a King as was *Alexander*. How often fell it out in *Rome*, that when Supplies were to be sent to an Army, discords were importunately sollicited by the Tribunes, and the Army hindered from being listed? Was there any such thing in *Alexander*, in whom supreme Authority and Empire did consist? Nor did he yet want some more confiding Friends, whose counsels he was accustomed to make use of, and these but a few, wise, and wholly intent upon the good of that Prince, upon whom all their greatness did depend; as Counsels ought to be in busyness of great weight, to the end that they may be maturely resolved upon, and readily executed. Which happens not where many command with equal authority, and oft-times with much differing thoughts and ends.

But it may yet be more clearly seen what succels the *Romans* would have had against *Alexander*, by looking a little forward, and considering the affairs of the ensuing Age. The first *Carthaginian* war lasted for the space of four and twenty years, in which time the *Carthaginian* power was weakened by the *Romans*; but not so quenched, but that it could soon get up again and trouble the very *Romans* that were Conquerors. And when *Hannibal* passed with his Army into *Italy* four and forty years afterwards, *Rome* being much increased in power and reputation, was not the Commonwealth of *Rome* not only robb'd of all the State which she possest, but the very City of *Rome* reduced into great straits? And yet *Hannibal* was not *Alexander*; he had not the Fortune, the Forces, nor Authority which *Alexander* had: He led his Army a long way by Land, and the Sea was blockt up by the possession which the *Romans* had in *Sicily*, and by their powerful Fleets at Sea, to keep him from receiving succor: Nor were his own Citizens a less impediment to him, (who envied his glory) then were his Enemies, in keeping out his Army. But there was no such thing in *Alexander*, who by a short cut at Sea might have brought his Army to the Italian shores, and have easily been accommodated with all things necessary. Nor can that be objected to *Alexander*, which lessened *Hannibals* honor, to wit, That he knew how to overcome, but not how to make use of Victory: But amongst many of his singular endowments, he was very ardent and sollicitous in prosecuting Victories; so as no difficulty nor danger whatsoever did ever retard him

the least of time, from making good use of his prosperous Fortune. Which afforded *Plutarch* occasion to introduce *Alexander*, speaking of himself, in such manner as he challenged all the Praises which was given unto him, as more due to his own merit and worth, then to the favour of Fortune.

For these Reasons then, that which was first said, may be asserted, that is, that it may be numbered amongst *Romes* greatest good Fortunes, that *Alexander* the Great bethought himself not sooner of coming into *Italy*, or that he lived not long enough to do it afterwards; For had he done so, that Commonwealth must either have been oppressed by so much greater a Power, or if we will speak more mildly, and with more respect to the *Roman* Greatnes, she must have run great hazard in her Fortune. And certainly, that happy Genius which guided both these Empires to such a height of Greatnes and Prosperity, kept them at such a distance, as that their Forces should not meet together, which had they done some one of their Armies must either have been totally routed, or at least their Fame and Glory must have been much obscured. The like may be said to have happened in these latter Times, between Two Great and Fortunate Princes, The Emperor *Charls the Fift*, and the Ottoman *Sultan Solyman*, who did both of them flourish in one and the same time, and being both of them (if it be lawful to make this comparison by reason of their diversity of Faith) endued with great Emulation, grandeur of Spirit, and Warlike Worth, it seemis that either their own Election kept them from encountering one another, or else that they were alwaies kept far asunder by some certain occult cause, so as they might not hazard that Glory which with so much labour and danger they had won in the Wars, against other Princes. But it was particularly observed by all men, and not without great wonder, and it was attributed to the same respect; That the numerous and powerful Armies of both these Princes being brought into *Austria*, and come very near one another, with an intention, as it seemed, to try by Battle the force and worth of themselves and Armies, so great a preparation for War proved altogether vain: *Solyman* not advancing with his Camp to challenge the *Germans* to joyn Battle, as he had first professed he would; nor *Cesar* not budging with his men from the walls of *Vienna*, though before the approach of the Enemy, he had proudly boasted that he would assault him to revenge the former Injuries done to his Brother, and to all *Germany*. But because these considerations sute not with our present purpose, and for that we may peradventure have occasion to treat thereof hereafter; we will hear end this our present Discourse.

The Third DISCOURSE.

Whether was the betrer and more laudable Advice, That of the Carthaginians in offering to assist the Romans, against King Pyrrhus, or that of the Romans, in refusing their offer.

AMoangt many Wars made by the *Romans*, that was of very great weight and danger, which she had to sustain against *Pyrrhus*, King of *Epir*, when he past with a powerful Army into *Italy* in behalf of the *Tarentines*. Other Wars were made for the most part by the *Romans* against others, this was made against them by a King of greater power then was theirs, and of greater worth in himself, and of better experiance in Affairs of War. Insomuch as he deserved after *Hannibal*, to be esteemed the prime Commander of his, and of former Ages. This War was likewise commenced when the Commonwealth had not so well confirmed her Power as she did afterwards; this being before the first *Carthaginian* War, which brought the *Romans* first to make war out of *Italy*. But as the *Romans* upon this occasion gave many examples of their undoubted worth, so, opportunity of handling some State Affairs, from whence useful preceptis for Civil Government may be drawn, to him who shall discourse upon their Actions.

Whilst *Pyrrhus* was with an Army in *Italy*, the *Carthaginians* sent their General *Mago* with One hundred and twenty Frigats to assist the *Romans*; But the *Romans*, thanking the *Carthaginians* for this their readines to assist them, sent their General back, with all the *Carthaginian* Forces.

This being the matter of Fact, it deserves consideration, whether the *Carthaginians*, or *Romans* are more to be praised for their Wisdom and Magnanimity.

To proffer and lend assistance to one who stands in need thereof, especially to one who hath formerly been very fortunate, is a thing befitting Great and Generous Princes; and to refuse it, so it be done modestly, and without Arrogancy, shews no les Generosity, since men do thereby appear to confide in themselves. So likewise to maintain War in anothers Territories, so to keep it far from ones self is a wise and useful counsel; and not to value present dangers so much, as altogether to neglect things of a further distance, is no small sign of discretion. But let us come to a more particular consideration of these things, that we may the better see into them, and know what judgement to give of them, either in praising or dispraising them.

The *Romans* were at this time in Amity with the *Carthaginians*, and had often formerly renewed their Confederacy with them: The Confines of their Dominions being as yet far distant one from another, whereby the occasion of offence was taken away, did ratifie the Peace and Amity between those two States: So as it was a thing well-beseeming so great a Principality, as was that of the *Carthaginians*, not to forgo their friends in time of danger, though they were not bound by any particular Obligation, to assist them. And as the failing in such a duty might have cast some blur upon their City, so deserve they no small praise for their readines in performing it. But these things are peradventure of less force, and estimation amongst Princes; Whence it may be worth consideration, Whether

ther the *Carthaginians* were not perswaded out of other reasons to assist the *Romans* in this War. Great was the Fame of King *Pyrrhus* his Valor, and Forces at this time; and no less the report of his Ambition, and of his vast Designs of assaulting *Sicily*, and *Africa*, when he should have overcome the *Romans*. Wherefore the *Carthaginians* had reason to use all their endeavours not to make trial of their Forces and Fortune with this Prince: And nothing was more opportune for them, to keep such dangers far from them, then to keep *Pyrrhus* in *Italy*; who finding himself more withstood by the *Roman* Forces, thorough the assistance of the *Carthaginians*, would be necessitated to make the longer abode in *Italy*, and (as it falls out in long Enterprises) to waste many of his People there, and lessen that Reputation and Terror which usually accompanies great Armies, in their first and unexpected Assautes. To make war in another mans Country is alwaies good Advice; but best for those that are farthest off, especially when it may be hoped that such a fire may be long fed in another mans Country. The Forces of the *Romans* were sufficiently strong of themselves, but much stronger being joyned with those of the *Carthaginians*, and fitter to withstand *Pyrrhus* his Forces: Who on the other side, having undertaken this Enterprise, with vaste thoughts, and being resolved to hazard his whole Fortune, out of a desire of new Glory, and greater Empire, and being himself a valiant Commander of a valiant Army, it was not easily to be beleaved that he would quit *Italy*, unless Victorious, or else quite overcome and destroyd. If *Pyrrhus* should have overcome the *Romans*, when they were abandoned by the *Carthaginians*; and being afterwards big with Reputation of his Victory, should have passed into *Sicily*, to molest the Affairs of the *Carthaginians*, as his Design was to do when he left his Country, what danger would they have been in, or what succour could they have expected from the *Romans*, since they had not been aided by the *Carthaginians* in their great necessity, and must have been much weakened by the Defeat given them by *Pyrrhus*? But if the *Romans* had been assisted by the *Carthaginians*, and *Pyrrhus*, weary of trying his Fortune in *Italy*, should have turned his Forces upon the *Carthaginians*, how could the *Romans* have refused to have assisted the *Carthaginians*, in like manner as they had done them? Whence it follows, that those men which the *Carthaginians* should have sent into *Italy*, should have fought not onely for the safety of *Italy*, but for the like of *Sicily* and *Africa*, and with no less advantage to *Carthage*, then to *Rome*. But though it had been apparent, that the *Romans* might of themselves have resisted *Pyrrhus*, and have got the Victory, it had made no less for the *Carthaginians*, to make use of this occasion, thereby to oblige the *Romans*, whose Power was then very great, and their Worth very much esteemed, and their intentions of inlarging their Empire, being already known: So as it became the *Carthaginians* for their own safety sake, to have an eye to the greatness of this new Potentate; and not being able to quell him, they had all the reason in the world to keep him their Friend, to the end that he might turn his Forces somewhere else, and not upon them. But what Friendship is more firm then that which is bound with the Tye of great Benefits? For the receiver, must by an occult force of Nature incline to love his Benefactor, and the doer, loves this the noble Product of his good turn in another, and by so doing makes himself be the better beloved. Great was the *Romans* need at this time, who had not as yet met with a more formidable Enemy then *Pyrrhus*, and therefore the occasion was likewise great, which offered it self to the *Carthaginians* to contract a near Friendship and Confederacy with the *Romans*.

But to this it may be objected, That by succouing the *Romans*, the *Carthaginians* would draw anothers War upon themselves; Nor was it so easie a thing to overcome the *Romans*, as that *Pyrrhus* could end that War so suddenly, or with

so entire Forces, as the *Carthaginians* had cause to fear them: Nay, rather the irritating of *Pyrrhus* by Injuries, might provoke him to revenge, and make him forgo the *Romans*, and fall upon the *Carthaginians*. But say that the Affairs of *Rome*, though assisted by the *Carthaginians*, should have succeeded amiss (as things of this nature are alwaies subject to variety of Accidents) what hopes had the *Carthaginians* to defend either what they possessed in *Sicily*, or even the *African* coasts, when they should have sent the greatest part of their Shipping and Souldiers to assist the *Romans*? And why should the *Carthaginians* rather fear *Pyrrhus* his Greatness, than that of the *Romans*? *Pyrrhus* his Dominions lay further off, and more incommodious to molest the *Carthaginians*, then did the *Romans*; he was but one man, and though valiant, yet his life was subject to various mischances (as it proved afterwards, he being slain by a stone, thrown by a poor old woman.) But *Rome* abounded in valiant Commanders, and was come to the pass, a man may say, of preserving herself still the same: So as all other Princes ought rather to have had a care to keep the *Romans* from growing stronger, then any other Potentate: For *Romes* power was more stable, and therefore like to cause longer, and greater dangers to others. Wherefore to keep the *Romans* long busied in the War against *Pyrrhus*, by which their Forces must have been weakened, was the means to preserve other States from that Ambition of Dominion which was already discovered to be in the *Romans*.

On the other side; To assist the *Romans* in ridding themselves of the Troubles of War, especially if this should have happened by their obtaining any signal Victory, what was it but to increase the Reputation and Courage of others, so to hasten their own dangers? For being freed of such incumbrances, and aspiring after greater things (a thing which is always occasioned by good success) it was not likely the *Romans* would stand idle, but ready to imbrace any Enterpise, as it happened afterwards. For the first *Carthaginian* War ensued soon after the War made with *Pyrrhus*: For the *Romans* meeting with no resistance in *Italy*, after the Honor which they had won in their Victory over *Pyrrhus*, they began to march with their Forces into other Countries; they past into *Sicily*, being invited in by the *Mamertini*, as *Pyrrhus* was first called into *Italy* by the *Tarentini*. And the weaknes of *Pyrrhus* his Forces did not so much occasion the Victories won in the War, as did his inconstancy in prosecuting Enterprises once begun; which though it was a natural defect in him, yet may it be believ'd, that his sudden departure from *Italy* might be occasioned by the injury done him by the *Carthaginians*, who unprovok'd had taken up Arms against him, and were ready to come and find him out in other mens Countries. But it may be another greater respect might have moved him to assault the *Carthaginian* State, to wit, That he might onely have to do onely with the *Carthaginians*, as he had at first fought onely with the *Romans*; beginning to suspect, as having already discovered the *Carthaginians* good will, that if he should tarry longer in *Italy*, and that the *Romans* danger should encrease, that Confederacy might be made between them and the *Carthaginians*, which was first refused: So that whatsoever he should afterwards undertake against either of them, might afterwards prove more difficult. This was then the reason why *Pyrrhus*, whilst the business in *Italy* was not yet finished, nor the danger of the *Tarentines* not well secured, marched to go for *Sicily*; which caused so much trouble and danger to the *Carthaginian* Affairs, as if he had known how to make good use of his Victory, the *Carthaginians* might peradventure have been brought then to those final Extremities which were deferred for another time, more for the *Romans* Glory, then for their Welfare and good Fortune. Thus what hath been already said, may suffice for what concerns the *Carthaginians*.

Let us now see what the *Romans* did, and consider whether they did well or no-

in refusing the help which was voluntairily offered them, nay brought home to them by the *Carthaginians*. The War which was made by *Pyrrhus* against the *Romans*, must be thought to be both great and difficult, being made by a Warlike Prince, who brought many many men with him, well trained up in Arms, so as by the very Name and Fame of his Forces, he had almost brought many Cities of *Italy* to his devotion, withdrawing them from the obedience of the *Romans*; and though he were a stranger, yet having firm footing in *Italy*, whither he was called by the *Tarentini*, he was not likely to undergo those dis-accommodations, which Armies use to suffer in another Country, but his Forces appeared the more formidable by reason of that terror, which things of great Fame, and not formerly known, use to bring with them. And the Elephants were a great cause of fear, the *Romans* not being formerly acquainted with that manner of Militia. In so much danger therefore, when the whole Rest was at Stake, to presume too much upon ones self, and upon ones proper Forces, and to dream onely of Glory, when they were to have been more sollicitous of Safety, hath the appearance rather of Rashness, then of mature and wise Counsel. And why should the *Romans* promise so much unto themselves against *Pyrrhus*, as to despise the *Carthaginians* help, being as then accustomed to fight with the *Tarentini*, a weak Nation, given over to delights, of which they were reprehended by *Pyrrhus* himself; and being now to fight with true Souldiers, expert in all sort of suffeirings, and all military Discipline, in the recent Wars made by *Pyrrhus* in *Macedonias*. And when nothing else, but even Fortune (which in matter of War is so uncertain) should have proved averse unto them in any thing, to whom could they afterwards have had recourse for succour, having despised so great helps, readily sent by so great a Power, of so great esteem and Authority, as was then the Commonwealth of *Carthage*.

Yet on the other side, it may seem no ways to agree with the *Romans* Greatness and Generosity, to confess themselves so terrified by *Pyrrhus* his Forces, as that they needed Foreign help to defend themselves. The *Romans* might have had Peace from *Pyrrhus*, who when he came into *Italy*, sent his Ambassadors to *Rome*, informing the Senate by them, that he was come to compose the Difference between them and the *Tarentini*, with whom, if the *Romans* would have Peace, he proffered them the like: To which, answer was made, That the Commonwealth of *Rome* had not chosen him for their Arbitrator, neither did they fear his enmity; therefore let him first return to his own Kingdom, and then, as a Friend to the Commonwealth he might treat of Peace, and should be willingly listened unto.

But the City of *Rome* did already begin to envy and emulate the Commonwealth of *Carthage*, which she did peradventure more esteem then open enmity with the Kingdom of *Epirus*, wherewith she thought she should not so soon have to do neither in matter of Peace nor War, though *Pyrrhus* his ambition had then brought him into *Italy*. Therefore if the *Romans* would not accept of Peace from *Pyrrhus*, they ought less to acknowledg their Safety from the *Carthaginians*. They likewise thought they might so much rely upon their own Forces, having valiant and well disciplined Souldiers of their own, as that there remained no doubt of Victory in that War, then what does never part from the uncertainty of Chance in War. They considered that the number of Armies or Fleets might be increased by Foreigners, and yet the power to resist an Enemy not be made the greater; whilst either the differing ends of Princes, the little agreement between Commanders, or the contrary Custom and Discipline of Souldiers, do often occasion many discords in matter of War, which are not found where one onely Chieftain commands, and disposeth of all things, and where better obedience shewn

shewn by Souldiers of one and the same Dominion. Therefore was it that the Romans did sundry other times refuse foreign aid; as particularly, in the War against *Antiochus*, when refusing assistance sent unto them by other Kings of *Africa*, they with their own few, but valiant Souldiers, routed *Antiochus* his numerous Army, made up of many several Nations. Such respects as these might have been liable to consideration, even when their Faith and Friendship, who were to have lent assistance, had been for certain to be credited; but who could secure the Romans, who having already extended their Dominions far into *Italy*, could not grow much greater without injuring Nations further off: from being jealous of the *Carthaginians*, who were antient and powerful Lords in *Africa*, and in *Spain*, and possessed of the greatest part of *Sicily*; and as there were none who could more hinder the increase of their Greatness then the *Carthaginians*, so was it necessary that they being apprehended for such by the Romans, should likewise fear them for the preservation of their own quiet and security. And what charity is this, might those wise and ancient Senators of *Rome* say, which hath moved these *Africans* to be so careful of us, as without any obligation of Confederacy, and not sought unto, they should send so prime a Captain as *Mago*, with such a number of Frigats and Soldiers, to assist us, and to bereave their own State of such defence, to preserve the States of other men? The greater the appearances seemed outwardly, the more might it be suspected that these things proceeded not from sincerity of heart: If the *Carthaginians* had done this, because they held the Romans to be so unworthy, as that they were to yeeld to *Pyrrhus* his first assault, and so their States might be exposed to the same danger, it was not good to nourish such an opinion in the *Carthaginians*, by which they should no sooner be quit of *Pyrrhus*, but the *Carthaginians*, who were as willing to keep the Romans low, as *Pyrrhus* was, might come and set upon them. So whilst they should endeavor to secure the War which was on foot, and from which, if they were the same men which they had always used to be against their Enemies, they had great hopes they might defend themselves, they might have raised another more dangerous and difficult; if the Roman generosity had not suffered that by another's fraud, whereunto they should onely have given consent and some small reward, *Pyrrhus* should have been slain (as they were offered by an acquaintance of his, he should be) though thereby they were freed from all danger; but rather to exempt the Commonwealth from such a blemish, the Roman Commander chose to acquaint the enemy with what was plotted against him; how could they, or ought they to tolerate that the *Carthaginians*, who had sent aid, not out of any desire of *Romes* welfare, but as those that envied her glory, should boast themselves of being the preservers of the Roman Liberty? If it should have so fald out by any adverse accident that *Pyrrhus*, who came to assault them, should have proved Conqueror, nothing had been to be blamed but the Fortune of War, since they themselves should have carried themselves gallantly and advisedly in the maintaining of it: But if they should have accepted of the *Carthaginian* succour, men might think, that the Romans gave themselves for overcome, before a blow was given and that they were much inferior to the Enemy, not in Forces, but in Valor: That *Pyrrhus* had not undertaken that enterprise out of necessity, but onely out of a desire of novelty, and hopes of glory: That therefore if his first assaults should be stoutly sustained, he should have enough of it, and thus being invited by another occasion, which he understood was already brewing against him, by the *Sicilian* Discords, being naturally of a fickle humour, he might readily turn to some other undertaking; and that as he had come into *Italy* slightly, and upon no occasion, to make War against them, so he might easily be perswaded by any adverse Fortune to give over the Affairs of *Italy*, and fall upon something else;

had he been so strong in Men and Forces, as it seems men thought he was, he would not have sent his Orator *Cineas* to seek friendship with the Senate and people of *Rome*, and to endeavour that by words which he might easily have obtained by force, which was, to grant peace to the *Taremunes* his Confederates.

Something like this we may believe was said by that *Appius*, a Senator of experienced wisdom, who was employed in answering *Pyrrhus* his Ambassador, and in readily accepting the intimated War. And whosoever shall duly consider these so many and so sprightly reasons which they had to dismiss the Carthaginian assistance, must needs be perswaded that it did agree with the Roman wisdom and generosity. Yet he who will ground his judgment aright, and justly weigh what the Carthaginians did, must reflect upon divers respects, by which such actions are usually governed. If then the advantage of the busines be only considered, it will appear to consist well with what the Carthaginians did then advise upon: For, to hazard those few Forces which they sent to assist the Romans, tended towards the preservation of their own State from *Pyrrhus* his incursion; and it appeared rational enough, that the war made against him by the Roman forces, jo'ned with those of the Carthaginians, might draw on to a length of time: For it was believed by the resolution which *Pyrrhus* took when he went from his Kingdom, that he should not have so soon given over his attempt; and the Carthaginians being with a considerable strength in the Roman Armies, might at their pleasures, and in divers manners have so prolonged the War, and spun it out into such a length, as they might have so weakened both their Forces, as they needed not for a long time to fear either *Pyrrhus* or the Romans. But in the Romans resolutions to refuse the Carthaginian succor, the magnanimity of their minds is chiefly to be praised: For the War was not slighted by those who refused to make Peace with their Enemies, and to accept of assistance from their Friends; but full of dangers, which if they should be able to overcome, they thought it would be an action of great worth, but of greater difficulty. But this resolution, out of the aforesaid reasons, made not so much for their advantage for the present, as for the future. And it was known, that *Fabritius* his generosity in preserving *Pyrrhus* his life (though his Enemy) from the Treachery of other men, made no less for the overcoming of *Pyrrhus*, then did the military discipline of *Valerius Corvinus*, and the Roman Armies which fought against him. Wherefore he sent *Cineas* to *Rome* to grant liberty to such prisoners as he had taken, and to desire peace with the Romans, being moved thereunto rather by that noble act, then by any loss he had received in the conflict. And it may be believed, that it was this which made him resolve to forego *Italy* the sooner, and leave the Roman affairs quiet.

Yet such a Consideration may appear to be very weak, being compared to the advantage which might thereby have been gotten: For it had regard to things of uncertainty, and to dangers far off; whereas the Carthaginians help might have made for the good of present affairs. Wherefore the Romans might be herein convinced; if it were not to be said, that the desire of Glory was so great in them, as aiming only and chiefly therat, they put on their resolutions with such fervor, as they did not only exceed all others, but even themselves. They thought they should make their condition the worse by accepting of Forein assistance, whatsoever should befall them: For if they should overcome *Pyrrhus*, assisted with the Carthaginians, the military valor would be much lessened, which otherwise did belong to so great an undertaking, and to the so great hazard which they ran; but if they should be overcome, their shame would be increased; the Roman Forces, though assisted by so great a strength of Foreiners, not being able to resist *Pyrrhus* his Army. They might likewise peradventure doubt, lest by reposing some part of their hopes upon Forein aid, they might make their own Senators less fervent and sollicitous in providing

providing things fitting for the War, and their Captains and Soldiers less diligent in their military imployments ; as it often falls out in what is recommended to the care of many, that whilst one to ease himself a little, seeks to lay load upon another, the burthen is more weakly sustained by many, then it would have been by a few: But the truth of these things can but only be discuss'd by probable Arguments, to delight our selves in the variety of affairs which present themselves in the ballancing of several reasons which may happen in these great actions : For to give a determinate sentence therein, we want the groundwork of those particulars, which we cannot take notice of now in things done so long since, and by which all our works, especially such as are subject to so many alterations as are all Civil and Military affairs, can be only best regulated. It is most certain, that the *Romans*, who were formerly full of high and glorious thoughts, got so much boldness and reputation after having driven *Pyrrhus* out of *Italy* with their own proper Forces, and overcome him in so many Battels, as they did the easilier undertake any War, and no Nation in *Italy* durst ever after oppose their designs, whereby they soon opened the way to a large Empire.

The Fourth DISCOURSE,

Which of the two famous Roman Commanders, Quintus Fabius Maximus, or P. Scipio Africanus, brought more of advantage to the Commonwealth of Rome in managing their War.

Fabius Maximus, and P. Scipio Africanus, descended from noble Roman Families, and endued with excellent parts, did flourish in the same Age ; which happening to be at the time when the Commonwealth of *Rome* was much molested by the Carthaginian Forces, they had occasion to shew their valor in the behalf of their Country, and to purchase much glory to themselves. They had alike zeal to the common good ; their love to their Country, their strength of mind, and knowldg of military affairs was alike ; but they differed in opinion concerning the management of the War , and different was the occasion which they had in exercising it. Great was the service which the City of *Rome* received from these two ; but they differed much in their ways and ends. *Fabius* led the Armies through *Italy* against *Hannibal*, for the safety of the City of *Rome* : *Scipio* fought in *Africa* against the same *Hannibal*, for the glory and grandezza of *Rome*, being already freed from so many dangers of the Carthaginian Forces. The former brought succor and help in a very seasonable time to the affairs of *Rome* when they were much distressed, and raised up the tottering fortune of the Commonwealth : The latter, by discomfiting many of the Carthaginian Commanders, and even *Hannibal* himself, did not only put his Romans in perpetual safety from the Carthaginian forces and stratagems wherewith they had been so long molested, but brought whole *Africa* under their obedience. *Fabius* preserved *Italy* from the slavery of Forein Nations, into which she had certainly fallen, had it not been for his actions and advices, *Hannibal* having already possess himself of all the chief Cities : But *scipio* did much enlarge the Roman Confines, and made the Africans confess they were overcome by Italian valor, and submit their necks to the yoke of the Roman Empire. These excellent Commanders shewed great worth, and great experience in military affairs by these their actions, each of them using therein their proper qualities and endowments : *Fabius* loved constancie,

constancy, gravity, followed late taken resolutions, but such as were secure. *Scipio*, measuring all things according to the greatness of his conception, did willingly imbrace new Enterprises, nothing that was glorious seemed hard to him. *Fabius* feared *Hannibal* out of wisdom, not out of any cowardly mind; *Scipio* despised him, confiding in himself and in the valor of his Army. Wherefore *Fabius* thought he had ended the businels, if *Hannibal* being reduced to much hardship, should be forced to forgo *Italy*: But *Scipio* as if he had been sure of Victory, refusing all offers of Agreement how advantageous soever, made by the *Carthaginians*, would hazard the day in that famous place of *Zama*, where the height of Empire was to be decided between two powerful Nations. And truly it seems, that it was *Romes* good Fortune, which made these two so excellent men be at this time *Coetaneans*, though with different thoughts applied to the Safety and Glory of that Commonwealth: For the one, with much patience overcoming the bitterness of Fortune, and the Insolency of the Enemy, freed her from so many dangers into which she was fald: the other, finding the Commonwealth already restored, and knowing how to make better use of his good fortune then *Hannibal*, did by his noble daring add greater splendor, and glory to her.

But here it may be worthy consideration, which of these two may be thought to have done things which were better, and of more use for the Commonwealth. *Fabius* his actions tended to the safety of his Country, when he was reduced into great danger, and put a period to her troubles more by good Counsel, then by many Forces: But the *African* proposed unto himself the increase of Glory, and of Empire of the City of *Rome*. Wherefore not satisfied with what he had successfully done in *Spain*, he resolved to pass into *Africa*, where refusing all conditions of Peace, he would needs joyn battel with *Hannibal*, wherein his prosperity continuing, he won a great and glorious Victory. On the one side then, *Fabius* deserts appear to be very great, he having preserved the City when it was in a desperate condition, so by saving it from the utmost of dangers, he made himself a sharer of that praise which is given to the first Founders of Cities: And certainly such was *Hannibals* fortune at that time, the worth and reputation of his Army such, as all Force indeavoured against him, would have proved not onely vain but prejudicial; and his being judged by the Senate and People of *Rome* to be a Commander fit to cope with *Hannibal*, and onely fit to suppress his Forces, even then when *Scipio* that valiant and famous Captain, did live and flourish, shews that *Fabius* worth was so highly esteemed, as it was not to be exceeded. And this is afterwards confirmed by the grave testimony of *Paulus Aemilius*, famous among the most celebrated *Romans*; who being, as Consul, to go into the Camp against *Hannibal*, highly extolling things formerly done by *Fabius*, whilst he was Dictator, said that he would rather be praised in matters of War by him alone, then do things which might differ from his actions, though they pleased all the people of *Rome* therein. *Fabius* was indeed excellently well advised in all he did; for he was no less valiant in withstanding the Enemy in Battle, and in correcting the error and rashness of *Minutius*, Master of the Cavalry, who had importunely, and contrary to his opinion begun the Skirmish, then he was formerly wise in foreseeing the danger, and in endeavouring to keep it off. His constancy of mind in adversity witnessed his no want of Courage, but out of abundance of Wisdom he shunned the hazard of giving Battel. Wherefore after the discomfiture at *Canna*, no man was more constant, and ready then he to take a resolution. It is therefore said, that in the dejection of souls, and confusion of all things, the Citizens had recourse to his Counsel, as to an Oracle: And the comparing the actions of others, in what concerned the administration of War against *Hannibal*, made *Fabius* his worth appear the more; for before he took upon him the Dictatorship, the Consul

ful *Flamininus* was routed at the Lake *Thrasymenus*, and when he laid down the Dictatorship; *Terentius* taking other courses then did *Fabius*, gave occasion for that famous and grievous overthrow which the *Romans* received at the Battel of *Canne*; whereby it may be known, that wise Commanders (just like understanding Physicians when they meet with weak bodies, do oftentimes make use rather to prescribe quiet and good government, free from all disorder, then Physick) when they know the Forces of the Commonwealth to be but weak, as were those of the *Romans* at that time, ought also to free the State from great and eminent dangers, by temporizing, and by proceeding leisurely with all advantage, then by using Force of Arms and hazarding a Battel. Which made *Hannibal* say, That he feared *Fabius* his fearfulness more, then the daring of the other *Roman* Captains: And finding all his Designs at other times frustrated by *Fabius*, he affirmed that the *Romans* had also their *Hannibal*. Nor could his cunning be indeed overcome otherwise then by cunning, and by knowing how to make use of fitting occasions, and how to bereave the Enemy of the like, which indeed was peculiar to *Fabius*.

It may moreover be said for *Fabius*, and in praise of his advice, that as no humane Action is more subject to divers unexpected Accidents, then in Battle, wherein great Effects are often produced from very small Accidents, so cannot a Commander attribute at any time so much praise unto himself in Victories, but that good Fortune will challenge a great share therein: Wherefore it is numbered amongst the chief qualities which are to be desired in him who would prove a good Commander, that he be fortunate. Besides, no Victory is ever won by meer fighting, without much blood, and much loss of ones own men; so as to overcome an enemy by such means as *Fabius* knew how to do, and without exposing himself to the danger of a set Battle, to overthrow an Enemies Army by reducing it to great hardships, is a thing of more rare virtue, and which makes the Commander more praise-worthy. By these cunnings were *Hannibals* cunnings deluded, by these was his fierceness tamed, and the reputation won from him, and from his Army, which he had won in Battel, by having so often worsted and overthrown the *Romans*. So as it may be said, that *Fabius* conquered *Hannibal* a Conqueror; but that *Scipio* overcame him when he was already conquered. For *Fabius* had to do with him, when he was in *Italy* with a puissant Army, and in the height of his greatest prosperity; But *Scipio* made not trial of his Forces against those of *Hannibal*, till he was returned to *Africa*, with his Army beaten and wasted by sufferings; and when by the usual change of humane Affairs the state of things between the *Carthaginians* and *Romans* was sufficiently altered. Wherefore *Hannibal*, who had formerly endeavoured nothing more then to fight his Enemies in a pitch'd field, when he was returned to *Africa*, perswaded the *Carthaginians* to Peace, and proposed all conditions of Agreement to *Scipio*, so to shun joyning Battel with him, in which, as if he had foretold his own misfortunes, he lost the remnant of his Army which he had brought from *Italy*.

Wherefore should it not then be thought, that it was harder for *Fabius* to stop the course of *Hannibals* Victories, then it was for *Scipio* to overcome him in Battel, when the *Carthaginians* were at their greatest loss, and calamity? Nay, it was objected to *Scipio*, when he endeavoured to lead his Army into *Africa*, that he did it to shun encountering with *Hannibal* in *Italy*. It is a very common, but a very true saying,

Non minor est virtus quam querere, parta tueri.

Fabius preserved the Glory, Reputation and state of the Commonwealth, which his Ancestors had won; *Scipio* increased them. So as had it not been for *Fabius*, the Name, at least the Fame of *Rome* had been almost lost: But she had onely been less glorious without *Scipio*.

On the contrary, who will consider *Scipio's* great actions, how can he judge him to come short of any other Roman Commander whatsoever, either for glory or desert; since he may be said to have been the first who opened the way unto the Romans of conquering the whole World, as they did in a short time? For by his means *Africa* was conquered, and a curb put to the greatest and most powerful Enemies that ever the Romans had; so as none ever after durst withstand the Roman greatness by force, or did disdain to humble and submit themselves to their worth and fortune, whom the most powerful and fortunate of all other Nations did already obey? *Scipio* brought all *Spain* under the Roman obedience, driving away the Carthaginians from thence, whom he overcame in four several battels: Nor did he make the way easie to greater acquisitions, less by his excellent gifts of mind, then by force of Arms; making those people affectionate, and faithful to the Romans. And yet as not much valuing these his great deeds, being returned to *Rome* full of glory, he endeavoured to return again with his Army into *Africa*, knowing that the Carthaginians could not keep quiet at home, but must be troubling and endangering the the Romans: Nor had he less difficulty to overcome *Fabius* his obstinate opinion in the Senate, who blamed this advice, then in routing the Enemies in the Field.

But if *Fabius* be to be esteemed, because he in a short time freed the Romans from the danger of the Carthaginians; what must we say of *Scipio*, who did for ever secure them from these their Enemies, bereaving them of their Land-Forces by taking the Flower of their men away from them in Battel; and the like of their Maritime strength, having by agreement forced them to burn all their Ships? Which won him so great respect from all persons, as at his return from *Africa* people ran from all parts, only that they might see him. To say truth, what can be said of *Fabius*, save that he did not lose? But in *Scipio's* Victories, what can be desired to make them greater or more glorious? In the space of forty five days he raised a powerful Army; and followed by more Voluntiers for the fame of his worth, then he carried Soldiers with him by Decree of Senate, he marched into *Africa*: He conquered People and Cities, that were enemies to the name of *Roman*; he overcame *Asdrubal* and *Hanno*, two famous Carthaginian Commanders; he discomfited *Hannibals* Army, and ending the War with the overthrow of the Enemy, he returned time enough to *Rome* to lay down his Magistracie. *Hannibal* being withdrawn from the walls of *Rome*, and kept at gaze by *Fabius* his cunning, stayed in *Italy*, expecting succor from *Africa*, to renew the War with greater Force. *Scipio's* advice and actions were only able to draw him out of *Italy*; so as carrying the War elsewhere, at the same time he freed his own home from the troubles and danger thereof. He who should have asked *Fabius*, what the signs were, what the fruits of his Victories; what could he have shewn? No Enemies taken, no Cities won, no Gold nor Silver brought into the Comon-Exchequer. But many things prove the glory and deserts of *Scipio*: So many Prisoners taken, amongst which *Syphax*, the great and famous King of *Numidia*; so many Cities subjugated in *Africa*, and in *Spain*; the annual Tribute imposed upon the Carthaginians; the rich Pillage brought home from the Enemy.

What is there then of like, nor to name equal, between these two, which may make them contend for military glory? But certainly it may be affirmed for truth, that the one and the other of them are come to the height of glory, though they took several ways to arrive at it: For each of them shewed wisdom and valor in their actions, becoming advised Statesmen, and great Commanders. Divers accidents concurred in their several actions, which perswaded them to proceed after a differing manner: For *Fabius* being to withstand *Hannibals* violence, who being already advanced into the very bowels of *Italy*, and being drawn verynear to *Rome* herself,

herself, had filled all things with fear, did not think it fitting in this confusion of affairs to hazard all the fortune of the Commonwealth in a day of battel: For the neerness and power of the Enemy did not allow time to recruit and stop the course of *Hannibals* Victories, in case that Army wherein the chief hopes of *Romes* welfare did consist, should have been beaten.

But *Scipio* having to do with the same *Hannibal*, when he and his Army were in *Africa*, and neer the City of *Carthage*, knew that if any thing of ill should befall him, he should only lose those men that were with him; which loss might easily be recovered, the condition being considered wherein the Commonwealth then was: And it being his fortune to overcome *Hannibal*, he reduced the affairs of the *Carthaginians* (whom he had worsted in divers other battels) to the utmost of dangers: Wherefore by the victory he got great rewards for himself, great glory, and increased the Empire of his Commonwealth. *Scipio* had also other reasons which persuaded him to fight; his being in a forein Country, his keeping of the Enemy from recruiting after their late losses, and he being shortly to lay down his command; so as to spin out the War in length, was to deprive him of his conceived hopes of victory, and to lesien what he had already done. *Scipio* therefore had as much reason to engage in battel, as *Fabius* formerly had to refuse fighting.

This is confirmed by the several ways of proceeding of the same *Hannibal*, an excellent Commander; who at first, when he was in *Italy*, desired nothing more then to come to a pitch'd battel, out of the aforesaid reasons; so afterwards being withdrawn with his Army into *Africa*, shunn'd encountering *Scipio* as much as he might, the different condition of affairs advising him differently. And it is a general rule, That those things ought to be avoided which please the Enemy; for the respects being different, that which makes for the one, must needs be bad for the other. It must afterwards be considered, that if *Fabius* had pleased, when he was made Dictator, after the unfortunate Fight at the *Trassamine* Lake, to lead that Army into *Africa* which was destined for the safety of the very City of *Rome*, it must have been exposed to apparent dangers of the Enemies victorious Forces, with uncertain hope of success in *Africa*; nor would this diversion have been then peradventure a sufficient means to have freed it from danger, as it did afterwards when *Scipio*'s counsel was followed in an opportune time, when after divers bad successes both in *Spain* and *Africa*, *Hannibal* was sent for back to assist the much weaken'd affairs of his Commonwealth.

He therefore who will go about to imitate the actions of these two Captains, if he will reap good thereby, must first very well consider every particular of those things which he goes about, and therein accommodate himself, either by hazarding battel, and hasting on to the end of the enterprise with sudden and resolute Parties, or else must haras and overcome the Enemy by drawing things out to a length, and by reducing him to many inconveniences. He also who will advise wisely touching the assaulting of another mans Country, to keep his own from danger, or who will else make good his own affairs only by way of defence, must have divers respects in consideration, which lead to the knowledg what in his case is fittest to be done; and by so doing he may hope for the good success which these two famous Roman Commanders had. But howsoever, though their affairs fall out less prosperously, he will win the praise of being either a wise and circumspect, or else a valiant and bold Commander; as besell *Scipio* and *Fabius*, because each of them knew how to manage the War so, as the condition of Times, the quality of their own and of their Enemies Forces, the diversity of the Place, and other respects and accidents, which in such cases ought to regulate our actions, did advise them to do.

The Fifth DISCOURSE.

Whether War being to be made against the Romans, Hannibals Counsel was good to carry it into Italy.

Hannibal, a cried up *Carthaginian* Captain, intending to wage War with the *Romans*, resolved to lead the Army which he had already raised in *Spain* into *Italy* by land, passing first over the *Pyrenean Mountains*, and then over the *Alps*, that he might approach as near as he could to the *City of Rome*, the *Seat of the Empire*. This is thought by all men to be a bold and generous advice, but it is much doubted whether it were advantagious for the *Carthaginians*, and for *Hannibals* own designs. He thought, that being to quell the *Roman* Power, he must shake it in those parts where it had taken deepest root: That the *Romans* would be furnished with *Soldiers*, *Victuals*, *Moneys*, and all things else from *Italy*, wherewith they were wont to maintain War against several Nations, and to encrease their own Glory and Empire: that whilst they were Masters of this, they could not be much prejudiced by any thing that could be attempted against them in other parts: That usually his advantage was very great who assaulted another at his own door, because he keeps the perils, and greatest losses of War far from him: He increaseth courage in his own men, and takes in from the *Enemy*, and makes the way more easie to Victory, not onely by Forces but by Reputation, and also by the fear which he infuseth into the *Enemy*: but the farther off the War is carried, and the nearer the *Enemy* is assaulted in the Centre and very heart of his State, the more are such advantages got: If the *Romans*, who were alwaies wont to molest other mens Affairs, should be forced to fight within their own *Confines*, and were to wage War, not to enlarge their *Dominions*, but to defend themselves and what they held dearest, they would prove less then themselves, because their courage would fail them, and the splendor of the *Roman* name would be obscured, which did so much help to the atchieving of their Enterprises. Therefore the *Romans* knowing by experience the disadvantage of making War at home, and open enmity being professed between them and *Phillip* King of *Macedon*, fearing least the *Carthaginian* War being ended, he would assault *Italy*, as *Hannibal* had done but a little before, would be the first who should pass with their Army into *Greece*, and carry the greatest trouble and danger of War into the States of others. But the longer and more difficult the way was for *Hannibal* to conduct his *Carthaginians* into *Italy*, so much greater Honor wold he win when he should have overcome these difficulties: That without great constancy and worth in the Commander and *Soldiers*, so hard an Enterprise could not have been undertaken, such craggy mountainous seats passed over, and their way be made by the *Sword* amidst an *Enemies Country*.

To this was added, that there were many in *Italy*, who were not pleased with the *Romans* Empire, by whose Colonies sent by them into other peoples Countries, they were robbed not onely of their Goods but of their Liberty: That the fame given out that *Hannibal* would free these from the *Roman* slavery, and the whole world from the fear of their ambition and power, might alienate the minds of such as were Neighbors to the *Romans*, and reconcile them so much the more to him. *Hannibal* did likewise consider, as he whose intention it was not to make Inroads into the *Roman* Territories, to make a sore and long War with them, that

that there were many in the *Carthaginian* Senate who were not well pleased with this enterprise, some being moved by respect of the contrary Faction, others by envy to his glory, and others by zeal they bore to their Countries quiet. That if he should be with his Army in some neighboring Country, and that the *Romans* should be but weakly invaded, and not soundly set upon, it might in likelihood fall out he should be sent for home, and Peace be concluded. He feared likewise lest his Army, which was composed of divers Nations, when his Soldiers should find themselves near their own houses, they might the more easily disband. Being therefore only intent to come with his Forces into *Italy*, he would shun all occasions of tying his men against the *Romans* in a pitch'd Field, when *Publius Scipio* went to encounter him at the Banks of *Rhodanus*. Moreover it would not satisfie the high and magnanimous end which he had prefixt unto himself, of freeing *Carthage*, his Country, from the Tribute to the which she was made liable by the *Romans*, to molest them in any part further from the State, but he must march against the very City of *Rome*, the Seat of the Empire, to allay, or at least to weaken much their power. Other smaller things might have given some trouble to the *Romans*, and have retarded their greatness; but in the same danger and uncertainty of War, whereby she had provoked so powerful an enemy against her, the reward, and the benefit were not equal in both the cases. Very great and difficult undoubtedly was such an enterprise, but befitting *Hannibal*, who, as it was said, had through the magnanimity of his spirit, proposed unto himself to imitate the deeds of *Hercules*, and had taken up arms against the *Romans*, not out of any hatred he bore them, but for the dignity of Empire. So as what would have infused fear into another, did set his mind the more on fire. He thought likewise by force of necessity to infuse into his Soldiers that strength and constancy of mind, which was as an excellent vertue in himself, whilst fighting should be enforced, all occasion of flight being taken away, to put all their hopes of safety in their Swords. This most expert Commander knew likewise wherein his Forces did exceed, and therewithal he would make trial of their worth. Wherefore passing with his Army safe over the Mountains, he foresaw he should find large Plains in *Italy*, wherein he might fight the *Romans* upon great advantage, his Army abounding in Horse, and the Infantry being the *Romans* chiefest strength.

Then as this counsel was taken by *Hannibal* with reason, so if this action be particularly considered, it may be said, that he was very successful therein: for the first time that he had to do with the Roman Armies in *Italy*, though the Armies of two Consuls were joyned together against him, that which was first sent against him into *France*, and that which was destined to encounter him when he should have descended the Mountains, he came off with such victory as he put *Rome* into great terror, both for that the City was not wont before to hear such bad news from their Captains, as also for having so powerful, and so victorious an enemy so nigh at hand. But what can be added to the victories gotten at the Lake of *Thrasymenus* and at *Canna*, (places made famous for the calamities which the *Romans* suffered there) to make his glory greater? and the good thereof was answerable to the greatness; for those of the Empire rebelling every where, and flying from the *Romans* distressed fortune, to *Hannibals* favor and obedience, he soon made himself Master of almost all *Italy*, and put the very City of *Rome* to great danger and confusions. So as it was either his noble daring which begot such prosperous effects, or else it was thereby accompanied.

Yet there wanted not other reasons, and respects, which may make *Hannibals* advice of leading his Army into *Italy* appear less useful, and less praise-worthy; and it may be said, that if he had passed into *Italy* with almost all the whole *Carthaginian*

ginian Forces, bringing along with him Veteran Soldiers, and the greatest strength of the Carthaginian Empire, he ought to have considered, that undertaking to make War against the *Romans*, a warlike, powerful, and fortunate Nation, the Carthaginian State was not likely to keep unmolested by their Forces ; Reason not permitting it to be believed, that they who formerly, not provoked by any injuries, but rather excited by a desire of Government, had happily waged war with the Commonwealth of *Carthage*, would now stand only spectators of their own misery, and repulser of offence, but that they would rather endeavour to carry that fire which was kindled in their own houses, either into *Africa* or *Spain*, to keep the Carthaginian Forces from succouring that part where their own danger was increased. And so did the effect ensue ; for the *Romans* having first assaulted *Spain*, and after *Africa*, and finding them both but badly provided of Garrisons fitting to withstand so potent an Enemy, they reduced the first under the obedience of their Commonwealth, driving all the *Carthaginians* from thence, and did put the other into so great confusion, as little more then the bare name of a Republick remained to the very City of *Carthage*. But how could *Hannibal* hope to tarry long in *Italy*, and to be able to receive such succors and supplies as he must of necessity stand in need of ? The way was shut up by Land by the craggy mountains, and by the Enemy ; and the Sea was less open to them, the *Romans* not being only masters of the Sea, but of Navigation ; for their Fleet was greater then that of the *Carthaginians* : whence it was, that the succor came neither time enough to *Hannibal* for him to prosecute his Victories ; neither when it was sent, could it come safe to him, his brother *Asdrubal*, who conducted it, being cut in pieces, together with all his men by the Consul *Claudius*.

Out of these respects it may be thought, that it had been better and safer for *Hannibal* to have commenced the War against the *Romans* in *Sicily* or *Sardinia*. The pretence of taking up Arms against the *Romans*, for the recovery of such things as were granted out of great necessity to them by his Commonwealth, was more just. Wherefore he might have bethought himself of not provoking the disfavor both of God and man against him ; as it appeared on the contrary, that his breach of Articles, and his too bold design of driving the *Romans* out of *Italy*, their own proper seat and dominion, made all things prove crost unto him. The business would likewise have proved more opportune and easie, by reason of the ill satisfaction which the people of those Islands received from the *Romans* power, which occasioned in them a great mind to rebel, as was afterwards found. The Carthaginian Commonwealth was strong enough by Sea ; and though Fortune had not been propitious to them in their Naval conflict with the *Romans*, yet was their experience in Maritime affairs greater ; and the City was then so well provided of Shipping, as we read that they were above five hundred Ships which they were forced to burn by command from *Scipio*, after *Hannibals* Rout in *Africa*. If *Hannibal* would then have put his Army into these Bottoms, and have turned with powerful Forces upon *Sicily* and *Sardinia*, and being also assisted with the Peoples inclination, he could not almost have doubted to have reduced them in a small time under the Carthaginian power. And having won these Islands, what way would he have made for the enterprise of *Italy* ? He might have made use of this situation, and of his Fleet, to have kept the Sea open to himself, and block'd up to the *Romans* : whereas doing the contrary, it happened otherwise ; for the Carthaginian Fleet being very weak, the greater part whereof were employed in other places, it was overcome by the *Romans*, their Navigation and Succor was hindred, and finally all *Hannibals* designs were frustrated. But the advantage which *Hannibal* might have reaped by such an enterprise, and by the getting of *Sicily*, may easily be known by what *Scipio* got, who being to pass with his Army into *Africa*, putting in

in at *Sicily*, he thereby got great assistance and accommodation. And the *Carthaginians* themselves were aware, that the War ought to have been handled thus: For after the death of *Hiero*, Lord of *Syracusa*, they sent their Fleet to regain *Sicily*; but the counsel was too late and unopportunely taken; for Fortune beginning now again to smile upon the *Romans*, and the enterprise being undertaken with but weak Forces, they did little else but raise Tumults, with more of loss to those that had rebelled against the *Romans*, than any advantage to the *Carthaginians*. It seems likewise that *Hannibal*, when he first endeavoured to joyn in league with *Philip* King of *Macedon*, whose strength by Sea was very great, and his jealousies of the *Romans* likewise very great, as also his desire to secure himself therefrom, had laid a better foundation for his designs, and might have had better success in his endeavours against the *Romans*; which because out of vainglorious ambition he would accelerate, he overthrew them.

Let us then bound *Hannibals* praises within straiter precincts, though his fame found very gloriously in the memory of all Ages, for the greatness of his attempts, and his success therein at first; since that advantage ceaseth which might first have counselled him to the affairs of *Italy*: And let us only see whether he may have purchased any true glory by his so great daring, and by the readiness wherewith he buckled to battel. He who will weigh things with reason and experience, will find that Wisdom ought to be of greater consideration in a worthy Commander, then force of Arms. Which may be seen in *Hannibal*; for the wisdom of *Quintus Fabius* did that against him with safety, which the War waged with much loss, and more danger, by *Flaminius* and by *Sempronius*, and afterwards by *Gaius Terentius*, all of them Consuls, and Commanders of the *Romans* Armies, could not do; who rashly hazarding the doubtful events of *Bat:el*, were overcome by *Hannibal*, and brought the affairs of *Rome* to almost utter despair. The praise then which is given to *Hannibal*, is great eagerness of mind against dangers: which though of it self it may make him worthy some admiration, yet such a virtue falls easily into vice, and instead of Boldness, may be termed Rashness. But if we will consider *Hannibals* Actions yet a little more narrowly, we shall the better discover, that *Hannibal* having undertaken this War unjustly, and violated the Articles made between the *Carthaginians* and the *Romans*, he cannot deserve to be truly named valiant, the virtue of Valor not consisting in the maintaining of an unjust Cause. And if *Hannibal* ought to glory of his having routed the *Romans*, his glory will prove the less, since the Captains whom he overcame were not so much cryed up, and were of lesser experience and worth then many other *Romans*, who never had to do in any great enterprise; and that it was not his own worth, and the worth of his Soldiers which made way to his Victories; more then did the ignorance, rashness, and chiefly the discord of the Roman Commanders; to whom, through some unlucky Star, it was the misfortune of the Commonwealth at that time to commit the guidance and command of her Forces. But when he met with *Fabius*, *Marcellus*, or *Scipio*, the face of affairs altered. And yet *Hannibal* ought to have believed he should have met with these, or at least such as these, then with the others, or such as them: For the *Carthaginians* had experienced much to their los's, in the preceding War, what the worth of the Roman Commanders was. *Hannibal* might likewise have considered, how hard it would be for him to vanquish so many Cities, so many Roman Colonies, defended by Citizens who did partake of the Roman name and valor. But this was seen afterwards by experience; when he first began to undertake the taking in of Cities, and when entring into *Umbria*, and being incamped about *Spoletum*, he spent much time there to little purpose; and finding how strong defence was made by a little Roman Colony, he saw how vain his designs would be of storming the City of *Rome*.

And though many of the chief Cities of *Italy* fell into his hands, this happened through the renown of Victories which he had won; which working upon many people who did accommodate themselves to the *Victors* fortune, they gave themselves willingly over to the *Carthaginians*, and rebelled against the vanquished *Romans*. But to besiege Cities required time, and time afforded means to the *Romans*, who were at their own homes, to recruit their Forces, and reduced *Hannibal*, who was a stranger, into many inconveniences and necessities. Insomuch as it is affirmed by *Witers*, that when *Hannibal* had the means of fighting afforded him (which he so much desired, but had little reason to hope for) by *Terentius* the *Consuls* rashness, who was afterwards routed and overcome; his affairs were reduced to so great and desperate straits, as manifest signs of revolting over to the enemies Camp were discovered, and in himself a mind to save himself by flying away into *Africa* by Sea.

But let us take the end of War into consideration, which we will be better able to judge by, then by its beginning: And though it is usually said, that Event is the fools Schoolmaster, yet it often falls out, that things are known by the event, which would never have been formerly thought upon; and the best instruction is that which is learnt by experience. *Hannibal*, after having with various and uncertain success, but with very great and certain dangers, oftentimes tried the event of sundry Battels with the *Romans*, was constrained, not so much out of obedience to the *Carthaginian* *Senate*, as out of necessity to forgo *Italy*, and to lead the remainder of his Army, which was already very much lessened, back into *Africa*, to relieve the City of *Carthage*, which was by *Scipio* reduced into great danger; and with his like former boldnes, though not with the like prosperous success, come to a day of Battel with his enemy: Wherein his Army being overthrown, and with that Army, which was the strength of the Empire, all hopes lost of ever being able to make head against the *Romans*, the War was finally ended upon new conditions, and by the agreement, but in effect by the ultimate ruine of the *Carthaginian* Commonwealth: And together with the loss of her Liberty, she was bereft of all her maritime Forces; for amongst other grievous conditions, she was enjoyned to burn all her Ships, whereof she had great store; so desirous were the *Romans* to keep her from attempting any novelty.

But how can we pass over these great actions, without reflecting upon the wonderful variation of humane affairs, and without marvelling at the several fortunes of these two powerful Nations? For the *Carthaginians* having as Conquerors overrun all *Italy*, and bereft the *Romans* of almost all their Forces, when it seemed as if their Commonwealth, following this her miraculous prosperity, was in a short time to mount to a supreme greatness of Monarchy, they fell from these high hopes into the extreme of misery, being bereft not only of the gallantry of Command, but of Liberty. And on the other side, the *Romans*, who having not many years before her Armies so notably defeated by *Hannibal*, as they were glad to employ all their care about the safety of the very City of *Rome*, did on such a sudden rise to such a height of reputation, and power, as driving the *Carthaginians* out of *Spain* and having put the affairs of *Africa* into great confusion, they forced them to recieve their Laws from the *Romans*. This victory of the *Romans* was that which opened them the way to that Monarchy, at which they afterwards did in a few years arrive; for having quell'd the *Carthaginians*, and increased their own Power by the ruine of the Forces and Dominion of others, there was not any other Potentate who could long resist them. Other people seemed not to be ashamed to yeeld to them who had conquered the *Carthaginians*, and made themselves Masters of their Commonwealth. No truer, nor better reason can be given for this indeed so miraculous diversity of condition and fortune which befel these two great and powerful

powerful Commonwealths, then the excellency of Military Discipline, which was better ordered, and understood by the *Romans*, then by the *Carthaginians*. For hence it rose, that every Citizen being amongst the *Romans* employed in the Militia, they had greater store of Commanders and Soldiers. So as though they were oftentimes worsted by *Hannibal*, they could notwithstanding soon muster other Armies, and get new Forces: Which the *Carthaginians* could not do; who having had a notable rout at *Zama*, were totally opprest, not being ever able to rally again, because they had no other Soldiers nor Commanders under whose conduct they might hope for better events. But when the *Romans* were overcome, they wanted not *Fabius Maximus*, *Marcellus*, *Claudius*, *Scipio*, and many others, who behaved themselves more fortunately in that War, and did better service the Commonwealth; and they could easily send Recruits unto their Armies, and supply the places of such as were slain in Battel, out of their own Citizens of *Rome*. Which was caused by the committing of the Government of the War to their Consuls, which place of Magistracy enduring but a year, occasion was offered to many other Citizens, to get experience in military affairs, and all others were so obliged to the Militia, as after the *Carthaginian* War was ended, they who had not served in the Wars for the space of four years at the least, were by the Censors noted of Infamy, and blotted out of the publick Muster-books. But the *Carthaginians* having through the power of the Barchinian Faction, transferred the Supreme Authority of administration of Arms, upon some few Citizens, as it was formerly upon *Hannibal*, the Father to this man, and after him upon this *Hannibal*, and his brother *Asdrubal*; when *Asdrubal* was slain in *Italy*, in the conflict which he had with *Claudius*, and when *Hannibal* the Son was abandoned by his former good Fortune, and by the reputation he had formerly gotten; and the Commonwealth being also wonted to make use of mercenary Souldiers; the Army of antient Soldiers being lost in the Battel of *Zama*, they could not recruit it with their own Citizens, nor withstand the blow of so dire a mischance. These, and such like things may be argued, concerning this great action of *Hannibal*, and these important successes of War; but rather out of probabilities, then any certain demonstration. Yet these very considerations, may serve for useful instructions in hard and difficult resolutions, to foresee what end is likely to befall the undertaking of great Princes.

The Sixth DISCOURSE.

Whether it was well done by the Romans, to carry the War against the Carthaginians, into Sicily and Spain, and into Macedonia and Greece, against King Philip; whilst Hannibal waged War with them in Italy.

Amongst all the Wars made by the *Romans*, none was more long or troublesome, then that which they made with the *Carthaginians*, especially when their Commander *Hannibal* did flourish, so from hence chiefly may noble matter of discourse, and useful Instructions for matters of State be gathered. Whilst *Hannibal* was in *Italy*, which was for the space of about Fourteen years, the *Romans* made War notwithstanding in other Countries; as in *Sicily*, *Spain* and *Africa* against the same *Carthaginians*; and against *Philip* King of *Macedon* in *Greece*. But as War was made against them in

in *Italy*, so were they the first Authors of these other Wars; which affords occasion of no small wonder to him who considers, and doth well weigh this their proceeding. One would think, that the *Romans* being set upon at home by so powerful Enemies, as it was apparent that their whole Forces were not able to resist, should not have resolved by dividing the same Forces to make their defence weaker; since the main of all their affairs depended upon the success of their Armies against *Hannibal*, how can it be thought a good advice, to hazard with part of their Forces the whole Fortune of their Commonwealth? A thing which when forced by necessity, is thought a great misfortune to the State wherein it happens. And when *Italy* should be lost, as it was in great danger to be whilst *Hannibal* was there with a puissant Army, to what purpose could any acquisition serve which should be made in *Spain* or elsewhere, which must of necessity fall of it self? And with what courage could the *Romans* fight in Forein parts, when their own Country was wasted with War, their houses, wealth, and all that they had exposed to utmost danger? So as whilst fighting against *Hannibal*, and all their minds being inflamed, not only out of a military obligation, and out of charity to their Country, but out of the natural and powerful love which every man bears to his own affairs, one man stood for many: So when abroad, the unquietness and doubt of mind keeping them afflicted and in jealousie, by reason of the dubious case wherein they left whatsoever was most dear unto them, would not permit many to stand in fight for one. Who can praise the suffering of danger to increase at home, out of hopes of purchasing abroad? Had the *Romans* Armies been in another Country, and employed about other affairs, reason would have advised them to have sent for them back into *Italy*, when they saw so powerful an Enemy upon their backs. For, *Vis unita fortior*; Force when united is stronger, and better able to keep what is harmful afar off. Thus we see it falls out by vertue of mother *Nature*, in our bodies; when the Heart is ill at ease, all the spirits of the body flock thither to defend it, as the most noble part, and whereupon life it self depends.

Hannibal was a powerful Enemy, formidable for his excellent worth and military discipline, and for the many Forces which he brought with him; and moreover *Italy* was as it were unarmed at this time, and wanted her valiantest Commanders, and best Soldiers. What could the Carthaginians have more desired for *Hannibals* prosperity, then to see the two *Scipio*'s, *Gneus* and *Publius*, on whom only the welfare of the Commonwealth, now so much in danger, did rest, sent into parts afar off, so as they could not, in her very greatest extremity, return to succor her? If *Hannibal* had had a mind to have left *Italy*, was not this parting of the Roman Forces, and the want of their best Commanders, a powerful reason to make him stay? And what advice was it to provoke other Princes and People to enmity, as must needs be done by sending Forces to molest *Spain*, whilst the Commonwealth was in such trouble and danger, as she ought to have made friends on all sides? By which they incensed that Nation, and drew other African Princes upon their backs, who were Friends and Confederates with the Carthaginians. And the increasing power of the Romans being formerly apprehended by other People and Princes, the condition of those times should have rather advised them to have cloaked such thoughts, and not to draw hatred and envy upon them: For every one must needs hold, that if the Romans, being in such calamity and danger, would vex other Countries with war, no Province would have been free from their Forces when they should have been rid of *Hannibal*. Which made the Romans cause worse, and *Hannibals* better, with those in *Italy*, who did not much affect the so much greatness of the Commonwealth; and much more with forein Nations. Wherefore the *French*, who first opposed *Hannibal* when he went into *Italy*, did for these respects favor his brother *Asdrubal* afterwards, when he past with succor through

through their Country; nay, many of them joined with his Camp; and followed the Carthaginian Colors in *Italy*, to maintain the War with them. If the Romans did not know themselves to be sufficiently able to withstand *Hannibal* in *Italy*, where they had all conveniences, and he being a stranger wanted all, and could only come by them by force; what reason could perswade them to maintain War in *Spain* at the same time? which War must be as incommodious to them, as it was advantageous and convenient for their Enemies; both for that that Province was at their devotion, for the neareſſ of the City of *Carthage*, and for the accommodation the Sea afforded them, in furniſhing them with all things necessary to make War; which certainly may be done better and more commodiously at home. Thus the *Cimbri*ans, after having given many defeats to the Romans in *Gallia*, were by them overcome in *Italy*. War is likewise made at home with less danger, out of the easiness of recruiting an Army, when Battels prove unfortunate. Thus the Romans being oft-times worsted by *Hannibal*, did maintain and raise up their abject fortune: And the *Venetians* being assaulted at their own homes by those of *Genoa*, by reason of the commodity they had of assembling all their Forces together, did not only withstand, but did overthrow the Assailants, who were gotten even into their Washes, and were ſetled in the City of *Chioggia*.

But if we will then consider the particular condition wherein the Romans were at that time, we ſhall find all their affairs in great disorder, and ſuch as did advise them rather to leſſen then to increase new Expences, by undertaking new Wars. The publick Treasury was ſufficiently decreased by loss of the usual Rents of ſo many places which *Hannibal* was poſtſt of in *Italy*; for that what they were maſters of in *Sardinia*, was to ceaſe paying uſual and great contributions; for that the people who were ſubject to the Romans, were ſo much wearied with continual Wars, as they were hardly able to maintain thoſe few Soldiers which they had need of for their own defence, not in a caſe to furnish other Armies with monies, as Writers affiſm. Others add, that the affairs of the Romans were grown to ſo great a ſtraiſt, by maintaining ſo many Armies ſo long a time in ſeveral Countries, as that the *Scipio*'s writing to the Senate, that they could no longer maintain their Soldiers who were grown needful of all things, the Commonwealth was fain to beg aid from thoſe who had gained much in former times by publick Impositions, ſo to provide out of private purſes for the paying and viſtualling of the Army: An example of much charity to their Country, which was brought to ſo great a neceſſity; but with all of ill advice, and but little wiſdom in thoſe who had brought it to that paſſ. The Romans affairs were ſo weakened in *Spain*, as *Gneuſ Scipio*, contrary to the cuſtom of the Romans, was forced to make uſe of many Soldiers of that Nation to recruit his Army: which through the deceiſt of thoſe Barbarians, was the cauſe why he received a notable Defeat, wherein he himſelf likewiſe lost his life.

It might at first peradventure be thought an uſeful aduice to auſſault the Carthaginian States, ſo to remove *Hannibal* by diversion from *Italy*. But ſince experience proved the contrary, how can the increasing of danger at home, to carry it abroad, be praifeſed? Twas already eight years that *Gneuſ Scipio* had made War in *Spain*, and *Marcellus* had labored long with various ſuccesſes in *Sicily*, when *Hannibal* was notwithstanding ſtill ſo powerful in *Italy*, as marching with his whole Army from *Capua*, he went to auſſault the very City of *Rome*, where all things were full of tumult and conuſion: And had not the Romans had good fortune by the great ſtore of rain and water, which falling from the ſkies, retarded the firſt auſſault of *Hannibal*, all the hopes of ſo flouriſhing a Commonwealth had been diſpach'd. Who then in ſuch extremity of danger, in which with great ucertainty of ſucces the Walls and Gates of *Rome* herſelf were gaſtred, did not wiſh that *Marcellus*,

the two *Scipio's*, and the rest that were at war in *Sicily*, and in *Spain*, had been there present, who if the City of *Rome* should be lost, must be made a prey unto the enemy ? The very fame and honor of such a Victory being sufficient to make all that the Romans in so long proceſs of time had taken from the Carthaginians, return to their former obedience.

On the other side, if so many Commanders and Roman Soldiers, wasted in wars ſo far off, had been all joyned together in *Italy*, how could *Hannibal* have ſo long withſtood ſo great a power ? The firſt onſet of the Carthaginian Army was great, when it advanced ſo far, as the fortune of the *Romans* began to give back, and the *Romans* to confeſs themſelves overcome, having had many great routs. But when Fortune began to face about, and the worth of the Carthaginian Soldiers began to flag, who were deboiſhed with the delights of *Capua*, (which was the cauſe why *Hannibal* tarried long in *Italy* without doing any thing of note) reaſon tells us that if he had been affailed by ſo many Roman Commanders and Soldiers, he muſt have been forced to have left *Italy*. And he being gone, and the danger removed to a further diſtance from home, the *Romans* having a valiant, and an expert Militia, and having won great reputation by this Victory, the other enterpriſes which they ſhould have afterwards have undertaken either againſt others, or againſt the *Carthaginians* themſelves at their own homes, would have proved more eafe, and more certain : And expeſience proves clearly, that the Affairs of *Italy* would have given the Law to all other proceedings ; and that upon the ſucceſs thereof the whole War diſtended ; for the *Romans* could never drive the Carthaginians totally out of *Spain*, till the rout given to *Asdrubal*, Brother to *Hannibal*, by the Consul *Claudius*, by which the power and fortune of the Carthaginians growing leſs in *Italy*, they fared alike in *Spain*.

But the War undertaken by the *Romans*, againſt *Philip* King of *Macedon*, at the ſame time when *Italy* was all on fire with the Carthaginian War, may peradventure be thought a buſineſs of greater importance. For *Philip* was a great Prince, and might eaſily have troubled the *Romans* affairs, by reaſon of the neigborhood of *Greece*, whose people were his friends and confederates. And though *Philip* had ſhewed himſelf not to be very well affeſed to the Commonwealth of *Rome*, ſince he had firſt ſent his Ambaſſadors to *Hannibal*, to treat of joyning with him in confederacy againſt the *Romans*, and had afterwards ſet upon, and taken the Cities of *Apolonia*, and *Orico*, that he might have, (as it was ſuſpected) the better opportunity to offend the *Romans* ; yet the preſent condition of Affairs ſeemed rather to advise them, to diſemblaſe their injuries and ſuſpicioſs, then by unimpoſtunely revenging the one and aſſertaining the other, put their affairs in greater danger, and make him a certain and open Enemy, who was as yet concealed and doubtful. And time might have opened the way u.to them to have made him their friend, and to have brought him into their parts ; which it was formerly known he had mind enough unto of himſelf ; but being put in fear and jealousy of his own affairs by *Hannibal*'s ſo great proſperity, he was diverted from it. And counſels which bring certain miſchiefs with them, ought not to be undertaken out of hope of evading another evil which is further off, and uncertain, when he who uſeth it is in ſo weak and dangerous a condition, as the addition of any new inconveniencie how little ſoever, is ſufficient to ruine him : and this was the condition of the affairs of *Rome* at that time. Yet it may be ſaid that the very Authority of the *Romans* name was a thing of great moment, and ſo much the greater as the event approved of their counſel. For *Hannibal* could not have been drawn out of *Italy*, but by troubling the affairs of *Africa*, and by putting the Carthaginians into the ſame hazard and dangers, as they had endeavored to put the *Romans* into. They conſidered then, that *Hannibal* having ſhewed ſuch conſtancy, and worth in leading ſo numerouſ

merous an Army, consisting of divers Nations into *Italy*, and having found that Fortune (according as is usually said) favoured his boldnes, their chief hopes of overcoming him lay in making him be his own ruine, and suffering his Army to moulder away through hardships. And this manner of warfaring, used by *Fabius Maximus* had saved and restored the Commonwealth, which the different opinion of other Commanders, by hazarding themselves upon the fortune of a Battel, had almost quite undone. Now to compas this, it was necessary to keep the Carthaginian Forces so employed abroad by diversion, as they could not relieve *Hannibal* in *Italy*: For if so, many of the Carthaginian Armies might have passed safely into *Italy*, as the *Scipio's* did defeat in *Spain*, they would have so overflowed *Italy*, as there could have been no escape for the affairs of *Rome*. This very advice was followed by the Venetians, when they had their Enemies at their own own homes, and were in the same danger and disorder by reason of the rout given them by the *Genoese*, as the City of *Rome* was in, after the defeat at *Canne*. For they joyned in confederacy with *Barnaby Vis Conte*, Duke of *Millan*, and making a great Effort, sent many Soldiers against the City of *Genoa*, and did so molest their affairs by Land, as they kept off those succours, which otherwise would have been sent to their men who had taken the City of *Chioggia*, who missing of supplies, and being fought withal, and besieged by the Venetian Forces, of Conquerors became conquered, and fell into the hands of the Venetians.

Moreover the Romans considered, that in the Wars which they made in *Sicily* and in *Spain*, they had this great advantage, that they fought not with *Hannibal*, a Captain of singular and unparalleled valor. It was likewise held, that the Roman Commanders and Armies, might more securely make trial of their worth and fortune, in Wars made out of *Italy*, as they had oftentimes done; for when they had any loss abroad, they lost nothing but those men which the fortune of War beft them of; but if they should overcome, they got the Enemis Country, just as it befel them in *Spain*. Wherefore it being disadvantageous for them to fight in *Italy*, it proved the better advice to temporize with *Hannibal* in *Italy*, and at the same time to fight with *Mago*, *Asdrubal*, and other Carthaginian Commanders in *Sicily*, and in *Spain*. So as the losses in *Italy* were recompensed by acquisitions made in *Spain*, the which of all other Countries, was the first that was reduced into a Province, and did much inlarge the Confines of the Roman Empire. But if the Sea had been open for the Carthaginians, as it would have been if the Romans neglecting their Fleet had not provided for the affairs of *Sicily*, *Hannibal* might easily have been furnished with things necessary from the Carthaginians, wherewith to reinforce his Army. So as no part of *Italy* should have been free from his forces, who unassisted or succored, could notwithstanding keep his Army so long together, and attempt so many enterprises; they therefore thought they had done enough, in entertaining *Asdrubal*, a Captain of great authority and valor, so as he could not (as they knew his design was) pass with a new Army into *Italy*, to joyn with *Hannibal*, as he did after the *Scipio's* death, and after the rebellion of many of the Spanish Cities, the Carthaginians being moved to do their utmost, since they had lost *Syracusa* and *Capua* which were both of them fallen into the Romans power. So as no assistance being given unto *Hannibal*, all the labor was lost which he had so many years undergone in *Italy*. On the contrary, the Romans persevering in their first opinion, when the two *Scipio's* were dead, sent *Publius Scipio* into *Spain* to keep *Asdrubal* from making his passage, diverting the Forces which were to pass over with him into *Italy*, by keeping the Carthaginians molested at home: It follows not therefore by a general rule, that what was good for one of the enemies, must be hurtful for the other; so as it were good for the Carthaginians to wage War in *Italy*, far from their own homes, this very

same thing must be harmful for the Romans. But since they could not be the first Assailant, *Hannibal* having fallen upon them with such violence, it was reason, that the Romans taking the same course, should assault the Carthaginian Territories. We read also, that the same *Hannibal*, being still of the same opinion which once he was, being with *Antiochus* in the time of his Exile, whilst he was treating of making War against the Romans, he persuaded him to pass over as soon as he could, and with as great a strength as he could put together, into *Italy*; affirming that all other enterprises would be to no purpose, whilst *Italy* was at peace and quiet, and that the Romans had means to maintain War abroad.

This very same thing, for the same respects diversly considered, ought to have instructed the Roman Commanders and Senators in the Carthaginian war; to wit, that they were not to suffer their Enemies to rest quiet at home, so as free from all thoughts of defending themselves, they might the better turn all their Forces upon *Italy*, and the very City of *Rome*. And if they had taken that resolution at first, which they did afterwards by the advice of *Publius Scipio*, (who from the conquering of *Africa*, took the name of *African*) to wage War with the Carthaginians nearer their own home, they might peradventure have freed *Italy* sooner from the so many troubles and dangers which she underwent by *Hannibal's* long abode. But it may be moreover said, that many other things did force, or at least persuade the Romans to undertake these Wars. *Sardinia* was first assaulted by the Carthaginians with those very Forces which were destined for *Italy* to relieve *Hannibal*; so as it behoved the Romans to march with their Armies thither, not only to maintain and defend that Island, which was of such importance to the Commonwealth, but for that they therein defended the welfare of *Italy*, by keeping so many Warriors afar off, who if they were free, were ready to assault her. And this advice proved very fortunate; for *Quintus Fabius* gave so notable a Rout to the Carthaginians in *Sardinia*, as they lost about Forty thousand of their Soldiers. The death of *Hiero* the Tyrant of *Syracusa*, occasioned the War made in *Sicily*, and the great commotions of that Island, by which it was comprehended, that if these their designs had not been hindred by the Romans, that great and famous City would have fallen into the power of the Carthaginians, to the great prejudice of the Romans, who for the same reason (being assisted by the *Mamertines*) undertook the first Carthaginian War; judging that if the Carthaginians should be absolute Masters of *Sicily*, it would be a step to pass into *Italy*. But this would have been the more incommodious at this time, for that by reason of the so many places which *Hannibal* had taken in *Italy*, they might have had a more easie and secure receptacle there. Moreover, the Romans were invited to make War with the Carthaginians in *Spain*, and to divert their Forces, by reason that they understood how that Province was but ill satisfied with the Carthaginian government, and that it was well inclined to the Romans; which did much facilitate those enterprises which were boldly undertaken, and fortunately atchieved. The City of *Saguntum* was also the first rise of these Wars in *Spain*; which they thought it did not become the generosity of *Rome* to leave in the power of the Carthaginians; so as upon any other good success, they might seem to have lost the chief cause in this contest: Neither did they notwithstanding take *Saguntum* till after eight years War in *Spain*, when the other affairs of *Rome* began to prosper very much; as if the City which was the beginning of so many Wars, had been reserved to be the end thereof.

These and other such like reasons may be alleagued for the War undertaken against the Carthaginians; but that which they made against *Philip* may be said to be caused rather by necessity then choice: For *Philip*, for his part, being already resolved to follow *Hannibal's* fortune, and expecting large recompence, had sent his Ambassadors several times formerly to him, to conclude a confederacie with him: where-

wherefore the Romans thinking it better to prevent the Enemy, then to be by them prevented, fell suddenly upon him with their whole Fleet and Army, hoping to suppress him, though they did not wholly effect their design. But they continued their War against him afterwards in *Greece*, incited by the commotions already raised in that Province by the Italians; knowing that unless they should interpose themselves, *Greece* must either fall into *Philip's* hands, whereby the power of a People that were Enemies to the Romans, and already very formidable of themselves, would be greatly increased; or else they must have recourse to the assistance of King *Attalus*, as the Grecians had already protested to the Romans, and so they must suffer the neighborhood of another King, who was already powerful in *Asia*, and might at another time trouble the affairs of *Rome*. And the wisdom of the Romans was always such, as not being cast down by any adversity, they never seemed so much to apprehend present dangers, but that they had an eye to those which might ensue, and in time grow greater. And this peradventure was that which did prove the Romans power and worth more than any thing else; since, when as they were as yet but masters of a small State, and that their affairs were reduced into great difficulties, both by their so many bad successes in battel against *Hannibal*, and by the risings of their Friends and Confederates, yet they resolved to maintain War at one and the same time in four several Countries, to wit, in *Italy*, *Sicily*, *Spain*, and *Greece*; and they were able to manage them all. And certainly such advice was no less useful than generous: For he who should overcome the Romans in any one place, could not hope quite to subdue them, since they had other Armies and valiant Commanders who might make good their fortune, and raise it up again.

So as things formerly alledged for arguments to asperse this their resolution, may peradventure be allowed of in such States, and amongst such Princes, where there is not that worth, discipline, or power as was amongst the Romans; but in them, or such as they, they are of no force; and very Experience, by the issue of these Wars, seems to confirm and approve of the Counsels by which they were underaken.

The Seventh DISCOURSE.

Whether the destruction of Carthage was the rise of the ruine of the Roman Republick.

Carthage, a glorious and famous City, both for the command she had in *Africa* and *Spain*, and for being long Rival in glory with the Commonwealth of *Rome*, being at last to yield either to the great worth or happy genius of the Romans, was not notwithstanding made tributary to *Rome*, but was burnt and destroyed even to the ground. The Carthaginians were oft times overcome in battel by the Romans, and had severe Laws imposed upon them; yet were those undaunted fierce minds never well quell'd, but beginning to heighthen their hopes and augment their Forces, after the second Carthaginian war, they molested those that were friends to the Romans, and contrary to their Articles, began to sail upon the Sea with Men of War. These things being therefore treated of in the Senate of *Rome*, caused variety of opinions: Some were for the total ruining of the City of *Carthage*, since otherwise the Commonwealth of *Rome* could not be free from their injuries and molestations; and *Cato* was very stiff of this opinion, who bringing some fresh Figs which were gathered in *Carthage*, shewed

shewed what dangers they were always subject unto by reason of their Enemies neighborhood.

But others endeavoring the contrary, sought to prove, that totally to extinguish the Carthaginians was no good advice ; and *Scipio Naflia*, a man of great authority, was greatly averse to this resolution, being thereunto moved (as he said) not through any pitty to the conquered enemy, but for the advantage of his own Citizens, who when they should be free from the fear of the Carthaginian Forces, would suffer many evils through Idleness. So as it was the common saying, and opinion, that the destruction of the Carthaginians would hasten on the ruine of *Rome*. And *Salust* in the beginning of his History of *Catilines Conspiracy*, describing the abusive customs of the City of *Rome* at that time, seems to be of opinion, that the overthrow of *Carthage* did more harm to the Commonwealth, by introducing idleness and pleasure, then the keeping of her flourishing and in arms, would have done. Yet there were other considerations which did thwart this opinion, shewing that it was not peace and idleness, but the continually being verst in Arms and War, which was the true cause of the Civil discords, and change of Government in *Rome*. This it was which fomented ambition in the Citizens, this it was that did too immensely increase their power. Finally, it was this that divided the City, and through discord brought it to utter ruine. And how can it be said that the City of *Rome* was ruined by Peace, since she never tasted thereof. Insomuch as for the space of Six hundred eighty five years, that famous Temple dedicated to *Janus* by *Namna Pompilius*, that it might stand open in time of War, and shut in time of Peace, was onely twice seen to be shut ; once in the Consulship of *Titus Manlius*, after the end of the first Carthaginian War, and once more in *Augustus* his time, after the Naval Victory over *Mark Anthony*. Thus were the Romans, and chiefly the most valiant amongst them, great enemies to Peace ; not so much endeavoring to procure greater strength to the Publick Empire, as to encrease their own glory and power. Therefore one War was made to beget another, no time being ever to be found wherein the City was to enjoy honest and civil leasure. And Provinces, and the authority of administering War, was oft times confirmed to those who commanded their Armies, who either desired to continue in their command, or occasion requiring it to be so, that they might put an end to the Wars begun : As it fell out in the second Carthaginian War, where the time of tarrying in that Province, and the continuing of his command was prolonged to the Consul *Scipio*, who waged War in *Spain*, to the end that he might finish what he had begun.

The like was done to *Fabius* in the Wars which he made against *Hannibal* in *Italy*, and upon other occasions ; a thing which being done contrary to the rule of Law, though it made somewhat for the Publick advantage at the preſent, yet was it cause of great disorders afterwards. Thus *Marius* whilst he was abroad in the *Jugurthan War*, was created Consul, and made chief Commander against the *Cimbrians*, though he ought not in his absence, and in time of contumacy, to have been chosen to that Magistracy. *Cesar*, after having commanded the Roman Armies five years, when he was sent to wage War in *France*, had his place of command continued unto him for five years longer ; and not herewithal content, but being accustomed to rule, he asked leave of the Senate to keep abroad, and to continue in the Army ; which when the Senate would not give way unto, they too late opposed his desire, he being grown so powerful, by reason of his continuation in military command, as he valued not the Senates Authority, nor the being declared an enemy to the Commonwealth. But if we will consider the beginning of Civil Discords, how, and where the siding began, which infected the minds of the Citizens with pestiferous corruption, we shall find that this happened not in time of

of Peace in Cities, or by reason of Civil Affairs; but in the Camp amongst Weapons, and when the Commonwealth was busied in weighty Wars. For *Marius* being drunk with the desire of military glory, and not being able to endure that it should be taken from him, or diminished by *Sylla*, as he imagined it might happen by reason of *Sylla's* happy success in the Jugurthan War, wherein having taken *Jugurtha* alive, he had the glory to have put an end to that War; He began to think of establishing yet more greatness in himself, by making many of the Order of Cavaliers, and of the people partial to him, and impudently corrupting the Citizens, first with moneys, and afterwards with open force of Arms; making the Magistracy and command of the war be conferred and resolved upon in him, as he did in the Consulship, and Proconsulship against *Mithridates*. The Nobility being affrighted at this man's greatness, by reason of his authority and reputation with the Soldiers, they mightily increased *Sylla's* power, who was an enemy to *Marius*, till at last they came to taking up Arms and shedding of civil blood. But who knows not that *Cesar*, moved thereunto more out of a desire of his own greatness, then out of his alliance with *Marius*, raised and maintained his Faction in *Rome*; and that his power increased not in Peace, and in the Market-place, but in War, and in the Camp? So for the same reason for which *Sylla* was advanced a little before, it behoved the Senate to confer more greatness upon *Pompey* then became the condition of civil Government; so as the whole City was divided; and with those arms, by which, though taken up, and made use of against enemies, the first occasion of contention among private Citizens was given, the very Commonwealth must be wounded, which stood in the midst between them; so as her vital spirit of liberty being taken away, her throat was cut by those whom she had most favoured. But whence did the so many other corruptions of those times arise, save from the so many prosperous successes of war, by which the Citizens being much enriched and made proud, could not betake themselves to live parimoniously, and with civil equality? And it is said of *Cesar*, that he corrupted the people of *Rome* by moneys which he had got in the War, so to make them confer places of Magistracy as he listed, upon such as were his friends, and partial to him. Out of these respects the wise Legislator, *Lycurgus*, intending to lay the foundation of a long lasting Government in *Sparta*, though he introduced Military exercises, to the end that the Citizens might be able to defend their Country; yet he ordered the City so, as it could not much increase its power by any Foreign War. But the Commonwealth of *Rome* not being ordered for peace, could never find out, nor enjoy a peaceful condition.

How is it then given out, that peace and idleness was the ruine of that City? How should she beleive that her Arms should remain idle, if she would have the whole world for her enemy, as *Marius* said to *Mithridates*; that who would not receive Law from the Romans, must make themselves more powerful then they? So as the counsel which *Scipio* gave to his Romans of not utterly destroying *Carthage*, might be good in another respect, for the preservation thereof might encrease the glory to their Commonwealth, which many of her valiant Citizens seemed greatly desirous of, to wit, to have easily pardoned their enemies, when they should have humbled themselves; as the *Carthaginians* had then done, having not only with great humility begged peace of the Senate by their Ambassadors, but given many of their chief Citizens for hostages to *Scipio*, and great store of Arms, to secure the Romans that they would keep their Articles. And truly the destruction of that noble City, did differ from the usual generosity of the Romans, who had wont, after Victory, to grant the Cities and Kingdoms to those very enemies with whom they had fought, making both King and People in all parts or Tributory, or Confederate to the Senate and People of *Rome*. But I

see no reason at all why they should forbear the rooting out of these the Romans ancient enemies, for fear lest they should be undone with idleness, and that civil discords should thereupon ensue. How many years were there between the second and third Carthaginian war? and yet when was the Commonwealth of *Rome* free from Foreign war, though these her Enemies did not appear to be so? The last Carthaginian war being hardly ended, did not they wage war in *Spain* with the *Numantines* for the space of fourteen years? And yet in these times the bounds of the Roman Empire may be said to have been very narrow, in respect of what they were afterwards. *France*, which then was Mistress of more Provinces then now she is, was not as yet subdued; nay, the difficulty and length of that War bringing along with it the prorogation of Command, since *Cæsar* commanded the Armies for ten years together, did much increase those disorders which did at last prove the ruine of the Commonwealth. But how much did *Pompey* enlarge the bounds of the Roman Empire in *Asia*? over how many conquered Kings and Provinces did he triumph? *Armenia*, *Cappadocia*, *Media*, *Iberia*, *Syria*, *Arabia*, *Phenicia*, and other Nations were reduced under the Romans power by this sole Commander. It will seem strange, and yet it is related by authentical Writers, that nine hundred Cities were made subject and tributary to the Roman Empire by *Pompey*, and almost as many more by *Cæsar*: And he who will consider it well, shall find that the Roman Commanders did flourish most, and were most cryed up, after the destruction of *Carthage*. *Rome* wanted then neither means nor will to exercise her Arms: not to mention so many Wars, which were all of them famous, if not for the greatness of acquisition, at least for other weighty accidents; and if not for their strength, yet for the wisdom of the Enemy: That of *Tigranes*, *Mithridates*, *Jugurth*, and so many others, where the then almost lost name of the *Carthaginians* did not concur.

But if it had proved true, that the Commonwealth of *Rome*, when *Carthage* should be destroyed, should have remained in idleness, so harmful to her liberty, if *Scipio's* counsel had proved successful, and those evils had been taken away which he feared would befall the Commonwealth, *Carthage* was not only not to have been undone, but her power should have been suffered to increase; for it is seen by what hath been said, that War of it self was not able to keep the Citizens united, but was rather that which did divide them. But this peradventure might have been done by War wherein their own defence had been only conceived, and the keeping of themselves from danger: And yet it is an absurd thing to say, that an Enemy must be preserved, and men must be continually in trouble and danger of War, for the conservation of a City. But say, I beseech you, was there not forty three years between the first and second Carthaginian war? And yet though *Rome* was free from dangers, and from being troubled by the Carthaginians, nay, for some years every where more quiet then she ever was at any other time, yet fell she not upon those great mischiefs of civil contentions, which she afterwards incur'd in the greatest heat of her former Wars. This was occasioned, because the City was not as yet corrupted, as it was afterwards; because it grew old, and because there was not any that knew by correcting her disorders to return her to her first principles. What danger can ensue unto, or can harm the common liberty or authority of Citizens either in War or in Peace, whilst the Laws are observed? And when the Laws are trampled under foot, what State can be free from the snares of the Enemy? The Spartan Kings had not supreme authority in War; but War being governed by good Laws, could never injure them. Power intrusted in Citizens with due measure and temper, was never prejudicial: And behold an example thereof. On the one side, *Agesilaus* King of *Sparta*, being Commander in chief of the Army against *Far-nabæsus*, and being entered *Asia* with great hopes of signal victories; when he was called home by the Magistracie of the *Ephori*, readily obeyed. On the other side,

Caſar, being already returned into *Italy* from the French enterprise, will, contrary to the will of the Senate, keep the Army together, and despiseth the authority thereof. *Cato's* counſel of destroying *Carthage* might then have proved good, not of it ſelf, but when the Romans, being ſafe for these Enemies, and ſetled in a condition of not being to fear any Forein forces, could have ordered unto themſelves a firm and quiet Civil State.

It was known by experience, that the other agreement made with the *Carthaginians* had done but little good: For they keeping ſtill the ſame mind, though not the ſame fortune, did not let ſlip any occaſion of throwing off the yoke of ſlavery which the Romans had put upon them. So as the only means to reſt ſecure from their Forces, ſince their words were not to be truſted, was to put them out of their ancient neſt, and to make them live far from the ſea, as they were commanded to do after that their Country was deſtroyed, ſo to bereave them of the opportunity of the ſea, by means whereof that Commonwealth was grown great and powerful. But wherein was the quiet of *Rome* bettered by the ruine of *Carthage*, if they would have to do with more barbarous Nations, and Nations further off, not moved thereunto through fear, nor provoked by any injury, thinking their Empire was only to be bounded by the Confines of the Earth? What had the *Parthians* of common with the Commonwealth of *Rome*? what injury had they then done her, to make the *Romans* take up arms againſt them? yet *Crassus* had a mind to find them out in those far diſtant parts, whereby to draw upon himſelf and the Roman Armies ſo many great loſes and ruines as they were to undergo in that War. The overthrow of *Carthage* ſhould peradventure have taken from the Citizens of *Rome* their deſire of continual warfaring, as it took from them the occaſion of being in Arms; but it did not ſo; for the cauſe which produced and nouriſh'd theſe thoughts, was internal, not external. So as they were not provoked to Arms, but did rather provoke others; and when they fought not for the welfare, they fought for the glory of the Empire: For all the Orders of that City conſiſted only in the exercise of the Miſtia. But how could a City be long paſſed, which was wholly bent upon thoſe things which were the means to bring her to her end? how could ſhe enjoy true civil felicity, if ſhe knew not what it was, and did not value it, but did abhor that peace and quiet which begets civil felicity?

Therefore if that Commonwealth had been well iſtituted in civil Orders, and that when *Carthage* was deſtroyed, ſhe had known (which ſhe did not) how to lay down Arms, this had been the way to bring her to much good, nay, to the true and chief good of civil felicity, not to the ruine and perdition thereof. So as if *Scipio* doubted that the introducing of Idlenes into *Rome* might bring with it ſuch notable diſadvantage, it was perhaps, because knowing the imperfections of that Government, he feared not that Idlenes which the laying down of Arms is wont to produce, but that which is born, and doth increase with the corrupt customs of Cities, by which contrary, but wholly peſtiferous effects are begot en; as the making of ſome Citizens love pleasures, and hate labor and toil; and others ſtrangely proud, lovers of brawls and novelty. The *Athenians* endeavoring to banish this ſort of Idlenes from out their City, committed the care thereof to the chief and moſt ſevere Magiſtrate, called *Areopagus*. But that true and vertuous Quiet which is opposed unto Toil, and which as a thing to be desired ought to be ſought for in a City, doth not banish, but doth nouriſh true generosity of mind, which makes men willingly enter, when need requires, into the dangers of War, for honesty ſake, and for the deſence of their Country, not out of ambition and deſire of ſelf-greatneſs: And to free the City from the fear of her powerful and bitter enemies, the *Carthaginians*, was not contrary to this. So as I may conclude, That it was not the deſtruction of *Carthage*, but the ill Government of *Rome*, which wrought her ruine.

The Eighth DISCOURSE.

Why Rome could not regain her Liberty after the death of Julius Cæsar, as she had formerly done, by driving the Tarquins first out, and then Appius Claudius and the other Decemviri.

Many do not without reason wonder, why the City of *Rome*, which after having droven the Tarquins out, who had reigned for above Two hundred and forty years: And which having afterwards made *Appius Claudius*, and the other *Decemviri* lay down their Magistracy, who usurped Tyranny, could put her self into a free condition; why I say she could not do the like when *Brutus*, and *Cæsarius* had slain *Julius Cæsar*: when it appears they ought rather to have done so now; the people being more numerous and powerful, and the City in such greatness, as the liberty, nay rather power which the people had in ordering that Commonwealth, ought to have been more esteemed and held dear. To this may be added, that in the time of Kings the very name of Liberty was not well known, much less was the good thereof injoyed; Wherefore a good which they had not known ought to have been of less power with them: And in the Government of Kings the City had been so successful, as it seemed she might run a hazard by chusing a new form of Government, which she had not formerly experienced. And in the time of the *Decemviri* the affairs of *Rome* were also in a very weak condition; nor ought the Liberty, or command of that City be reputed a thing of such moment as it became afterwards by the wonderful felicity by which she marched to the height of all Glory and Greatness. Besides, the Government of Ten, retained a certain shew of a Commonwealth; and many being therein interessed, she seemed to have thereby also a better ground for her subsistance; Whereas in *Cæsars* time, he having reduced the main of all affairs into himself, and begun to accept of the Title and Honors of a King, all Form of a Commonwealth and of Liberty was lost; and he having maintained himself in that degree onely by his own Greatness, and in a City so full of Nobility at that time, and of so many generously minded men, his Principality must of necessity be the weaker, and easilier to be eradicated; which when it should fall, it seemed that the former Government of Commonwealth must of it self rise up again. These and other such like reasons, afford occasion of seeking into the cause why contrary effects were seen to ensue.

We will herein consider first, what the customs of the City of *Rome* were in each of these times; and what effects were prevalent in the peoples minds, men not being accustomed to imbrace such things as are truly useful, but often such as by the predominate affection are held to be so. Whilst the City was in an humble cond.t.on, and that her Citizens were not begun to be corrupted by an immoderate ambition of Governing, there was no siding nor partaking studied amongst them, which crept on by little and little, and did so contaminate all orders, as it reduced the Commonwealth to such weakness, as wanting strength to rule her self, she must fall, and being once down could not rise up again. This corruption began amongst the Soldiers, in whom the Commanders did permit such unbridled licentiousnes, to the end that they might dispose of them as they listed to oppress their particular enemies, and sometimes against the very Commonwealth: As *Sylla* did to lessen *Marius* his power, and *Marius* no less to counterpoize *Sylla* by the

the same means, things growing into such disorder, as he made the servants of the Commonwealth to take up arms against his enemies the *Syllanians*; and this authority did so continue in great Citizens, and in the Commanders of Armies, as it seemed a wonder, that *Pompey* the Great, who had exceeded all others in Glory and Power, after his return into *Italy*, having prosperously ended his enterprise against *Mithridates*, should be content to quit the Army, when every one feared that he would enter *Rome* therewithal, and do even then with *Rome* as *Cæsar* did not long after, assume unto himself the chief Government of all publick affiis: So great was the disorder, and so little was the Authority either of Laws or Senate esteemed. But his Design, who plotted tyranny in the succeeding time, prospered the better, for that this corruption which was first entred into the Soldiers, was past into the Nobility, and spread every day abroad amongst the people: For those who had been Generals of the great Enterprises of War, being grown exceeding rich, did several waies purchase the popular votes, turning and winding them as they liked best, to the end that the places of Magistracy might be conferred on them, or upon their Friends and Adherents. Neither was the very Senate free from this contagion, but being long before accustomed not to be at their own command, but to depend upon the power of those who were of supreme Authority in the Armies, they fell headlong into the same errors into which the people were fallen, manifestly adhering by way of Faction, not by any civil favor, to particular Citizens who headed parties, and the autho:is of novelties; which was at first done with some appearance of honesty, to maintain the Commonwealth, and to defend Liberty against those who had been too immoderately exalted by the peoples favour, to the injury of other more deserving Citizens, and to the prejudice of Liberty. But in the proceſs of time and affairs, those who had taken up Arms in behalf of the Commonwealth, proved no less burthenſom, much power thereby encreasing in one particular person, then those themselves against whom Arms were taken up. For an immoderate desire of encreasing in power and wealth, began to possess the souls of many who were already accustomed to rule longer, and with greater authority, then was fitting to be done in a Civil Government. So as all things were put into great confusion; and now, not those who were worthy and valiant, but those who were most bold, & insolent found places of greatest honor in the Commonwealth. Hence it was, that it being observed that those who had adhered to *Sylla*'s party (when his Adversary being overcome, he was become almost the sole Arbitrator of all things) had often gotten great riches, and preferments in reward of their wicked actions, the wealth of those who were proscribed by *Sylla* being given to these, and such being easily proscribed at his Favorites pleasure, whom they would rob of their Palaces or of what they valued most: Many allured by hope of getting better things, and more easily then they could have done in a well-governed Commonwealth, loved confusion, and favoured the Government of one alone, thinking that they might obtain Honors, and many other favors, which are usually bestowed freely upon such as are partial to them, by those who will preserve themselves in leight of Power.

Hence then it arose that *Brutus* and *Cassius*, the murderers of *Cæsar*, were not so backed, nor met not with that general approbation from the City, to uphold their fact, and the common Liberty, as *Junius Brutus* and *Virginins* did, when they raised the people to free themselves from the Tyranny of the *Tarquins*, and of the *Decemviri*: The latter had recourse unto the Camp, and kindled a fervent desire in the Soldiers to vindicate the injuries, and insolencies used by the *Tarquins* and by *Appius*: But what favour could *Brutus* and *Cassius* expect from the Soldiers, themselves being contaminated, and more desirous to preserve the chief command in one onely person, that they might keep the power in themselves, then

to remit the Commonwealth into Liberty, whereby their uncurb'd licentiousness was to be corrected? Therefore as soon as *Octavius*, the adopted son of *Julius*, and who afterwards took upon him the name of *Octavius Cæsar*, and of *Augustus*, returned after *Cæsar's* death into *Italy*, he was freely accepted by the Army, he being well beloved by the Soldiery, out of memory to *Julius Cæsar*, and out of hopes that if he should succeed him in power, they might share in the same favors and priviledges. But *Brutus* and *Cassius* were compell'd to gather together sufficient Forces to defend themselves, to have recourse for help to Foreign Princes, and with their Soldiers to fill those Armies, which were to defend the Liberty of *Rome*. So much were the Customs of the City altered in those times, and those generous Roman spirits extinguished, who for a long time had loved the name of Liberty more then any other thing, and then any other Nation. And though the fact committed by *Cæsar's* Murtherers was approved of by the Senate, yet there were many chief men, and of great authority, who being *Cæsar's* friends, and depending upon him, did much detest it; amongst whom were *Marcus Antonius*, and *Lepidus*, *Cæsar's* intimate friends, who did openly and powerfully maintain, that *Brutus* and *Cassius* were to be pursued by the publick Arms, as Enemies to the Commonwealth, and that *Cæsar's* death should be revenged.

This diversity of inclination in the People, and in the Senate towards the former and these latter Vindicators of the Liberty of *Rome*, to boot with the diversity of Customs by which the City was swayed at these several times, were much furthered by the differing conditions of the persons interested: For the name of the *Tarquins* was become hateful to all the common people of *Rome*, not only because they kept them always busied in laboring their own grounds, but because they were become hateful to all people by reason of their haughty carriage; so as they had no Fautors who did desire or endeavour their return to *Rome*, but some few young Noblemen who were well pleased with that former Government, by reason of their intimacie with the Kings sons, which secured their insolencies. But these were not of themselves of any authority to disturb the peace and common liberty; and those in whom the publick authority did reside, were so well disposed towards the good of their Country, and so uncontaminable by any other affection, as *Brutus* condemned two of his sons to suffer death, because they were of the number of those who had conspired in favor of the Kings sons. And in the time of the *Decemviri*, *Appius* was not held to be proud, but cruel; and yet not so really, but in appearance, which by the common people is held to be as bad: For he had ordered many Lictors to walk always before him and his Colleagues, with many Fasces in their hands; and having afterwards taken away Appeals, he seemed in all his actions to aim at Tyranny, which is always injurious to the People. So as it is no wonder if they did not afterwards resent that such men should be removed from Government wherein they had behaved themselves so ill, and did desire to return under the Government of *Consuls* and other Magistracies.

To this may be added, that the People had then almost the same authority which some particular Citizens did afterwards usurp, and did go about to obtain all unjust things from the Senate by sedition, as these did in the ensuing times by force of arms. So as no such way being opened in the first State of the City, the People knew that when the *Decemvirs* should be driven away, they might obtain many things of favor to themselves, as indeed they did. For, Appeals were not only again allowed of, but much amplified, and the Tribunes of the People were declared to be *Sacrosancti*. But *Cæsar*, using therein either his natural endowments and worth, or some wonderful cunning, had wrought himself into much favor with the People, by his humanity, magnificence, liberality, by his familiarity with all men, by easily pardoning offences, making of noble and frequent Shews, by his sumptuous

sumptuous and costly Feasts, and by his rich Gifts; and by these means secured his Tyranny upon the sound foundation of universal favor, and upon the favor of many partial Friends, whom he had made great, and by many singular favors bound them fast unto him, and interested them in his own greatness and power. So as he who will consider these things duly, must confess, that in *Brutus* and *Cassius* the intention was more to be commended than the act; for their danger could bring no true safety to the Commonwealth, as they themselves were soon aware of, by flying from that City, which they ought to have summoned to Liberty, and making themselves the Heads of those who should rise up in their behalf. But the busines being inopportunely undertaken, miss'd of that success which opportunity might have brought it: For *Caesar* might easily have lost the Peoples favor, either for that thinking himself sufficiently settled in his Dominion, he might value it so much in the future; or for that they being naturally given to love change, might grow weary of his too great power, which was already begun to be much suspected by his having accepted of the title of King, and of many other Honors which he had formerly refused: Things which made the People aware of their error, in being too conformable to the will of one sole Citizen. If such an occasion had been waited for, he who should have had a mind to have restored the Commonwealth to her Liberty, might have had some better foundations for the effecting of his desire. And if it shall be objected, that the City could not throw off the yoke of servitude after the death of *Caligula* and *Nero*, though they were very vicious, and much detested by the People; it may be answered, That then the power of the Emperors, and authority of the Soldiers were too strongly confirmed, who put *Caligula* and *Nero*, and other of their successors to death, not out of any desire of restoring the City to liberty, as *Brutus* and *Cassius* had done, but for that they were weary of their Empire, and hoped to be better rewarded by those who were by them cryed up for Emperors in place of those that were slain.

The cause of such diversity of success may likewise be known, if we will consider some things more in general. Whilst the City of *Rome* was in such a condition by reason of her Laws and Customs; as she was of herself well given to Politick Government, it was impossible to introduce Tyranny, so as it could be continued there: For the Body of the City not being organised so as became such a Government, which is the Soul of the City, such a Union could not be settled there, as might assume vital Form: And as it falls out in natural affairs, every thing is not made of every thing, but from this or that other assigned matter, such, or such a thing is particularly generated, answerable to the quality of the said matter, and to the virtue of the generating cause; so in our civil actions, every State cannot be fashioned out of every State, but these things are likewise determined by a certain order; so as from Aristocracie we pass into the power of a few, from thence to a Popular condition, and at last to Tyranny.

Yet are these Transitions very hard to be observed in the City of *Rome*; for that her Government was always mixt with divers species of Regiment: yet it may be seen how divers Parties prevailed in divers Times, so as they came to constitute a different Form of Government. At the beginning Virtue was highly esteemed, the greatest Honors and chieftest Places were conferr'd upon some few that were the most famous, and most virtuous Citizens, though the People had always a share therein. But Ambition, and the desire of Rule and Riches, did afterwards mightily increase in the Nobility; who deceiving the Multitude by several artifices, they reduced so much of the publick Authority into themselves, to maintain their private greatness, as the Laws having lost their efficacy, and the choice of the Magistrates, and the resolution in all weighty and important affairs, depending upon the will of some few powerful Citizens,

the City wholly lost the resemblance that she had of an Aristocratical State; and took the form of being governed by a few: And those very Citizens, that they might preserve the power amongst themselves, were forced to favor the multitude, by promising and permitting unto them things that were both unworthy, and unlawful. So these men, that they might domineer over more noble personages, were forced to obey the base will of the Soldiers, and of abject and insolent Popular men, which reduced the Commonwealth at last to a base and corrupt Popular State (though in former times the peoples Authority was always great, but better moderated notwithstanding by the Laws and certain considerations) from whence it was more easie afterwards to pass to Tyranny, the Plotters using those very means, which it hath been observed *Cæsar* made use of, to usurp unto himself the sole Government of the Commonwealth.

Such changes have usually been seen in other Cities, and at other times, where the condition of Government hath given the same occasion. So *Athens* was alwaies subject to frequent alterations of Government, and particularly to Tyranny; Insomuch as the wise Legislator *Solon*, who had the charge of reforming it, before his death saw it fallen from the state whereinto he had reduced it, and tyranny brought in by *Pisistratus*: for the corruption which was amongst the Inhabitants, afforded matter and means to any one who had a mind to posses himself of the Liberty thereof. And it is likewise seen of Modern Commonwealths, that those wherein the people have had much authority, or rather licentiousness, they have not been able to keep in a constant Government, free from Civil Seditions, and have been but short-lived. As happened in the City of *Florence*, wherein for the consideration abovesaid, it was easier for them who had a mind to suppress the liberty thereof, and hard for him who desired to preserve it. So as though the House of *Medici* hath by various accidents been sundry times driven from thence, and though *Alexander* the first Duke thereof lost his life; the City, though otherwise noble and magnificent, being much infected with parties, and corrupted by popularity; all endeavors of preserving it in the form of a Commonwealth, and in true liberty, proved vain: And on the contrary, the Commonwealth of *Venice*, by reason of her excellent Form of Government, which though it be mixt, hath little in it of Popular Government, and much of the *Optimati*, not having given way to such corruptions as use to trouble the quiet of civil life, nor afforded means to any who should goe about to plot against the publick Liberty, hath been able for a very long space of time to maintain her self in one and the same condition, and free from those dangers, into which other Commonwealths have fallen, for not having a Government of equal temper with that of hers.

The Ninth DISCOURSE,

Which is the safer way to be taken, to arrive at Honor and Glory in a Commonwealth; that which was held by Cato, or that which was pursued by Cæsar.

Julius Cæsar, and Marcus Cato, who was afterwards called Uticensis, both of them very famous, and greatly cried up persons, both for their excellent endowments of mind, and for the great Authority which they held both with the Senate, and with the people, did both of them flourish at the same time in the Commonwealth of *Rome*: But they did so differ in Manners and Customs, as it may afford occasion of wonder, if we will consider how, steering several courses, they happened both of them to arrive almost at one and the same end: And of doubt in him who shall propound unto himself the example of these two great Personages, to purchase Fame and Power in a Commonwealth, whether of the two he ought most to imitate. *Cæsar* won much love by his great humanity, liberality and magnificence; but *Cato* was reverenced for the austerity of his Comportment, by the integrity of his life, and for the zeal he shewed in the managing of all publick affairs. Those who were opprest either by poverty, or by enemies had recourse to *Cæsar* for protection; and those who hated wicked men, and the inventors of novelties, trusted that *Cato* would chastise and suppress them. *Cæsar* never spared for any labour by which he might hope to purchase renown and glory; and *Cato* by despising glory became glorious: *Cæsar* desired to shew generosity, and greatness of spirit in all his actions; and *Cato* delighted in nothing more than in modesty, and innocency of life: *Cæsar* was much given to all acts of Grace; and *Cato* constant in all acts of Justice: *Cæsar* seemed to take delight in Sports, Feasts, and Banquets; and *Cato* profest openly to scorn all favor, save what the merit of his own worth brought with it. So as the greatness wherein the Commonwealth then was, was said to be most resplendent in *Cæsar*, so the preservation of the antient Form of the Commonwealth, and of the customs of her first age was held to be preserved in one onely *Cato*. These two so excellent Personages took these two differing ways, yet each of them acquired great Renown, Fame, and Authority. Great was *Cæsars* glory by the many things he did in War, but *Cato* was no less celebrated for Civil Affairs. *Cæsar* by his great Authority could make *France* be first assigned unto him, and then confirmed upon him, where he kept in chief command with his Army for the space of Ten years; He also made use of the peoples favour, not to aggrandise himself, but to make the greatest honors be conferred on his Friends, and upon such as depended on him, which was that which made his faction so potent. And truly, he who will consider it well, will finde that as long as *Rome* retained any Form of a Commonwealth, *Cato's* power was no less then was *Cæsars*, for he oftentimes bore it even against *Cæsar*: As when the busyness of those that were Complices with *Catiline* in his conspiracy, was in hand in the Senate, they being accused by *Cato*, and defended by *Cæsar*, were condemned to be put to death. And also another time, when he opposed the publishing of the Law proposed, and favoured by *Cæsar*, touching the division of Lands in *Latium*, wherein *Cato's* authority appeared to be the greater, by making *Cæsars* ambitious designs fail of success in so popular things as were the *Agrarian* Laws. The same success had the things maintained by *Cæsar* against *Pompey*, though he was more powerful then any other Citizen; for having stoutly opposed

opposed *Metellus*, who moved at the time of *Cataline's* conspiracy, that *Pompey* should together with his Army be recalled back to *Rome*, he carried the business; which was the cause why these two prime Citizens endeavored the friendship and good will of *Cato*, for they doubted of compassing what they desired without his good will, so great was his Authority. *Cæsar*, when *Cato* appeared to be his bitterest enemy, procured *Cato's* releasement, when he was imprisoned by order from the Senate: And *Pompey*, that he might be fastened to him by the bond of Alliance, endeavored to have his Neece for Wife. Whence it is conceived, that *Cato's* austere behaviour had purchased him more Authority, though unarmed, in the management of the Commonwealth, then the reputation of having commanded Armies, and their so much obsequiousness to the people, had done to *Pompey* and *Cæsar*.

A just occasion then offers it self here of consideration, whether was the better, and safer course taken to arrive at Glory, and Civil Greatness, or that which *Cæsar*, or that which *Cato* took? *Cæsar's* comportments seem to have been more noble, and better befitting a Civil life, as also more easie to be imitated; and what indeed is of more importance for the happiness of a City, then quietness and concord amongst Citizens? What more proper to produce and preserve this, then Magnificence, Grace and Affability? all which vertues were proper to *Cæsar*, and which by a straight and speedy way guided him to the height of greatness and glory. He who desires to obtain this favour from Citizens, must abstain from doing any injury, must seek out all occasions of doing good, must attribute much to others, must speak moderately of himself, must do good things, and make them appear to be so, so as he may help not onely by his actions, but by his example. Rigor, Severity, the négléct of all other respects, where there is onely an upright mind to do well (things which are sufficiently commendable in *Cato*) may of themselves peradventure border nearer upon true vertue, but bear a less proportion with civil vertue, if respect be had to that which is found, not to that which is desired. Who does not value the love of his Citizens, or will not endeavor the acquisition thereof save by very upright ways, which are not always possible, meets with continual occasion of contention, from whence great and open enmities do often arise, which do at last put the City into confusion. So as such men do first ruine themselves, and then the Commonwealth. When laws are observed with such extremity of rigor, it seems to be done to oppress Citizens, not to preserve Justice; Wherefore such a Government is but little acceptable, and therefore easier to receive alteration upon any accident that shall happen: This was seen in *Cato's* actions; for his way of proceeding got him many enemies, who that they might make themselves able to bulk with his Authority, made themselves strong by Alliances and Friendships, and became not onely formidable to him, but even to the Commonwealth. If *Cato* had not despised the Parentage offered him by *Pompey*, *Cæsar* had not joynd alliance with him by giving him his Daughter *Julia* for Wife, which was the occasion of both their too excessive greatness, by which they ruined the Commonwealth. The people were not pleased with *Cato's* severe way of proceeding, which made them the more easily adhere to *Cæsar*, and his Associats, and so not perceiving it, became enemies to the Commonwealth. Therefore *Cæsar* might still continue in the peoples good opinion, and long preserve his Authority and Power: But *Cato*, though his counsels did sometimes prevail, yet was not his Dignity and Power grounded upon so sound foundations, as that he could alwaies keep himself in the same condition: Nay, sometimes things were born against him in the choyce of Consuls, when people much more unworthy then he were Corrivals with him. The little pleasingness of his proceedings was also cause, though under pretence of honor, and publick employ-

imployment, why he was sent from the City, and in a manner banished, being sent by Sea to *Cyprus* for some concernments of that Kingdom; so as the Commonwealth suffered by his absence; and particularly *Cicero*, who was formerly upheld by *Cato's* authority, and held for a Defender of the publick Liberty, was banished. By these things the question seems clearly enough decided, that *Caesars* way of proceeding is much more easie and certain to bring a man to dignity and greatness, then the way which *Cato* took.

Yet he who on the other side shall examine *Cato's* manners and actions, as he will find them more praise-worthy, so will he think that they may lead by a righter and more direct way to true Honor, and to that greatness which is to be desired by him that lives in a Commonwealth. For he takes a safer and a more noble way to arrive at Dignity, who walks by the way of true Virtue, of Justice, Modesty and Temperance, then he who endeavors the like by Popular Favor: For that Favor which is won by a good repute, and by vertuous actions, is easily preserved by herself, and of herself; nay, the cry'd-up Honor which ariseth from publick Employments and Places, if it be not grounded upon true worth, soon vanisheth, and leaves that in obscurity which did before shine forth so bright. But he who deals uprightly, doth always advance as it were by a certain natural motion, and confirms himself more and more in the habit of well-doing. So that Favor which hath so good a leaning-stock, is more firm and stable; whereas that which is purchased by extrinsical appearances, as it is easilier gotten, so is it upon any flight occasion more easily lost. For those who are moved to favor for such reasons, are incited so to do rather out of their own humor, or for their own advantage, then out of any true affection that they bear to such persons: And therefore growing either glutted of the same things they did so like at first, or thinking that they may receive them in a larger proportion from others, they change their minds, and turn their liking elsewhere.

Moreover, he who does that which of it self is good, can never want a reward: For though he do not purchase those exterior demonstrations which are usually gotten by worth, and which do more illustrate it, he notwithstanding feels that true content within himself which springs from well-doing, and which is held by wise men to be the best reward of good actions. For he who loves and favors Equity and Justice, makes the Laws be observed, prefers the publike good before private interest, thinks nothing an injury wherein the Commonwealth is not offended; this man may be truly said to be a great Citizen; for that publick dignity and greatness maintains his private credit and estimation: Nay, such men as these, if by any ill fortune or bad accident they fall from favor, they find always, as it were by some occult power of Virtue, some others to protect them. As was seen in *Cato*, who having drawn upon him the enmity of the greatest part of the Nobility, and being but little befriended by the People for impeding the *Agrarian* Law, though he were for a while held low, he was notwithstanding created Consul in rivalship with *Metellus*, who was favored by *Pompey*. And by a more notable example, *Murena* himself, who was accused in Judgment by *Cato*, was not only not his Enemy afterwards, but defended him against *Metellus*; and *Cato's* reverend authority prevailed over *Metellus* his fury, who being accompanied by a number of armed men, was come into the *Piazzza* to promote the Law of making *Pompey* return with his Army to the City in the time of *Catalines* Conspiracie: And we read, that when he returned from *Cyprus*, the Magistrates, Priests, the whole Senate, and very many of the People went in such numbers to meet him, as the banks of *Tyber* were full of them on both sides, as if he had entred into the City in triumph. And another time being in the publick Assemblies put by the Pretorship, by the violence of the Consuls *Crassus* and *Pompey*, yet he, being but a private man, was accompanied home to his own house that very day with more men, then followed the Magistrates.

If then we will know in this diversity of affairs, which of these two courses it is best to follow, since by what you have heard, equal credit may almost be given unto both, we must weigh what his natural inclination is who will set these examples before him to follow them; what the true end is which he proposeth unto himself, and after what Form of Government that Commonwealth is ordered in which he is born, and which he serves: for without such considerations it is hard to know what course of life a man must take. He who seeks to win favor, must above all things shun affectation, as that which makes a man always suspected to be ambitious, and his actions not acceptable. For he whose genius is naturally given to humanity, and to a sweet and pleasant manner of conversation, if leaving that, he will put on a Socratical severity and gravity, he cannot hope to use it so, but that some other end being discovered to be in him, he will not only not win credit, but will sometimes become ridiculous. So on the contrary, when a man is known not to be wittily or facetiously given, but that his nature is rather given to be grave, if he will appear to be civil and very familiar, faunting and flattering with humble words, and in a base manner, he incurs the same mischief; for such forced behavior denotes affectation, and grows tedious. *Cato* was born with this severity, as he had witnessed all his life time, by all his actions. He was a Sloven in his feeding and in his apparel; he went on foot to his Country-house, and sometimes when he was in place of Magistracy he would give Audience unshod; and in Garments unfit for the Bench. In fine, all his actions were unpolished, severe, despising such things as others did most value. The clean contrary was seen in *Cæsar*, who was given to quaint behaviour, humanity and grace. They therefore by their several ways proved both of them great men, and famous, because they followed their natural genius and inclinations.

In the next place, the end which a man propounds unto himself, who endeavors to get Honors and Employments in a Commonwealth, is to be considered: for if he aim only at the publick Service, and at his Countries good, it is fittest for such a one to lay aside all particular interest, and not valuing any private favor, to attend only a punctual observance of the Laws, and the depression of such Citizens, who to the prejudice of the publick Liberty, will become too powerful as did *Cato*. But if one who is miserly byassed by ambition, propounds unto himself the becoming great and powerful, by any whatsoever means; those arts and applications which are pleasing to most men, and which purchase applause, and universal liking, will certainly lead him more safely to that end, and conduce most to his purpose, as they did to *Cæsar*; who abasing himself that he might mount the higher; giving, that he might get the more; being subservient unto others, to the end that he might command over them, knew so well how to cover his most affected and ambitious thoughts, as at last he did not only attain to the greatest Authority that is usually granted to any one in any Commonwealth, but drew all Dignity and publick Authority upon himself.

Next it must be had in consideration, what the Form of that Commonwealth must be, in the which a man who lives therein, propounds unto himself the acquisition of place and honor. For if the Form be Optimatical, wherein virtue is esteemed above all things, certainly *Cato's* Manners and Customs will better suit with such a Government; for in such a Commonwealth, the Magistrates in their dispensation aim chiefly at those things which were very eminent, and much commended in *Cato*: But if the peoples authority be great in the City, *Cæsar's* Manners and Artifices will be better beloved, and likelier to win approbation, and consequently the peoples favor in their suffrages, which may carry them to the height of Civil preferment. Therefore in *Sparta*, which was an Optimatical Commonwealth, divers men did flourish, who in their lives and manners did resemble *Cato*; as on

the contrary, those Citizens were most esteemed of in *Athens* which was a Popular Commonwealth, who knew how to win the Peoples good will, after *Cæsars* way: whence it was that she fell easily afterwards into the power of many Tyrants; insomuch as the liberty of the Commonwealth was possest at one and the same time by Thirty such men. But in *Rome* where the Government was partly Popular, partly Optimatical, both *Cæsar* and *Cato* might win renown, for divers Citizens were diversly minded, according to the diversity of Government in the administration of publick affairs; but in that mixture, *Cæsar* might get firmer, and more settled authority then *Cato* in civil dissentions, because the Popular Faction was much the greater. So that *Cato* siding with the Senate to the very last, and being, according to his wont, and worth, unwilling, to be exposed to the licentious will and pleasure of the Conquerors, he was born down, together with the Senate, and reduced to the necessity of making himself away. And *Cæsar* being by the Soldiers suffrages, and by force, confirmed and settled in Power and Authority, which were already too immoderately granted him in the Commonwealth by the peoples favor, he possest himself of the common publick Liberty, and destroyed all Form of Civil Government.

The Tenth DISCOURSE.

To what Age of the City of Rome, the greatest praise and merit is to be given, for the prosperity and greatness, whereto she arrived.

Such and so many are the Grandeur and prosperities of the City of *Rome*, as the consideration thereof affords always new matter of discovering divers mysteries therein very well worthy to be examined and observed: but if we shall consider amongst many other things, how her prosperity did still from time to time increase both in state and reputation, a particular desire will arise in us, of knowing to what Age the chief praise and merit of that Cities arrivall at such a height of Greatness and Glory, is to be attributed. Three Ages may chiefly be numbered wherein that great City did still more and more increase, and grow greater in Reputation. To wit, the first, which may be termed her Infancy; from the foundation of the City till the driving out of the *Tarquins*, and to the first Consulship of *Junius Brutus*, and of *Tarquinius Collatinus* which was the space of Two hundred twenty four years: The second, which shall be her Adolescence, from that time till the beginning of the second Carthaginian War; betwixt two which times, there passed the space of Two hundred forty six years: The third, her Youth, which was the flowre of her years, and of her greatest prosperity, may be termed the rest of that time which past from the beginning of the said War, which was in the Consulship of *Appius Claudius*, surnamed the *Bold*, till *Cæsars* Dictatorship, the space of Two hundred and twenty years, which makes up the full number of Seven hundred and ten years, which the Commonwealth of *Rome* lasted, which might be so termed for the temperate Government of the first Kings, and for the authority which the Senate held therein also, as long as the Dominion lasted. For what concerns the times of Emperors, no mention needs to be made thereof, for what concerns our purpose: For to boot with the corruption which ensued of the first Form of Civil Government, they enjoyed,

and for the most part but unworthily, the labors of other men ; and though the City maintained herself in great height for the space of four hundred years, nay, though many gallant and magnifick things were by the Majesty of the Empire, and by the Emperors power, yet these did not concur to the first foundation of the Empire, which is that which is now particularly enquired into ; but the Empire did for the most part decline in divers parts, and in sundry times, till at last it began to hasten more headlong to ruine.

The chief and greatest praise then of this most noble and most artificial Fabrick may be attributed to the first that laid the first foundation : For those that succeeded them, finding that they might thereupon safely erect the great structure of the Roman Empire, their Counsels were excited, and their work chiefly helped by those who did first think thereupon, and did so work, as the City being well ordered and disposed of with good principles, might rise to a greater degree of dignity and Empire. But those of the third Age, having noble examples of worth before them, and seeing so good and gallant a work already so prosperously increased and raised up, went more courageously on to greater and more noble works, having framed a conceit unto themselves out of the former prosperous successes, that they might be able to make (as they did) their City the Mistress and Monarch of all Nations. The first Age was governed by seven Kings, of differing natures and customs for the most part, but well fitted to what concerned the service of the new City, and Romes rising greatness. For *Romulus*, the Father and Founder thereof, was excellent at Arms ; so as accompanied by other military men, he began the first habitation, and did so order things, as the new City might subsist of herself, without putting herself under the protection of any neighboring people. But *Numa*, who succeeded him, that he might give the form of a true City to the new Inhabitants, ordering them by certain Laws, and chiefly by Religious worship, did so behave himself, as in all succeeding times that City was always much given to Religious affairs ; which though they were false of themselves, yet did he thereout draw good advantage concerning Civil affairs. The third King, *Tullus Hostilius*, reassuming Arms, bridled the boldness of the neighboring people, who conspired the ruine of the City ; and getting many victories over them, began not only to think of such things as concerned the safety of the City, but to enlarge her Confines by way of Arms in her neighbors Territories. *Anus Martius* did study Civil affairs more, and minded the multiplying of people in the City, and the making of divers Orders which might reduce it to the form of a great and well-governed City. *Tarquinius Priscus* accustomed the People to know the majesty and dignity of Empire ; by which reverence he, to the great service of publick affairs, increased obedience in those who both then and afterwards were to command in the City, and in the Armies. But *Tarquinius Superbus*, the City being already got to her full growth, procuring his own ruine by his rashness and unbridled licentiousness, opened the way to the liberty of *Rome*, and to her greater greatness.

By which things it may be conceived, that the second Age found the City already well instituted in Arms and Religion, much increased in People and Buildings, accustomed to know the dignity and majesty of Empire, she being esteemed and feared by the neighboring people, an Enemy to Tyranny, and finally fit to receive a good Form of Civil Government, and able to govern herself by her own Orders and Forces. So as those who followed in the ensuing Age, finding the way chalk'd out unto them to lead the City on to a greater degree not only of safety, but of glory, they found less of difficulty in all their undertakings : As it is usual in all things, whereunto it is harder to give a beginning, then to augment them. Wherefore the praise is due to those first Romans, which is given to the first Inventor of things, of knowing how to put on generous thoughts, and use good counsels, when

the City was so weak as she knew not how to nourish them, nor had any example of her own men. Therefore in the following Age, the height of praise which was given to any one that had deserved well of the Commonwealth, was to honor him with the name of *Pater Patriæ*, and to compare his actions to those of *Romulus*, and of those that followed next after him; from whom, as from the first Founders of the City of *Rome*, it was generally granted that the rest had received power and virtue to imitate them. The custom was therefore always observed in *Rome*, of honoring her Birth-day with solemn sacrifices, as that which by its happy Auspices had not only given excellent Auguries, but as it were a certain vigor to the so many other Felicities which did at all times accompany her. And it was particularly interpreted for an excellent Augury of the City of *Rome*'s greatness, and of her increase in power and authority over all the Latines, that she was born and increased from the ruines of *Alba*, most of the Latines having been Colonies of the ruined City of *Alba*.

Now if we shall consider what may be alledged on the behalf of the second Romans, we shall find such and so many things to be said for them, as the first Garland of the glory of *Rome*'s greatness may seem to be due to them, without offence to any others. For he who shall weigh things well, shall find that this Age brought forth more noble and truer Examples of real worth, than any other; so as they did not only excell themselves, but even all Foreiners: For the military valor which flourished in the Citizens of *Rome* of this Age, was accompanied with other excellent virtues, and especially with vast charity towards their Country, not for their own glory, but out of love to her greatness and prosperity. Danger was so despised by some of them, as some famous men amongst them did even sacrifice themselves and their lives for their Countries welfare, as the examples of *Curtius*, and of the two *Decii* do even at this day, much to their glory, shew. The generous Commanders in that Age did contemn riches as well as danger; so as they overcame not only their Enemies, but even themselves; things which were praised and admired in *Quintus Cincinnatus*, in *Fabritius*, and in *Paulus Aemilius*. But how famous did they prove in matter of War, and worthy of that praise which is given to excellent Commanders! He who shall consider how Enterprises were managed by the two *Papyrii*, the Father and the Son, against the *Samnites*; what the Forces of the conquered Enemies were; of what advantage their victory was to the *Romans*; will confess that their merits came not short of any, neither in those, nor in the following times. This Age was often to withstand the *Galls*, who were powerful and bitter Enemies to the *Romans*, by whom the very City of *Rome* was assaulted and endangered; for the delivery whereof *Furius Camillus* grew so famous. But this was not the only occasion of trying the Roman Forces against the *French* in those times: *Quintus Servilius Ala*, and *Q. Fabius* withstood them; when the *French* returning more powerful than before neer to the City of *Rome*, by means of these illustrious Commanders, their whole endeavors proved vain. In this Age, divers People of *Italy* did sundry times jointly conspire against the City of *Rome*; which, the more formidable she grew to her neighbors, the more did a common apprehension make them arm against her: And notwithstanding, she did not only seem not daunted amidst those dangers, but having still the better of those by whom she was infested, she increased by the ruine of others. For these reasons Forein forces were called in by the very *Italians*, and *Pyrrhus* was received into *Italy*, that he might wage war with the *Romans*; whose renown was so great, as the chief honor in matters of war was given by *Hannibal* to *Pyrrhus*. And he who in a few words will conceive the worth of the Commanders in this Age, let him say that *Livy*, who was much versed in the Roman affairs, did attribute so much to the Commanders of this Age, as he esteemed them not only equal, but superior to *Alexander the Great*: holding for certain,

certain, that if *Alexander* after he had conquered *Darius*, had turned into *Italy*, he would have left the glory that he won in *Persia*, when he should have met with the Roman Forces, commanded by *Fabius Maximus*, *Valerius Corvinus*, *Papyrius Cursor*, and *Titus Manlius*.

But above all things it is worth consideration, that in this Age, the City of *Rome*, was confirmed and established with more certain and useful orders, as well in Civil as in Military Affairs, whereby she long after was governed, and by virtue whereof, she chiefly arrived at such a height of greatness. Great were the rewards which were given in *Rome* to military worth, and those Citizens were much egg'd on by glory to great undertakings, and sharp sufferings. Triumph was a great ornament and glory to victorious Commanders; which was first used to honor the Consul *Posthumius*, for the Victory he wan over the *Sabins*. The first equestral Statues, were likewise an invention of this Age, which were granted to Consuls who overcame the *Latins* in Battel. In this Age the Mural and Civic Garlands were first used, to the end, that there might be rewards for every mans worth. The wintiring of Soldiers in the Fields and under Tents, was begun to be used by the Romans in this Age: a thing which proved so useful and necessary afterwards in greater and farther distant enterprises. What did more advantage the City of *Rome* in her greatest dangers and weightiest occasions, then the authority of *Dictator*; a Magistracy of reverend majesty, and which proved so often the true and onely remedy to maintain the affairs of *Rome* in their less prosperous times. This was first created in *Rome*, to resist the forces of Forty *Populi Latini*, who were joyned in league together against the Romans, and against whom *Posthumius* was created the first *Dictator*. But how reverend and unviolable the obseruance of military orders were with the Commanders of this Age, may be demonstrated by the famous examples of the severity of *Posthumius*, and of *Manlius Torquatus* against their own Sons, who for not obeying the command of their Superiors, though it were accompanied with noble daring, and happy success, was punished by death.

And as this age was busied in perpetual Wars, new Wars being perpetually raised up by the same people of *Latium* and *Toscany*, whom they had often overcome, so to it that Fortitude, Vertue of mind, and Military Discipline is chiefly to be attributed, by which the people of *Rome* proved more excellent then all other Nations. For this so continual exercise of Arms for so many years together, did so accustom the City to Military Affairs, as it was not onely easie for those that followed after, to tread in the footsteps of these their Predecessors, but almost necessary for the preservation of the City; which being long accustomed to labor and warlike occupations, could not, nor would not without intestine disorder, live in idleness. And as for the orders in Civil Affairs, certainly no small praise is likewise due to this Age; for not to touch upon many particular Laws and Institutions; the most famous Laws amongst the Romans of the Twelve Tables, made in the Decemvirate of *Appius Claudius* and his Colleagues, by which the City of *Rome* was chiefly governed, were Institutions of this Age; industriously taking divers things from the Grecians, amongst whom more then in any other Nation, all learning, and all the most noble Arts did then chiefly flourish. Amongst other things, great was the wisdom of allowing the *Latins* to be free Denizens of *Rome*, for hereby the City was notably augmented, and her Empire established. For she did not onely for ever free her self from the vexation which she had had for the space of Four hundred years by the Forces of these people, whom they had often subdued, and who had often rebelled against the Romans, and could not by Force be kept within the bonds of obedience; but being hereby obliged so fast, and so interessed in the same Affairs with the Romans, she was much assisted

assisted by them in the so many Wars which the Romans made afterwards. The use of Colonies was of great advantage likewise to the Roman Empire; for it served to *ease* the City when she was opprest with too many Citizens, and to keep others in obedience who were daily reduced under the Roman Empire. And this use of Colonies, though it had a certain weak beginning, when *Romulus* sent some to inhabit in the City of *Fidena*, yet was it oftener and more orderly introduced, and confirmed in this second Age; So as experience shewing the good of this institution to those that came after, this custom was ever after followed by the Romans. This Age is likewise a great argument of the civil wisdom of the Citizens: for though there were therein important Insurrections often made, and so great broils between the People and the Nobility; and though it were harder to keep those in obedience, who had continued to serve in the Commonwealth in her Wars for the space of a hundred years after the driving out of their Kings, without pay, yet were they able to appease all discords without the effusion of any civil blood, as it happed afterwards in the third Age, wherein great tumults arose from little ones; so as Civil Wars, or at least dissensions and partakings continued amongst the Citizens for about Fifty years, from *Sylla*'s Dictatorship to that of *Cesars*, thereupon the final ruine of the Commonwealth ensued. It also gives a great proof of the perfection of the orders observed in the City of *Rome* in these times, that she was twice able to shake off slavery; First, that of the Kings, and then that of the *Decemviri*; which the Third Age could not do, which being once fallen under the command of *Sylla*, though he himself forewent the vast authority which was granted him, and left the City in Liberty, continued notwithstanding still in factions, which soon after brought her past all remedy under *Cesars* most express Tyranny. And certainly great was the endeavor after Liberty in this second Age, in respect whereof all things else were set at nought; insomuch as *Brunus* did not pardon his own Sons life, it being suspected that he had had to do with *Tarquin* to the prejudice of Liberty; and the whole people of *Rome* condemned *Manlius Capitolinus* to death, he who had saved the Capitol and the City of *Rome*, for being suspected his actions tended towards Tyranny. Those who lived in the hardest times of this second Age shewed their constant generosity, when the City of *Rome* being burnt and destroyed by the French, they would not abandon her, and go to live at *Veij*, as their forlorn fortune, and the condition of these times seemed to advise them to do; but kept their hopes alive for better things, which if they had then abandoned, that name and fame of *Rome* had peradventure been for ever lost, which her happy genius promised her. So as he who shall consider the works and actions of those Citizens of *Rome* of this second Age, may with reason think them worthy of great praise; so as it may seem they had nothing to desire, whereby to have been made as illustrious in the sight of the world, and their actions equal to those of the Third Age, then to have had occasion of greater enterprises, as they had. But on the contrary, these mens actions are more to be commended for the integrity of their manners, for their love towards their Country, and for their other noble vertues; whereas in those of the last Age the splendor of their glorious actions in War, was oft-times obscured, and stained by other vices, by Ambition, Avarice, and immoderate Liberty; to which things the Third Age was so addicted, as they brought her in the height of her greatest prosperity, to utter ruine.

But before we pass this sentence, it will become us in justice to hear what those gallant Romans can say in their own behalfs, who by the cried up Fame of their stupendious actions, have filled the world with the glory, and wonder of the Roman greatness. And how much shorter the time was wherein the supreme Monarchy was founded and established, so much greater demonstration is thereof the

the generosity and worth of these men, who had the boldness to undertake so many Enterprises, and could bring them to a good end. For, the first time that the *Romans* carried their Forces out of *Italy*, was by reason of the Carthaginian War; wherein amongst other things, it was not only a thing commendable, but much to be wondred at, that the *Romans*, being till then unexperienced in Maritime affairs, did so soon learn that manner of Discipline, as they overcame the *Carthaginians* in many Sea-fights, who for so long a time before had profess'd themselves to be Sea-men, and had the first place given them by all other Nations for their Naval preparations.

But whereby can the excellent Military Discipline of the *Romans* be better known, and their unvanquish'd worth, then by their deeds done in the second Carthaginian War; wherein at one and the same time they were able to maintain so many Armies in *Italy*, *Sicily*, *Spain*, and *Greece*? And yet one only City of *Rome* could furnish them all with Commanders and Soldiers out of her own Citizens, and Italian Colonies; and that in so great a number, as that there was above Eighty thousand fighting men of the Roman Army in the Fight at *Canne*. On the contrary, *Carthage*, though her Dominions were large and powerful, after she had been several times routed by the *Romans* in *Spain*, being willing to defend *Africa*, nay the very City of *Carthage*, the head of the Empire, was forc'd to recall that her Commander in chief, and those her Soldiers which she had in *Italy*. The *Romans* thrice overcome in battel by *Hannibal*, took still fresh courage, and assuming new Forces, did evn face Fortune, whom they won at last to be their friend, and in a maner obedient to their deserts. But the *Carthaginians*, when once overcome by *Scipio* in Fight neer *Zama*, yielded, and humbled themselves to the *Romans*. But the last *Punick War*, as it ended in a shorter time, and with less trouble then the former two, so brought it more glory and security to the *Romans*; for the very name of the formidable Roman Forces, was sufficient to put an end to that War; and the final ruine of *Carthage* which ensued, did for ever secure the Commonwealth of *Rome* from the false faith of the *Carthaginians*.

But other great and noble feats of Arms, undertaken at the same time with great courage and happy augury, as the War against *Philip* in *Macedonia*, and in *Asia* against *Antiochus*, did sufficiently illustrate the Roman Forces, and did enlarge the Confines of their Empire in farthest distant Nations. In the three *Punick Wars*, which lasted forty three years, with variety of fortune, they fought sometimes more for safety then for glory: But herein the People of *Rome* shewed not only the power of their Forces, but the generosity of their minds; having undertaken the one War to revenge the injuries received from *Philip*, in his having supplied *Hannibal* with succors; and the other to preserv'e some Cities in *Asia*, antient Colonies of *Greece*, in their Liberty, and from being injuriously oppress'd by *Antiochus*. And if it be said, that these so many Enterprises were made by the Italian Forces; the first and chiefest difficulty consisting in the subjugating of *Italy*, the first and chiefest praise seems to be due to th's Age: But take this for granted, it must be added, that a great share of this very praise is due to the last Age; for the *Insibri* and *Liguri* were not assubjected by the *Romans*, till after the end of the second Carthaginian war; the first being conquered by *Marcellus*, the second by *Quintus Fulvius*; who won so much the more glory thereby, for that these are very noble parts of *Italy*, and that the Country of the *Insibri* was posses'd by the *Galls*, who were at that time very potent in those parts, and *Liguria* was inhabited by a very fierce and warlike people. These are not then things altogether so great and glorious, as that they surpas's all other things done by other men at other times: But if we shall look further into this very Age of *Rome*, we shall meet with other actions so great, and as miraculous, as their splendor will obscure the glory of those very *Romans*, who

who were so cryed up in comparison of other Nations. For when the City of *Carthage* was utterly ruin'd, with which the City of *Rome* had fought so long, and oft-times with variety of fortune, and those dangers being secured for ever, there not remaining any other Potentate who could of himself give a just counterpoise to the Roman power, they march'd so fast on to Monarchy, as in t' e space of one hundred years, between that time, and the time of *Cæsars* Dictatorship, they extended the Confines of the Roman Empire almost over the face of the whole Earth. Amongst the rest, great was that War which was taken against *Mithridates*, under pretence of defending *Nicomedes* and *Ariobarzanes*, who were Friends to the People of *Rome*, but in effect to oppose his vast designs, wherein aspiring at the dominion of all *Asia*, and of *Europe* also, he became formidable even to the very *Romans*; who though they had to do with this potent Enemy, who could put together in this War an Army of Two hundred thousand Foot, and Fifty thousand Horse, and a Fleet of Three hundred Ships, yet did they not only discomfit *Mithridates*, but took occasion to make other Victories in Nations far off; for they marched with their Armies into *Armenia* against *Tigranes*, because he had favored *Mithridates*, and received him into his Kingdom, when he was driven away by the *Romans*. And he who will observe the Roman History, will have occasion of wonder, that though the Roman Commanders and Armies were often overcome in battel, yet in all the Wars that ever they made they have at last proved Victors. But the things that were done in the last years of this Age, do exceed whatsoever could at first have fallen into the thought of man, thereby to settle the Commonwealth in a flourishing and fortunate condition. To pass by so many other glorious Victories and Triumphs, who can choose but admire the great deeds of *Pompey* and of *Cæsar*? the speed which the first made in finishing so many Wars, his great good fortune chiefly in subjugating so many Eastern Provinces in a very short time; and the second's constancie and fortitude, demonstrated in so many battels, and in curbing so many Western Nations. In so much as it is said of both these, that each of them won above eight hundred Cities to the Roman Empire; which certainly hath dimmed and obscured the glory and memory of all Antiquity.

What resolution shall then be given in this so doubtful question, in which so many reasons may be alleaged on all sides? It is a great matter certainly to give a beginning to things, which being afterwards increased, are wont usually to proceed on more easily: And yet on the other side, according to the known saying, they are no less to be commended who add to things begun, and do preserve what is already gotten, then are the original Authors. But neither these, nor those may be said to have won the Gole; which they can only properly be said to do, who bring things already begun; and since much augmented, to the highest pitch of perfection which such a thing is capable of, or whereunto, being measured with due respect, it can arrive. And these degrees are found in almost all things that are effected by humane industry; that is, the beginning, the increase, and the perfection: After which two other things follow, declination, and final ruine, whereof we do now treat. But these several degrees may clearly enough be observed in Empires. In these then did the Citizens of *Rome* adoperate themselves in all the aforesaid Ages so worthily, and so much to the good of the City, as each of them may seem to lay claim to the chief Crown of the Roman glory. It may then be said, that though many things concur to the production of any thing, yet do they not all do it after the same manner, nor are they all of equal dignity in themselves, or of equal force for the constituting of that work. Thus in the foundation of *Romes* Monarchy, certainly the Founders of the City did concur from whom she received her first nutriment, which help'd so much to strengthen that body, and made it fit to sustain the weight of so great an Emp.re. Those also who did next succeed them, who did add to her Militia,

her Government, to her good orders both for War and Peace, and made her fitter for greater things, have their part therein ; and finally, those who by so many, and so signal Victories, placed her, as it were, with her own hands on the top of her greatest power and dignity. But in this connumeration of things, what can be affirmed, but that the last Age, which by her particular Acts, and labors saw the Commonwealth seated, as it were, in the Throne of Majesty, may with reason challenge the greatest part of this merit and glory, because she concurred as the nearest cause to the sounding, and establishing of the City in that state and condition, wherein she was in her greatest excellency and glory amongst all Nations. It is true, that he, who in another respect, will more consider the necessity then the dignity of the thing, may peradventure be of another mind ; for it is most certain, that had not the City of *Rome* been first founded by *Romulus*, and maintained by other Kings in her beginning against her insulting enemies, if the Capitol had not been saved afterwards from the *Gauls*, if the so many conspiracies made by the people of *Italy* against her rising greatness had not been repulst, there could have been no such thing as the Victories and Triumphs of the *Scipio's*, *Marcellus*, *Fabritius*, *Metellus*, *Pompy*, and *Casar*, and of so many others, who atchieved those things by the strength of the City, already happily begun, and increased with much industry and valor.

But as it usually falls out in natural things that their augmentation, changing as it were that first Form, proves the corruption thereof, so as that subiect being reduced to another condition, little count is held of precedent affairs ; so in these things which are formed by mans industry, as a thore unpolished Form is succeeded by another, which renders that subiect more excellent and perfect, no man values the former, or consideris it with a thought of praise or imitation : So we see it falls out in the more noble Arts, as in Painting, Sculpture, Architecture, and the like, which daily grow to more perfection, those are most commended in them who therein prove the greatest Masters ; so as their particular praise walks hand in hand with the perfection which by their industry they have brought to that Art, wherein they have with much industry and study spent their time.

Cincinnatus his poverty was praised, and the like of some others of those Commanders, who were called up from the Plough to be Consuls and Dictators, because they bore a certain proportion to the condition of those things, and of the City. But the magnificence of *Crassus*, and of *Lucullus*, had more coherence with the greatness to which the City of *Rome* did afterwards arrive. It seems then that neither can there be any comparison made between these ages, for as they were sufficiently different between themselves, so different thoughts, studies, and exercises did become them : which things, if they had any thing of conformity between them, it was rather by likeneis, or figure, or rather some dispositions of those first weaker operations ; to the other greater and more noble. And as it is seen in every individual man, the same things are not proportionate nor proper to all Ages, but divers things do accommodate themselves to divers Ages, though the one be subordinate to the other, so as the exercises may both be the same, and different, because they are accommodated to the same aim, and end, but are notwithstanding otherwise put in use, in Childhood, Youth, and Manhood ; just so in the point we are now upon, things snt not with a City in the second Age, which were proper to her in the first, neither could the second do those things which were reserved to the third, and which would not be praised in the third, had it not done more then either the first or second. So to end this Discourse, it may be said, That the City of *Romes* happy genius produced men well adapted to her three conditions, and very excellent for what each Age and condition brought forth. For

if the first would have made too much hast in agrandising, and making the City famous, they might rather have disordered themselves, and by making many enemies, have encreased the difficulty of effecting those things, which when riper, proved afterwards more safe and easie: And likewise if the second should have imbraced things disproportional for her strength, and have carried her Forces out of *Italy*, before she had therein settled the Roman power, it might have proved rather the corruption then the perfection of the Commonwealth. The first therefore, and the second, are very much to be praised, for such things as became that Age and state of the City wherein they were done. But by how much more the adoperating cause doth work upon a more noble a perfect subject, by so much doth the work prove more perfect and excellent. Therefore those of the third Age having occasion to act in greater matters, as finding the City already very spacious and powerful, the off spring of their industry and labour hath proved more noble, and they have won such praise to the Commonwealth, as greater is not to be pretended unto.

The Eleventh DISCOURSE.

How the Roman Empire, though it fell oftentimes into the bands of base and wicked men, was notwithstanding able to maintain it self in the reign of many Emperors, and how it came to be finally destroyed.

AS amongst all humane actions; those Commands and Powers are noblest, and of greatest worth, by which a man gets to be above other men, and doth govern them in a manner as God doth rule and govern the world, so of all Dominions and Commands that ever were, the Roman Empire was greatly remarkable; and held in great esteem and reverence by all Nations; and did so far extend her self, as it may almost be said with the Poet, That her Confines were those of the whole world which was known to antiquity. Which may be comprehended by this, that Constantine the Great having divided the Empire between his three Sons, the elder Constantine, to whose third part fell the Provinces of *Spain*, *France*, and the greatest part of *Germany*, together with the Island of *Great Britain*, made War with his Brother Constantine, to whose share many other Countries fell, to come to a better agiustment of division, wherein he thought his Father had dealt unequally with him. But now this so stupendious Fabrick erected in the concourse of many years, by the worth and labor of so many gallant men, must finally run the fate of all humane things, must be dissolved and fall to the ground, and by her ruine occasion vast revolution of things. Hence it was that so many noble Cities were ruined, and the ground-work of some others laid, which proved afterwards very noble Structures. Hence it was that many intire Regions, had their antient Inhabitants driven away, and were possest by new Citizens, had new Customs, new Laws, new Tongues and new fashions brought in; and hence it was that *Italy*, which had been the Seat of so great an Empire, was subject to greater alterations, and more heavy calamities then other Provinces. It will not then be an unacceptable labor (man being so naturally given to the desire of knowledge) to seek out how, and for what causes chiefly these things happened. For that general rule, That whatsoever

hath had a beginning, must have an end; will not satisfie our inquisitive understandings. Empires, as all other earthly things, have their beginning, increase, perfection, declination, and last ruine and destruction, all of them ordained and disposed of by certain causes: And though they may be seen to vary according to the variety of Accidents, that is not notwithstanding Chance which appears to us to be so, when we cannot penetrate into the true causes of things.

In the beginning, the Roman Empire was governed in the form of a Commonwealth, her first Founders having begun to enlarge her Dominion amongst her neighboring people. She continued in this her infancie, as I may call it, many years, till the times of those famous *Scipio's*, who brought *Spain* and *Africa* under her dominion. But afterwards in the ensuing Age, wherein *Cesar*, *Pompey*, and so many other famous Commanders did flourish, she mounted to the height of her greatness and glory: Neither did *Augustus Cesar* degenerate from the worth of them, though the Form of Government was changed; but he likewise did much increase the Empires Confines in the Eastern parts amongst the *Indians*, and other exterior Nations, and establish'd excellent Orders both Civil and Military in the Empire. But this Monarchy may be said to stand at a stay at this time, being constituted in a Throne of Majesty, reverenced and obeyed by all Nations; and in this condition she preserved herself for wellnigh three hundred years, wherein though many and great Wars were made by the so many Emperors who governed in those days, yet were they rather made for the preservat.on, then for the enlarging of the Empires confines: For there was not almost any of the barbarous and far distant Nations, as well of the East, as of the West; which those Emperors were not forc'd to vanquish and overcome several times, and reduce them to the obedience of the Empire, from which they had rebelled. And if any one did enlarge the Empire in furthest remote parts, as did the Emperor *Trajan* in *Armenia*, *India*, and soine others in other Regions and Provinces, it was notwithstanding at the same time lessened in other parts by new Rebellions. But in *Galienus* his time, who was the thirty fourth Emperor, the Empires supreme greatness began to decline: For though she received her mortal wound afterwards in the time of *Arcadius* and *Honorius*, which was above a hundred years after, yet in this intervening time, the Empire being in her decaying age, grew weak, yet sustein'd herself, and like a Tree whose root hath been for a long time very deeply fix'd, could not be easily eradicated; so as though she were oftentimes shrewdly shaken by Armies of sundry Nations, yet was she able to resume her strength, and keep herself on foot.

Thus stood the Roman Empire then; wherein many miraculous things offer themselves to our consideration, and invite us to seek out the true occasion thereof. For on one side it appears a strange thing, that an Empire arrived at such a height of greatness, when she once began to decline, hasted so fast to her ruine, there not being any other Potentate left in the World, which was able to counterpoise her power; yea, which did not obey her, as subjugated by her Armies; having also so many Soldiers to defend her, desirous for their own advantage to preserve the Empire. But on the other side, he who shall consider, into the hands of how many base and wicked men this so great Empire fell, he may very well wonder how so violent a thing could endure for so many Ages, and how a Dominion governed by so many Tyrants could pass from hand to hand through the series of so many Emperors, whereof there were above five hundred between *Cesars* time, and that of *Arcadius* and *Honorius*, in whose days the Roman Empire began visibly to fall, by the taking of *Rome*, by the ruine of *Italy*, and of other Provinces belonging to the Empire: And yet 'tis known, that the Persian Monarchy, which was of so great esteem amongst the anrient Kingdoms, was quickly ruined by its falling into the hands of Princes given to idleness and pleasure, and was by *Alexander* carried

to another Nation ; whereof there are many examples seen almost in every Age.

Let us then say, that another violence helped very much to sustain this violence ; of such a force is the union of alike things. Thus did the corrupt Customs of the People and Militia of *Rome* help to maintain the State and Power of these Tyrannous Princes : For since People lived in *Rome* with much licentiousness, and were entertained with many Pastimes and publick Shews made by the Emperors, wherein those appeared to be most splendid who were most overgrown with vice, as were *Caligula* and *Nero*, who did not only make the wonted sports of Hunting and of Comedies be often represented with more then usual magnificence, but introduced new Shews, as Naval battels, Chariots drawn by Camels and Elephants, and permitted all licentiousness to the Soldiery, no man desired to change condition ; and the Praetorian Soldiers enjoying all things of use and priviledg neer unto the City, did not greatly care to be commanded by generous men : And when such Princes grew tedious to them, they put them to death, proclaiming a new Emperor, and receiving from the new Prince many gifts in reward of their wickedness : And the disorder grew so great, as sometomes the Empire of the World was by the Soldiers sold by Outcry to who would give most for it, and at low rates, as it fell out in the time of *Didius Julianus*. Nor was the authority of the Senate able to correct this so great inconvenience ; as well for that being trodden under foot by force, it was grown very weak, as also for that the antient Roman generosity was wanting in them. So as the Senate having resolved, after the death of *Caligula*, to free the City and Empire from the like Tyranny, and to restore her to her liberty, they could not be constant in their resolution ; but being abased by fear, submitted soon to the obedience of *Cladinius*, of *Cæsars* linage, and accepted of him for their Emperor, as soon as he was cry'd up by the Praetorian Soldiers. The like to which happened afterwards in many Emperors ; those being confirmed by the Senate, which were chosen by the Army.

This licence was diversly used by the Soldiers themselves : For the Praetorian Bands, and that Army wherein the Emperor was at the time of his death, pretended a particular priviledg in the choice of the new Emperor. Yet Emperors were so often cry'd up by other Armies also, which were in several Provinces of the Empire, as all of them desirous in *Galienus* his time to usurp this authority, there were thirty two, who at one and the same time made use of the name and title of Roman Emperor. So as it seems it may be truly said, that the Roman Empire was preserved, not in respect to unity, or to the same form of Government, but only in respect of that Authority which Roman Armies held of making Emperors, whom by reason of the said Armies all Provinces were to obey, there being no Militia like to that of the *Romans*, or which could resist them, or withdraw themselves from their yoke. But great was the diversity in all things, almost in all Ages, for the height of Empire was arrived at by several ways : Some got it by Inheritance, as *Tiberius*, *Caligula*, *Nero* ; and in the following, *Constantinus*, *Constantius*, and many others ; some, though very few, were chosen by the Senate, many by the Emperors themselves, who in their life-time chose some one for their Companions and Successor in the Empire, calling him *Cæsar*, to whom after the former Emperors death, the Title of Emperor, and of *Augustus* was given : But their number were most, who got the Empire through favor of the Soldiery ; wherein one and the same respect did not always prevail, but many much different considerations ; regard sometimes being had to the birth and affinity that any one had to the former Emperors, sometimes to worth, and to some singular action of War, sometimes to favor, which Commanders knew some way or other how to come by from their Armies, and sometimes to some other such like things : whence

Whence it was that persons not onely of much differing condition, but even of divers Nations, were made Emperors of *Rome*; *Trajan* and *Theodosius* were *Spaniards*; *robustus*, *Giovianianus*, and *Valentinus*, *Hungarians*; *Diclessian* a *Dalmatian*, *Cato* a *Slavonian*; and some others. But that which made the difference greater, was that this Empire as it was diversly gotten, so was it diversly administered: By some so tyrannically, as there is no so infamous and wicked vice, whereof you find not shameful examples in the lives of *Tiberius*, *Caligula*, *Nero*, *Commodus*, *Carcalla*, *Heliogabolus*, and other of those Emperors; whereas the Empire was governed by some others with such Wisdom and Justice, as no more perfect Regal Government can almost be imagined. And what excellent vertue (not to speak of *Augustus*) was there to be desired in *Vespasian*, *Titus*, *Trajan*, *Adrian*, *Antoninus*, *Marcus Aurelius*, *Alexander Severus*, and such like? Whence it was, that there having been good and bad Emperors in divers Ages, as much of Dignity, Authority and Power as this Empire lost through the bad Government of those wicked Princes, it recovered as much by the valor and good Government of these good and virtuous Princes.

And this may be alledged for the first reason, why the Emp're was able to preserve it self for so long a space of years. For being for a while run into many disorders, such as were introduced by the baseness and negligence of other their Predecessors, were by the worth of generous Princes amended, and returned to their first channel. The Romans antient and confirmed use of good military orders, did likewise help well towards this: Wherefore though the Empire were in the hands of unworthy persons, yet finding the usual Armies already raised, and ready for any enterprise, they were able by means of their Commanders, to wage war successfully, and to quiet such rising, and rebellions, as continually arose in so great an Empire. Thus *Tiberius* did not onely return *France*, which had rebelled to obedience, but subjugated *Comagena*, and *Cappadocia* and driving out their Kings, reduced them to Provinces. *Nero* drove the *Parthians* out of *Armenia*, and placed King *Tigranes* there, making that Kingdom Tributary to the Empire. *Claudius* did not onely reduce *Mauritania*, which by means of her Commanders made insurrection against the Empire; but did himself in person pass with his Army into *England*, to appease the Risings of that Island; and yet these Princes were not thought to have of themselves any great worth in them. These and some other such like causes may perhaps be alledged why this Empire could maintain it self in that greatness to which it was arrived.

But to come to that which men are more curious in inquiring after, as a thing very strange of it self, as also for many other notable consequences; to wit, to the causes of its declining and ruine, Three may, in my opinion, be chiefly alledged; The immeasurable greatness of the Empire, the simplicity and wickedness of those who governed it, and the corruption of customs, which were far different from those with which it was first founded, and wherein it grew great. Humane imperfection is the cause why mans vertue, as it is not onely finite, and bounded, but weak and brittle; so hath it to do with things not onely finite and bounded, but circumscribed within no very large limits; which were it otherwise, it would loose it self in an Ocean from whence it would not know how to escape safe. And of this, to omit the examples of many other of our actions, we will onely consider, for as much as appertains to what we have now in hand, That his worth must be exceeding great, who is to rule, and command over others. Philosophers have affirmed, That such a one ought to exceed others as far in Wit and Worth, as he doth in Dignity and Power; nay that his worth and vertue ought to weigh against that of all those that he will rule over. But let us pass by these supreme Eminencies, which are rather to be desired, then ever hoped to be found. 'Tis very certain,

tain, that it is very hard to govern an Empire well, and the greater it is, the greater is the difficulty of governing it. Wherefore *Lycurgus*, a very wise Legislator, knowing that the quiet of a City, and the long preservation thereof in one and the same condition, and with a certain Form of Government, ought to be the true cause of ordaining good Laws, would of his own election so dispose of his *Spartans*, and of the orders of that Commonwealth, as she should not be able much to enlarge her Confines. But on the contrary, *Rome*, as all the constitutions of the City, and the Cities Armies aimed chiefly at the enlarging the power of the Commonwealth, so did she never know what belonged to the enjoyment of Peace, not only by reason of foreign Forces, but not by occasion of discord between the Citizens. The bounds of her Empire grew to be almost immense, and she marcht with her Forces to the utmost parts of the Earth, subjugating the farthest distant and most barbarous Nations. But at last, not having almost any foreign Enemies to fight with, her Citizens began to make use of their Armies which had conquered other Nations, in long and deadly contentions amongst themselves; till at last the worth and fortune of *Cæsar* prevailed, so as *Augustus* remained sole Lord of the World, and *Tiberius*, who succeeded him, entered peaceably into so great an Empire, wherein were an infinite number of Soldiers, train'd up in a perpetual Militia, and by reason of Civil wars, accustomed to live very licentiously. The greatest acquisitions of the largest and farthest distant Provinces were very lately made, there having been above 1700 Cities taken by two only Commanders, *Cæsar* and *Pompey*, and powerful Nations vanquished. So as it behoved to keep a great number of Soldiers in those Garrisons, to keep the people in obedience, which were in parts farthest distant from the Senate of the Empire. But the very same thing which was introduced to provide against those dangers, was cause of others, by reason of the Authority which the Armies had already usurped, and out of hopes afforded to the Commanders of attaining this supreme dignity, by being by the Soldiers cried up Emperors. Wherefore one only man, though of never so much worth, not being able to supply all places, and provide for so many things as so great an Empire stood in need of, and less able to correct the disorders, which in so many States, as civil humors in members farthest distant from the heart, did daily more and more increase, the Empire must needs be continually vexed both by foreign Nations, and by its own Soldiers; so as it was hardly ever free from such troubles; nor was War sooner ended in one place, but it broke forth in another; nay for the most part, divers Roman Armies fought in several places, at one and the same time, each of them endeavoring to sustain him whom they had chosen to be their Emperor. Therefore *Adrian* to remedy so many disorders in the Empire, which he thought did only arise by reason of the Emperors being so far off, and the largeness of the Confines, resolved not to keep his certain abode in *Rome*, but spending his whole time in travelling to visit all the parts of his Dominions, to keep his Subjects in their duties; and knowing how hard a thing this would be to do, and almost impossible in so large Confines, he resolved to shorten them in the Eastern parts, making the River *Euphrates* the utmost bounder of the Empire, and restoring all the people of the higher Provinces to their Liberty, even to *India*; who being by his successors reduced under the obedience of the Empire, and many rebellions ensuing thereupon, and much difficulty, not only in the further distant parts, but even in those that were nearest at hand; *Constantine* the Great, knowing that these evils could not otherwise be helpt, but by carrying the seat of the Empire nearer those parts, chose the City of *Byzantium* to be the place, which being rebuilt by him, took from him the name of *Constantinople*. And hence it is that the Indian Gymnosophist, being desitous to shew *Alexander* the Great, that whilst being born away with a desire of Rule in far distant Regions, he was gone

so far from his own Kingdom, as he gave it occasion of rebelling against him, made a hard and stiff Ox-hide be laid upon the ground, and walking upon the utmost skirts thereof, shewed him, that when the part that was trod upon gave way to the foot, another part rose up: And that so it befell many great Princes, who whilst they seek to keep one part of their States low and quiet, the rest, which they keep far from, rise up in rebellion.

Hence it was, that many Emperors, not only such as were unfit for Government, but even the wisest and most valiant, knowing and confessing themselves to be oppressed by the weight of so great a mass, chose others who in their life-times were to be their Coadjutors in Government, and who should succeed them after their deaths in the Empire, which was seldom quietly possest by one alone, the Armies of far distant Provinces refusing oft-times to obey those who were chosen to succeed in the Empire by other Armies, though they were with all solemnity allowed and accepted of by the Senate; as befell *Galba*, who being created Emperor by the Spanish Army, was not accepted of, nor obeyed by the German Army. The like befell many others; so as sometimes it was not well known who was the true Emperor. And certainly, at all times of the greatest height of this Empire it may be known, that no one man, though of never so great worth, was able to govern it in peace and quiet. And even *Augustus* himself made trial of many Insurrections in *Spain*, *Germany*, and in the Eastern parts, amongst the *Seythians* and *Parthians*; though at last, through his singular worth and great good fortune, the whole World being reduced to an universal Peace, he was able to shut up that famous Temple of *Janus*, which was kept always open afterward, his Successors having always occasion to molest themselvs with War. So as the saying is made true, that *Suis & ipsa Roma viribus ruit*. But this her ruine was certainly accelerated by the lewd conditions of those into whose hands the Empire often fell: For through their fault, the internal causes of the States corruption were either occasioned, or much increased; since by their ignorance, baseness, avarice, cruelty, lust, and other enormous vices, they drew on contempt and injury, the first and chief roots of all change of Government: For by contempt the Subjects take occasion to rebel, and chiefly the richest and noblest; and from injury comes hatred, and desire of change of Government. And it was the greater misfortune for this Empire, in all other respects more fortunate then all other Empires, that in those very times wherein there was greatest need of a continued succession of wise and generous Princes to confirm the State, which by vertue of the great *Augustus* was reduced from War and past disorders into Peace and good Government, should after him fall into the hands of three very lewd and base Emperors, *Tiberius*, *Caligula*, and *Nero*; from whose enormous vices those chief evils arose to the Provinces of that Empire, which we, but now mentioned, the contempt of that supreme dignity, both amongst Forein and her own Soldiers. The former, by rebelling, strove to free themselves from their obedience; the other, through insolence, bereft them of Empire and life. Hatred, and desire of change arose likewise in the Senate, which was deprived of its authority; and particularly in those who were offended, or had any thing of generosity in them. Hence it was, that soon after, to wit in *Nero*'s time, *Cesars* linage ended; and that the Soldiers accustomed to much licentiousness under such Princes, usurp'd the authority of making Emperors, as they did in *Galba* after *Nero*'s death, in *Osho* after *Galba*, and so in many others. His worth who commanded in chief, and his good fortune who was to succeed in the Empire, was sometimes able to make a Successor, but not to take this authority totally from the Soldiery, through confidence of whose favor many aspired, though by bad means, to usurp the Empire; and amidst these contentions the Empire must needs be divided, shatter'd, and weakened. From this root another disorder arose, which was cause of many heinous mischiefs,

to wit, the general corruption of Customs in all the Orders of the City of *Rome*: For Subjects following, as usually they do, their Princes inclinations and exercises, men began to give themselves over to an idle life: and Vertue being neither nourished, nor at first maintained, still languished more and more; so as the Art of Commanding failing, good Obedience was also wanting; every body made his will his law; nor was there any sort of wickedness, how infamous soever, from which the Commanders or Soldiers were restrained by any respect borne to the Majesty of the Prince. All reason was reduced to the sword, and every one dared to attempt as much as his power encouraged him to compas. Such and so great were the vices which crept daily into men of all degrees and qualities, as it would be too laborious a thing to number them up all. This one example may suffice to shew, to what dis-solueness and licentiousness the affairs of *Rome* were reduced, when *Galba* having chosen *Piso Labinianus*, a man very famous for his civil behaviour and military worth, his election was neither accepted of by the Army, nor by the Senate, because it was thought that if he should come to the Empire, he would correct the many misdemeanors both of Citizens and Soldiers: But both of them being kill'd, and in stead of him *Osho* was made Emperor in *Rome*, and *Vitellius* at the same time cry'd up Emperor by the Army in *Germany*. The affairs of the Empire were then governed with such confusion, and grew so much worse in the succeeding Age, the disorders growing to be confirm'd by a bad habit, as when any Emperors should go about to correct the immoderate licentiousness of the Soldiers, by reducing them to their antient discipline, were they never so good and wise Princes, they were slain by the Armies; as was *Alexander Severus, Probus*, and some others. So as no certain Form could be given to such a Government, wherein the Soldier had so great a stroke in Authority, making and unmaking Emperors at their pleasure; so as it might seem to resemble a Popular State; and yet the Emperors commanding with supreme authority in so ample a Dominion, Monarchy might appear to be there formed.

It is not much to be wondred at then, if this monstrous body of the Roman Empire being composed of almost incompatible, ill-govern'd, and unproportioned parts, should be sick of divers infirmities, and must at last suffer dissolution, sooner then otherwise her greatness and power promised. The negligence and pusillanimity of some Emperors were likewise cause why the City-Soldiers, who kept still about the City, as it were the Life-guard of the Princes person, and who were the flower of all the rest both for valor and discipline, being long kept idle, grew so effeminate, and so unaccustomed to labor and military exercise, as when some more valiant Prince would make trial of them, they load themselves deceived in the hopes they had of their pristine worth. Wherefore the Empire having already received great losses and damages in divers battels, things grew to that height, as (not to mention many almost innumerable particulars which in this case might be produc'd) when the States of the assaulted Empire would defend themselvs against the Northern nations (as you shall shortly hear) they were forced to take others of the same Nations to oppose their violence: To so great a want both of Power, Soldiers, and Military discipline was the Empire reduced before it was so rent and so bereft of many Provinces, as it was afterwards. Then, as the Roman Empire was got to that height of power and greatness by the worth of those first antient Romans, and by the excellencie of their military discipline, so her good Orders being afterwards corrupted, she took so clean contrary a way to her first beginning, as it behoved her soon to fall to ruine; it being a certain and true rule, That States do increase and are preserved by the same means by which they had their first beginnings, and are corrupted by the contrary.

And he who shall consider the antient ways and works of those who laid the first foundations

foundations of this Empire, and shall compare them with those which infu'd in the time of Emperors, will find such difference therein, as the necessity of coming to such an end may soon be seen. The Roman Armies and their Leaders, were once excellent examples of worth and discipline. Who does not praise and wonder at what *Titus Manlius* did, who punisht his victorious Son with death, because he fought the enemy before the sign of Battel was given? Very remarkable were the severe punishments which were oft-times imposed upon the Soldiers disobedience, even for slight causes, whose tumultuous proceedings were oft-time punished with decimating the whole Army. But how different from these examples were those which were afterwards in the following Age shewn by many of those, who waged War, and commanded the Roman Armies? The Commanders indulgence towards the Armies, the Soldiers uncurb'd licentiousness, the authority and boldness whith they assumed unto themselves, both over the people, and over the very Emperors, whom they were to obey, are not they monstrous things in a well ordered State?

Those antient Romans did so study Military Affairs, and so frequent were the exercises of the Militia with all Citizens, as when the City of *Rome* had not extended her bounds beyond *Italy*, she had so numerous Armies, as she was able to maintain at one and the same time, but in several parts above One hundred thousand men in Arms; and yet when so many calamities and ruines befel her by the Barbarians, when she commanded over so many Provinces and Kingdoms, her antient Discipline was so lost, as for want of Soldiers she was forc'd to make use of mercenary Barbarians, who getting at last to be very powerful, did joynly turn their Arms against that Empire, for whose defence they were called in, and whose pay they took. Nor is the vanquishing and beating of the Roman Armies, which was for so many years unconquerable by other Nations, to be attributed to the Goths, or those other Northern people; but rather to the corruption of their Customs, to the loss of their good Discipline, and to the discord and baseness of the Commanders, and Soldiers of those times. For were not the French a valiant and stout Nation? to overcome whom, it behoved *Cesar* to fight so many Battels, and to make so often trial of the Romans worth and fortune, and that not without much danger: Did not the Romans wage War in *Spain* for the space of almost Two hundred years together, before they could well conquer that Nation, and get quiet possession thereof? How often did the *Saxons*, *Bavarians* and other people of *Germany* take up Arms to molest the States of the Empire? Yet all their commotions were still suppress't. And had not the Roman Empire almost continual War by reason of their so many Insurrections, with many other Eastern Nations, and chiefly with the Persians? And though sometimes they tasted of adverse fortune, yet their los's was always recovered, as also the prejudice of the reputation of the Romans Forces by their own Commanders and Soldiers, so as they were always forc'd to keep within their own Confines, and under the obedience of the Empire. But when they stood in greatest need, when the Empire received so sore and so irreparable blows from the Barbarians, it was brought to such weakness in the Eastern parts by reason of the many great disorders which were in the Head, and in all the Members, which were now become incurable, as it was not able to sustain the force of the fierce and warlike Northern Nations. And beginning once to fall, when its worth was but little, it could not get up again, as it had done at other times.

Now if we will apply these more general considerations, to some particular chanc's of this Empire, the true ciuse of its declination will the more easily be known. The Affairs of the Empire were almost at all times greatly molested by divers of the Northern People, many of which were never reduced to the obedience of the

Empire, some of which had not been known till they took up Arms, but of all the rest the *Goths* proved the most famous for the ruine of the Empire, and for the so many calamities of *Italy*, and of many other Nations; and he who shall consider their beginnings and their progress, must needs wonder very much, and through confusion lose the discourse of humane wisdom; To think how this barbarous people, and so far remote from our Regions, and unknown by them, insomuch, as at this day their original is not by Authors agreed upon, without or Kingdom, or Military Discipline, falling down tumultuously at first, to possess themselves of other mens Countries, should soon become so powerful, and formidable, as that they should overcome the Romans, who had overcome the world. Who could have imagined that a new, and unknown people, were to come from forth the utmost Northern parts, to destroy so vast an Empire, by which so many powerful Kings, and famous warlike Nations were subjected? The most general opinion is, That these men who destroyed the Empire, came from *Scythia* into *Europe*, where they were possess of many large Regions, differing amongst themselves in name and habitation; those who lived more towards the East being called *Eastern-Goths*, and others, more *Western-Goths*. But they were thought to be but new Inhabitants of that Country, into which they were first come from certain Islands in the *Sarmatian* Ocean; and that being worsted by some of their neighboring people, after many contestations had with them, their Country being moreover of two small a circuit for their abounding numbers, they betook themselves to seek out new seats, and other habitations. And thus they passed over very many times in very great numbers into the Provinces belonging to the Empire, possessing and indamaging many Countries: The things a little before mentioned, being the cause why these evils, and the greater ruines which ensued were not remedied. For the Empire being of a very vast extent, was continually troubled with sundry commotions in sundry parts. The Princes who commanded were of little worth, and the former antient valor and discipline was no longer found in their Armies, which were given over to licentiousness.

Hence it was, that when in the time of *Philip*, the first of that name, but in order the Nine and twentieth Roman Emperor, the *Goths* fixt themselves in *Mysia* and *Thrace*, such forces were not sent against these novelties, as might appease them, and quell the then but small strength of these tumultuous people. For there being no loyalty in the Commanders, nor valor in the Soldiers, those who were sent by the Emperor against such enemies, intended their own particular interest more then the service of the Empire. Insomuch as *Macrinus* and *Decius* being sent the one after the other to be chief of the enterprise, made themselves be cried up Emperors by the Army, having first permitted much licentiousness in the Soldiers, that they might win their good will. And when the same *Decius* was truly possess of the Empire, after the death of *Macrinus*, and of *Philip* also, joyning battel with the *Goths*, he found the effects of nourishing sedition in Armies, and in winking at their disobedience, and at the non-performance of their military duties; for his Army was routed and put to flight by the *Goths*, and he seeking to save himself by running away, was drowned in a marshy ground. And when after these losses, the Empire ought to have been restored, and the honor thereof vindicated by the Successor with new Forces, *Gallus* who had obtained this suprem dignity by the Souldiers rashness, and who was a poorly spirited man, and had come by the Empire by indirect means; That he might enjoy his leasure time in *Rome*, which he leudly spent, he was easily periwaded to make a shameful peace with the *Goths*, not onely permitting them to tarry in the Provinces which they were possesled of, but obliging himself to pay them a certain sum of money yearly.

Thus the City of *Rome*, which was Mistress of the whole World, became tributary to a Barbarous people, who knew not till then what belong'd to Imperial dignity, to Wealth, nor to Military glory: This base Agreement gave a great blow to the reputation of the Roman Empire; so as in *Galienus* his time, who soon after succeeded in the Empire, so many mutinies and insurrections arose, as *Italy* it self was hardly kept in obedience; and the *Goths* grew so insolent, as breaking the Peace which they had made with the *Gauls*, they took many Cities in *Bythinia*, in *Thrace*, and in *Macedonia*: By which prosperous successes others of the *Goths* being encouraged, who had tarried all this while at home, where they lived in narrow precincts, they sent to the Emperor *Valens* to demand abode in the Provinces of the Empire; with whom fear prevailing more then the antient honor of the Empire, and the Roman generosity, gave way to their request, allotting *Bulgaria* and *Servia* for these new Inhabitants to live in; suffering the Northern Nations thus to get footing, and to increase in strength, which had always been the greatest Enemies to the Empire, and from whom the Emperors had received such injuries and shame. These easie acquisitions, and the hopes of greater matters, made *Alaricus* King of the *Goths* march not long after with a numerous Army from his own Kingdom towards *Italy*, demanding that a place of residence might be allowed him by the Emperor *Honorius* in *France*; and receiving a denial, did in his fury do greater mischief.

But the same Emperor *Valens* soon felt the harm of this his ill-taken advice: For the same *Goths* increasing through the baseness and negligence of others, and the *Huns*, *Alani*, and other Northern people conspiring together with them, they besieged the City of *Constantinople*, and other noble Cities were endangered: which made *Gratianus* choose *Theodosius* for his Companion in the Empire, for the great repute which was had of his valor, though he were a *Spaniard* by Nation. But though he behaved himself gallantly against these Enemies, and wan some brave victories; yet since they had already got great strength, and were governed in obedience under their valiant Masters and Commanders, and for that the Empire was still busied in other Wars, it was thought expedient to come to peace with *Alaricus* King of the *Goths*, leading him and a great number of his men under the Empires pay, to make use of them in other undertakings. For the *Goths* being kept in continual pay by some former Emperors, amongst other Soldiers which served the Empire, and being of themselves conversant in many Wars; they were become a valiant People, and had learn'd the Roman discipline, though not the corruption which overthrew it, in the Roman Camp. Which, though it might be good for the present occasions, it did certainly prove very pernicious afterwards: For though by this Peace *Theodosius* was safe from any fear of this Nation, whilst he governed together with *Gratianus*, and also afterwards when he held the Empire alone by himself, he being a person of singular worth, and one who by his industry had somewhat renewed the antient discipline amongst the Soldiers, yet after his death the Forces of the Empire beginning again to flag; and the Empire falling into the hands of his two sons, *Arcadius* and *Honorius*, who succeeded their Father whilst they were but young, and proved not to be of such gallant parts as the condition of those times required, many of those who commanded under *Theodosius* in several parts rebelled, who were all of them cryed up Emperors by those Armies wherein they commanded; by which occasions being invited, the *Goths* did not only return to rise up in Arms against the Empire, but also other Northern Nations who did then inhabit *Germany*, as the *Alani*, *Franks* and *Vandals*, took up Arms, and did at one and the same time assault the States of the Empire in several parts; many of them marching more particularly towards *Italy*, and against the very City of *Rome*, which after divers passages remained in prey to these Barbarians;

the antient Roman worth being so decayed, as there was not any one who did so much as provide for the welfare of so stately a City, which was the Queen of the World. And the Emperor *Honorius* (a thing which is not to be mentioned without much marvel) whilst *Italy* and other Countries were wasted with War, and the very City of *Rome* was reduced to the utmost extremity, remained in *Ravenna* an idle Spectator of his Subjects so great calamity, and of the ruine of his State, in so base and stupid a manner, as being told he might do well to provide for the preservation and safety of so many of the Empires Provinces, which being miserably torn in pieces, were falling into the power of the Barbarians, answered, That he could live without them.

After the ruine of *Rome*, these victorious Barbarians past into *France*, and into *Spain*, where being recruited with other people of their own Nations, and the Roman Armies being busied in Civil seditions, and in maintaining those Emperors which each of them had chosen, they had leisure to fix themselves there, and to take possession of those noble Provinces, the greatest part of whose antient Inhabitants being extinguished, they settled themselves there, and did long govern those Dominions; and others of them passing into *Africa*, and having won large Territories, did with the same Fortune and same thoughts institute their proper Kingdoms. But on the other part, other People called the *Huns* fell into *Pannonia*, called now by their names, *Hungaria*, and possessing themselves likewise thereof, fixt their abode and dominion there. So as there was hardly any Western Province of the Empire which was not at this time troubled by this fury of War, the Roman Princes and Soldiers not having sufficient worth to withstand them: Insomuch that when *Attila* marched with a furious Army to destroy *Italy*, the Empire not having any Soldiers that they durst confide in to impede his passage, the Romans were forced to take King *Theodoricus* with a good number of his *Goths* into their pay; by whose assistance that cruel Enemy was at that time kept off. But the Empires weak Forces being at last tyred, and some Commanders being lost in whom there remained yet some worth and discipline, the greater, and almost fatal ruines of *Italy* began; wherinto when these cruel Barbarians entred, they put all to fire and sword, bringing total destruction to many noble and populous Cities. Which (according to the natural order of all things mortal, wherein *Corruptio unius est generatio alterius*) gave occasion to the birth of the City of *Venice*, wherunto the remainder of the Italian Nobility had recourse, and saved themselves.

The Twelfeth DISCOURSE.

Wby the Commonwealth of Rome, though she suffered many Defeats in divers Battels, yet did still prove Victorious at last.

HE who shall narrowly consider the great actions of the Romans, will still discover new things therein not onely worthy of praise but of admiration. Their prosperity was certainly very great, but proceeding, as it is to be beleived, from their worth, and from certain and ordinary causes. The People of *Rome* made more Wars, then ever any Potentate hath been known to do; but that which occasioneth the greatest wonder is, that their success in all of them was prosperous: And that though the Roman Armies were in many Battels overcome, yet still in the conclusion of every War the Victories fided with them.

It will then be worth the while to seek out the truest, or at least, the most truth-like causes thereof, by reasoning thereupon. The City of *Rome* waged continual Wars from the first foundation thereof till *Augustus* his time, which was for above Seven hundred years. The gates of that famous Temple of *Faunus*, which were never to be shut but in time of Peace, stood always open, unless it were once in the Consulship of *Titus Manlius*; nor was there almost any Nation known in those daies, with whom the City of *Rome* hath not at some time made trial of her forces and worth. That Commonwealth in so many, and so long contentions of War, was likewise sometimes favored, sometimes frowned upon by fortune; so as sometimes she was brought into very great danger; yet still she prevailed at last, and triumphed over her formerly victorious enemies. Long and heavy was the dispute, which in her very beginning she had with so many people of *Italy*, and chiefly with those that were nearest, who singly by themselves, and joynly with others, did conspire against the Romans, and did by all their best endevorts seek how to keep the power of the Empire low, which was ordained, as was afterwards seen, to the height of all greatness. Nor was the Commonwealth of *Rome* secure from the efforts of foreign Nations; nay many times she was to withstand the fury of the French, who assailed her with great Forces, that they might totally subdue her, and possess themselves of her Territories, as they had done of so many other parts of *Italy*. The Commonwealth made trial of her Forces, even in the beginning of her greatness with other Kings; till beginning with the first *Carthaginian Wars*, to wage War further from her Confines, she proved at last a terror even to the most remote foreign Countries, which she at last subjugated assuming always greater and better courage, as her Empire did encrease; and her Military Discipline bettering by exercise, as did also her worth by prosperous success.

Who will not then admire these so great and unparelleld things? Who can consider them without endeavoring to know the reasons thereof? *Polybius*, whilst he recounts some of these wonderful things, terming the people of *Rome* invincible, adds (that he may in a manner give the reason thereof) that these people brought whatsoever enterprise, how hard and difficult soever, after many and various successes, to a good and desired end, because they were modest in prosperous, and constant in adverse fortune. These two excellent vertues are certainly requisite to whosoever propounds true and perpetual Glory for his end, and does aspire thereunto

thereunto: for the variety of humane affairs does not tolerate that man should arrive at the height of power, and at supreme honors by a streight and short path of continued prosperity; therefore constancy, or let us rather term it Magnanimity or Fortitude is requisite for him, to the end that he may persevere in the same gallantry and grandeur of spirit, wherewith he did propound any great action to himself, without being weary or quiet till he hath effected it. And modesty is likewise necessary for him, that is to say a temperate affection, so as he may not lose himself in prosperous successes, and being puffed up with pride and vain glory, may not think he is come to his journeys end, when he is not gotten half way thither; which is the cause why many have lost their good fortune, and not reaped the true fruits of many worthy and well begun labors. So as it may be numbered amongst those things which made great Kings amongst them, and which brought them to so great an Eminency of power, and command, that they were endowed with these two excellent Vertues, whereby they knew how to make use of both fortunes.

But these may peradventure be but general rules, and not such as may give satisfaction; for if we will look into the Commonwealth of *Greece*, we shall find many eminent examples of both these vertues, yet were they not able to carry them half the way so far towards the Goal, whereat the Romans arrived; wherefore are not their actions worthy that high esteem which is deservedly put upon the Roman Affairs. There have likewise been many famous Princes in several ages, who neither wanted generosity or mind, constantly to prosecute noble actions by them begun; nor modesty and temperance in all other affections, meerly out of a desire of glory; and yet their enterprises have not alwaies succeeded well, nor have they enlarged their Power and Dominions, as did the Romans. Let us pass on then to other considerations which shall hereafter be looked upon, how the Romans governed themselves and their counsels in their Militia, what their military orders and institutions were, what state they were at first possest of, which served as it were for a ladder for them whereby to climb up to the height of such greatness and command, and we shall find that these were such amongst the Romans as were not all of them together, or in such excellency in other Principalities and Nations, so as they were with reason to produce such effects as they did. All the Offices of War were administered amongst the Romans by their Citizens; varying sometimes the condition of the persons, together with the names and authority of those who commanded the Armies; for they made sometimes use of Noblemen, sometimes of Plebeians. But they still kept amongst their own Romans, all the degrees of the Militia, and afforded occasion to many to exercise themselves therein, so as there was not any witty Citizen, or hopefull Young-man of noble extract, who was far from them. Nay, it is seen, that those who were more given to the study of speculative Learning, when the places, and Governments committed to their charge, did so require, betook themselves, as others did, to the managing of Arms, and to warlike Affairs; in such sort as even *Cicerio*, wholly given to Philosophie, and the study of Eloquence, when he went Pro-consul into *Cilicia*, waged War with the *Parthians*. Hence it was that they never wanted Commanders, and if at any time the Roman Armies suffered any thing by the imprudency or infelicity of one Commander, they knew quickly how to make amends by the worth and fortune of another, as it fell out at all times; For in that Commonwealth, by reason of her orders, and by her being still employed in War, the way was alwaies open to many Citizens to employ themselves in Arms, and in commands of the Armies. Nor was the obedience which is due by Soldiers to their Commanders the less for this. For a Consul, or Dictator had the like authority in the Camp, as the person of an absolute Prince could have had, who commanded his Army personally.

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Therefore by descending to more particulars, the benefit may be the more easily discerned which redounded to that Commonwealth, by means of these her good orders : For if any disorder did at any time happen (as usually there doth in any, how well soever ordered Government) through the fault of any particular Citizen, whereby the Commonwealth suffered prejudice in the administration of War, this might soon be amended, and the prejudice received from the enemy, might quickly be restored by the presence and worth of some other Citizen. Thus it fell out, that when the Roman Armies, whilst the bounds of the Commonwealth were but small, were overcome by the *Sabins*, by the *Equi*, by the *Capen-nati*, by the *Falisci*, and by others of their neighbors, with whom they waged War, they could easily stop the course of that their bad fortune, and shun running into greater dangers. The rout which was given by the *Equi*, and *Sabins*, and which was the greatest given in those times, was known to be occasioned through the distaste which the Army took at *Appius* the *Decemviri* and at the injustice, and cruelty which he used towards the Soldiery. Wherefore returning to the former Government of Consuls, *Quintius* the new Consul had the means given him of recovering the Militia's formerly lost honor and credit ; by giving a great overthrow to those very enemies, who were grown so proud and insolent for their victories had over the Roman Army.

Thus likewise, when the Roman Armies were shamefully put to flight another time by the *Equi*, *Fidenates* and *Falisci*, first through the defeat of *Papyrius Mucelanus*, and then by the like of *Genutius*, and *Titinius* the military Tribunes, who were mean and unexpert *Plebeians*, and who without much authority had the care of the Army ; When *Quintus Servilius* was created Consul, and after him *Furius Camillus*, they won the most famous victories that the Romans had ever gotten till that time (which was Three hundred and fifty years after the building of the City) against the *Equi*, and other of their Enemies. But this may be better conceived in greater affairs, when the Commonwealth was much increased. The Roman Armies received so notable defeats in the War which *Pyrrhus* made against them, as the whole affairs of the Commonwealth seemed to be in no little danger, having so potent and victorious an Enemy within their bosoms : yet at last not being dismayed for any adverse fortune, but treating freely with their Enemy, rather as vanquishers then vanquished, they reduced their affairs to such a condition, as *Pyrrhus* thought it his best course to quit *Italy*, and leave the Romans quiet. It is herein to be considered, that the Romans being so long accustomed to continual Wars with their neighbors the *Italians*, and particularly with the *Samnites* a little before this time, against whom the Romans marched with numerous Armies, and had good success winning many famous victories ; insomuch as *Val. Corvinus* kill'd above thirty thousand *Samnites* in one day, made much for their withstanding so great an Enemy as *Pyrrhus*, and for their maintaining themselves against Foreign Forces, against the use of Elephants, and other new ways of warfaring, which *Italy* had not known before ; whence it was that the City of *Rome* did at this time abound in valiant men, and who were expert in the Militia. So as *Cynneas* who was sent by *Pyrrhus* to *Rome*, told him, that he had seen a City so very full of Inhabitants, as he feared if his Highness should continue his war with the Romans, he should go about to overcome an *Hydra* : And *Pyrrhus* himself hath more then once admired the worth of the Roman Commanders.

Who doth not even with wonder consider, how many Commanders, and how many Armies the Commonwealth of *Rome* could set out in the War with the *Carthaginians*, and especially in that with *Hannibal*, which did more endanger the affairs of *Rome* then all the rest ? since it maintained War in so many several parts at one and the same time, in *Italy*, *Spain*, *Africa*, and *Greece*. Which they were able

able to do by reason of the infinite number of men where with *Italy* was then inhabited, who were all well disciplined, by reason of their long exercise in War. We read, that when the Romans made War with *Hannibal*, they had sometimes, what of their own proper Soldiers, and what of their Associates, who did all neighbor near upon them, twenty three Legions, which made about an hundred thousand Soldiers, for defence of their Empire. Moreover, whilst the Commonwealth kept her Forces divided in several parts, as she did with wonderful judgment in the Carthaginian war, which was the sorest of all the rest, though she tasted of adverse fortune sometimes in some parts, yet were not all her Forces utterly destroyed; for that part of their Forces which was yet safe and entire, was able to make good the fortune of the whole Commonwealth. Thus after those notable Routs which the Roman Armies had, the one by the *Tyrian Gauls*, when the Forces were commanded by *Lucius Cassius*; the other by the *Cimbrians*, when they were led on by *Catus Servilius Cepio*, in which two Battels the Romans lost above Eighty thousand Soldiers, they were able notwithstanding to recruit themselves, and defend their affairs; because they had another victorious Army at the same time, commanded by *Marius*, who had just at that time gloriously ended the War against *Fugurth*. Thus when the Commonwealth of *Rome* seemed to be utterly ruined by reason of the two discomfitures given them, the one at *Thrasymenes*, the other at *Canne*, she was restored again by her prosperous success in War with *Spain*. Thus when two of her Armies were worsted in *Spain*, the Commonwealth was preserved in safety by fortunate success of their Wars in *Sicily* and in *Italy*. When the Romans were in greater danger then ever, there being at the same time two great Carthaginian Armies in *Italy*, and two most valiant Generals, *Hannibal* and *Asdrubal*; yet would not the Romans keep all their Warriors in *Italy*, but did at the same time maintain and reinforce their Armies in *Sardinia*, *Sicily*, *France*, and *Spain*. And though by reason of so many Wars which begot one another, the Commonwealth must needs oftentimes run great hazards, especially since she oftentimes exposed her Armies to the doubtful event of Battel; yet did they thereby receive this of good and safety, that by reason of their continual exercise of Arms, they were the more easily provided of valiant and experienced men, and were the better able to govern themselves in adverse fortune. The Carthaginians, on the contrary, not being able to make use of many good Commanders or Soldiers, (for they did not make use of their own peculiar Militia, as did the Romans, but did employ some few of the chief of their City-Factions in commanding their Armies) could not so easily recruit and reinforce their Armies, when they were weakened by any adverse fortune; nor had they whereout to pick better or more fortunate Commanders, when any of theirs were faulty. Insomuch as when the Carthaginians were overcome by *Scipio* in *Africa*, they were forc'd to recal *Hannibal* from *Italy*, suffering the Romans to take breath in those parts where they were most molested; and *Hannibal* himself not having means to recruit his Army, which he had brought with him from *Africa*, and which was wasted and weakened by long march, and adverse fortune, was necessitated to give way to the valor and fortune of the Romans.

It made not a little likewise for the Government of the Roman Commonwealth, and for the maintaining of her in her weak beginnings, that the Militia was exercised for many years without any pay to the Soldiers. So as whilst their means was yet but small, and yet they must still be in Arms, by reason of their being still infested by many of the neighboring Nations, the want of monies was no cause of not maintaining their Armies, as it hath been the ruine of many States; but if they happened to receive a Rout, the Army might be recruited by other chosen and commanded men. But afterwards when the City was much better peopled, and much

stronger, so as she was able to make greater undertakings, the publick Exchequer was so enriched, answerable to what became a well-ordered Government, and which aspired to the heighth of Empire, as she was not for this cause so incommo-dated, as that she must yield under the weight of War, nor yet for any her greatest misfortune. Whereas in some other Commonwealths, as in that of *Sparta*, the poorness of the Exchequer introduced by *Lycurgus* his Laws, hindred her from enlarging her Empire; and when she aspired thereunto, she was forc'd for want of things requisite to flie for help to the Kings of *Persia*; so as in lieu of domineering over the rest of the Grecians, she became a servant to Barbarians, because she exceeded those Terms and Rules wherewith her Government was founded and es-tablished.

After these considerations, some things may be added which proved likewise very advantagious for the securing of the Roman greatness: As the continuation of the Militia, out of a duty imposed upon every Citizen, of spending almost all the best years of his life in the Camp, every one being bound to militate till he had advanced fifteen Pays at least: So he who had fought in one or two Battels, was not permitted to sit down and rest, but continuing in the Militia, by reason of the ex-perience he had gotten, became more useful and advantagious in the Wars. Amongst others, we have a notable example of one *L. E. Siccus*, who was slain in the Camp in the time of *Appius* his Decemvirate, after he had followed the Wars for Forty years together: and after having been in above a hundred Battels. It is also a thing of great consideration, that the nerve of the Roman Armies con-sisted in their Infantry, though they had some Horse to strengthen them; whence it was, that they were sooner recruited, and reinforced after a rout, for that men are sooner recruited then horses: there being greater store of them: And which the Romans could the better do, because they made use of men of one onely Country for their Soldiers, that is to say, of their own men, and those of their Associates who were at hand and ready to be joyned together, and be employed in any action; which doth not fall out so when Armies are to be raised and recruited out of many Nations, and from far distant places. But it was a great help to the Romans a-bove all other things, for the maintaining of themselves in all events of so many Wars, which they made with so many powerful Kings and Nations, that they were possest of *Italy*; a Province, which in those times did more abound in men and arms, then any other Country; as may be known by many things, but chiefly by this, That the Commonwealth of *Rome* had labored very long ere she could subjugate *Italy*, which was not wholly subdued, in all the parts thereof, till after the Commonwealth had extended her Precincts very far: when afterwards by the Forces of the same *Italy*, she in a few years overcame all other Provinces, and Nations. Therefore the War which was made against the Romans by the neig-hboring People, the *Iceni*, *Peligni*, *Marusini*, *Lucani*, *Marci*, and others, which was called *Bellum Sociale*, because they termed themselves fellow-companions to the People of *Rome*; though there were but a small part of the Italian Forces in it; yet that Country being excellently well inhabited with warlike men, it was thought to be one of the hardest, and most dangerous Wars, that ever the Commonwealth of *Rome* made; nor could it be ended but by allowing those People, the Franchise and Liberty of Roman Citizens, which was as much as to grant them the thing they fought for; for the obtaining of that, was that for which they fought. And we read, that a muster being made throughout all *Italy* of all the Soldiers which might be assembled to withstand the danger which was threatned by the Barbarians, when the *Transalpine Gauls* which dwelt about the *Rhodofius*, were summoned by the other *Gauls*, who were already possest of some parts of *Lom-bardy*, that they might prepare to assault *Italy*; the Muster role of such as were able

able to bear Arms, amounted to Seven hundred thousand Foot, and Threescore thousand Horse, who were fit to serve upon such an occasion. And yet the greatest part of *Lombardy*, which was possest by the said *Gauls*, nor some other of those Provinces which are now comprehended within the Confines of *Italy*, were not numbered in this Muster-roll. Which is so much the more to be wondred at for that this happened after the Carthaginian War; to wit, when the Commonwealth of *Rome* was not yet gotten to that height of Power whereunto she arrived afterwards; people multiplying through the greatness; and felicity of the Empire, and many men having been consumed in that long and sore War.

To these things may be added the excellency of Military Discipline, which as it was in great perfection with the Romans, so was it of great advantage to the obtaining of so many Victories, and to the compleating of so many enterpris. For though the *Grecian*, *Macedonian*, and *Roman* Militia were of great esteem at one and the same time, yet that of the *Romans* did so fir exceed the others, as that it was not onely stronger, and more secure, but better fitted then the rest for all places, and times. Amongst other Orders of the *Grecian* and of the *Macedonian* Militia, wherewith the Armies of *Alexander the Great* did in particular so miraculous things, the *Phalanx* was muchcelebrated; but this, though it were in it self of very great strength, it oft-times proved not so serviceable, if upon any occasion it became to be divided, or disordered: But the Roman Ordres were not onely firm and stable, as was the *Phalanx*, but were more adapted to every place, and every season, and proved very congruous for all warlike actions; so as to their own great advantage, and to the prejudice of their enemies, making use of their own Soldiers, the Romans performed the Office of whatsoever military Discipline by their own men, fighting in all postures, either in whole bodies altogether, or Squadron to Squadron, or man to man, so as not any man was idle or useles in their Camps, or Battel's. For whilst they minded fighting and not flying, or free booting, the routs which their Armies did oft-times receive, were not such, but that they did in some places make their party good against their enemy, and keep some part of their Army safe; which proceeded principally from the exquisite ordres of that Militia. Insomuch as *Hannibal* when he came first into *Italy*, having after his first conflicts learned the excellency of this Militia, made his Soldiers use the Romans Arms; and *Pyrrhus* did not onely betake himself to use these Arms, but did mingle many *Italian* Soldiers, the better to accommodate his Militia to the Roman Ordinances; saying, that that Discipline of the Barbarians (a name given by the Grecians to all other Nations) was not at all barbarous. So when it happened that the Romans received any rout, as they did in the Battels made against the two aforesaid Commanders *Hannibal* and *Pyrrhus*, very experience in other success's made them know that it was not the goodness of any forein military Discipline which bereft the Romans of the Victories which they were wont to bear away, but for that the Romans wanted such excellent Commanders as those two were. Therefore when the worth of the Commanders came to be equal, the goodness and excellencie of the Roman Military Ordinances prevailed before those of those very Armies, which for some other respects had the better of the Romans.

But to proceed upon our late consideration, we must say that the Arms used by the Romans were thought very convenient, and better then those of other Nations, as Launces which were usually given to Soldiers of the first Files; whereby they received much benefit, as well to withstand the first fiercest efforts of the Enemy, as to weary them in cutting those arms in pecees, being to come to closer fight; and then whole bodies of fresh and well armed Soldiers succeeded in the Roman Armies. For their bodies were covered with their Bucklers, which were

very large ones, and the short, but very sharp swords and finely tempered, used by the Romans, were of great advantage to the Soldiers, who might wield them in a long fight, as well to defend themselves from their Enemies blows, as to let flie upon them; which was not practised in other Militia's of those times; particularly not amongst the French, with whom the Romans had often and dangerous fights, for they used very little Bucklers, and long heavy swords, very sharp at the point, so as they were easily wrested, and made unuseful. Therefore the routs which the Roman Armies received, were very few in comparison of those they gave their Enemies; and being but seldom worsted, and often victorious, the state, strength, and reputation of the Empire did still increase; so as when some adverse forune happened, it was not sufficient to extinguish, nor nor so much as long to weaken the greatness of that Commonwealth. Divers particular good rules observed in the administration of War, were likewise of great moment for the carrying on of the Roman affairs. Amongst which the diligence which was used by publick constitutions in dividing of the prey, may be numbred for one; for they used to place the prey or booty first in publick, and did then so divide it amongst the Soldiers, as those who were upon the guard shared as well thereof, as those that were farwardest in the action, and who had sact the Enemy. Whereby occasion was not given for those notable disorders which have been observed to happen in these latter times, wherein upon such an occasion the loss of the whole Army hath ensued.

The faith also which was so exactly observed, and the fair proceedings with such Cities as were subject to that Dominion, won the Romans the good affection of the people; by whose favor Empires are usually more upheld upon any adverse accident, then by any other thing. Of these we read of many notable examples; it being as far from that good Military Discipline, to bear with the insolency of Soldiers, as it is introduced in these our last Ages to the great prejudice of people, though friends and subjects. For such faults as these were severly punish'd, the which is observable amongst so many other actions, for what the Romans did to those people, to whom they did not only restore the goods and liberty which had been by the Soldiers wickedly taken away, and so their grievances were redrest, but those were severly punish'd who had committed such things. To this may be added, that the Romans, to the end that the power of the Commonwealth might still prevail, and might upon any occasion be made use of, endeavored as soon as they bent their minds to greater matters, to accompany their Land-forces with Maritime-aids, so as the one might help the other, and the one not only be made more powerful by the other, but more secure, as it fell out, and as it may be observed in many of their actions; but chiefly when seeing their affairst succeeded but ill with the Carthaginians, who prevailed by reason of their antient Maritime profession, and had likewise great advantage in their Land-Militia by their use of Elephants, which the Romans had not as yet well learned how to resist; they bent themselves wholly to Naval preparations, wherein they did afterwards behave themselves with such valor and prosperity, as they overcame these their so fierce and cruel Enemies in a Naval fight, and raised their fortune.

Let us in the next place observe, that the greatness and generosity of the Romans was such, as not content to secure their neer neighboring dangers, and out of a desire of quiet to leave the sparkles of those Wars unquench'd, from whence another fire might soon be kindled, theyalways endeavored to see the last sparkle quite put out. The Roman Army was overcome, and much endamaged by the *Galli Geffati* after the death of Consul *Atilius*, where their liberty being exposed to much danger upon this so sad accident, the Romans would once more try the fortune of battel, wherein they had good succels, and cutting in pieces above Forty thousand of that

Nation, they did vindicate their former injuries. Nor yet did they then lay down their Arms, though they were freed from that their greatest danger; but knowing that there remained yet other powerful Armies of the same *Gauls* in other parts of *Italy*, they would continue war against them, and of assailed become assailors; which afforded them occasion of those *Marcellus* his notable victories, and of making themselves masters of the chieftest Cities of *Lombardy*, which were possest by the *Gauls*. The Commonwealth of *Rome* was never in greater danger, then when *Afdrubal* passing over the Alps with a numerous Army, entred *Italy*, whilst his brother *Hannibal* was there likewise with another powerful Army. They fought *Afdrubal*, and to their great joy their Consuls were victorious: which notwithstanding, they forbore not to continue war in *Spain*, though they were free from their greater and nearer dangers; but with the Forces they had there, went to find out, and to fight other Enemy-Armies of the Carthaginians which were in that Province; for they knew if those Armies should remain entire, the War might easily be renewed, and other impediments being removed, *Hannibal* would be the more easily succored with necessaries which he wanted, and so might still molest the Romans in *Italy*. Thus not allowing of any Peace, then what might be purchased by either having totally quell'd, or at least very much weakened the Enemy, the Romans never laid down Arms but when they were entire Victors: which other Princes not being able to do, have deferred their ruine for a short time, but have not totally kept it off.

Many other things might likewise be thought of, by which it might be evidently proved, that the Romans did always prove victorious at last, and did perpetually increase their State and strength. But what we have already said, may suffice to teach such Princes and Nations as shall aspire to the highest degree of glory, whither it is that they ought to bend their thoughts, and which are the best means to arrive thereat: And when all other necessary accidents shall correspond, those who shall imitate the excellent worth and discipline of the Romans, will not find themselves any whit deceived.

The Thirteenth DISCOURSE.

Whether the City of Rome could have maintain'd herself longer in the glory and majesty of her Command, if she had preserved her Liberty and Form of Commonwealth, then she did under the Government of Emperors.

After that *Cesar* had robb'd his Country of her liberty, and changing the antient form of Government, reduced the Commonwealth of *Rome* into a Monarchical form, she continued therein in a continued series of many Emperors, safe and entire, or at least without any remarkable alteration or declining, for the space of about four hundred years, till the time of *Arcadius* and *Honorius*, wherein *Italy* underwent many miserable ruines, as did also the very City of *Rome*, which was the Metropolis of the Empire; so as she could not resume her antient greatness, as formerly she had done after some adverse events.

It appears to be, and truly is a thing worthy of deep discourse and consideration, how this so great and well-founded Empire, after it began to totter, did so soon precipitate

cipitate into final ruine. If the time of this its duration be measured in respect to the ordinary mutation of humane things, and more particularly of State-Governments, the time of its continuance may appear to have been long enough: but if the greatness and power of the Empire be taken into consideration, which was such as that there was no other Potentate that could weigh against it, or rather no Country which was not in some sort subject thereunto, it may very well invite us, so far as may be probably conjectur'd by so great success, and where so many various accidents concur, and have a share, to conjecture whether the Roman Empire would have been longer or shorter lived, if it had been still governed in the form of a Commonwealth, then it did when it fell into the power of one only man, under the government of Emperors. Many things may perswade us to beleieve that in whatsoever condition or form of Government, this Empire must have run the same fortune, and walked on with some little variation of time to the same end it did. First the vicissitude of humane affairs, which by reason of their natural imperfections, will not suffer sublunary things to be still in the same state of being, but will have it so, as being carried about in continual motion, they must sometimes be raised higher, fall sometimes lower. Other People, and other Nations, besides the Romans, have flourisht in other times, though not so much, nor so highly cried up. Other Ages have seen other great Empires, so as the rise of the one hath been the fall of the other; and it is a great truth, that Lordships and Empires, as do mens lives, nay as befalls every thing that is born, in time wax old, and proceeding on by ordinary and natural gradations, have their beginning, increase, time of perfection, declination, and final ruine. Till *Honorius* his rule, at which time the Empire began palpably to wander from its grandeur and dignity, it had continued for so many years, as the longer duration thereof would have almost exceeded the common condition of other things; this may well be a general reason, but one that is so approved of by other reasons, and continual experience, as it may be reputed certain in particulars, though sometimes we ignore the proximate reason. But to proceed to more particular considerations, why should we beleieve that the Roman Empire should have been of longer duration if it had been governed by a Commonwealth, then under Emperors? Not only reason, but experience shews, that the Government of one alone is fittest to keep up suprem power in large Dominions; since all other great Powers and Lordships have been founded and governed by one only King or Emperor.

The City of *Rome* is the only example of a Commonwealth which hath purchased large Dominion; nay, we may therein also observe, that as soon as she grew to be Mistress of many Provinces, that Form of Government behoved to be altered, as not fit to sustain so great a weight. In the very times of the Commonwealth, when any thing was to be agitated or treated of, especially in Wars of great importance and difficulty, they ran to create a Dictator; because the supreme authority which by vertue of that Magistracie was granted to one man alone, was held requisite for the good administration of the most difficult businesses. The Magistracy of the Dictator did punctually represent the Majestie, and Dignitie which the Roman Emperors did after retain; Wherefore *Cesar*, when he made himself the Master of the Commonwealth, made himself be declared perpetuall Dictator; And the name of Emperor was taken from the very name used by the Roman Commanders, and shewed the Authority which they had of Emperor, which is to command over Armies. And certainly the uniting the power of many in one alone, doth not only not weaken, but doth much to the strength and power of a Government or State: For it encreaseth obedience, facilitates resolutions, and hastens the execution of weightiest affairs. So as had not the Roman Forces, when military Discipline flourished most amongst them,

them, been with-held oftentimes, as if opprest by internal seditions, sprung from that sort of Government whereof they did so much partake, and which did oft-times retard great enterprises, it may be argued that the City would have sooner gotten to that height of greatness and Empire, which she arrived at, born even even by main force against all these difficulties, by the great worth of her Citizens.

Let us observe in the next place, that though the Empire of *Rome* had changed the Form of Government, and reduced the supreme power into one alone, yet we finde not, that she was bereft of those arms, and helps wherewith she had been preserved whilst she was a Commonwealth; but did rather encrease them, and did very much establish Forces; for the Emperors kept alwaies about their persons a great number of Soldiers, for the defence of Imperial Majesty, which were therefore called *Pretorian-bands*, and Armies in the Garrisons of Provinces, which might defend, and keep them from any commotion which might be raised, either by their own Subjects, or by foreign Nations. Nor were the Emperors themselves wanting in taking order for Arms and all things belonging to War; nay, not onely those that were held valiant, but even who for all things else were esteemed cowards, and given over to all manner of vice, did either by themselves, or by their Commanders undertake and finish many Wars. So it seems likeliest that the Roman Empire might govern her self, and so long preserve her greatness as she did, chiefly for being sustained by the chief Authority, and reverent Majesty of one onely Lord, which was of such force, as it for a long time did overcome that weakness, which otherwise might have befalln the Empire, by the abject baseness of many Emperors; where on the contrary, whilst it was a Commonwealth, it was divided, rent, weak, and easie to have been opprest, if it had then met with the power of any great, and valiant Nation, which would have suppressit it, as did so many Northern People do to the Empire. And if the corruption of antient customs may be judged to have been the readiest and truest occasion of the ruine of this Empire, the Commonwealth was never free from the like, but even as for this very cause, of having fallen from her good Principles, that first Government was altered, and the City lost her Liberty, so might she have done, though she still kept the Form of a Commonwealth. Avarice, ambition, immoderate sensuality, were the maladies wherewith the City of *Rome* began to be infected, not when she was governed by Emperors, but whilst she was ruled by her Citizens in Civil Government; And if it be objected that this did not hinder her from giving the greatest testimony of her valor in War, since in the last Age of the Commonwealth, when these vices and corruptions were rifeſt among the Citizens, Military Discipline did flourish most, and greatest actions were done: It cannot then be said, that neither the corruption of manners in the times of Emperors, did destroy the Empire, nor that the integrity thereof could have longer preserved the power of the Commonwealth. But so much the less for that the Empire did not fall to ruine (though it was sufficiently agitated by home-disorders) in such sort, as that either the Subjects did vindicate their Liberty, or the Commanders of Armies divide the Empire amongst them, as did *Alexanders* Commanders after his death; but the Roman Commonwealth, though it was oft-times thrust at by such commotions, was still notwithstanding able to subsist, and to raise it self up again when it began to fall. But barbarous and foreign Forces overthrew it at last; with whom the famous Commanders in the time of the Commonwealth, not having had any occasion to try their worth, it cannot be said what would have succeeded upon such an occasion, if the Government of the Commonwealth had continued till that time. It is likely, that the disorders and factions increasing much more, whereof so many p[er]nicious seeds had been sowed in all the Orders of the City, the City, and

Territories belonging thereunto being to remain the weaker, and the more exposed to the injuries of foreigners, would have been the easier opprest, if she had been to have withstood the terrible shock of these fierce and wild Northern Nations, which the Emperors Forces did notwithstanding long resist; insomuch as the Roman Empire maintained it self for the space of two hundred years after it was molested by these sorts of people; nay, it maintained it self in dignity and majesty for about fifty years after it was shrewdly shaken, till in the time of the Emperor *Leo the First*, *Rome* and *Italy* being totally abandoned, the name and power of the Western Empire did totally terminate.

It may therefore be thought a gallant and well-advised action, that the Emperors did so long temporise, and keep the Arms of these so powerful Nations from the more inward parts of their State, of *Italy*, and chiefly of *Rome* herself, like so much venom from their hearts; with which if they should have tryed the fortune of War, hazarding one Battel, or more, as upon other occasions those antient Roman Commanders had done, they might peradventure have brought the Empire sooner to its ruine, since they had to do with a very warlike people, and whose condition was such, as they must either die, or overcome. And certainly they had done worse, if they had therein trusted and relied upon Fortune, since they could have gotten nothing by the victory when they should have won it, were it not the saving of themselves for the present against those Armies, who might have been succeeded by others of the same Nations, and so the War to have been renewed more hotly and direfully then before, out of a desire to revenge the death of their friends; whereas the los of a Battel or two on the Romans side, might have drawn along with it the ruine of a most noble Empire. It was then fortunate for the Commonwealth of *Rome*, that she met not with these people in such necessity and danger; for if that had befalln her, which hapned in the time of Emperors, that Fame might peradventure have been obscured which she was happy in, of being glorious and victorious in all Wars; and the course of her so many prosperous successes might have been interrupted or broken off by this unfortunate end.

Yet if we will look on the other side, we may peradventure meet with other no less prevalent reas ons which peradventure perswade us to the contrary. Experience shews us how good the Orders were wherewith the Commonwealth was founded, to make great acquisitions: But it is a general rule, That States are preserved by walking in the same ways wherein they were founded; for every thing is preserved and maintained by alike things, and are corrupted by the contraries. If the Roman Arms, governed by her own Citizens with Civil authority, were sufficient to reduce so many States and Kingdoms under the power of the Commonwealth, what reason have we to believe that they should not still be as able to preserve what they had gotten; which is more easily done? The basenes and carcenes of many of those Emperors did doubtlesly open the way to the Empires ruine; for they often-times suffered those Northern people to settle themselves in divers Provinces of the Empire. *Valarius* was permitted by *Honorius* to inhabit with his *Goths* in *France*; and soon after becoming his Colleagues, they likewise obtained some Cities in *Spain* from him. *Valentinianus* granted likewise *Servia* and *Bulgaria* to other *Goths*; and before these, *Gallus* had bought peace of the *Goths*; so as becoming more bold and insolent, they made themselves masters of *Thrace*, *Theffaly*, and of *Macedonia*. Thus the very Emperors themselves having through their pusillanimity suffered mischief to increase at home, and these their fierce Enemies to grow powersl, they could not afterwards drive them out of those places which they had possesst themselves of, nor keep them long out of *Italy*. This would not have been suffered by the generosity of the Roman Commanders and Citizens, who when they were in a much worse condition, would by no means agree with King

Pyrrhus, who had assailed *Italy*, unless he would leave them, and return to his own Kingdom. And that they might draw *Hannibal* out of *Italy*, they betook themselves to molest the Carthaginians in *Spain* and in *Africa*, after they had for so many years generously withstood their Forces. And whilst that State continued in the form of a Commonwealth, as if Liberty had infused noble and generous thoughts into them, the City of *Rome* was an example to all the world of all sorts of virtue, chiefly of Magnanimity in undertaking great enterprises, and of Fortitude and Constancie in managing them, and in bringing them to a happy end. But when the Commonwealth was ruin'd, and a new sort of Government brought in, that antient Roman worth went astray by little and little, till at last it was quite lost. So as the ensuing Ages gave as many examples of ignorance and baseness in the very Emperors themselves, and in others who were of greatest degree and authority in that Empire. Hence then it was, that the good and antient Customs being corrupted, both in Civil government, and chiefly in the Militia, the State being reduced to great faintness, and growing old, had not strength enough to govern it self when it met with stout opposition. The Roman Empire was brought to so miserable a condition when it was set upon by the Northern Nations, which wanted all manner of order and military discipline, as well in their Commanders, as in the Soldiers of their own Nations, whereof the Roman Armies had been for a long time full; insomuch as for above twenty years together, before the *Goths* pass'd into *Italy*, they put themselves into the usual pay of some of the Roman Emperors: And when *Theodosius* the Second, who was to make head in *France* against a valiant and numerous Army led on by *Attila*, it was found that the Army which he had then got together retained only the bare name of a *Roman Army*, being totally composed of *Barbarians*, *Vizigots*, *Franks*, *Burgonians*, *Alani*, and others, who notwithstanding bore away the victory for the Roman Emperor. The like hapned in *Gratianus* his time, who being set upon by *Atalaricus* King of the *Goths*, was fain for the defence of *Italy* to make use of *Goths*, *Huns*, and other Soldiers of those Nations.

But the antient valor of the *Romans* was no less lost in their Soldiers then in their Commanders: For so great an Empire was grown to so great a scarcity of valiant men, and such as were fit to command the Armies, which were to withstand the raging violence of these fierce and barbarous Nations; as *Honorius* found none to whom he could commit such a charge, but one *Stilico*, who was himself a Barbarian, a *Hun* by Nation, and very perfidious, who moved by his own interest and designs, sought to maintain his authority, and to the end that he might place his Son in the Empire, whilst he commanded over those Forces which were raised to extinguish the *Gothish* Armies, he did not only not beat them when he might have done it, but sollicited other Northern people to assault divers Provinces of the Empire, and so procured them more Enemies. And *Theodosius* the Second, having placed all authority and hope of defending the Provinces of the Empire from the fury of *Attila*, in one *Etius*, when he had lost that Commander, he had not any one fitting to undergo that charge, but was forced to leave the passage into *Italy* free unto him. That which is reported of *Attila*, doth greatly witness the weakness of the Empire, and in what need it stood of valiant and faithful men; that being foretold by his Southslayers, that if he should come to a day of battel with the Roman Army in *France*, he should lose the day, but that his losse would cost the Empire dear, for they should lose one of their best Commanders; he did put so high an esteem thereupon, as notwithstanding such an Augury, he refused not to joyn battel.

The Wars made by the Empire many years before the times of this its greatest calamity and ruine, were made against their own Roman Commanders, who com-

manded over their Armies in several places, and who being in far off Provinces, rebelled against the Emperors, hoping that they might usurp the Empire, to the which every one of them did aspire, since they saw that all ways, even the most indirect, lay open to a succession therein, so as the Discipline and worth was alike in both the Armies, and still the Romans got the victory, that is to say, those who had the greatest Power and Authority in the Roman Empire. But as soon as occasion was offered of trying the worth of those Soldiers who served the Empire against foreign Forces, and that whatsoever the Roman Empire lost, proved an addition to their cruel and mortal enemies, the weakness thereof was soon seen, and what a loss it had suffered by the total corruption of Discipline, and good ancient orders. Which could not have happened, if the Commonwealth had still continued; for it is not likely that valiant Commanders would be found wanting in that City, where by the vertue of good military Institutions, Soldiers did so much flourish; since those who had betaken themselves to other imployments, when once they took upon them the Government of Provinces, behaved themselves so in the Militia, as they deserved commendations, for there was a certain spirit of glory in them all, and a desire of propagating the common good, as also an aptnes for all things which did befit Roman spirits. But as soon as the Form of Government being changed, the same Romans began to degenerate from their antient worth, and that the chief imployments, nay the Empire it self fell into the hands of foreigners, all things else must likewise suffer alteration; and in particular, disorders in the Militia, and the licentiousnes of the Soldiers grew to be such, as so great an Empire seemed sometimes to be governed by chance, there not being any one therein who took care for the common good, nor for the obseruance of good Orders, neither at home nor abroad. And the making of the Militia mercenary, was cause of the going less in worth and discipline, as also of treachery; Insomuch as those very Soldiers, who served the Emperors, favored the Enemy; as it happened in *Theodosius* his time, when those who were to guard the *Pirencian Mountains*, were bribed to let the *Vandals* and *Swedes* pass into *Italy*, without making any opposition, which was the occasion of other mischiefs. And the treachery of his Commander *Gallus* hindred the Emperor *Decius* from pursuwing a famous victory gotten of the *Goths*, when not being so well flesht as they were afterwards, nor yet so powerful, they might have been the easilier kept back.

But in time of the Commonwealth, the Roman Commanders, and Soldiers, fought for their own Grandezza; the Nobility grew famous and powerful, and the people in whose name, and in that of the Senate all Wars were made, got honor and advantage by those things which by their Arms they added to that Dominion: So as amongst other actions of the Commonwealth, it is not without wonder to be considered, how she could maintain so many and so numerous Armies as she did, meerly out of Roman Soldiers. But when these respects began to fail, and that the Militia grew mercenary, and that the Soldier grew past all measure insolent, by reason of their Commanders leudness, who permitted them to do all manner of foul things, to the end that they might have their assistance in their usurping the Empire: The Roman Empire which had formerly wont to be so formidable to their Enemies, so obedient to their Commanders, began to behave themselves poorly against thier Enemies, and insolently against their Lord and Master, troublesome to their friends whom they were sent to assist, and too unable to defend them against foreign Forces: which things, as they were begotten by the change of Government, so is it most apparent that they were the occasion of bringing the Empire to a sooner and more miserable end. So many, and so heinous disorders could not have risen, if the City had continued in a Form of Commonwealth,

wealth, or of Civil Government; for though all the Citizens might not have peradventure proved good and valiant, yet amongst so many there would still have some one been found, of such excellent worth and charity towards his Country, as would have been able, if not totally to cure such disorders, at least so far to have bounded them, as they should not have run into so great a precipice. And though amongst the Emperors, there were some who were endowed with excellent virtues, yet could not the affairs of the Empire revert to its beginning, because there past sometimes a whole Age betwixt one and another of these good ones: And the Empire, for a continued series of many Emperors was administered by base men, plunged in a multitude of vices; Insomuch as it became almost impossible for those who succeeded to reduce the affairs to any good condition, which had so long run to the worse.

Moreover no one mans abilities, though never so excellent, were able to govern so great a body, as was the Roman Empire, much less those of such as were so unfit, even for Governments of less importance, as were many of the Roman Emperors. Whence it was that *Adrian*, a wise Emperor, thought it fit for the welfare of the Empire, to go in his own person, and consolidate it with his presence, and visit in perpetual progresses, sometimes one, sometimes another Province; for the good Government whereof, they being so many, and so remote, the example of so many rebellious Commanders and Armies, shewed how false and unworthy the Ministers had been who had been by the Emperors sent thither. But in the Commonwealth there were a great many Citizens who were interess'd in the Government and Greatness thereof, so as though some valiant man went to the Wars, the City remained not without Government or Obedience; nor did the appointing a Commander in chief over one Army, bereave them of others who might command more Armies, if they had need to wage War at one and the same time in several places, whereof the Commonwealth of *Rome* did in all Ages give notable examples.

Nor can it be affirmed, but that the Commanders, and Armies of the Commonwealth have made War with people as powerful in Arms, as were those Northern Nations, whose fury the Roman Empire could not resist. For, not to mention so many bitter Wars made by those antient Romans, the enterprises done by *Julius Cesar* in *France*, were they not undertaken against people, in whom all the respects met which were considerable in those Northern Nations? very numerous Armies; for we read, that one onely Army, amongst many sundry people whereinto *France* was then divided, which was vanquish'd and wholly overcome by *Cesar*, consisted of above Three hundred thousand fighting men. But the *Helvetii*, *Foringi*, *Boii*, and others who were routed and overcome by *Cesar*, had taken up Arms of meer choice, and that they might get new places to dwelin; just as did the *Goths*, *Hunnes*, *Vandals*, *Lombards*, and others; and this with such resolution as to put a necessity upon themselves of doing their utmost to get a dwelling place, they burnt all their houses in their own Country. But the *Almans* led on by their King *Ariovitus*, were they not a fierce Nation, and long trained up in Arms: and yet these were also overcome by the same *Cesar*, and by the Roman Arms. The same may peradventure be more properly asserted, of the *Cimbri*, *Ambroni*, and *Teutones*, who were not long before this overcome by *Marius*: For these were also a very barbarous people, and come from the Northern Countries, from whence *Romes* so many mischiefs did afterwards proceed. There were of these above Three hundred thousand fighting men, they had left their own homes for the same reason, that they might find out new habitations; and being already well advanced into *France*, they boasted that they would be Masters of *Italy*, and ruine *Rome*: But against these did the Roman Armies boldly march, and

went over the Mountains to encounter them ; so as those Barbarians began to be routed, and met with a rub to their greatest Forces : And afterwards those who had advanced by another way, being gotten safe into *Italy*, they sent to desire *Marius* the General of the Roman Armies, that he would assign them some Territories where they might live quietly, and they would therewithall rest contented, without endeavoring to advance their Fortune any further by their Arms. But they did not then obtain it of the Roman General, as did the *Goths* and other Foreigners afterwards from some of the Emperors, who not trusting in themselves, nor in their Armies, permitted those Barbarous hostile Nations to live peacefully in those Provinces of the Empire, whereof they had injuriously possessed themselves. Nay, though there were not above Fifty thousand Foot in the Roman Army, and that they were to fight with six times as many of the Enemy, the Roman Commanders did not refuse to join battel with them, and did totally overthrow the Enemies Army, thereby securing *Italy* for that time, and for many years after, from Transalpine incursions. But 'tis seen, that neither the number of the Enemy, nor the desperate-mindedness of them with whom they fought, nor the discipline nor induration in Armies and military duties, (all which things were in these barbarous Armies overcome by the Romans) were sufficient to discourage the Roman Commanders and Soldiers, whilst the Commonwealth did nourish generous thoughts in them, and in their Forces. And in *Augustus* his time also, because Discipline in War was observed, *Drusus* and *Tiberius Nero* were able to drive away the *Vandals*, who were then called *Borgondi*, and to frighten other People of the furthest Northern parts from coming to infest *Italy*, as they were preparing to do :

No good argument can then be inforsed from what hath been said, nor can there be any rational judgment given of what would have befalln the Roman Empire, if it had still been kept under the antient government of a Commonwealth, till the great combustions made by these Northern people, by whom it was destroyed. Certainly the acquisition, or preservation of States, does not depend upon the Form of Government, whether it be of one alone, or of a few, or of many ; for we have examples cleer enough of great Empires which have been won, and preserved by a King, by the *optimati*, by a People, and by a Commonwealth mixt of divers sorts of Governments. But the strength or weakness of every State depends upon particular Orders, chiefly in point of the Militia, wherewith it is instituted, and the force and vertue whereof useth to be such, as even Tyrannical Governments, which carry with them so much of violence, have risen to a great height of power, and have preserved it long, as by woful example to others we may this day discern in the *Ottoman Government*. As then the City of *Rome* grew great and powerful, not for being either formed of an Optimatical, or Popular, or mixt Government, but for her good Orders and Institutions in military affairs ; whence it was, that when at any time the *Romans* had bad success in their battels, yet all their enterprises did still end in victory : So cannot it be alleged for a true and immediate reason of the ruine of that Empire, that it fell under the government and obedience of one alone. For this Supreme Authority, were it either by succession, or by election, if (as it hath been for a long course of time in so many other Countries) it had passed in a settled and usual manner from one Prince to another, whereby the Soldier should have had no occasion to have usurped a very undue and harmful licentiousness in all things, and that the antient discipline, obedience, and military worth had been observed in the Roman Armies, as it might have been, under one only Lord and Master, it may be safely said and believed, that that the Roman Empire would have suffered no more by the fury of these Northern inundations, then it would have done if the State had continued in a Commonwealth ; but as the *Cimbri*,

Teutones, *Ambroni*, all of them people of the same Nations, were formerly withstood by the Roman Arms, so the violence of *Goths*, *Huns*, *Vandals*, and all such like might have been stopped. It is only so far true, that the change of Government afforded occasion to the ruine of the Empire, forasmuch as the good orders and Roman discipline were peradventure easilier corrupted, when recommended to the care and diligence of one only Prince, who was oft-times unfit for Government, then it would have done, had it been guarded by many Citizens at once, as it was in the Commonwealths time. But it is very hard to penetrate into the true causes of so great events, and so remore from our memory, which are referred to the deeper judgment of him who is the true and Supreme Lord, and who governs and doth dispense States and Empires by ways and ends, which are unknown to humane reason.

The Fourteenth DISCOURSE.

Why the Grecians did not much extend the Confines of their Dominion, as did the Romans; and how Greece came to lose her Liberty.

Of all other anient People, there are two that have been greatly famous; so as their names, and the glory of things by them done, hath been conveyed over to the memory of Posterity with large acclamations; to wit, the *Romans* and *Grecians*; alike for notable examples of all worth and vertue, but sufficiently unlike for the greatness and duration of Empire: For whereas the *Grecians* did not extend their Confines beyond the bounds of *Greece* herself, nor did she long flourish in the same splendor of dignity, nor greatness of fame and dominion; the *Romans* did command over almost the whole World, and their Empire, although the Form of Government was changed, endured for many Ages; for there past above eleven hundred years between the building of *Rome*, and the time wherein she was taken and sackt by the *Goths*. They then who shall consider these things, may with reason desire to know why these two Nations did differ so much in fortune, since they were equally worthy. It was not in any one City alone, that choise men for both all civil and military worth did flourish in *Greece*, as in *Italy* they did in *Rome*; but many Cities did at the same time produce Citizens excellent in all manner of things. It would be a tedious thing to number vp the gallant Actions of *Miltiades*, *Themistocles*, *Aristides*, *Phocion*, *Alcibiades*, *Agelaius*, *Cimon*, *Leontidas*, *Epinomidas*, and of so many others whose Fame rings loud amongst us: And *Plutarch*, when he writes the lives of the most excellent *Romans*, finds as many *Grecians* almost to parallel to them, who are as highly cry'd up for the same vertues. Yet did never any of their Cities, nor *Greece* herself the Country common to them all, ever rise by any of their actions to that high pitch of Fortune and Command, as did the City of *Rome*, and whole *Italy*, by the illustrious deeds of the *Romans*. This diversity of success ought not to be attributed to Fortune, but their certain and natural causes. If *Greece* should have enlarged the bounds of her Empire into the farthest distant Regions, as did *Italy* through the power and gallantry of the *Romans*, she must either have been reduced under the power of one only Potentate, or they must all of them have been joined in an uniform consent in the prosecution of great designs: But so many difficulties discover themselves in both these things, as when they

they are considered the wonder ceaseth, why she could not encrease her Dominions, answerable to the Fame, Vertue, and Glory of things done by that Nation. *Greece* was divided into many several people, who were all of them totally, or for the most part governed by proper Laws, and Civill Institutions in the Form of a Commonwealth, though they were of divers States. And though they had a general Council, which was called the *Amphyctyonies*, wherein men met, who were sent from all the chief Cities, to treat of the most important affairs, and such as did concera the common interests of all *Greece*, yet did not this Council give one onely and certain Government to all *Greece*; but it was such an Assembly as are the Diets which are in these times sometimes call'd in *Germany* upon some particular Occurrences; wherein many Princes, and free Cities of that Province meet, which do much differ in State, Dignity, and Form of Government; and who have free votes in counselling and in resolving upon such matters as are therein treated. But amongst other people of *Greece*, the *Spartans* and the *Athenians*, antient people of *Greece*, and who for a long time, had by their worth purchast much authority, were very numerous and eminent when *Greece* did flourish most, both for publick power, and for the admirable worth of particular Citizens. For though the *Corinthians*, the *Argives*, the *Acheans*, and some other people, were of greater con sideration, in respect of other lesser Cities, yet they for the most part did rather follow the fortune of the *Lacedemonians*, and the *Athenians*, then their own. And the *Thebans*, who for a while were in better esteem then the rest, by reason of their Soldiers Discipline, whom they called by a particular name, of the Sacred Cohort, yet because of all her Citizens, onely two arrived at any celebrated honor, to wit *Pelopides* and *Epaminondas*, and for that her Militia consisted but of Five hundred men, their City never arrived at that degree of Dominion and Glory, as did *Sparta* and *Athens*. But as much as these were greater then the others, so much did they the more emulate one another, both for private worth and glory, as for publick Dignity and Reputation. To these did the other people of *Greece* adhere, some being by them commanded, others by vertue of particular considerations. These two Cities were highly esteemed for the orders of the first Founders of such Commonwealths, to wit *Lycurgus* in *Sparta*, and in *Athens*, *Theseus*; so as these people who did long before inhabit the same Country, began to take name, and authority over the rest: Those who did inhabit the *Terra firmis*, held for the most part with the *Spartans*; and those of the Islands with the *Athenians*. But yet every City was free, and hugely intent not to let the power either of the *Spartans* or *Athenians* encrease too much, but to keep the strength of these two chief Cities so equally ballanced, as when the one of them should go about to oppress the other people of *Greece*, the oppressed might have recourse to the other.

It is therefore to be observed in all the actions of the Grecians, that the rest of the people were never firm in their friendships, either to the *Spartans* alone, or alone to the *Athenians*; but when the one of them began to exceed the other, they sided with the weakest; not valuing any tie of friendship or confederacy, when they met with any such respect: So as for a long time the affairs of *Sparta*, and of *Athens* marcht hard in hand, though each of them both gave and received many routs, and partook both of good and bad fortune in War. *Sparta* was strongest by land, and *Athens* by Sea; so as they did counterpoise one another; and therefore, and for that (as it hath been said) they had each of them many dependants, and confederates, they kept the forces of whole *Greece* divided, nor was there means afforded to either of them, much to exceed the other. Wherefore neither of them could busie themselvs in far off affairs, nor against strangers, because they were still at contestation between themselves. And if at any time they went about

bout to do it, they were either hindred or diverted, as were the *Athenians*, when they past with their Fleet above *Sicily* under pretence to affst the *Leontinians*, but in effect, to get the Island to themselves; aspiring, by advice of *Alcibiades* (who had higher conceptions, then any former Grecian had had) to pass over into *Africa* against the *Carthaginians*; the *Spartans* having discovered the design, and not being able to endure, that the *Athenians* should to their prejudice, grow more powerful, resisted their Forces, and succor'd *Messina*, when the City was ready to be lost, and also assailed the *Athenians* in their own Territories, to divert them from that enterprise. The same thing, for the same occasion fell out, when the *Athenians* passing with their Fleet into *Egypt*, had induced the *Egyptians* to rebel against the *Persians*; and very powerful Forces were already brought by Sea from *Greece* to *Cyprus*, to assault the King of *Persia's* Territories; But the *Lacedemonians* growing jealous of their greatness, frustrated that design, opposing them so many waies, and by so many Forces, as if the business had been not to have abased, but to have exalted the power of the *Persians*, the common, and continual enemies of *Greece*. But these things were done by the *Spartans*, as they gave out, onely to curb the immoderate ambition of the *Athenians*, and to maintain, and defend the liberty of whole *Greece*; upon which pretence they undertook, and for many years maintained that famous War, of the people of *Morca*, which did much molest whole *Greece*, and kept their Forces very low. Therefore in the time when these two greater and more famous Commonwealths did flourish, they made use of their Forces more against themselves then against foreiners; and in domestick War, which was the cause why *Greece* grew weaker, not more powerful: For whatsoever of prejudice befel either of the parties, was prejudicial to *Greece* her self, and the fame and glory of their victories was blemish'd and lessened by the loss of those Grecians that were overcome.

Therefore she never became formidable to other Nations, as did *Italy*, where when the fame and worth of the *Romans* began to prevail, and the other neighboring Potentates were extinguished, her force and power being all of a pece, the *Roman Arms* were dreadful to all people, nay they were all finally overcome by them. But *Greece* never having been able to reduce her self to a condition, that all her forces should be under the power of one onely Potentate, and that War was administred under the Auspice of one onely Commonwealth, she was of necessity to be alwaies too weak and impotent to inlarge her Confines much. So as that which made the Grecians be much esteemed, to wit, her having so many Commonwealths, did much diminish the glory and dignity of Empire, to which otherwise her many signal vertues might have carried her, if her Forces had been in the power of one onely or Prince, or Commonwealth; or at least if there had been a greater union, and better intelligence amongst the so many Commonwealths that were in her. But too great a desire of Liberty, which made it harder for one People to be obedient to another People, was directly that which made them injoy it the lesser while. For being weak, and divided amongst themselves, the way lay open to any who who would assault, and oppress them. But the better the Grecians were accommodated with all vertue and discipline, which made them esteem all others besides themselves barbarous, so much the more were they born away with too much vivacity of spirit, to such an elation of mind, as none of them could indure to see themselves equalld either in publick, or in private by another, nor any City to his, nor any of his Citizens to himself. So as every more valiant man, and every more generous action grew suspitious to others, and were more envied, and disturb'd then the rest, all their ambition and emulation being turned upon themselves.

It is reported that Pausanias, who was Commander in chief in a Victory had against

against the *Perians*, did in token thereof present the Temple of *Apollo* in *Delphos* with that famous golden Trevet; whereat the rest of the *Grecians* being greatly scandalized, made *Pausanias* his name be raced out, and placed in stead thereof the names of all the Confederate Cities, whose People were present at that Victory. And 'tis said of *Alcibiades*, that full of vexation, he had wont to say, that he could not sleep for thinking of the Triumphs of *Miltiades*. But there are a thousand examples of such like things, which shews how fervently they did contend one with another in point of glory. *Themistocles* and *Aristides* were profess'd Enemies; so were *Alcibiades* and *Arias*, and many others of the most famous and valiantest Citizens of *Athens*: Where there was such contention amongst themselves, and so great care was had that no one man should exceed another very much, notwithstanding any action which might make him more glorious and potent, as *Ostracism* was ordained, which was, the banishment of such Citizens for ten years, who were very remarkable either for excellency of parts, or prosperous fortune, more then were the rest; by which means they lost their best Citizens, nay sometime made them become their Enemies, as was seen in *Alcibiades*, *Themistocles*, *Pericles*, and some others, who were born for the aggrandising of that Commonwealth, and yet through the corruption of the Orders thereof proved prejudicial to it. Whereupon *Xerxes*, who favored, and gave entertainment to such men, had wont to say, that he prayed God that his Enemies might still banish such Citizens.

The divers Forms of Government made likewise much against the union of the people of *Greece*. Some of their Cities were much for *Democracie*, as *Athens*; and some others lean'd more to *Aristocracie*, as *Sparta*. Such diversity of Governments produced diversity of Customs and cogitations; so as they could hardly be all of them pleased with one and the same thing, every one measuring their actions with peculiar respects divided from the rest. So as when in the time of *Lysander* King of the *Spartans*, the City of *Athens* was taken, to the end that they might master it the better, they changed the Form of Government, reducing it from a Popular condition, the form of its former Government, under the authority of a few, as that which did more resemble the *Spartan* Government. And in the following times, when the *Spartans* ran the same fortune with all the other *Grecians*, and was compell'd to obey the King of *Macedon*, it was requisite to alter the Laws and Institutions of that City, which were at first ordained by *Lycurgus*. These things did beget and maintain so great a disunion in *Greece*, as she could not only not unite her Forces together to carry them against other Nations, but hardly could she defend herself with them: As was seen, when being mightily endangered by an Army of the *Perians*, which came with a great power to assault her, the War was diversly administred, they not agreeing what City should nominate the Commander in chief; the *Spartans* would have reduced the defence to narrow passages by Land, and the *Athenians* would have put the whole fortune of *Greece* in their Fleet; the situations of their Cities, and the condition of their Forces, would not permit that one and the same thing should be equally useful and commodious for them all. Nor was the eminent danger of the *Perians* so potent Army able to unite the Forces of all *Greece*, but that some of the chief People, as the *Thessalians*, *Argives*, and *Thebans* would be exempted from out the League; and the *Argives* being requested to adhere to the Confederate of so many other Cities, answered, that they would rather obey the *Perians*, then give way unto their antient Rivals and Enemies, the *Spartans*. Finally, the *Grecians* having obtained a great and unexpect'd Victory in the Sea-fight at *Salamine*, when they were to have pursued their Fortune, after having beaten the Fleet, and made the Enemy retire, they of themselves gave over all further hopes, and came home to their own Havens; for that the *Spartans* envied the glory of the *Athenians*, and fearing by reason of their being

being stronger at Sea, that if they should have proceeded on in their success, they would not have spared their own *Grecians*, but have domineered over them; and soon after being more moved by envy, and their antient home-contentions, then by any hatred to the Enemy, when they should have driven the remainder of the Persian Army out of *Greece*, the associate Cities fel upon the *Thebans*, because severing themselves in these common dangers from the *Grecians*, they had recourse for friendship to the *Persians*. So as *Greece* reaped no good by this prosperous success, because the *Grecians* knew not how to value it, nor knew they how to use the Victory when they had got it. *Aterdonius* was overthrown at the Battel of *Platea*, together wch his whole Army, which after *Xerxes* his flight he commanded in chief: But wht advantage got the *Grecians* by so great a victory, save their dividing of the prey? which made them return all of them the sooner to their own houses. Nay, there arose greater and more cruel civil wars between them afterwards, then had ever been before; and the busines grew to that height, as the *Spartans* who had always profess'd themselves more bitter Enemies to the *Barbarians* then all the rest, joyned in league with them, and conspired with *Tissaphernes*, who was Governor of *Libia* for King *Darius*, to ruine *Greece*. Truces made between them were also often broken; and out of too great proneness to adhibit faith to the suspitions which they had one of another, the publick faith was broken; no tye being strong enough to keep those minds fast together, which were so divided by perpetual emulation. But of all the rest, two things are very considerable as touching this present Discourse, and the Judgment which is to be given thereupon; to wit, of what strength the *Grecians* were in military affairs, and with what Princes they had to do, in the time when *Greece* did flourish most, and had most reason to aspire to enlarge her Empire. Certainly he who shall well consider it, will find that warlike Discipline was neither so highly esteemed of, nor of that excellencie and perfection amongst the *Grecians*, as it was amongst the *Romans*; for the *Romans* valued nothing more then military valor and discipline; nay, for a long time they studied no Sciences nor Liberal Arts, (wherein those who took any delight, made use of *Grecians*) but did wholly give their minds to military exercises, and sought for praise from nothing but from War. Whence it was, that more Soldiers excellently well train'd up in military affairs, were to be drawn out of the City of *Rome*, then out of other whole Provinces: whereas the *Grecians* did not give their minds to the study of War, but to Learning, and to the Liberal Sciences, which flourish'd a long time amongst them, as either born with them, or very well cultivated by them. There were as many of them that frequented Universities to become Philosophers, as of those who studied the Soldiers craft. How many Professors were there amongst them of Oratory and Poetry, wherein they proved so excellent, as all that ever desired to prove good therein since, have obserued their rules, and trodden in their steps. How many rare Artificers have there likewise been of *Grecians* in all the most noble Arts, particularly in Sculpture and Picture-drawing? The original, or at least the perfection whereof, knows no other beginning then from *Greece*: In the memory of all Ages, the names of *Phidias*, *Polycletus*, *Alcamenes*, *Aglophon*, *Polynotus*, *Parrhasius*, *Zeuxis*, *Apelles*, and of so many others are celebrated. Wherefore *Greece* was more famous for the excellencie of Learning, and of the Liberal Arts, then for skill in the Militia. Yet was the City of *Sparta* better then the rest at military affairs; and *Athens* was sufficiently famous for her Fleets by Sea, and her skill in maritime affairs: yet the Spartan Militia was bounded within narrow precincts, and it was late ere the *Athenians* did much mind their maritime exercises, to wit, not before *Themistocles* his time. And certainly, neither of these Cities was compleatly well ordered for the acquirement of Empire: For *Sparta*, though her Institutions tended to Arms, yet did they aim more at their own defence, and at the preserv-

tion of Libertie, then at the acquisition of Empire; not only private Citizens, but even the publick weal being constituted in great poverty, and restrained to a small number of Citizens; they were forbidden all commerce with foreigners, least they might corrupt the Laws and Customs of their Country, their lives were austere, and they were contented with a little; Whence it was that those Citizens were a long time from desiring any further greatness, it being therefore propounded to *Cleomenes* King of *Sparta*, by one *Anaxagoras* of *Miletum*, who had caused many of the Cities of *Ionia* to rebel against the King of *Perſia*; to make use of that occasion, and take up arms; shewing him that he might penetrate even to the Cities of *Susa*, and posſeſſ himself of the wealth of all those Kings; The *Spartan* laught at the proposition, and considering onely the length of the voyage, ſaid, He would none of those riches, which were not worth ſo much la-bour. Yet because the Government of *Sparta* preserved it ſelf for a long time without any great alteration or change, and grew therefore the stronger, it was able to get the Dominion of whole *Morea*, and had afterwards the prime place for dignitie, and Empire amongst the Grecians. On the contrary, *Athens*, which by the opportunitie of the Sea, and by divers of her iſtitutions aiming at the in-creasing of the City, ſeemed as if ſhe ought to have inlarged her Dominion beyond the Confines of *Greece*, could not make good uſe of her Forces, nor reap the fruit which became the worth of ſome of her moſt excellent Citizens, who were high-ly ſpirited, and were minded to raise their Country to further greatness, because ſhe could never order her ſelf ſo as to preferve herſelf long in one and the ſame Form of Government, but was buſied in perpetual Civil diſorders, precipitating herſelf ſometimes into a corrupt Popular State, ſometimes into the tyrannie of a few.

But the Grecians ſeemed as if all their thoughts were uſually bounded within themſelves; inſomuch as it is ſaid of ſome of their moſt famous Commanders, That they did more willingly exercise themſelves in Wars made amongst the Grecians themſelves, then in Wars againſt the Barbarians; ſince come what would, the advantage and honor of the Victory did remain in *Greece*. But as for what be-longs to the Militia, ſome may peradventure think, that it may be proved by ſome famous Victories that the *Grecians* won from the *Medes* and *Perſians*, that they did much ſtudy Military Affairs, and were very good at Military Discipline, inſomuch as for that part, there was no more to be wiſhed for in them. To this it may be anſwered, That it is not to be denied, but that the Grecian Militia might be thought to be good and laudable when compared to that of the Barbarians, with-whom they had moſt to do; But that it is no waies to be held comparable to that of the Romans, who did excellently well understand whatſoever belonged to the true Militia, better then did any other Nation in any whatſoever time. Inſomuch as by reaſon of their good orders, and of the ſo many Victories which they wan, they propounded unto themſelves the conqueſt of the whole world; which out of the ſame reaſons they effected. But it is obſervable in the Victories which the Grecians got againſt the King of *Perſia's* Forces, that they were occaſioned, not ſo much through the good ordering of their Militia, as by reaſon of a certain obſtinate reſolution which they had put on, to defend *Greece* from the eminent ſlavery of the Barbarians, the fear whereof made them bold to encounter whatſoever danger.

Many of their actions prove this, as amongst others, that of *Leonidas* was ſufficiently famous, who being left with onely Five hundred of his *Lacedemonians* to guard the Streight of *Thermopylae*, fell boldly with them one night into the Perſian Camp, where were ſundry Hundred thousands of men, not being perſuaded thereunto out of any hopes of victory or ſafety, but onely out of a deſire to re-venge

venge the injuries done by *Xerxes* to *Greece*, by the slaying of so many enemies, and by his own voluntary death. Who knows not that in the Naval fight at *Salamina*, it was necessity that made the Grecians so courageous? Since the *Athenians*, who were of greatest power in that Fleet, were already without any Country, their City being burnt by the Enemy; so that their ultimate hope of any good consisted in that daies good success. And to make the necessity the greater, *Themistocles*, who was their Commander in chief, chose wisely to joyn Battel in a place which was far from any friends Territories, thereby to bereave every one of any other hopes of safety but by being victorious. And the great multitude of the Persians Fleet, served rather for confusion to them then for any strength, for of above a thousand Vessels which were therein, it is said that hardly Two hundred entred the Battel. And the Victory which was obtained not long after by land against the Army led on by *Mardonius*, was rendered the less difficult by the reputation which the Grecians had won by their Naval Victory, and by King *Xerxes* his running away, whose Soldiers proved no more courageous then did their Master, for whose glory it was that they were to fight; whereas the Grecians fought for themselves, for the safety of their Country, their Houses, and of all that they had.

But to boot with all this, it may peradventure not without truth be affirmed, That the actions of the Grecians have been transferred over to the memory of posterity, for greater then what indeed they were. For *Greece* had great store of excellent Writers, who according to the custom of the Nation, amplifying such deeds as might purchase glory to them, have studied very much to set them forth to the best, and to make them appear praise-worthy. Wherefore *Salust* in the beginning of his History, rendring as it were a reason why he took the pains to write, saies, That the Actions of the Romans may appear to be the less, out of the little care they had of putting them into writing, every one being more intent to do praise-worthy actions, then to celebrate the actions of other men; whereas the Grecians actions were made to appear, not what they really were, but such as the most excellent wits of good Writers could by their adornments set them stately forth.

Moreover there met many things in the Romans, much differing from what hath been said of the *Greeks*; for their whole study was to make their City powerful by any whatsoever way, that they might, as they did, draw upon any occasion great store of Soldiers from thence. This was the original of the sanctuarie, wherein wicked men driven out of other Countries were received, and afterwards People of many of the neighboring Cities, were allowed the priviledges of the City of *Rome*, the more to interest them in what belonged to the honor and greatness of *Rome*, as to that of their Common-countrie, yet was not the War admistred under divers names or auspices, as it was in *Greece*, by reason of the several Leagues had between several People, but by the sole authoritie of the Roman Commanders, and still in sole respect to what made onely good for the Commonwealth of *Rome*. Now if we will consider with what forein Po:entates the Grecians had to make War, we shall find that this also made it the harder for them to acquire other mens Countries, for just when the Grecians, by reason of their having many gallant men amongst them, might have aspired at the aggrandizing of their Empire, the Persian Monarchie was grown so powerful as it ruled over all the East; And was not onely got near to *Greece*, by the possestion of *Lydia*, but did also possess *Ionia*, an antient Colony of the Grecians. So as it was a very great and difficult undertaking, to go about to posses the Territories of so great a Prince, who though he should receive a rout might easily recover his los, and put himself in a safe posture of defence, by reason of the largeness of his Domi-

nion, and the multitude of Soldiers that were at his command. So as join this outward impediment to the inward, which lay in their home-discords, and we shall see that the Routs which the *Grecians* gave to the *Persians*, did no further incommode the *Persians*, then the loss of those Armies ; nor did the *Grecians* receive any further benefit thereby, then the defending of themselves, and their safety for no long time from further dangers. But the Kingdom of *Macedon*, though of much less strength for extent of Empire, became very formidable by reason of its good Discipline in War, and for the great worth of some of her Kings, amongst which *Philip* the Father of *Alexander*, who as he proved a great Prince, and of deep designs, so was he very pernicious to *Greece* : For divers People of *Greece* having recourse to him for help against some other *Grecians* that were their Enemies, they were willingly received, and their request graciously listned unto, that so he might nourish their discords, and weaken all their Forces by continual Wars ; by which means he made himself Arbitrator of all *Greece* ; insomuch as there were not any of them who did not sometimes apply themselves unto him, either for Peace to themselves, or for help by War against others.

Wherefore *Philip* discovering his intentions at last, that he was resolved to rule over all *Greece*, he entred thereinto with powerful Forces, and was no less grievous to those who first called him in, then to the rest against whom he declared his coming to be. So *Thebes*, which was the first City which made use of his Forces, and did it oftner then all the rest, was one of the first (though with prejudice to all the rest) that tasted the bitter fruits of her unadvised Councils, being ruin'd and destroyed by the same *Philip* ; who being much allured by the taking of that City, and by hopes of greater matters, resolved to make himself Master of other Cities of *Greece* : To which design whereas all *Greece* ought to have opposed themselves for the common interest, they went about; though by several and divided counsels, to join themselves with him, and to place their own safety in his friendship and fidelity. Thus did all *Beotia*, *Thessaly*, and other Regions adhere unto him ; and the *Athenians*, who, encouraged by *Demosthenes*, took up Arms themselves, and endeavored to raise whole *Greece* against *Philip*, being but in weak condition after the so many defeats received from the *Lacedemonians*, they also had recourse to him for safety by the way of favor and peace, not only for themselves, but for all *Greece*. So as the *Spartans* being left almost alone to oppose *Philip's* Forces, they proved much too weak to withstand such a power ; so as *Greece* being opprest by Forein forces, fell at last into the hands of the *Macedonians*. And when there was a likelihood, by the death of *Philip*, who had not as yet well confirm'd his government over them, that the *Grecians* might have shaken off their yoke of servitude, *Alexander* succeeded in the Kingdom, so valiant a Prince, as he was a terror not only to his neighbors, but to all the East ; who by his supreme greatness, and excellent worth, made all his Soldiers so inamor'd of him, as some of the *Grecian* Commanders, who had followed him in the Wars in *Persia*, stuck not to affirm, that there was not any one in *Greece*, who ought not to desire as the greatest happiness that could befall them, that *Alexander* might sit in the Throne, as King of *Persia*.

But after *Alexander's* unexpected death, *Greece* seemed to have a better opportunity offered her to remit herself into her former liberty, being just at that time in Arms ; for the *Athenians* with many other people were rebell'd against *Alexander*, and had an Army on foot of Thirty thousand men, besides a numerous Fleet, discontented because he would have received into their Country a great many of *Citizens*, who had been banish'd for diversity of Factions. And moreover, the divisions of Empire made by *Alexander* among so many of his Commanders, and the contentions which suddenly arose amongst them, were things which gave *Greece* great oppor-

opportunities of not being any more subject to be commanded by a Foreigner. Yet could she not lay hold thereon, either because their former valor and generosity began to fail in them, and their antient Customs to be corrupted, (for many who had received favors from *Philip* and from *Alexander*, loved better to be governed by one man alone, then to restore their Country to her liberty ; and chiefly for that the People having for the most part had great authority in those days, the best and most valiant Citizens were rewarded with banishment and other injuries for their service :) Or else it may rather be said, that the same reason of Civil discord which had at first made *Greece* weak, and not able to maintain herself in a free condition, did concur at this time likewise to make her relapse into slavery. Thus the *Acheans*, and the *Argives*, who together with the *Athenians* had taken up Arms against the *Macedonians*, either out of fear of *Antipaters* Forces (to whose share in the division of the Empire after *Alexanders* death, *Macedonia* and *Greece* fell, of which Provinces he was formerly Governor) or else egg'd on by envy, they soon forewent the League which they had contracted, lest the City of *Athens* might have returned to her former greatness, and so suffered the *Athenians* to be made a prey of by the *Macedonians*. And the *Spartans*, out of their same antient respects, standing idle Spectators of other mens miseries, and not thinking that the same afflictions might befall them, minded more to secure their own City with new Fortifications, then to oppose themselves, as they ought to have done, to these Forces of the Enemy, and not have suffered them to increase by the Forces of *Greece* herself, and by those whom they had subjugated.

After this, *Greece* enjoyed peace and quiet ; some of them enduring patiently the *Macedonian* government, and others not fearing (as they ought to have done :) the like mischief, because it was not as yet come home unto them. So when by the various accidents which befell the *Macedonians* in their own Kingdom, *Greece* might have kept them low, or at least have kept them from further domineering, permitting *Cassander*, *Antigonus*, and *Demetrius* to live peaceably and quietly for all them, and sometimes too much believing their flatteries, and allured by a certain appearing Liberty wherewith those Princes thought good to keep the *Grecians* in obedience to them, they knew not how to make use of any of so many occasions, till at last in *Philip's* time (that *Philip* with whom the Romans had Wars so long, who proved so gallant a Prince, and possest himself of *Macedonia* together with other Provinces) she returned to her antient revolts. And as *Philip* the Father of *Alexander* made himself Lord thereof, by the same means whereby he had got entrance thereto ; for King *Philip* entered *Greece*, being call'd in by the *Argives* and *Acheans*, who were made War upon by the *Etolians*, with whom many of the Cities of *Greece* were so ill satisfied, as to shun being governed by them, they voluntarily put themselves into the power of King *Philip* ; who had the way at last opened unto him (to the end that no part of *Greece* might be safe from the *Macedonian* Forces) to fall upon *Sparta*, with which City *Philip* was before upon good terms and in peace : For the *Lacedemontans* not being able to endure that the *Acheans*, by *Philip's* favor, should grow too great in *Morea*, the Principality whereof they had for a long time held, breaking their former agreement and confederacie made with *Philip*, were joined with the *Etolians*, assisting them against the *Acheans*, who were Friends and Confederates of the same *Philip*. And after many revolutions, the business came at last to that pass, as the *Grecians* being too late aware that they had suffered the authority of the *Macedonians* to grow too great over them, by which some of them had been formerly tyrannically dealt withall, and others apprehending the like imminent danger, not able to endure these yet greater mischiefs, they fled to the *Romans*, craving help and succor from them against *Philip* ; as did the City of *Athens* chiefly, as having suffered greatest

greatest injuries, and being wont to be the head of the greatest, and most important innovations in *Greece*. Nor was it hard for them to obtain it ; for the Romans, making profession, that they had made it their busines that there should be no unjust power upon the earth, but that Reason, Justice, and Law should rule every where, did willingly imbrace the protection, and defence of the weakest, whom they found to be opprest by the more powerful : which thing under pretence of defending others, and of a noble piece of generosity, made the way to divers acquisitions the easier to them ; covering by these means their ambition of Government.

But the Romans were very cunning herein, who in all their actions shewed as if they desired nothing but glory, by which they did miraculously win the hearts of all *Greece*: For in the Expedition which they made against *Philip*, their Armies having, at the instance of the Grecians themselves past over the Sea, run many hazzards, and endured much hardships ; when they had conquered *Philip*, and drove him out of *Greece*, they restored all those Cities which had been formerly under his Dominion, to their Liberty ; suffering them to live under their own Laws, but yet so, as made advantagiously for them, placing some of their own Roman Soldiers in some of the bordering Towns ; alleadging that they did this for the good of *Greece*, that being freed from the slavery of *Philip*, they might not fall into the like of *Antigonus*, a powerful King at that time in *Asia*, who might be the better kept out of *Europe*, for fear of not offending the Roman greatness, then for fear of the weak forces of *Greece*, which were already very low. But the truth was, that these places opportunely held by the Romans, served to secure them of the Grecians fidelitie, if at any time forgetting their obligation, and desirous of novelty, as they had alwaies appeared to be, they should have a mind, with prejudice to the Roman affairs, to joyn with any other stranger Prince ; for they desired that they might depend on the Authority of the Commonwealth of *Rome*.

So as that *Greece* which had so many valiant Soldiers and Commanders, and was so famous amongst other Nations, not having known how to make use of time, whilst the name of the Romans was but obscure, and that their Forces were busied else-where, to make way for their further greatness ; was forc'd afterwards to follow the fortune of the Romans, and to confess themselves to be overcome by their more excellent worth ; and to acknowledge all that remained of good or safety to them, from their favor.

But to rerurn from whence we have digrest ; and to proceed with the successes of *Greece* in divers Ages, let us say ; that it being the fate of *Greece* to fall upon two so potent neighboring Princes, as were the Kings of *Persia*, and *Macedonia*, it did not onely foment their Civil discords, but did hasten their final ruine, for if the Grecians had had less powerful neighbors, they would either not have had recourse unto them, or else the use of their Forces and assistance in their own *Greece* would not have proved so prejudicial to them : It being a true & general rule in State Affairs, that no foyign Forces are to be made use of, for a mans own safety, which are much greater then his own ; for by so doing, a man must depend upon another mans will, which where rule is in question, is usually more ready to endeavor its own conveniency and greatness, then to keep word, and to consider another mans good, though he be a friend and confederate : Yet it may be affirmed, that *Greece* having for neighbors not onely one but two great Potentates, it was a thing which as it hindred her from making acquisitions abroad, so it might have been of great help unto her for the preservation of her self, and Liberty, if she could have made good use thereof. For if at any time she should be opprest by one of them, she had means to have recourse to the other, from whom she might safely build for help,

help, since self-interest concurred therin, for it would be dangerous for either of them to suffer the others power encrease too much, by the ruine of *Greece*. So as if the Grecians, when they were threatened ruine by *Philip*, had known how to make use of the help which was offered them by the King of *Persia*, they might peradventure have escaped that bad fortune; but being exceedingly jealous one of another, they had all of them recourse to the same Prince, because none of the rest might make use of his friendship and favor. Thus *Philip* the first had greatest opportunity offered him, of making himself by degrees, First, chief Captain, next, Arbitrator, and lastly, Lord of all *Greece*, by keeping some of her people quiet, and in peace, which he easily granted them for his own ends; and by making War at the same time upon some others of them, and he who shall compare these antient successes of the Grecians affairs, with others of the ensuing age, and nearer unto us, shall and will find very like effects which have sprung from the same occasions. For *Greece* being once humbled, and assubjected by the Roman greatness, was afterwards returned to great honor and dignity in the time of *Constantine* who placed the seat of the Empire in the antient City of *Byzantium*; but she knew not how to keep therein by reason of her discords. For after that the *French* and the *Venetian*, had taken *Constantinople*, though the Empire returned to the aforesaid Grecians, yet through many and various chances which happened afterwards, whole *Greece* was divided; some of them following the Princes of the Grecian extract, and some of them the *Latins*, the people for the most part holding with the former, and the Nobility with the latter. So as recourse being had to Arms, for the deciding of so many controversies, they applied themselves for help unto the *Turks*, and causing a great number of them to pass over into *Natolia* in *Greece*, *Greece*'s ultimate ruine did ensue thereupon. For these Barbarians, who were accustomed to live among craggy Mountains, inamored of the beauty and pleasantness of this Country, and inoved, as some say, by a certain good augurie, whereby they were advised to tarry there, promising them much happiness in that Region, whereinto they were come, and called, they possest themselves of divers parts and Cities of the Empire, sparing nor friends, nor enemies; and placing their Regal Seat amongst them, they grew soon much more powerful, being favored therein by the great dissentions which still continued amongst the Grecian Nobility, and other neighboring Lords, as those of *Servia*, *Bulgaria*, and *Albania*, interesting themselves therein, they, together with their own interests, drew along with them the destruction of many other States, and gave just occasion to posterity, for ever to blame their ill taken counsels. For it the Grecians had been at unity within themselves, and as solicitous to keep the *Turks* from advancing their power, as they were to abase that of the *Latin* Princes, they might certainly have hoped to have kept that fire a far off, which hath burnt and consumed so many noble parts of Christendom. Since it is seen that the Grecian Forces, whilst their Lords, after being driven from the City of *Constantinople* by the *Latins*, kept in the parts about *Natolia* (which was for above fifty years) although they had already begun to be governed by one alone Prince, under a just form of Empire, were yet able to keep them bounded within the mountains of *Natolia*, in barren places, not suffering them to make any acquisitions of moment, nor to enter into *Europe*, as they did afterwards. But it was the particular imperfection of this Province, and of that in all other respects, most noble Nation, that she understood not, or knew not how to make use of her many and valiant Forces; Since if we will look back upon antient stories, when *Philip* had reduced *Greece* into his power, he put so high an esteem upon the value of those Soldiers, as he undertook by them chiefly to effect his antient desire of making the enterprize of *Persia*, which not being able (as hindered by death) to effect, was after so gloriously ended by his Son *Alexander*, and

And it is related, that being thus minded; *Philip* had already mustered Two hundred thousand Foot, and Fifteen thousand Horse in *Greece*; and that *Alexander* desirous to prosecute his Fathers intentions, but by different advice, building his chiefest hopes in the body of an Army of but Thirty thousand valiant Soldiers, many of which he raised in *Greece*, did by their valor chiefly end so many glorious Enterprises.

The Fifteenth DISCOURSE.

Whether Ostracism, used by the Athenians, be a just thing, or no; and whether it be useful for the preservation of a Commonwealth.

IT was instituted by the Laws in some antient Commonwealths, that such as were very eminent above the rest either for Riches, Glory, Friends, or for any other Civil power, or who did exceed the other Citizens for any particular worth, should be banished the City; not out of punishment or penalty, but for the common good, to the end that Equality being the better maintained, and as it were a certain Consonancie amongst the several ranks of Citizens observed, the Government might be the safer, and more durable. Which custom was for a long time observed by the *Athenians*, and chiefly then when their Commonwealth did flourish most; and ten years was the limited time for this exilement. This Law was commonly called Ostracism, whereof *Aristotle* toucheth a little in his Third Book of the *Politticks*. But whether such a Law be just, or no, and whether it may make for the preservation of a Commonwealth or State, for which end it was instituted, is a Consideration of no small moment in point of Police; there being much to be said on both sides, both in praise and dispraise of so strange a Law and Custom.

In the behalf thereof, these things may be had into consideration: That nothing is more requisite for the long preservation of a City, especially of such a one as is governed in form of a Commonwealth, where the Government is in the hands of many, then Equality amongst Citizens; whereof the more excellent the temper is, and the more it is tied fast by strict Laws, so as it cannot be exceeded on any side, the life of that City or Commonwealth will be so much the longer, more quiet, and more secure. A City may be resembled to a humane Body, compounded of divers Elements, and consisting of many Members: and that as that humane Body is more healthful and more handsom, wherein every elementary quality is better distributed, and every member better proportioned; so that City or Commonwealth wherein every degree of Citizens hath a moderate authority, state and fortune, and well proportioned to the whole, doth preserve it self the longer, and keep freer from the contagion of civil seditions: Though the Head be the noblest part of the Body, and the Eyes the like of the Head, yet would they not be of ornament, when either that or these were bigger then their ordinary and natural form; they would rather take away all Decorum and beauty, which is nothing but a due proportion in all things. Then, though it may seem a gallant thing to shew the greatness and nobleness of a City or Commonwealth, that there be many very wealthy men therein, and of excellent civil gifts, and that the supreme Degrees and Negotiations of the Commonwealth be bestowed upon these; yet another reason may perswade the contrary; for this eminencie spoils the proportion of the whole, and doth not represent a City of

of Free-men, and partakers of the same Government, but the form of a Tyrannical Government, consisting of Lords and Servants, hateful names in good Governments. Therefore all the best Legislators have chiefly aimed at the reducing of all things, as much as may be, to an Equality, in that City where they would introduce a Politick Government, and a peaceful and durable condition. Insomuch as *Plato*, to take away all occasion of civil discord, would have all goods to be common, in that his Commonwealth which he propounded to himself for the most exact form of Government: So as there should be no such name as Rich, or Poor; but only that of Citizens of the same Country, and who live under the same Law. So as no man could out-doe another, by altering this so necessary and useful Civil Equality: which not being to be had where there is a Propriety of Goods, the *Athenians* would provide against those inconveniences which the unequal condition of Citizens produced, by driving at a certain time out of the City such as had caused the disorder, and who were suspected to be the Authors of Novelties, and of trouble to peaceful living.

And truly, he who shall consider what the beginnings of those evils have been, which have inwardly vex'd and troubled both Commonwealths and other States as well in antient, as in these more modern times, shall find, that all the confusions and civil disorders which have after a long time brought many States to their ultimate ruine, have sprung from this root. How was partiality, and the corruption of good and antient Orders introduced in the Commonwealth of *Rome*, whence all great things may take example, if not from having suffered avarice, and the power of some Citizens to increase too much? Who having made themselves so great by the continuation of military Commands, and for having many ways whereby to purchase popular favor, as the Commonwealth could not keep them within any bounds, nor could the Laws curb them, did totally subvert that Government: insomuch as it was said of *Caesar*, that he would not have any Superior to him in the City; and of *Pompey*, that he would have no Equal. And *Cato* had wont to say, that *Caesar's* immoderate greatness had enforc'd *Pompey* likewise to exalt himself above what otherwise became the publick service, to the end that the one might counterpoise the other. So grant one inconvenience, others will easily follow: And as too great eminencie in any Citizen, although he be not ill-minded towards the Publick, ought to be suspected; so it is hard to rid ones self thereof when it is once brought in and tolerated, where those usual means and institutions are wanting which the *Carthaginians* had, without falling upon violent courses, which in stead of Physick proves poison to that State. The House of *Medici* began to lay sound foundations for its greatness in *Florence*, by means of old *Cosmo's* great wealth; it afterwards increased very much by the vertue and wisdom of *Lorenzo*; and so by little and little getting to a great height of power, which exceeded the ordinary condition of a Civil State, it was no longer able to live under the Laws of the Country, but would assume unto it self the superiority of that Government: So as when the *Florentines* were too late aware thereof, they could not moderate that too immense greatness; for the continued power of that Family, wherein there had been excellent men for worth, and eminent degrees and dignities, purchased by them both in their own Country, and elsewhere, had got them so many to side partially with them, as their own Faction was able upon any occasion to sustain them.

The like happens also in some States wherein there is not so express a form of a Commonwealth, but a supreme Prince, yet also many particular Lords of great authority. In such States, the too much greatness of Barons hath oft-times proved too pernicious: For there being in all men naturally a desire of growing greater, and they having means to do so, where their power is not limited by the Laws and Customs of the State, they are easily induced to mount higher then stands with their

degree, to equal their authority to that of the King himself, and to put for innovations prejudicial to the State. Amongst many others we have a notable example hereof, in the present troubles of *France*, which were occasioned by having suffered some prime Lords to grow too great in power, whence civil discords have risen in the Kingdom, and the better to foment and sustain their parties, and to perfect their designs, they had recourse to foreign forces, and kindled that fire which is not well quenched yet. It hath therefore been thought a very wary and well advised course wh ch hath been used by some Princes, to have an eye upon such, whose greatness and eminencie above others may render them suspected, and to allay this their greatness, by not admitting them into chief imployments, by taking away or lessening their Priviledges, and Immunities, and by lessening their authority, and universal favor by other means, according as occasions have counselled. *Consalvo* a great and famous Commander in the former age, had done excellent service to King *Ferdinando*; and when in all other respects he was to have looked for great rewards, as having by his own worth gotten, and preserved the Kingdom of *Naples*, he was taken off from all imployment, and brought back into *Spain* to spend the remainder of his years in a private condition: That prudent Prince was moved thereunto, as knowing that such a man who was so generally cried up, and who was so followed and applauded both by the common people and the Nobility, could not but be to be suspected: So as he knew it was requisite for his own security, and the like of his Dominions, not to suffer him to grow greater to his Masters prejudice, and therefore to take from him all Command and Imployment.

The Instructions given to this purpose in a figurative way, first by *Periander* to *Thrasylus*, and after by *Tarquin* the proud to his Son *Sextus* are very observable, to wit, to cut off the tops of the highest Poppies, or ears of corn; whereby they would infer, that he who will rule in safety, must not suffer men to grow more eminent then others, for what concerns any Civil Power; which though it appear to be a thing proper to onely tyrannical States, yet when it is used with discretion and wisdom, hath another aspect, for all particular interests ought to give way, where the publick good, and the preservation of universal Peace and Quiet of the State (which is of a much greater concernment) is in question. But when this may be done by any ordinary way, as by Law and Custom (as it was among the *Athenians* and other antient people) then this remedie proved the more just and secure. There is not any mischief in the City which stands in more need to be cured by the physick of the Law, then Ambition; for Ambition is such a sickness in the mind of man, as where once it takes root it never leaves the mind free and healthful till it be torn out by main force; but rather the maladie increasing by length of time, it makes men as it were frantick, so as the ambitious man covets all things, and is not satisfied with any thing, having neither mean nor bridle. Honors, Dignities, Preferments how great soever they be, serve rather for tinder to make this inward fire flame the higher, then for water to quench it, insomuch as some of these vain-glorious men thought it a small matter to command the whole world, when they heard it disputed that there were more worlds then one. Now to this almost natural, and ordinary defect of humanity, and altogether as harmful to the quiet of all States, as it is of it self incorrigible, *Ostracisme* will prove a wholesome cure; and which the *Athenians* in particular knew their Commonwealth stood in need of. For as *Greece* did in that Age abound in men, who were really valiant, so ambition seemed to have set up its rest amongst them.

Wherefore miraculous things are written of that Nation in those times. But such as wherein it may be found that true worth was greatly contaminated by an immoderate desire of glory, and haughtiness. The Laws of canvassing, and all other provisions

provisions thereunto tending have alwaies proved fruitles, for every little spark'e that remains of this fire, though it be covered over with ashes, may cause great Combustions. It seems therefore that no other remedy is sufficient for those evils which proceed from pride and ambition, then totally to rid the City or State of such men as are desirous to exceed all others.

Plato said, that men who were truly wise would be as contented with not ruling over others, as most men do what in them lies to get precedencie, and command over others. Therefore where such a desire is discerned, and where there is matter to occasion it, as are great riches, high places, and vain glory, a man may with reason suppose that there is there an unsound foul, which ought to be taken away lest it infect the whole Commonwealth. To take all Nobility, all riches, all civil pre-eminencie, totally away from a City or Commonwealth, as is now done in Turky, and as formerly it hath been done by divers Princes, that they might rule the more securely, relisheth too much of Barbarism, and Tyranny, though it hath not proved an ill taken advice to them that have known how to u[e] it, reputing it just, though not in self, yet as it hath suited well with such a Form of Government; but to rid a City of such things, and of such men for a certain prefixt time, is such a provision as tends to the preservation of splendor and reputation, without either prejudice or danger. This is a means whereby vertue and other civil preheminences may be rewarded; but not so, as the greater part be scorned, and opprest, for the haughtiness of some few. And he who shall well consider it, shall find that banishment from a mans Country is not a thing simply, and of it self evil, or at least not so great an evil, but that it may be easily and willingly b[r]n w[i]t ali, by him who values the common good so well as he ought. But that wh ch makes banishment be thought a mischief, is the bad quality which is thereunto annexed, when it is inflicted for punishment; there being thereby imprinted as it were in indeleble characters, that such a one is leudly given, and hath committed some fault, which is a thing naturally abhorred even by the wickedest sort of men. But set this respect aside, to live out of a mans Countrie, hath no resemblance of evil, but is willingly imbraced by many as an advantage, and some endeavor it as a badg of honor, that they may have occasion to serve their Prince, and to deserve well abroad. He then, who to obey the Laws and Ordinations of the Commonwealth or State shall live for a certain time from his own home, is so far from suffering thereby in his honor, as he merits thereby; for he may say that by this his obedience he is serviceable to his Prince and Country; though he do not act any thing. So then he receives no injury, and may, and ought to pass by any particular inconveniency, for the publick good. Nay it may so happen, that that very power and greatness, by which a man becomes liable to the Laws, is the longer and with less danger preserved unto him, though he cannot enjoy it without some parenthesis of time. For we see by experience, that these greatnesses and continued prosperities do easily precipitate a man, either through the envy of others, or by being too immoderately used, and sometimes draw along with them the total ruine of the whole Family.

It may in the last place be alleadged, that this exemption from publick imployments, and Court service, may make him retire to his private studies, and enjoy himself, which ought to be esteemed one of the chiefest blessings which man can attain unto in this life. Insomuch as the Philosopher said, that to be kept from preferments is a pleasant breath of wind which sweetly conveys the wise man to the Haven of peace of mind, and of his lawful studies, which many forbear to do of themselves, least they may be thought by the world to be vile, and abject men, and of no abilities. By these things it is concluded that Ostracism is a good thing, and to be praised; and that this custom of the *Athenians* is fit to be followed and imitated by others.

But now let us face about. What is more necessary for the preservation of a City or State then Justice, without which no sort of Government can last long, nor merit the name of a Commonwealth or State: For, take away Justice, and you take away the very being thereof, and leave nothing but a mis-shapen matter, made up of corruption and disorders. But in distributive Justice, which imports so much towards good and quiet living, Reason doth advise it, and all good Customs do approve of it, that a Geometrical proportion; not an Arithmetical ought to be observed; insomuch as it is not all men who ought equally and indifferently to share of Honors and Preheminencies in a City, but those who for some good qualities and endowments do deserve them. Therefore that Government where the Law of Ostracism is observed, must needs be subject to all change and revolts: For it cannot but be displeasing to the chiefest and best of the City, who seeing themselves whilst they are present, threatened with exile, and the overthrow of their grandezza, and having recourse when they are absent to the favors of other Princes to revenge themselves for the injury they have received, may easily disturb the Peace of the City, and put the whole Government into a hazardous condition. Those who have been driven out of their Country by reason of any Civil faction, as it fell out long ago in divers Cities of *Italy*, have always been instrumental to the keeping of those Cities in perpetual troubles, and of reducing some of them to slavery, which had wont to enjoy liberty. And yet what was this banishment but a kind of Ostracism? For in these civil seditions, none but such as were of greatest power and authority, and of whom the rest were most jealous, were driven out: Nor was this done by the will of one only, but by their Decree in whose hands the reformed Government was. So as it may be said, that these Cities used the Law of Ostracism; which hath notwithstanding always proved prejudicial, and at long running mortal. And to say truth, to what purpose could such a Law or Custom serve, unless it were the more to exasperate Civil dissention? Which the same *Athenians* having learn'd by experience, they did annull this their Law; for the business was come to such a height, as they drove out Citizens out of particular spleen, not out of any publick respect; as was done by *Hyparbalus*, a man of a mean condition, and no ways liable to Ostracism, who for being an Enemy to *Alcibiades* and *Nicias*, was by their means banished by vertue of that Law.

But say the Law were kept within its due bounds, and used only against such as bore greatest sway and were most eminent; to reduce all things to an Equality, is not only an unjust, but a violent action, and which doth even contradict Nature herself, which did not only make so many different species of things created in the world, but gave various instincts and hidden qualities to those of the same species, so as some might prove more generous and of greater worth, as is seen not only amongst Men, but amongst bruit Beasts, yea even amongst Vegetables. Then since this Equality is not to be found amongst Men, it is great injustice to distribute things equally in a Government to those whose parts and deserts are unequal: For in conferring of honors or preferments in a City or State, a Geometrical, not an Arithmetical proportion must be observed: It is the vertue and merit of every one that must be weighed. He who is richer then another, may be serviceable to his Country by great and frequent contributions to the Publick. He who hath many Clients and Friends, may by his power and authority dispose the Peoples minds to believe well, and act well in the Cities occasions and affairs. He who is advanced above others in glory, must have deserved it well of the Commonwealth by some noble action, and may confirm himself therein by some other like action. And he who is more generally given to any Virtue, be it or Warlike or Civil, is always fitter then others to serve his Country and Prince upon all occasions. So as to drive such men as these out of the City, is no better then to cut that member from the body

body which is loveliest, and fitter then the rest to be serviceable thereunto. Such an Institution then can have no admittance but in Tyrannical governments: And the examples alleged of *Thrasybulus* and *Tarquin*, are examples of Tyrants, who being resolved to preserve themselves by violence in their usurped dominions, were to be jealous of all the best and most powerful men, and endeavor to be quit of them for their greater security. But a just Prince must not imitate such examples; nay, even in a Politick Government, these Proceedings wwould be pernicious. For he who will thereby preserve himself, must change the Form of the whole Government, and reduce it to a Despotic and servile condition: with which such Orders holding some proportion and conformity, they may for a certain time prove useful for the maintaining of that Tyrannie; as it hath done to the *Turks* in these later times, and formerly in soime other Nations, wherein the whole Government hath related to the sole and peculiai accommodation of the Lord Paramount, without any respect to the good of the Subject, and more according to will then to Law. Nor is it true, that the power of Citizens, or greatness of Barons in a Kingdom, proves alwas harmful; it may rather upon many occasions prove the safety of that City or State. But this may be ill used, as many other things are; the which notwithstanding whosoever should go about to take totally away from a City, would ruine it, not bring it to perfection. Therefore the Law ought to provide for taking away the abuse of things, not the things themselves, when they are not simply and in themselves evil. And if the Authority which the Roman Commanders held in their Armies had been well regulated, and their continuing in their military Commands moderated by a shorter time, *Ceser* could not have made use thereof as he did to the prejudice of the Commonwealth, he having continued so many years Commander in chief of the same Army, and in the same Province. Nor had they needed to have raised *Pompey* to such a height, to oppose *Cesars* greatness: But when when they had let it run on too long, to declare him an Enemy to his Country, and drive him out of *Italy*, proved a violent remedy, and mortal to the Commonwealth.

Neither can that benefit be expected as is pretended, (by the banishment of so many Citizens, who being become too great, are for suspition driven out of their Country) of securing themselves from their power: rather Injury added to Ambition, serves for another incitement to make them endeavor some innovation in the City, and makes them the more sollicitous in plotting by the means of such as are their friends and adherents in their own City or State, to raise some revolt in it; for which they have easie recourse to the favor of other Princes: So as the trouble of being offensive to those States from whence such men are expell'd, is rather increased then diminished. We have infinite examples in all Ages of those, who being driven by banishment out of a City or State, have been the occasion of notable mischief and ruine thereunto: For though it cannot be denied, but that the too great power of Citizens in a City, or of Lords and Barons in a Kingdom, begers suspition, and is dangerous, and doth usually cause no small difficulties to the good and peaceful Government of that State; yet some other remedy then Ostracism may be used to obviate those disorders which such excesses do commonly beget: For that is only to suffer a sore to grow old and to gangrene, that they may be afterwards forced to use fire or sword to heal it. In a well-govern'd State, an eye must be had, and care taken both by the Law it self, and by the Prince who rules in chief there n, not to suffer any one to grow to too excessive a greatness: And if any one do arrive at such a condition, as he begins too far to overtop the rest, the foundation and groundwork of his power must dexterously be taken away, and of his plotting thoughts, so as he may not thereby be able to work any novelties, or disturb the publick peace: Which may easily be done by his wisdom who commands in chief.

the same men ought not to be suffered to continue long in the same employments, and especially not to exercise them too long in the same place; such things ought not to be left in their power, which may serve for fuel the more to kindle their ambitious thoughts to the prejudice of the publick good, which may be done under a pretence of honor, so as the Princes may not be noted for injustice, nor can the particular personages account it as an injury done them.

If any one do abound in riches, let him have expensive employments, that he may lessen that wealth, which made him appear more eminent than others. If he be of too great authority in the Court, or amongst the People, as having had the management of important affairs along time, send him to some place of Magistracie, or other employment a far off, and change him often from place to place. If he be great and remarkable for glorious actions done by him, give him hard and difficult employments, wherein if he succeed not well, his reputation will soon grow less with the people, who judge by the events. But if such a one appear too much ambitious, and be so, as many men are seen to be, out of a certain vain-glory, but without any malice of heart, he may be contented and kept quiet, by conferring honors upon him of glorious appearance, but little profit. But the remedy will prove peradventure harder in those who boast themselves to be more nobly descended, and of better blood than others, for many several respects; meet often times in them, to make them great and powerful; yet even against these remedies may be found, without passing by a violent and illegal way to the driv.ng them out of the City or State; their friends or kindred, may be kept low and humble, whereby their power is lessened; if they commit any excess in case of Justice, as such mean out of arrogancie often do, be severe unto them, take their privileges from them, declare them to be for a certain time incapable of any Publick employment, and do some other such like things; which being done, upon some just occasion, although the parties concerned be therewithall displeased, yet not being disliked by the generality, their hatching of mischievous plots against the present Government and Weal publick, will have less fuel to feed upon.

But what shall be said of him, whose worth and vertue do.h exceed that of all others? by what pretence can a just Prince, or a well-governed Commonwealth humble such a man, or keep him low, or aloof from partaking of their Councils? To this it may be answered, that if this supposed personage be endowed with true vertue, he will not be subject to any suspition, nor will it be imagined that he will do any foul or wicked thing which may be prejudicial to his Prince or Countrie; but that all his endeavors shall aim at the common good, and it is just and convenient that such a man should alwaies bear sway in every well-ordered Commonwealth. But if the vertues which render him so great and eminent, tend to policie, that is, when a man does that which is good and honest, having his mind bent upon some other object then meer worth and honesty, as most men use to do, out of hopes of glory, or of bettering themselves; which things notwithstanding are so far vertues as they are helpful to the State, and have a certain resemblance of true worth; it will not be amiss that such a one who may be suspected to misemploy his good endowments, be proceeded against in manner aforesaid. We may then conclude that the custom of the *Athenians* concerning Ostracism ought neither to be praised nor practised in relation to the act it self; but may admit of commendation and imitation as far as the intention thereof reacheth, *viz.* to provide that the ambition or malice of a few, rob not many of their quiet, nor do perturb or confound the whole State.



THE SECOND BOOK.

The First DISCOURSE.

Why the Commonwealth of Venice hath not so far enlarged her Pre-cincts as did the Roman Commonwealth.



EN may be allowed to wonder not a little, if they take it into their consideration, why the Commonwealth of *Venice*, having so excellent Laws and Institutions, and having so long preserved her self in power and authority, hath not notwithstanding much enlarged the pre-cincts of her Empire, as did the Commonwealth of *Rome*, in a lesser space of time and in a form of Government which was not void of many imperfections: The thought thereof hath made me oftentimes desire to search into the true causes of it.

I find this hath been taken into consideration by some other modern Writers; but to boot that his discourses are already buried in oblivion, it may be the things by him alleadged have not been such, as may give full satisfaction to one who shall look narrowly into the carriage of our civil actions. He was of opinion that the greatness of the Roman Empire was soley to be attributed to the vertue of her Ordinations, and Form of Government; from which since the Venetian Commonwealth doth differ, he thinks that the cause why she hath not been able to make so great acquisitions. And he is so resolute in this opinion, as without distinguishing between things & things, between times and times, he doth so equally extol all the orders and actions of the Roman Commonwealth, as he doth propound some things for example to all other Princes and Commonwealths, as are rather to be blamed then to be imitated, and which were the reasons of the ruine of that Commonwealth, as the dissensions which was between the Nobility and the Common People, and other such things which are rather disorders

disorders then orders, and more apt to confound, then to establish States. Insomuch as his opinion is, That if there were a City at this day in *Italy* which had the same Form of Government as *Rome* had of old, that City might, as the other did, make herself Mistress of the World. As if the condition of times, and the so many various accidents upon which humane actions, and especially the augmenting and change of States do depend, were to be held for nothing ; and that it be in the power of a wise Legislator to give the Empire of the World to that City, which he knows how to govern by good Laws. But experience teacheth us much otherwise ; since we have known many antient Commonwealths founded by very wise men, and confirm'd with excellent Orders, equally for what concerns Peace as War, yet not any one amongst so many hath been able, I will not say to acquire so much Dominion as did the Commonwealth of *Rome*, but nor hardly able any ways to extend their Precc nets amongst their Neighbors. The intrinsecal Orders of the State are not simply of themselves sufficient to make so great Atchievements, (though they may peradventure concur very much thereunto :) Nor ought the State of *Venice* her not being Mistress of larger Territories, be attributed to any defect in this behalf ; but many other things are to be taken into consideration, whereby the truest causes of such effects, which amidst the uncertainty of such like affairs can be found out, may be discovered by looking into.

To know then whence such a diversity proceeds, we must take the busines a little higher, and examine, First, what was the original beginning of these two Cities, *Rome* and *Venice* ; what their Founders were ; and then what their situation, what the inclinations, studies, and virtues of their Citizens ; and lastly the condition of times, and qualities of their neighboring Princes must be examined. All which things appertain to this Consideration, as well as the Orders of the Commonwealth, and their Form of Government. He then who shall look upon the first Founders of these two Cities, will find them ; even in these the r first beginnings, not a little differing : which occasioned differing intentions, and differing ends ; and therefore peradventure a differing state, and differing condition. The first Erectors of *Venice*, where men who were peacefully given, as those who having been wearied by the so many calamities of *Italy*, occasioned by the inundation of the *Barbarians*, had withdrawn themselves, that they might shun the danger of War, into that piece of marsh ground in the *Adriatick* Sea, which was then greater then now it is, and the chiefeſt of many small Islands, which by a common name were called *Venetia*. So as they lived for a while without any Orders either Military or Civil ; those first Inhabitants contenting themselves to live in peace and quiet, without dreaming of any greater matter : For it neither stood with the end which they propounded unto themselves in this their new abode so to do, nor did the condition of those times permit it : And they were ſo fenced from the Arms ſo Enemics as then, both by the natural condition of their ſituation, as also by the ſalt waters, as they needed not to arm themſelvſ for their own defence. Therefore their Citizens being by long custom inured to theſe thoughts, they had no thought of taking up Arms, though the City were already much increased both in Forces and Authority, unleſ when they were provoked, and more to keep themſelvſ from being injured by others, or to aſſiſt their Friends and Confederates, then out of ambition of Rule, and of enlarging their bounds. And he who ſhall conſider what their greatest and and moſt difficult enterpriſes were in theſe first times, will ſee they aimed all at this end. The *Venetians* fought first with the *French*, and afterwards againſt the *Huns*, in defence of their Country, and of their Liberties ; and long after with the *Genoſes*, enforced thereunto by neceſſity, and provoked by many grievous injuries : For this very valiant and generous Nation would not reſt quiet, out of an emulaſion of glory in ſea-affaers ; wherein though they were oſtentimesworſed by the *Veneti-*

113, yet they still found occasion of new Contests. The Commonwealth of *Venice* hath oft-times taken up Arms likewise, in times neerer this our Age, with greater preparation for War, and with more courage to defend their State in *Terra firma*, which they had already gotten with much ado, and whereof they were justly possessed; in somuch as they have sometimes valian ly repulsed the fury of most powerful Leagues of Princes, who were resolved upon their ruine.

But it becomes not the mouth of a *Venetian* to say how oft they have taken up Arms in defence of their Friends and Confederates, lest he my seem to upbraid others with the services his Countrymen have done them. But divers People and Cities assisted and preserved by their Forces, do witness this. And to speak only of things of more recent memory, how great a desire hath this Commonwealth shewn to the common good? and to this purpose how careful hath she been of the liberty and glory of *Italy*, in sustaining long and heavy War, to preserve the noble *Neapolitan* Territories in the *Italian* Princes, and the like of *Milan*? But he who will look further back, and see what they have done, will find that the *Venetians* have undertaken and finished famous enterprises out of zeal to Religion; as they did in the Wars of the Holy Land against the *Saracens*, and divers other times against other Princes, to preserve and increase the glory of the holy Church, and the Papal dignity: which amongst many other actions, is clearly and nobly witnessed by the famous Naval victory won from the Emperor *Frederick Barbarossa*; for the which *Venice* doth at this day enjoy many great priviledges, in witness of her great worth and singular merit. But it is needless now to particularize in those things whereof all Histories are full: It will suffice to touch upon some things, wherby it may be conceived what the first beginnings of the City were, and what were the intentions and end of her Citizens:

Romes ends were far different from these, who from her very beginning aimed only at Empire and greatness; being built by *Romulus*, a fierce and ambitious man, who not content to have recovered his Kingdom to his Grandfather *Numitor*, and opened the way to the Lordship of *Alba longa*, resolved by the assistance of a great many young men who followed him, to purchase a better fortune and condition for himself, and to build a new City, which must have a warlike institution to keep the minds of those stirring youth busied in military exercises, and to defend himself from his neighbors; who finding that the new City aimed at greater designs, thought to keep it low. *Romulus* might with reason promise himself to purchase more Dominion, and to enlarge his Confines; for he built his City in a Country which was possest by many people, who were weak, and at odds within themselves, so as he needed not fear any potent Prince who might oppose his designs, or suppress his Forces before they were somewhat better established. This was the first foundation of *Romes* greatness; for the City beginning soon to habituate herself to military discipline, and to turn her thoughts upon War, and aggrandising her State, she grew so confirm'd therein with time, and with continual military orders, as the Militia and all things thereunto tending did continually flourish in her. For those that came after, following (as it falls out for the most part) the example of their Predecessors, her Citizens were always desirous of warlike glory, and of Empire; proving to be like *Romulus*, and those other valiant men from whom they had their beginning and increase. Thus they always made one War beget another, not being able to endure the suspected power of their Neighbors, nor yet the injuries done unto them by their Friends and Confederates; under whic two pretences they made first many notable acquisitions in *Italy*, and afterwards (passing over the Sea) in *Africa*, in *Spain*, and in many other Provinces.

But to pass on now to another Consideration, let us affirm that the situation is

of great moment for the Rule and Dominion which one City is to have over another, as that which affords security for self defence, and opportunity to subjugate others; this helps likewise to make a City plentiful and wealthy, without which States are hardly acquired. For where there is scarcity of livelihood, povertie is more to be fought withall then Enemies, and want of wealth renders a City alwaies weak, and easie to be wasted and opprest. Hence it was that *Sparta*, though she had excellent Laws and Institutions, yet whilst she observed them, she could not much inlarge her Dominions; for by them the City was bound for what concerned both the private and publick condition, to be kept poor, and far from any commerce with others; and in our time the Cantons of the *Switzers*, though they be a very valiant Generation, yet being poor, and seated amongst Mountains, and for the most part in barren places, their Soldiers being fighting under the pay of other Princes, they have not been able to do any thing for themselves, or to make any acquisitions, but have onely preserved their Liberties.

If we shall then consider the situation of *Venice*, we shall certainly find it very opportune for most things, and miraculously well for some things. For if we have respect to safety, what City can be compared to this, which without any Bulwarks of Walls, or Garrisons of Soldiers, defended by her natural scituuation, is of her self safe from all injuries, and inexpugnable? So as she is the onely example after so many Ages of being untouched by the Barbarians violence. If we respect abundance of plenty and wealth, the accommodation that the Sea affords her, and the so many Rivers which disgorge themselves, either into the neighboring Sea, or into her own Gulf, are such and so many, both for the conveyance of victuals, and of merchandize, as it is no wonder that so great a multitude of people can live in her with such abundance of all things, and not onely her own Citizens, but even foreiners who inhabit there, grow rich therein. But as for Empire and command, as she is miraculously accommodated for the imployment of Forces in Sea enterprizes, so for what belongs to the like on land, she hath not those conveniences which peradventure are requisite. Therefore it was long ere she bethought her self of purchasing any Territories in *Terra firma*, minding onely Dominion at Sea, whereunto she was invited by her scituuation, and by the institution of her Ancestors; touching which it is worthy consideration, that the Sea Militia and Discipline, upon wh ch the Commonwealth was for a long time bent, are not such as can naturally give occasion of great command, because their Fleets cannot of themselves penetrate further then the Rivers which fall into the Sea; wherefore all her acquisitions were onely Islands, or places on the Sea shore, because she had not then numerous and well disciplined Armies to dive into the hearts of Dominions, and to pursue victories.

All Cities which have placed the pitch of their power in their Fleets, have had the like success. For though they may have purchased some reputation, and some precedencie by Sea, yet have they not been able much to inlarge the Confines of their command. Thus the *Athenians* and other people of *Greece*, though they were very strong in these kind of Forces, proper to that Nation from whence the art of building of Ships, and of Navigation is thought to have its original, yet have they alwaies been esteemed weak, and but little valued by such Nations, which they could not by their Forces make subject to their Dominions. But the City of *Rome*, which studied more the Militia by Land, then by Sea, and built her greatness more by Armies then by Fleets, having more field-room wherein to exercise her Citizens valor, made much greater enterprizes, and made many Provinces subject to her Dominion. Nor did the Romans make use of Fleets by Sea before they were necessitated, that they might sail into *Sicily* and *Africa*, to oppose the power of the *Carthaginians*, which they had reason

to be jealous of, by reason of their too great power, and vicinity.

But when they had occasion to make use of their Soldiers by Sea, they shewed no less forwardness and daring therein, then they had done by land. Insomuch as the skill and experience of the *Carthaginians*, who had long been Masters at Sea, was oft-times overcome and deluded by the valor and military Discipline of the Romans; till at last that Nation which was held to be so powerful at Sea, was destroyed and beaten by the Romans; who had a long time been unexperienced in Maritime Affairs, but very expert in Land-Armies, and Military Discipline. So as the Empire of the World being contested for by these two Commonwealths, it was seen that it more availed the *Romans* to be a little superior to the *Carthaginians* by Land, then it did the *Carthaginians* to exceed the *Romans* much by Sea. For the good Orders of their Armies, the valor and discipline of their Soldiers, got them the victorie over the *Carthaginians*, and opened the way to the Monarchie of the World; which had sundry times before been done by the same means, by the *Assyrians*, *Persians* and *Macedonians*; Land-Forces having alwaies in great acquirements prevailed over those of the Sea, and the Discipline of Armies over the experience of Maritime Affairs. This is likewise more clearly seen by reason of the new Monarchie founded in a short time by the Turks in *Asia*, and in *Greece*, which was not done by Sea-Forces, wherein they were not any waies considerable, till of later times, but by the multitude of their Cavalrie, and more by the firm ranks of their *Fanizaries*. And to say truth, the very Forces by Sea are increased and maintained by those of Land, for larger Territories do easily furnish men, moneys, victuals, and other necessaries for the well ordering of Fleets at Sea. The which is likewise known by experience of the very Commonwealth of *Venice*, which before she had got any State in *Terra firma*, could never make so numerous Fleets, though she did very much study Maritime Affairs; nor could she prevail in the important Wars against the *Genoese*, as she did afterwards, when her power was much increased and confirmed by her Land Territories. Thus in this last Age, she hath been able to set forth at first above a Hundred nimble Galleys, and afterward more Galleys, and greater vessels of all sorts as hath been seen by experience in the two last Wars against the Turks, wherein nothing more gallant and glorious could be desired on the Commonwealths behalf; whereupon also, as the worthy and becoming fruit of such industry did the Victorie of *Lepanto* ensue, which will be memorable in all Ages. And it may suffice to know what the Maritime Forces of the Commonwealth are, and how they are abundantly supplied from Land with all things to make them powerful at Sea, yea; even then when the Sea was blocked up for what concerned them; that they were able to maintain so great a Fleet in all seasons, for three years together. Wherefore *Francisco Foscari*, Duke of *Venice*, a Prince of singular wisdom, by whose advice, and under whose happy auspices, great acquisitions were made on firm land, was wont to say, that the Commonwealth could not have increased much in power, if she had not employed her Forces on land enterprizes; which because she had not formerly done, was the cause why that greatness was much retarded and hindered, whereunto she might easily have arrived if such counsel had been sooner taken; and by setting before her the example of the worth and glory of the *Romans*, she might have aspired to greater Empire. But those who governed the Commonwealth were a long time far from any such thoughts; being more intent upon peace and quiet, or upon such Wars as might enlarge and secure her Dominion by Sea; which may be clearly witnessed by what past with *Ezzelino da Romano*, with the *Scalligers*, the *Carrareti*, and with others who ruled in the next neighboring Cities; whereby it is seen that the *Venetians* being contented with defending their friends, and vindicating their own injuries, dreamed not on their Domi-

nions, of which they might easily have bereft them; till when overcome by necessity, and by the insolencie of the *Carraresi*, and by other accidents of those times, they were compell'd to apply their minds and Forces thereunto, and to fix their Dominion there.

Let us consider on the contrary, how opportunely *Rome* was seated to foment her Citizens dispositions much to augment her Dominions; almost in the midst of *Italy*, just fitting for a principal City, being placed (as may be said) in the Center, to the end that she may equally extend her Power and Forces on all sides. The City of *Rome* stands on firm land, or *Terra firma*; but so neer the Sea, as she may reap the commodity thereof, without being thereby endangered: she is apt to breed up Armies, and to nourish men in the exercise of the Militia; nor is she inconveniently seated for the transportation of her Forces by Sea into other far off Provinces. This diversity of situation hath begot diversity of inclinations in the Inhabitants. Thus doth Nature always adapt mens minds to those Arts which they are to exercise themselves in, or else Custom doth inform the Habit, and turns it into Nature. For as the *Romans* following exercises conformable to the situation of their City, were more inclined to Land-war, and in Peace to husbandry: So the *Venetians* invited to other things according to the diversity of place, applied their studies otherwise to defend their Liberty, and to increase their wealth, using the Sea-Militia for the one, and Traffick and Merchandising for the other. Which whosoever shall upbraid our Citizens withall, seems not to know, that without these a City could neither have long preserved it self, nor increase in state and wealth, as it hath done: For not having any particular Territories whereout to extract their hvelihood, she would have been always poor and weak, and wanting other imployments, she would have been destroyed, if not by forein Forces, by her own Idleness, as many other Cities have been, the Citizens wanting wherein to employ their thoughts, and to exercise themselves in quiet times. But if the Citizens of *Rome* were much commended for their husbandry, insomuch as at this day many famous men of that Commonwealth are as much celebrated for having been good Husbandmen, as good Commanders; as were *Curtius Dentatus*, *Quintius Cincinnatus*, *Attalius Collatinus*, *Marcus Regulus*, *Scipio Africanus*, and others; wherefore should the *Venetians* be upbraided with their Merchandising, this being an exercise as fitting and requisite for the situation of *Venice*, as was that of Tillage and Husbandry to the like of *Rome*? If the care of cultivating the Earth did not abase the minds of those antient and reverend *Romans*, who have left so evident examples of worth to all other Cities and Nations, why should the industry of Merchandising redound to the opprobry of the *Venetians*, seeing to the contrary with how much glory and how much publick benefit they have for so long a series of years govern'd the Commonwealth?

The studies and actions of the *Romans* and *Venetians* have then been different, but notwithstanding alike in this, that they aimed at the same end, though they took several ways thereunto; to wit, at Glory, at the Grandeur and Liberty of their Commonwealth. Many famous examples of Fortitude, of love to their Country, and of all other sorts of worthiness have been seen in each of them; so as in our men nothing was more to be desired, unless greater and more frequent occasions wherein to have employed themselves, that the greatness of their actions might have corresponded to the magnanimity of their minds. Yet do not we *Venetians* want examples of many men who have been very famous for fortitude of mind and military worth; and he who shall examine the life and actions of many Princes of the Commonwealth, will find them to be such as deserve praise and celebration. Such have *Ordelafio Faliero*, *Vidale*, *Dominico Micheli*, and *Henrico Dandalo*, *Sebastiano Ziano*, *Andrea Cantareno*, *Pietro Mocenico*, *Andrea Gritti*, *Sebastiano Veniero*,

Veniero, and divers others been ; whose worths might be parallel'd to that of the *Fabritii, Marcelli, Fabii, Scipio's*, and others of their so much cry'd up men, if they had had a larger field to exercise themselves in, or had the greatness of their Commonwealth afforded them fame equal to the merit and valor of those renowned *Romans*.

But let us now come to consider those most important reasons of the condition of Times, and their Neighbors qualities. The City of *Venice* had her beginning, when *Italy* was possest by the wild Northern Nations, and when being perplex'd with all other sort of miseries, she fell finally into the slavery of *Barbarians*, wherein she lived for the space of many years : How then could a new City aspire to Empire, while the Forces of the *Barbarians* were so powerful in that Province, as the most powerful Roman Empire was not able to withstand them, which was shook and destroyed by their fury ? It rather seems a wonder, that a City in her first and weak beginnings was able to manage so great a War, and withstand (as she did afterwards) the violence of two fierce and potent Nations, to wit, the *French*, and *Hans* : The *French*, when their King *Pipin* being entred *Italy* with puissant Forces to drive out the *Lombards*, and being scandalized that the City of *Venice* had leant to the friendship of *Nicephorus* Emperor of *Constantinople*, turn'd his Forces upon her to subjugate and destroy her : And the *Hans*, when parting from *Pannonia*, (which took from them the name of *Hungary*) having overcome a very powerful Army of the *Germans*, and kill'd their King *Lodovicus*, they fell to overrun *Italy* again, their fury was withstood by the *Venetians*, which *Berengarius*, a powerful Prince, was forced to give way unto. But afterwards, the Forces of these Western *Barbarians* being in time weakned by *Charls the Great*, the State of *Italy* fell again in to the Western Emperors ; who being then very powerful, and masters both of *Germany* and *France*, the Forces of a weak Commonwealth were not likely to contest with so great Princes, with any hope of acquiring Territories. These difficulties being added unto by the Cities situation, withheld the *Venetians* a long while from thinking how to enlarge their Dominions in *Terra firma* ; in which opinion being for a long time confirmed, and having very successfully employed their studies and Forces in Sea-enterprises, (though the alteration of times did counsel them to the contrary, giving them hopes of noble acquisitions on Land) they either despised, or knew not how to make use of the occasions which afterwards were offered. Thus when the German Emperors, troubled with the domestick troubles of that Province, did forgo their possessions in *Italy*, the *Venetians* not minding then that opportunity, left the advantage to others, which they might easily have reaped : whereupon other Cities of *Italy* purchasing their Liberties from the Emperors at low rates, framed a peculiar Government unto themselves, as did *Florence* ; and others were possest by other powerful men, as *Milan, Mantua, Ferrara*, and other Cities of *Lombardy* : when if the Commonwealth of *Venice*, whose power was already much increased, had been minded to have possest themselves of any of the Imperial Territories, it is not to be doubted but they might in a short time have made notable acquisitions. But when they began very late, and more provoked by injuries then by ambition of dominion, to think upon Territories by Land, they found divers other Princes become very powerful both in Forces and Authority, and confirm'd in the States which they possest under somewhat a more lawful title. Wherefore they met with many difficulties ; and amongst the rest, the Wars proved very heavy unto them, which they were forc'd to make with *Philip Maria Visconte* Duke of *Milan*, who being Master of a great and rich State, became quickly very formidable. Nay, not long after, these new Potentates being already much increased and confirmed, and all of them growing jealous of the Venetian greatness, they joined all together with powerful Forces to oppose their designs. Thus in the War which they made against *Hercules de Este*, there was not any Italian Prince which

did not joyn against them, because they saw that if that Dukes State fell into the power of the Venetian Commonwealth, the way would be laid open to her for much greater matters in *Italy*; whereupon a noble Victorie which was already almost gotten, was impeded.

Hereby it may be then conceived how much the condition of the times was averse to the Commonwealths inlarging her Precincts by Land, partly by reason of her self, and partly through other various accidents; which though they were somewhat more favorable unto her in what concerned the Sea; yet met she not with small interruptions therein to her enterprises. For the Eastern Emperors being Masters of *Greece*, and of other States and Countries, wherein the Commonwealth was to have inlarged the Confines of her command by Sea, she could not make any great acquisitions whilst they preserved themselves in such reputation and strength, as became their State. But afterwards, when that Empire began to decline, she began to increase and flourish gloriously, and her worth was waited upon by much prosperitie; as was seen when the *Venetians* went in companie of the *French* to the business of the *Levant*, and after many noble warlike actions they took the City and Empire of *Constantinople*; of which acquisition the Commonwealth had so great a share, as that their Dukes did then assume the title of *Signori della quarta parte, & Mezza, di tutto L'Imperio della Romania*. And soon after with the like prosperous success, they did by sundry means reduce many Islands, and chief Maritime Towns under their obedience; and the Commonwealth marched on apace to greater power and command. But this course of glorie and victorie by War was much slackened by the original Customs and Orders of the City (as has been said) which related more to Peace, and Merchant affairs, then to War.

Insomuch as the *Venetians* seemed for a while to make use of these new acquisitions, rather for the better accommodatyon of their Navigation, and Traffick, then for any occasion of other enterprises. Their busyness did therefore infinitely increase at this time; insomuch as there was not any City famous for merchandizing in the *Levant*, whither the *Venetian* Ships and Merchants did not flock. Nay, a great number of men of that Nation did usually remain in those Cities, through whose hands the most precious Merchandise of those Countries past, to the great advantage of the City, and of her private Citizens. So as the *Genoese* plying the same places, at first a certain rivalship and emulation arose amongst them, as well for the profit of merchandizing; as for the expertness, and glory of Sea affairs, till at last they came to open and cruel War: which kept the Commonwealth so busied, and perplexed by disturbing Navigation, and even private affairs; as for a long while they had no leisure to undertake other enterprises, though they had met with opportunity for it, and that they had been thereunto dispos'd. For the *Venetians* having sundry times hazarded their Fleets upon the doubtful event of Battel, they tasted both prosperous and adverse fortune; insomuch as they were to fight in their own Gulf, not more for Empire, then for the safety of the City.

Thus whilst the Commonwealth spent her best years, partly in these private affairs, and merchandizing business, partly in the so long and troublesome Wars against the *Genoese*, another Power arose in the *Levant*, much greater, and more formidable then was the *Grecian* Empire. For the *Ottoman* Lords, beginning by divers accidents, but chiefly by reason of the discords among Christians, to make notable and successful progress in their rising Empire, grew quickly very great and powerful not onely by Land, but also by Sea, having reduced the City of *Constantinople* into their hands, a very fit place for Sea enterprises, whereby the Commonwealth of *Venice* was not onely bereft of all hopes of further increasing

creasing their Dominion by Sea, having so great and powerful an Enemy so near at hand, but even what they had already got, was exposed to hazard; so as being to maintain a bitter and difficult War, and to manage it with unequal Forces against this their sore and perpetual adversarie, she had more reason to think upon her own defence, then by force of Arms to win what belonged to others.

Let us in the next place consider the conditions of the nearest neighboring people amongst which she was to enlarge her Confines, whereby we may also know what difficulties the Commonwealth met with; for at the very first she was to overcome the *Dalmatians*, a Nation not onely very valiant, but of a quick wit, given to sedition, and desirous of novelties. Whence how great her difficulties were in quelling these, may be conceived by this, that the Commonwealth of *Rome* having so many, and so far distant Nations, yet could she never handsomely put the yoke upon *Dalmatia*, which never was under the Roman Empire until the time of *Octavius Augustus*, but had still before notably indamaged the Roman Armies. It is then no wonder that the state of a Commonwealth should be less, which had to contend with such Enemies; and who may not know by the actions of this Commonwealth, that she rather wanted occasion then worth for the further increasing her State and fortune?

Let us now likewise consider the condition of the times wherein the Commonwealth of *Rome* had her happy beginnings, and made the first progress to her Empire. Which we shall find to differ much, and to be free of the so many difficulties, which the *Venetians* met with. *Rome* had not at her first rise any powerful neighboring Prince; for the *Aryrians* had then the Monarchie, whose confines did not extend beyond *Asia*; and after the concourse of many years it was carried by *Cyrus* amongst the *Perians*, with whom it remained for about Two hundred years, till it was destroyed by *Alexander of Macedon*, who though he made greater conquests, and made his Forces be felt and dreaded much further off, yet dying young in the height of his Victories, he could not get into *Europe*, nor afford the Romans occasion of making trial of their Forces with a powerful and valiant Prince. And by his death (he having left no issue, either legitimate or illegitimate behind him) that Monarchie was soon destroyed, and his Empire was divided between his chief Commanders; so as several Kingdoms were thereout framed, with which severally the *Romans* did afterwards much to their advantage make War. So as *Asia* having then been the chiefest Seat of the Empire, the Provinces of *Europe* were not at that time any waies annoied by the power thereof; and those that were further from thence, as was *Italy*, less then the rest. But *Greece* which was then in high esteem for the excellencie of her Inhabitants genius, for what concerned both Civil and Military vertues, was divided into many several Peoplesdoms, who contending within themselves for the dignitie both of the soveraignie of that very Province, it so fell out that aspiring either wholly or chiefly therear, they minded not the annoying of other Nations by their Forces. In *Africa* the *Carthaginians* were very strong, the power of *Carthage* being almost at the same times as much increased, as was the like of *Rome* in *Italy*: So as she had the Dominion of many provinces of *Europe*, and did possess the greatest part of *Spain*: but this power did not any waies molest the *Romans* first designs, nor did it hinder them from making acquisitions in *Italy*, nor from confirming therein those Forces with which she afterwards did subdue the World. For the *Carthaginians* came not near the *Romans* for little less then Five hundred years, till such time as both the Commonwealths enlarging their Confines, they grew to be neighbors; Whercupon at last they commenced War, out of the envy and jealousie that each had of other. This was the condition and state of times when the Commonwealth of *Rome* had her rise and encrease.

Whence it may be observed, that though there might be some great Potentates then,

then, yet was there none which might compare with the Roman Emperors, who had a greater Monarchy then all the rest ; besides they were so far off, as their greatness could not impede *Romes* increasing, though she were as yet but a new-begun City. But she met with the like prosperous condition both of affiirs and times, in relation to her neareſt neighbors : For *Rome* had not only not any great contestation with any powerlike Prince in her first and weakest beginning ; but for the space of three hundred and ſixty years, till the firſt French war, ſhe had no occaſion of making trial of her Forces againſt any powerful people ; for then *Italy* was not only not ſubject to any one Prince alone, who might be greater by other Forces and other States, as it happened afterwards in the *Venetians* times, but being divided into many parts, as well in reſpect of dominion, as of other ſeparations, each Country contained many people of diſſenting government and power : So as *Latium* alone of herſelf, which is now called *Campagna di Roma*, contained four Nations, or rather Communaliſties, the *Hernici*, *Latini*, *Volsci*, and *Equi* ; with whom the People of *Rome* did for a long time make war. I mention not the *Cecinensi*, the *Crutumeni*, *Antinati*, *Sabini*, *Albani*, and other Nations of leſs esteem, againſt whiſh in her beginning ſhe exerciſed her Forces, whiſt ſhe learned (as a man may ſay) the firſt rudiments of her Milicia. *Tuscany*, though being taken all together ſhe were very powerful, and whose Confines were then much larger, yet was ſhe diſtiſhed into ſo many Signories or Lordships, as the Forces of every People apart by themſelves muſt needs be weak and of ſmall moment : which may eaſily be known by this, that bare Three hundred men of the Family of the *Fabii* were able to wage War with the *Veientes*, who were the chief of that Region, with whom they oft times fought with display'd Banners, and with dubious event, and were at laſt ſuppreſt more by the fraud, then force of their Enemies. So likewiſe the other parts of *Italy* which were neareſt *Rome* were ſo weakly inhabited, as it is not much, that a new City, but yet well inſtructed in weapons, might get unto herſelf State and Dominion : Nay, he who ſhall conſider what the increase of that Commonwealth was from time to time, will wonder how that People, who got afterwards the dominion of the whole World, was ſo late in enlarging the Confines of her Territories upon her Neighbors, when they were to contend in War with thoſe that were weaker then they, and that the bounds of their Empire did extend to beyond *Italy*. For, for above the ſpace of four hundred years, when the City was ſo much increased in Citizens, as ſhe raised Armies of Forty thouſand Foot, besides Horſe, the affairs of *Rome* were notwithstanding in ſuch condition as they made War even under the Walls of *Rome* with the *Equi*, *Volsci*, and *Veientes*, her firſt Enemies. And this wonder is not a little increased, when you ſhall conſider that Military discipline did flouriſh even from the very firſt in *Rome*, and was ever afterwards held in great esteem by her Citizens, who were bent with all their might to augment the power of their City, not being content, as were the *Venetians*, to enjoy peace and ſecurity. Wherefore the *Romans* gave eaſily way for friendſhip to all Foreiners, that they might by the muſtude of their Citizens render their City more powerful, and fitter to worſt Adverſaries : And their firſt King *Romulus* ſet up a Sanctuariy, where all ſorts of men, whether free or ſlaves, good or guilty, might have recepſacle. But that Commonwealth had alſo her imperfections, whereby being troubl'd with perpetual civil diſcorſes, ſhe found many impediments, and much diſſiculty in effecting her Citizens generous deſigns. But being gotten to a great height of power, the Counterpoife of forein Forces ceaſing by her own greatness, ſhe was able for a time to bear with her ſo many diſorders, till at laſt ſhe was brought to her final ruine.

We muſt now be permitted to take ſome other things into conſideration which appertain to particular order of this Commonwealth. A City which aspires unto Empire, muſt above all things elſe be well provided of Arms, ſo as ſhe want not any

any thing that is requisite for War : but she stands no less in need of good Laws, which are for many respects of great importance in all Governments ; as also for that when the licentiousness of Arms, intrusted in the hands of Citizens, is not corrected by the authority of Law, that which was destin'd for the good and preservation thereof, it turns at last to her ruine. Therefore it is requisite that a City be constituted with such Laws as may result both to safety from foreign Enemies, and to union between her own Citizens ; by which civil agreement the strength and reputation of a Commonwealth is much increased. Of these two conditions which ought to make a City powerful, and so as that power may continue long, the Commonwealth of *Rome* had the first in perfection, but was very faulty in the second: On the contrary, excellent provision was made by the Founders of *Venice* for the second, but much remains to be wish'd for in the former. Thus then had *Rome* a naturally warlike people, which she kept continually exercised in Arms, observing exactly Military discipline and orders : But she was much disorderly and confused in Civil affairs, nor knew she how to keep any settled form of Government, leaving too much authority in the People, and wanting usual means to suppress the immoderate power of Citizens. Whereas in *Venice*, the form and order of Civil Government is in every particular well disposed of, and excellently well understood ; so as she is the only example which in so many Ages, and so many accidents both of good and bad fortune, hath never been troubled with any important domestick discords. But then, as for Military orders, they are not altogether such as are requisite for the acquiring of a large Command ; for at her beginning, she applied herself (as hath been said) to maritime affairs, not with any intent of subjugating other Cities and Nations, but rather (as the condition of those times and busynesses did require) for what concerned Traffick and Merchandising, to which the preservation of Peace did much conduce, and the keeping of open and free Commerce with all men ; but having since had some such thoughts too late, they were not very fervently pursued neither, but only as necessity or some occasion did dictate : For the City was not disposed and established with certain and perpetual Orders, nor with any very ambitious ends for what concerned War, and for Land-Militia, it hath already been said, that for a long time the Commonwealth was totally a stranger unto it. And therefore when at last she made it her busyness, for want of any fitting preparation for it in her own people and Citizens, she had recourse for help to Foreigners ; and this custom growing stronger by time, she hath always made use for the most part of Foreign Commanders and Soldiers, brought under her Pay from elsewhere : which, as experience shews, hath turn'd much to her damage and disorder ; for her Forces being under the command and power of other men, she hath not been able upon many fitting occasions to make good use of the Victories, which she with great danger and expence hath won. And not to mention many other things, it is a thing very well known, that had not the no great fidelity of the Commanders counseled the Commonwealth of her just hopes, in the Wars which she made with *Philippo Maria Visconti*, there had not been any inch of that State which she had not been Mistress of. But sometimes the Marquis of *Mantua*, sometimes *Il Carmignola*, and sometimes *Sforza*, invited threunto either by greater rewards offered them by the Enemy, or by some other peculiar, though very irrational respects of their own, forsook the Commonwealths cause, and bereft her of the fruit of certain Victory. Which disorders, together with so many others sprung from the like occasion, and which did sufficiently interrupt her further proceedings, would not peradventure have ensued, if the Commonwealth had been accustomed to give the command of her Armies by Land to her own Citizens, as she was always accustomed to do in her Fleets, in affairs of no less difficulty and importance.

The Romans did not thus, who being to rig out Fleets against the *Carthaginians*, did not seek out *Sicilians*, or *Grecians*, or people of other Nations, to command over them, but made use of their own Citizens as well by Sea as by Land. *Cincinnatus* was taken from the Plough, and made Dictator against the *Sabins*; *Cicero* being taken from pleading at the Bar, was sent to the government of *Cilicia*, and to make War against the *Parthians*; *Scipio*, who parted a fresh Soldier from *Rome* is said to have gotten the knowledge of the militarie Art, by the way, before he arrived at the Enemy; *Sylla*, being sent *Quæstor* into *Africa*, with the Consul *Marius*, being till then a *Puney* in the Militia, became in a few daies so well instructed therein, and raised so great an opinion of valor and military Discipline of himself, as the Commonwealth did very soon put their chiefest hopes in him, in all their weighuiest affairs. In brief, people that are of a ready wit, and noble spirit, do easily accustom themselves by exercise to all things, and prove excellent therein; the experience whereof hath been seen amongst our selves, for those few who have betaken themselves to Land-service, have given such proof of their valor (which is witnessed by particular Histories) as it may very well be known, that the Commonwealth might have promised unto her self all gallantries from her Citizens, if she had known how to make use of them. But she was run into this error, because she would (as the conjecture of times did almost require) follow the example of the other Princes of *Italy*, who long before, and chiefly at that time when the Commonwealth did most apply her self to Land-affairs, made use of mercenary Militia's, which was then heighned to a great esteem by two famous Commanders of that Age, *Bracco* and *Sforza*, who were afterwards imitated by others in this sort of Militia; Wherefore the Captains whose Troops did ordinarily consist of horse, led them along to the service sometimes of one, sometimes of another Prince. So the Venetians who were but learners in this sort of Militia, saw that the Popes, the Kings of *Naples*, the Dukes of *Milan*, the *Florentines*, who bore great sway and authority in *Italy*, made use of this sort of Forces, they began to follow the foot-steps which were traced out unto them by others. Another respect may be added hereunto, which hath already been touched upon, that the Commonwealth having then put her self in a certain course, which she had for a long time observed, of making use of her people and her Citizens in Sea-affairs, it seemed dangerous to some to make such an innovation in a City ordained for civil Government, and which was greatly fixt therein by long custom. But it is not to be denied, but that when the aggrandizing of a State or Empire is in question, this which hath been spoken of is a great fault in a City which doth aspire thereto.

And it is to be observed in the Roman Monarchy that the happy success of their famous victories is chiefly attributed, to the discipline of their Militia, because it was excellent, and because it was exercised by their own Soldiers; and particularly in the *Carthaginian* Wars, which were sorer then all the rest which the *Romans* did ever make; it is observable, that the *Carthaginians* being equal to the *Romans* both for the reputation and worth of their Commanders, and superior to them in the numbers of their Soldiers, to boot with the strength of their Elephants, which they made use of in their Battels, yet their Armies were overcome, which consisted of mercinare people, and assembled out of many Nations, and yet not by the greater worth, but by the greater fidelity, constancy, and love of the Roman Soldiers towards their Country.

But for such abuses as these it may be alledged in behalf of the Commonwealth of *Venice*, that she did it to shun those mischiefs into which the Commonwealth of *Rome*, ran by giving these military commands to her Citizens; yet he who will truly examine the state of affairs, will find that the authority which is granted,

limited and corrected by the Laws, cannot be prejudicial to the publick good; and the experieace of the very City of *Venice* confirms this, where so great authoritie being so often granted in commands at Sea to her own Citizens, yet it was never known that the Commonwealth suffered any mischeif thereby, and certainly a great mistery lies in the well disposed orders of a City, by which Citizens are easily kept within their duties, wherein if any one chance to fail, he is soon chastised without any disturbance to the peace of the City. Which if by nothing else; is sufficiently proved in the City of *Venice*, by the long duration of that Commonwealth. So as these things were very well understood and ordained by her; and she might the more easily do it, by reason of the conditions of those her first inhabitants, as hath been said. But such freedom and licentiousnes was given in *Rome* to that warlike people, together with the government of their Forces, as the Laws were not so reverenced as they ought to have been; and the orders of the Militia being instituted by *Romulus*, before those of Religion and civility by *Numa Pompilius*, military discipline was alwaies in greater esteem then the study of civil affairs.

By all which considerations it is manifest, That the diversity of success in these two Commonwealths, hath sprung from this diversity of institutions, and from so many accidents, and not from any one reason, as was said at the beginning; but in this diversity both of them have their praises, and all those perfections and felicity, which is grantable to humane affairs. *Rome* was Mistress of the World, but could not long enjoy this greatness and prosperity, nor yet with the quiet of her Citizens. But *Venice*, though of much meaner Precincts, and condition, hath preserved her self (as an onely example) in her liberty for so many Ages, free from all domestick troubles, and with the miraculous union and concord of her Citizens.

The Second DISCOURSE.

Whether or no the Commonwealth of Venice be to be blamed for having taken upon her the defence of the City of Pisa, when it was oppugned by the Florentines.

I Have often, not without some, to me appearing reason, wondred, that some Historians should so much blame the Commonwealth of *Venice* for having taken upon her the defence of the City of *Pisa* against the *Florentines*, whereby they may seem to reproach the counsels of those wise and stout Senators, who had then the managing of publick affairs in their hands, for those very things, for which other Princes and States, have been by other Writers much celebrated. He who will know the truth of such judgements, must take unto himself more particular, and inward considerations, for it often-times falls out, that looking into the very pith and marrow of business, the clean contrary is found to what did first appear, and the face of things do seem to alter. Such actions may then be measured, either by the ordinary reasons of justice and equity, or else by the reasons of State, which are the more proper. If you consider this action of the Commonwealth according to the first measure, what is it that doth offend the nice consciences of these so scrupulous men? to take upon ones self the defence of the weakest, and those who suffer under the malignity of fortune, hath alwaies been thought a pious action, and befitting great and generous Princes; and how miserable was

the condition of the poor *Pisans*, how much it did deserve to be imbraced and favored both out of compassion and justice, is demonstrated (to omit for the present other particulars) by what was done at the same time by *Charls* the Eight, King of *France*, whilst he was in *Italy*, and by the so many favors afforded to the cause of *Pisa* by all the chief of his Court. *Charls* had promised the *Florentines* to keep the City of *Pisa* under their Dominion, being obliged unto them for their readines in receiving them into his State, and for having afforded them all assistance and accommodation ; yet did the afflictions of the *Pisans* appear to be so grievous, as he was moved more by compassion then by his own interest, or by his promise made to the *Florentines*.

A forein Prince used this charity to the *Pisans*, with whom he nor his Kingdom had never held any friendship or confederacie, his interests being not only separate from, but contrary to their welfare : And shall it be thought a strange and irrational thing, that the Commonwealth of *Venice*, which had had the *Pisans* for their friends and associates in divers enterprises, and who kept still friendship and commerce with that City, from whence also some of the noblest Families of the Commonwealth draw their original, and whose cause for the same respects was straitly annex'd unto their own, should interest herself in behalf of the *Pisans*, to comfort them in their great affliction ? Nor ought the Commonwealth of *Venice* to use greater respect to the *Florentines*, then they had used towards her, against whose designs they had so opposed themselves in the Wars formerly made against the Dukes of *Milan* and *Ferrara*, all stinging their Enemies both with men and monies, as they were thought to be the chief hindrance, why the businesse undertaken by the Commonwealth with great hopes of good success, had no better an end. The *Venetians* were thereunto likewise moved by the example of others : For if the Duke of *Milan*, the *Genoese*, the *Luchese*, and those of *Sienna*, had assisted the *Pisans* as much as they were able, how could the *Venetians*, whose Forces in *Italy* were much superior to theirs, stand idly looking upon the *Pisans* miseries, and upon the prosperity and greatness of the *Florentines*, whereby the common troubles of *Italy* were augmented ; since they alone adhered to the French faction.

But let us consider a little more particularly the cause which was undertaken to be defended by protecting the *Pisans*, and what it was that they did endeavour. Certainly nothing but the recovery of their antient liberty, whereof they were bereaved either by their several misfortunes, and by the violence of others, or at least (as they said) to reduce themselves to a less severe government then that of the *Florentines* ; under whose dominion being fallen but a little before, and the City of *Pisa* being sold at a low rate by the *Visconti*, the *Pisans* pretended first by the favor of *Charls* the Eight, King of *France*, and afterwards by the like of *Maximilian* the Emperor, to be returned to their former liberty : The former having used his power, and the other his anti. nt pretences of the Empire, to put them into that condition. And grant that respect were to be had to the possession which the *Florentines* had of that City, which notwithstanding was but of later times, the *Florentines* were likewise to have released the Haven of *Ligorn* to the *Genoese*, from whom they had taken it by violence. The *Venetians* did not perswade the *Pisans* to forgo their obedience to the *Florentines*, as *Lodovick Sforza* had formerly done ; for they minded more the appeasing of the commotions of *Italy*, then the raising of more ; they did not free them from the bond of obedience to the *Florentines*, as did the Emperor and the King of *France*, because they knew such an action did not belong unto them ; they were not the first that did foment the alienation of that City, as the *Genoese* and those of *Sienna* had done, because they had no intention to advantage themselves by the discord and ruine of others : But the City having

having already totally rejected the obedience of the *Florentines*, being thereof freed by the authority of other puissant Princes, and assisted by other more petty Princes to maintain their liberties; the *Venetians* being requested and conjur'd by the *Pisans*, when they saw them ready to fall into the depth of misery, if not assisted by them, and that their ruine would draw along with it great prejudice to the peace and liberty of all *Italy*, they at last took upon them their protection and defence. And I herein say nothing but what is most true, and confirm'd by the testimony of those who have written upon the passages of those times.

But let us consider other more particular accidents, and more weighty respects. *Charles the Eighth*, King of *France*, was at that time pass'd into *Italy*, to get the Kingdom of *Naples*; an undertaking wherein he had prosperous success, which was an ill omen to *Italy*: All the other Princes of *Italy* opposed him afterwards in his designs, (instructed by the fall of the King of *Arragon*, to have an eye to their own danger) except only the *Florentines*, who still continued in adhering to the *French*, the counsel of the most potent Citizens prevailing over the opinion of the more wise. So as the *French* preparing to return with mighty Forces into *Italy*, they had friendship with none, nor had they any other receptacle, save with the *Florentines*, with whom they had already made a new agreement to be by them assisted with men and monies. *Pisa* was at the same time straitly beleaguer'd by the *Florentines*; and had she not been succor'd by the *Venetians*, all her other aids were so weak, as she must speedily have fallen into the *Florentines* hands; who being freed of the expence and trouble of that Siege, would be more powerful, and more ready to assist the *French*, and to facilitate the enterprises which they were to attempt in *Italy*. Then if it were judged by the common opinion of all men to be just, honest and laudable to take upon them the defence of the safety and liberty of *Italy* against the *French*; how can those actions be blamed, which did tend (as it is seen) necessarily thereunto, by keeping foreign Forces afar off, and by bereaving them of their friends assistance? The affairs of the King of *France* did at this time ebb and flow, but for the most part ebb in the Kingdom of *Naples*: Great were the King of *Arragons* hopes of recovering the State, being therein assisted powerfully by the same *Venetians*: The King of *France*, though his Forces were in a readiness, was doubtful whether he should come into *Italy*, or no. So as at such a conjuncture of time, every least thing which tended either to the augmenting or lessening of his hopes, was of great moment. Pope *Alexander* moved by these respects, did much press the Venetian Senate to be resolute in assisting the *Pisans*, whilst he himself was somewhat doubtful and irresolute. The Venetian Senate had the *Florentines* in good esteem, and laying aside the memory of what was past, would have had them for their friends, if they would have separated themselves from the *French* (who were then the common Enemy) and have entred into that Confederacie whereinto all the rest of the Princes of *Italy* were entred, and by whom they had many fair offers made them, particularly to procure the reintegration of their State, if they would put on a generous resolution to regain those Forts, which as cautionary Towns for their fidelity were held by French garrisons, and do this by Force of Arms, not by Treaty or Agreement. But if these things could not be listned unto out of a pertinacious will, infected by the practise of some of their Citizens, what was to be done? Should the general safety have been neglected, to serve the will of some few, who peradventure did not well understand their own proper and true interests? To whom then was the injury done herein? Not to the *Pisans*, who with humble and earnest intreaties had very often prest the Venetian Senate to be received into the protection of their Commonwealth, nay, into their Dominions: Not to the *Florentines*, because they to keep them selves from parting with the *French*, did enforce a necessity upon the *Venetians* to take and maintain such

such a resolution, that they might keep the *Florentines* busied about *Pisa*, and the French from those succors, whereby the troubles and dangers of *Italy* were increased.

But I find that these transactions have been diversly interpreted, and the Senate blamed, who did not aim at succouring the oppressed *Pisans*, not at the common safety of *Italy*, but at their own thirst of bringing the City of *Pisa* under their Dominion. To this it is answered, that where the actions are evident, no judgement is to be given contrary thereunto; nor ought the secrets of hearts to be searched, which is reserved to a more excellent power then what humane discourse can arrive unto; it is certain that the defence of *Pisa*, which was oft-times denied them, was at last undertaken by the *Venetians*, when they being forsaken by all others, they were necessitated for the aforesaid reasons so to do. The *Pisans* offered to put themselves wholly into the power of the Commonwealth, and to set up her colours in their City, the *Venetians* would not yeeld hereunto, nor accept of this large offer; but the *Pisan* Ambassadors were sent back with many thanks for their affection, and were heard in what they desired, though in a differing manner; for the Commonwealth took upon her to defend the liberty of the City with the forces and authority of the Commonwealth, which she did for many years, with such fervencie and general consent, sparing neither expence, labor, nor danger, as she could hardly have done more in her own defence; they sent both Foot and Horse several times to the *Pisans* under their best Commanders, as also moneys and victuals, and shipping to accommodate the City with all things necessary, and to free them from the siege of the *Florentines* by Sea. Yet to give a greater testimony of what their minds and intentions were in this, when it was propounded to put the City of *Pisa* into *Cæsars* hands, and to remit the right of their cause to him, the *Venetians* did not onely not oppose it, but counseled them so to do, desirous that this controversie might be ended, whilst their faith, and the common interests were preserved safe; and when there was yet some opinion, that the *Florentines* allured by this advantage, and hope, might have adhered unto the league; but on the one side, in progres of time, the *Florentines* obdurate resolution was discovered of governing themselves by Counsels, apart from the rest of the *Italians*; and on the other, the deep deceits of *Lodowick Sforza*, who under the shadow of procuring peace and quiet, growing jealous of the greatness which the *Venetians* might arrive at by the acquisition of *Pisa*, and calculating other mens by his own, did in reality endeavor to secure himself from this his imaginary fear, by hindring the *Venetians* from pursuing that enterprise, to the which not long before he had exhorted them.

The *Venetian* Senate was inforced to maintain the cause which they had undertaken, to keep from breaking their faith unto the *Pisans*, and to free themselves from the infamy and repute of weak advice, to which they should be subject, as if they had condescended for fear of *Lodowicks* Forces, or else as not knowing his cunning; when it was already known to all men, that the endeavor of agreement with the *Pisans*, which was agitated under the name of the Collegues, was managed onely by him, and according to his will and interests. But say I pray, is this the onely enterprise wherein the sincerity, and candidness of the Commonwealth is to be known in just things, and such as do concern the common good of *Italy*? How often hath she maintained Wars, to the end that there might be a right, and an *Italian* Governor in the Dukedom of *Milan*? which cannot be denied since the effects thereof be so apparent, as she would not lay down Arms before she had compast this her intent, as she did by that famous agreement which was made in the City of *Bologna* the year 1529. in which year, by means of the *Venetian* Senate *Maximilian Sforza* was restored unto his State, to whom the Dukedom

dom of *Milan* did of right belong: and their ends in the business concerning *Pisa* may likewise be discovered, since when the agreement was come unto, the *Venetians* had no respect to their own advantage, but onely to the benefit of the *Pisans*, to the preservation of their liberty as much as might be, and to the right of what belonged to their Territories, which they were possest of when they put themselves into the Commonwealths protection; wherein the *Venetians* were alwaies very constant, though the imminent War with the Turks might have made them forget the dangers and interests of other mens, for their own concernments. And at last, as they would yeeld to nothing which might be prejudicial to the *Pisans*, so to witness to the World that in reality they had no thought in maintaining this controversy, to any peculiar design of their own, in making themselves Masters of that City, they put the determination of these differences, into the arbitrement of *Herckles* Duke of *Ferrara*; which though it had not any effect afterwards, the *Pisans* not consenting thereunto, yet it might be discerned, that the *Pisans* averse-ness thereunto, or the constancy wherein they persevered, was not fomented by the *Venetians*, but rose either out of the meer election or necessity of the *Pisans* themselves.

But let us come to another consideration, more proper for this business, that is, to the reasons of State, wherein the many of the same things do concur, yet they are cloathed with other respects, wherewith Princes building either onely or chiefly upon what may most redound to their own advantage, do not advise with counsel or equity, or do not attribute thereunto what is requisite. It is most certain, being already reduced to the greatest extremity, if they should have been abandoned by the *Venetians*, they must have put themselves either into the power of the Duke of *Milan*, or of the *Florentines*; but reason of State would not permit, that in this conjuncture both of times and affairs this City should be joyned to the Dominion of either of these. As for *Sforza* his vast and disordinate drifts were already known, and how he would be the sole Arbitrator of *Italy*; so as if he should become more haughty, and putt up by this important acquisition, no part of *Italy* could remain quiet or secure either from his force or craft. And as for the *Florentines* you have heard how resolute they were not to part from the friendship of the King of *France*, by how much greater the danger of whose Army was in recent memory, so much the more were his friends and associats to be kept weak and under, to the end that they might not increase to the prejudice and apprehension of the rest. It was seen in what danger *Italy* was put by forein Forces, how soon the Kings of *Aragon* were driven out of their Dominion, how little resolute the other Princes of *Italy* were to withstand forein Forces, which having once found an open and easie way into *Italy*, it was to be imagined that they would be cause of greater dangers and molestations to her. So as the Commonwealth being to be put into a condition of being able to resist the Forces of greater Princes, and of not being exposed to their wills, she was necessitated to think upon increasing her power and reputation, that she might depend upon her own Basis, and be well esteemed of by others. She knew particularly that *Toscany* was a State which might accommodate or dis-accommodate the French designs, accordingly as it was well or ill affected towards them. And the keeping of the City of *Pisa* dependant upon the *Venetians*, might several waies be helpful unto them in their intentions, in keeping the French from succoring the Kingdom of *Naples*, and in securing themselves afterwards from the *Florentines*, as also in winning such strength and reputation to the Commonwealth with friends and adherents, as she might provide for her own preservation, and for the like of those other *Italians*, who had the like intentions with her to maintain peace in *Italy*, and to keep her safe from foreign Forces. It was not then onely useful, but necessary

for the *Venetians*, in this conjuncture of affairs, to have footing in *Italy*, and to have the City of *Pisa*, if not subject to their dominion, at least dependent upon the authority of the Commonwealth. Now take it for granted, that that suspition might be true which they have so much divulged, who have endeavored to cast a blur upon the honor and dignity of the Commonwealth, to wit, that the *Venetians* intended to make themselves absolute masters of that City, only out of a design of increasing their dominion. Certainly the actions of a Philosopher, and those of a Prince, ought not to be measured by one and the same Rule; nor must we fancy the condition of men, and of affairs, to be what peradventure they ought to be, but what they are for the most part. Magnanimity is the proper vertue of Princes, which makes them always busie themselves about great matters, and whereby they make themselves be dreaded and reverenced by others. Therefore the desire of Glory and Empire is highly praised in such Princes as have been greatest and most celebrated, as *Alexander*, *Cyrus*, *Cæsar*, *Charls*, and all the rest of the most famous men, in whom a spirit of Grandeur and Generosity, which did still egg them on to new and glorious enterprisces, is not only commended, but even admired. If the *Romans*, whose actions are praised and celebrated by the general consent of all men, had been content to contain themselves within the precincts of *Latium*; their worth would have been hidden and obscured, nor would their names have been so highly cry'd up to the memory of posterity: And had not the *Venetians* had larger thoughts then to keep within their private merchandising affairs (as it became them to do in their weak begining) despising or neglecting such occasions as they sundry times met with of enlarging the bounds of their Dominions, the Commonwealth would not only not have gotten such esteem and reputation as it hath got, but could not have kept herself so long in liberty, amidst so many revolutions of affairs, and such movings of Forein Armies.

It remains now only to see whether the opportunity of the Times, and condition of Affairs did counsel them to purchase new glory and greater Empire to their Commonwealth. Which though it may be known by what hath been formerly said, yet it will more clearly appear by adding some other particular Considerations. The Commonwealth was then in a more powerful condition, then any Prince in *Italy*, being much stronger then them all both in Land and Sea-Forces; the *Pisans* cause was generally well wish'd unto; the *Florentines* were but little acceptable to the rest of the Princes of *Italy*, by reason of their friendship with the *French*; and for this and other respects were particularly much hated by their neighbours, the *Genoses*, *Seneses*, and *Lucheses*; and all the actions of the Commonwealth seemed to be favored by a certain Genius. She had lately gotten the Kingdom of *Cyprus*; she had enlarged her Confines in *Friuli*, by the acquisition of many Towns in the Country of *Goritia*; and she prospered greatly in all that she took in hand, and won much honor. So as in this happy conjunction, the *Venetians* ought not to abandon their good Fortune, lest they might too late repent for not having known how to make good use of their prosperity. They were to be ruled by the example of things past: For having oftentimes let slip many opportune occasions of increasing their Dominion by Land, whilst their Enemies were but weak and not well settled in their States, the like enterprisces being by them undertaken afterwards in a less convenient time, proved more difficult unto them. Others thought, that for the like reasons the *Venetians* should have forbore to meddle with the affairs of *Pisa*; for (said they) the City was so situated, as it could not be defended by them without much expence and inconvenience, they being to take a long compass about the Sea before they could furnish it with things necessary; and then the City it self was not so great a purchase, as deserved so much labor to purchase it. They added moreover, that at the same time, the friends of the other Princes did much envy the

the Commonwealth for her great prosperity ; so as it had better become the wisdom of that Senate to endeavour by concealing their thoughts of aspiring to greater things, to allay this envy, then further to increase it, as they did by attempting so great a novelty.

No doubt but those wise Senators who sat then at the helm of Government, did reflect upon these doubts and suspitions ; but it is to be believed that they were easily free of them, considering that the Commonwealth, when she was not yet so powerful nor strong, had undertaken many difficult, but glorious enterprises in parts far off, and had gotten notable victories against the Saracens, who were then very strong both by Sea and Land, and had placed Trophies of singular worth, and great zeal to Religion, in the Holy Land ; that she had many times taken up Arms in the behalf of the Emperors of *Constantinople*, against divers other Potentates, and upon occasions, had reduced many Cities into her power, which had formerly belonged to that Empire ; and that likewise she had for many years maintained sharp Wars against the *Genoveses*, and had put a period to many other gallant affairs by apparent victories : So as they thought that the Commonwealth had reason to promise herself good success in this her noble design of taking upon her the defence of *Pisa*, and of the affairs of *Tuscany*. Wherefore then ought they to distrust that the Commonwealth might keep the City of *Pisa* at her devotion, in times when her power and authority was much increased, and being accommodated with so many Ships and Gallies which were usually upon the Sea, and having the Island of *Corfu* in the Gulfs mouth, to receive the Ships in the mid-way which sailed from the one Sea to the other ? But on the contrary, who does not know how very opportune this situation was for many other things ; and of what use for the Commonwealth ? Their having got footing in *Tuscany*, might, according as occasions should be offered, open them the way to greater acquisitions ; and the Haven of *Ligorn* was extremely commodious for the Navigation, and Traffick which the City of *Venice* holds with the Western Provinces : which may the better be known now, for that since the affairs which had wont to be transacted in the East, being now turn'd to the West, Ships which come from thence laden with sundry sorts of Merchandise, putting into the Haven of *Ligorn*, to shun further Navigation, do there unload themselves, from whence their Loading is afterwards brought by Land to *Venice*. So as it seems, those wise Senators did even then foresee what high esteem was to be put upon that situation. But their desires have at least prevailed thus far, as that this Country is possest by very wise Princes, who are great friends to the Commonwealth ; with whom an excellent intelligence being held, as hath been of late, and as it is to be hoped it will be for time to come, Commerce will always be open, safe, and free in those Countries. So as no reason can perswade, that the fear of being envied by other Princes, should keep the *Venetians* from attempting so beneficial a thing : For if these thoughts (which ought not to be admitted of by any generous Prince) should have been sufficient to have stopp'd the course of the Commonwealths good fortune, she must not only have abstained from this, but from other enterprises ; and so her Dominion and Fame would have been shut up within her own Washes, if that peradventure might have been permitted them.

It was therefore necessary for the preservation of themselves, and of their liberty, to provide themselves of sufficient Forces (which cannot be had without Territories) to resist such as would offend them ; for the keeping of others well-affected, is not sufficient to keep off injuries. But War is not alwaies made out of fear of another Princes power, and with a mind to secure ones self therefrom, but most commonly out of contempt, and out of a beleef of being able easily to effect what you undertake against them ; and envy is oftentimes more supprest in the

very height of good fortune, when a mans condition is raised much above that of others, then when it is kept within common and usual precincts. But what Princes envy ought the Commonwealth to have feared? If you will say any Transalpin Princes, they had not as then any such firm footing in *Italy*, nor so ready Forces, nor peradventure had they their thoughts so interested, as that they were to make War upon that account with the *Venetians*; if you mean *Italian* Princes, every one of them were weaker then the Commonwealth, and the diversity of their ends and interests would be sure to keep them from joyning together. Nor was it likely that they would conspire with greater Princes against the *Venetians*, since it became all of them to apprehend forein Forces, lest they might all suffer in a common ruine. And if it be said, that notwithstanding it fell out so afterwards, as was seen by the league of *Cambray* which proved so pernicious to the Commonwealth, it may be answered, That things are not done (especially among Princes) as reason would perswade; and no certain judgment can be given of Actions wherein Fancy reigns. But let it be said, that the condition of things, times and respects, were altered by reason of many much differing accidents and actions, when these more heavy Wars began; but chiefly, because the French being become more powerful in *Italy*, by their acquisition of the State of *Milan*, and more desirous of subduing her, they resolved to leave nothing unattempted, which might bring this their design to effect; so as it was from hence that all the troubles and dangers came upon the Commonwealth, whereas she ought rather to have expected thanks, and good offices from the Crown of *France*, so as peradventure there may be more reason to blame the Commonwealth for having called the King of *France* into *Italy*, had she been thereunto moved out of a desire of enlarging her Dominions, and had not been thereunto compelled by the fraud and insufferable insolencies of *Lodovico Sforza*, to suppress the which she was inforced to have recourse to forein Forces, which afterwards turned themselves upon herself. But in the defence of *Pisa* things were otherwise; the end was very honest, for the business was to comfort the oppressed, not to oppress others; an enterprise which was to be approved of for the common welfare of all the *Italians*, whereby they only were weakened, who favored the affairs of forein Princes. The reward, if the War succeeded well, was very great, for it made much for the advantage and reputation, especially at that time, of having the City of *Pisa* either her Subject, Friend, Dependant, or Coafederate.

The Third DISCOURSE.

That the Commonwealth is not to be blamed for the unfortunate successes of War, after the routing of the Venetian Army in the action of Giaradada.

HE who hath sought out an occasion to blame the Commonwealth of Venice, out of envy to her glory, and particularly to the excellency of her Government, falling upon the times of her greatest misfortunes, say, That when by her unfortunate success at the rout of Giaradada she lost her State by Land, she witnessed that there was neither worth, nor strength, nor power in her orders to govern an Empire; and that she had had her increase, and had to this day maintained her greatness, more out of a certain appearance, and opinion, then by any excellency of power or counsel. I find these things written in some Authors, but chiefly amplified and affirmed by *Nicholas Machiavel*, a name which hath formerly been very famous for the curiosity of the matter which he took upon him to write on in his discourses; but it is now so condemned to perpetual oblivion by the holy Apostolick See, as it is not lawful to name him.

The misfortunes which the Commonwealth underwent in those days were certainly very great, but such notwithstanding as ought rather to move compassion in all mens minds, and shew the instability of humane affairs, then to afford matter of blame, and further oppression. It is said that the imperfection of the Commonwealth was discovered by these publick adversities; and (that I may give the very words of some men) that there was no true worth or excellency in her orders: yee prove they not this by any other reason then what is taken from the action it self, to wit, because she lost the day to the French, and that by the loss ther of the publck affairs were brought into exceeding great danger. But he who shall penetrate more inwardly into the truth of these things, will not rest satisfied with this judgement, framed rather from the event then out of any reason, and will speak much otherwise, and will take many other things into considerat on, before he give his judgement. And if we will by this our Discourse penetrate into the more inward considerations, we shall find that the Form of Government is as it were the soul which gives a true being to a City. For a multitude of men assembled together could not have whereof to live, nor would their place of habitation deserve the name of a City, were it not for certain Orders and Laws. But as the sensitive soul, which informs the animated body, cannot always make equal use of all her fudry powers and faculties; for though she preserve her self in her own purity, and perfection, yet needing the parts of the body, and ex rinfecal objects for her operations, she must oft times cease operating, and sometime produce th imperfect operations; so will it happen in a C ty, that though the form of government, which is as it were the soul thereof, be of it self very vigorous and perfect, yet can it not always, nor in all things shew its force and excellency, by reason of the need it stands in of instruments, and by its encoutring with many extr. rinfecal accidents, so as it must sometimes rest wholly idle, and other sometimes do but little good by its operating; Whence I infer, that though a City be exceedingly well ordered for Civil and Military Affairs, yet cannot she promise her self to enjoy peace long, nor long to keep herself in one and the same condition,

safe only as long as she shal be permitted so to do by the condition of other things, which are out of the Legislators power. So likewise the adverse fortune of a Commonwealth or Kingdom, which may depend upon so many other occasions, is not sufficient to infer, that such States are ill ordered: But rather as he may deserve the name of a good Orator, who handles his cause so as he does perswade handsomely, though he do not always attain his end; so ought not the Legillator to be accounted less wise, nor those Laws less good, by which the Government is well regulated as touching Peace, and the preservation of the City or State, though various accidents may produce the contrary effects.

These reasons and examples do clearly shew, how ill-grounded those oppositions are, by which, without any consideration of so many other circumstances, men will conclude that the Orders of the Commonwealth of *Venice* were weak, and of no worth, because her Army was worsted in the Battel of *Geradada*; and because after that Rout, the loss of the State, and so many other great losses did ensue. It is not the Event, but the Counsel by which things are done, which ought to give the true praise or blame to our actions. Let us then see in this Case which we are now upon, what the counsels were, what the hopes, what the condition of times were, and of Princes, and let us look into other such circumstances, and then we shall be able to give a better judgment. The times are three; and the affairs which upon this occasion may fall under our consideration, are of three sorts; to wit, such as did precede the action, those wherewith it was accompanied, and those which followed after. The Commonwealth, before this unfortunate accident fell out, was not only in a very prosperous condition, by reason of her happy success in the last War against the Emperor *Maximilian*, but also (as it was thought) in a condition of much safety, being joined in league and amity with the powerful King of *France*, when unexpectedly she understood that almost all the Princes of Christendom had conspired against her; and almost at the same time she heard that the King of *France* had denounced War against her. Where will you find a mind so constant, as will not be much disturbed at such an advertisement as this? The affection must needs be moved at the novelty of the action, and Reason troubled by the greatness thereof. What had the Venetian Senate reason to fear at this time less then this? The King of *France*, in league, friendship and confederacie with the Commonwealth for many years, out of observancie whereunto the *Venetians* had not only refused friendship with *Cesar*, which was offer'd them with so much advantage to themselves, but had taken up Arms to defend and preserve for that King, their Friend and Confederate, the State of *Milan*; little mindful of such a service, (as the usual affections of other men are seldom found amongst Princes) conspires her ruine, and turns those Arms against her, which through their friendship were grown so powerful in *Italy*. What should move him thereunto? Not desire of revenge; for there appeared no injury: Not any fear of his own affairs; for he had found them already very constant unto them: No self-interest; for he ought to have been jealous of *Cesar*s greatness, who had been his perpetual Enemy, and to have wished well unto the *Venetians*, who had been his antient Friends. But what shall I say of the rest? Had not *Cesar* the like obligations to the *Venetians*, as the King of *France* had, which should have kept him from such a confederacie? Nay, had he not peculiar respects which counsell'd him to the contrary? The injuries which the *French* had done to the Empire; the King of *France* his particular hatred to him; the high aspiring thoughts of that King, pernicious to the dignity of the Empire, and to the German liberty. Wherefore as he could never promise himself safe and firm friendship from the *French*, so he ought rather to have obviated their power, then have help'd to advance it. But who could have expected that such an action should have proceeded from the admired wisdom of *Ferdinand* King of *Spain*, so unusual, and

so harmful to himself, by reason of the prejudice and danger which he was to receive, in not preserving the State which he had won in the Kingdom of *Naples* in peace and quiet? For which cause, the greatness of the *French*, their fidelity, and natural desire of novelty ought to have been suspected by him; yet he assented to the increase of their power, and of his own danger. But how did those generous thoughts which Pope *Julius* the Second seemed to bear to the greatness and liberty of *Italy*, correspond with his joining in confederacie with the Transalpine Princes who went about to oppress her by the ruine of that Commonwealth, which was consist by all men to be at that time the Maintainer of the Glory of *Italy*, and the hope that she might again rise to her antient greatness and reputation? What safety could the Apostolick See expect, by increasing the power of those Princes in *Italy*, who were great of themselves, whom he feared, and upon whose authority he foresaw the Popes of *Rome* must depend?

These certainly were such things as did transcend whatsoever could have fallen into the imagination of the *Venetian* Senators, or of any other men how wise soever: Nor was the immensity of the danger less, nor less able to molest and confound the minds of those who were to prepare for resistance against so great a War. The King of *France* his Forces were of themselves very powerful, that Kingdom being then more flourishing then it had been for many years before; and become more formidable by the possession which the *French* had got of the Dukedom of *Milan*, which afforded them mighty conveniences to assault the Confines of the Commonwealth. And though *Cesars* Forces were not of themselves greatly considerable, yet were they increased by the fame he gave out, that he led his Army into *Italy* to make a certain and noble prey thereof, and with a mind to restore the Empire to its almost lost greatness, whereby he reconciled the mindes of the German Princes and people, and got them to joyn their Forces with his. Moreover, the King of *Spains* Naval preparation was in particular to be feared; to prevent the which, those Sea-Forces of the Commonwealth were to be employed, which should all of them have been employed in defending the State by Land from so fierce an assault. The Pope added no small reputation to the League by his authority; and his Spiritual arms being accompanied with Temporal forces, became the more dreadful. And though the other petty Princes forces were but small, yet was their will to offend the Commonwealth great; and the Kings of *England*, *Poland*, and *Hungary* were sought unto and sollicited by all these together to join with them, and to declare enmity to the *Venetians*.

If then the *Venetians* had yielded to this so new and great preparation for War, which like Thunder made both its noise and harm be heard and felt at once, what could have been said unto them? Ought not they to have been judged worthy of excuse, and their Commonwealth free from the imputation that their Orders were no way's good? For as an object of immensurable force does not move, but corrupt the sense; so the encountering with so weighty a conspiracie, was a thing not likely to incite the Commonwealth to shew her vertue, but rather to disorder and to confound her. Yet it is seen how she behaved herself upon such an occasion; and whether it may be inferred from these her first counsels, as from a thing that was in her own power, that she was not worth much, or that she did any thing unworthy of herself, of her fame, or of the reputation which she held amongst other potent Princes of that Age. What appearance was there in her of any fear, or rather what greater sign could be desired in her of generous confidence and most noble daring? What did she resolve to yield up of free-will? What noise, what complaints were heard, which shewed that she would terminante that contention with vain words, which could not be ended but with Arms? The Answer which was given to the French Herald who came to denounce unto them, that the King was upon his

march in Arms against the Commonwealth, was onely that that War was intimated them from the King, when they had more reason to expect Amity and Peace from him; but that they would not be wanting to their own defence, being confident that they should be able to defend themselves by their own Forces, and through the right of their cause. The effects were answerable to their words; for they betook themselves forthwith to provide for so great a War. The most expert Commanders were sent for from all parts, veteran Soldiers mustered in all places, in so great numbers, and so qual fied, as it was agreed upon by the common consent of all, that neither that Age, nor any other, for many years before had seen such an Army of meer *Italians* in *Italy*. Great and very miraculous was the union and concord both in the Senate and City, wherewith men of all conditions and ages to lend their helping hand to assist their Country at so great a need. There appeared so great a zeal in every one to the common good, such resolution to maintain the state and liberty of the Commonwealth even to the last gasp, as those who have appeared to be no very good friends to the *Venetians* in other things, do praise these proceedings, being forced so to do by the power of truth.

But let us come to those other things which accompany the action it self; The Senate upon mature advice, resolved wisely how that War was to be managed; they knew the enemy was very strong, the danger great, and that the welfare of the Commonwealth depended upon the preservation of that Army which they had now got together. But as it would be a great rashness to hazard it upon a Battel, so to keep it onely to be a safeguard to the City, shewed timorousness in them, would discourage their men, and increase the courage and reputation of the enemy. Whilst they bethought themselves what to do in this great exigencie to evade both these inconveniencies, the Senate ordered their Commanders to march with their Army to those Confines of the State of *Milan* where the Enemy should appear to be likely to make their first assaults; to the end that following their Army in near, but safe quarters, and that keeping them still incommodated, and in jealousie and fear of being assaulted, they might keep them from advancing further, and from falling upon any enterprise. The Commonwealths Army was very strong in Horse, amounting to the number of Ten thousand; and in Foot, to boot with a great number of Soldiers of their own Country, commanded by their own Orders, they had Twelve thousand veteran Soldiers, under exp.rienced famous Commanders, together with a great train of Artillery, and all other instruments for War; so as the Senate had reason to beleive, that they might effect their ends of maintaining the War, and of keeping the field; and so spinning out time (as it becomes those who are upon the defensive part, and find themselves to be the weaker) secure their own Affairs, and keep further dangers from them.

For it oftentimes falls out through various accidents, that the greater Armies be, they do so much the more easily moulder away of themselves; and the Forces of many several Princes, though they be at first great and formidable, prove less fit for great enterprises, by reason of the Colleagues different ends and interests. And as learned Physitians use no strong and violent remedies when the sick party hath but some grudgings of an *Ague*, and when the disease is not yet well known; So these wise Senators were of opinion, that the Commonwealth being set upon and almost opprest by the sudden violence of so many Enemies, it made not for their welfare and safety, to come to the violent remedy of a pitcht field, with enemies whose strength was not yet very well known. Together with these reasons, the *Venetian* Senate had for their example the success of the Commonwealth of *Rome*, which finding her self assailed by powerful *Carthaginian* Forces, and her Affairs being reduced to a great streight, preserved themselves from greater danger, by drawing out

out the War at length, and by keeping the Enemy incommodated ; but the *Venetians* had not a *Fabius Maximus* for their Commander in chief, as the French had an *Hannibal*, for there were many of those vertues in *Lodowick King of France*, which were praised in *Hannibal* ; chiefly a mighty thirst after glory, to purchase which he valued neither labor nor danger. But *Alviano* a famous and cried up Commander, not more for his own worth, then for this misfortune of the *Venetians*, was of a nature much contrary to that of *Fabius*, in knowing how to make advantage of time ; and though he had many other noble qualities, as greatness of spirit in undertakings, undaunted courage in executing what he undertook, and great experience in matter of War ; yet were these vertues little advantagious for the present occasion ; better befitting a Commander who was to assist a puissant Prince, desirous of glory, and in his most prosperous times, then a Commonwealth, which not making use so much of force, as of occasion, was slowly, but safely arrived at that greatness, and which was now, more then formerly to proceed by the like counsels.

But it may peradventure be said, that the Venetian Army wanted not a *Fabius*, having *Nicolo Orsino*, Count of *Pitigliano*, who in his other actions may be truly said to resemble *Fabius* very much, for he alwaies proceeded with the slowest and safest advices ; but in this he appeared much different, and inferior to him since he would not succour *Alviano*, who contrary to his order had given Battel, as did *Fabius Maximus*, who readily succoured *Quintus Minutius*, chief Commander of the Cavalry, though contrary to his opinion he had rashly exposed himself, and part of the Army to the danger of Battel. But on the contrary, *Lodowick*, King of *France*, was not onely like *Hannibal*, but did much exceed him ; for *Hannibal* knew onely how to overcome, but knew not how to make use of Victory, having spent much time to little purpose, after the rout given to the *Romans* at *Canne* ; but *Lodowick* pursuing the Victory, stopt not till he had regained all that he pretended unto from the State of *Venice*. But the Forces of the Commonwealth did either prove less valiant, and less fortunate then formerly they had done, or else they were hurried by some occult cause upon this calamity. Yet can it not be said that the Senates advice was less good, who in their Orders to their Commanders, did alwaies lay before them the importance of the busines with express and particuler command to shun the necessity of joyning Battel with the Enemy. Thoſe prudent Senators knew very well that that Army was not to be hazarded upon the dubious event of Battel, wherein consisted all the hopes of preserving her State by Land, and that the condition of affairs were ſuch on their ſide, that if they came to the trial of a Battel, it muſt be upon too much disadvantage. The War was made at their own doors, ſo as if the Enemy ſhould prove victorious, the conquer'd party could not have time to rally or recruit themſelves, for preservation of their own affairs ; but if the French Army had been overcome, the War would not notwithstanding be at an end, the Forces of the other Colleagues remaining ſtill intire : which were likelier to be ruined by their own diſorders, and by the diſcorſes which uſe to happen in Leagues, then by force of Arms, which could not be made uſe of without danger. The bad advice of ſome Commanders, or else ſome fatal adverſity of the Commonwealth would not permit that this advantage of time ſhould be waited for, whereupon they came to the conflict, not onely contrary to the ſo many aformentioned reſpects, but upon ſuch disadvantage, as with but half their Forces they hazarded the whole Fortune of the Commonwealth. How valiantly they fought is witneſſed by the general conſent of all men, nor do the victorious Enemies deny but that the victory was a good while doubtful ; but a few not being able longer to reſift a much greater number, that notable rout ensued which drew after it ſo many losses and ruines ; For the French Forces did not more ſecure the way to their Army in all places,

places, and facilitate their undertakings, then did the reputation of their victory.

Amidst so great amazement and astonishment, nothing was left unattempted by *Luigi Grigi*, and *Christoforo Moro*, who were the *Provedatori del Campo*, to uphold the Commonwealths fading fortune: They betook themselves to rally the remainder of the Army, they comforted the Captains and Soldiers with hope of better success, they intreated the Nobility and people of *Brescia*, and of other Cities, that being mindful of their Loyalties, and of other things done in service to the Commonwealth, in former Wars had with *Philip Maria Visconti*, they would be like themselves, and with like constancy keep themselves under the moderate command of the *Venetians*, and abhorring the severe *Transalpine Dominions*, they would with oae only inconvenience free themselves from many grievous mischiefs. But they were all so possest with a Panick fear, as no entreaties nor reason could be liftned unto; those who had escaped the Battel, were unfit either for strength or valor, to attempt any thing against the Enemy, no disposition to defence was found in the City, no not so much as to keep themselves from plunder; there were but few Forts at that time in the State, and those few of no condition of holding out long. What was then to be done, to whom was any recourse to be had? If all Princes and Countries were become Enemies, who were to be trusted? If all memory of former benefits were laid aside, so as least gratitude was found in those who had been most obliged, how could new men be raised, and provisions made for a new War? The armed Enemy was already at the gates, nay even within their houses, threatening assured ruine. What was to be done in such a general dispair, but to give way and suffer the cloud to pass, which they saw there was neither wit nor counsel sufficient to withstand? And as sometimes it falls out in greatest Tempests, that the skill and labor of the Mariners, being overcome by the malignity of the weather, they take down their sails and suffer the ship to drive up and down whithersoever the Sea carries it; So in cases of greatest danger, into which States do sometimes fall, he that sits at the helm must comply with his fortune be it never so bad, till the fury of those tempests being past over, the Commonwealth, though born down, yet not quite sunk, may rise again, and make way for her pristine greatness.

The Army being then to retreat, and the loss of the City drawing other losses after it, as one stone that gives against another, it was thought the best course to free the people from their former oathes, so to preserve them from sacking and plunder, which they must have undergone, if they should maintain their loyalties, and to free themselves from the tax of rebellion, if they should submit to the Enemy. Such a resolution might appear willing, and therefore less generous, but it was really necessary; prejudicial to him who doth consider meerly the present condition of things, but which might prove useful in the future: At first sight, it appeared to proceed from rashnes and fear, and yet it proceeded from wisdom, from charity, and in respect to the good of the State, and of the Subjects. The piety nor prudence of the Senate could not admit of the onely hope which was offered in this sad condition of times, to be used for withstanding so many enemies; wherefore the *Venetians* did magnanimously refuse those helps, and assistances, which were offered them by the *Turks*; though but little before (as some writers affirm) they had been very much sought unto by other Christian Princes, as by *Frederick of Aragon*, and *Lodovicus Sforza*, for the defence of their Dominions; and not long after by the Emperor *Maximilian*, to be made use of against the *Venetians*; but neither did the justly conceived anger against so many conspiring Princes, nor the desire of recovering what was lost, prevail with those most wise and religious men, but that it was over-born with the zeal of Religion, and with a firm resolution of preserving the glory of their other atchievements against the Infidels, immaculate;

neither

neither would the reason of State, if well understood, consider'd in the example of others, suffer them so to do ; and especially in the unfortunate success of the Emperors of *Constantinople*, who having unadvisedly call'd in to their assistance the Ottoman Princes, who were much more powerful then they, had drawn a greater ruine upon themse'ves, which proved the occasion of the fall of that Empire. But being unwilling notwithstanding to give over all hopes of accomnodating the afflict'd condition of affa'rs with some ease, the Senate resolved to have recourse to the Pope, and to *Cesar*, (though they had then appeared their bitter Enemies) to treat of some Agreement. They were moved much hereunto by the respect and reverence due to that holy See, and the pious and religious apprehension they had of Ecclesiastical censures, to which they were subject ; and they trusted more in prevailing with *Cesar*, then with the King of *France* : For what hopes were there to do any good by intreaties with him, who being first bound to the Commonwealth by obligation and confederacie, had spurn'd at all those respects out of meer desire of novelties ? To these then they granted all that they pretended unto ; for being to make them quickly jealous of the King of *France* his greatness, they knew some way would be found out for the Commonwealths better fortune.

But how is it possible to pass over here in silence another thing, not at all differing from this, by which such base aspersions have been endeavored to be cast upon the *Venetians* ; since by this our present discourse we go about to vindicate them, by searching into the truth ? We read in *Guicciardine*, a Modern, and to give him his due, in many things an excellent Historian, an Oration published by him in the name of *Antonio Justiniano*, sent by the Commonwealth to *Cesar* : wherein it is said, that the *Venetians* begging pardon at *Cesars* hands, with much subjection and servility of mind, did offer to submit the Commonwealth to be perpetually tributary to the Empire, and to acknowledg to hold their liberty, lives and livelihood from him : with some other base unworthy expressions, not only not true, but not likely to be so. For first, it is very certain, that *Justinian* being sent Ambassador to *Maximilian*, and finding him at *Trent*, was never admitted to have audience, peradventure for fear of offending the Confederates, and making of them jealous. Then, it is most certain that the Senate gave no such Commission : And let him who will not believe it, listen but to reason, and then he will be perswaded to the contrary. The Commonwealth had then lost all her Territories by Land, but at the same time she enjoyed all her State by Sea, wherein were not only one or two Cities, but divers Provinces and noble Kingdoms ; their Naval accouplements were very great, and equal, if not superior to those of whatsoever Potentate at that time ; all entire and whole, not having suffered any thing by this thunder of War, which had only overrun their *Terra firma* : their Treasure but little diminished from what it was at the begining of this War, which continued afterwards, and was maintained for the space of many years : The City of *Venice*, placed by her miraculous situation in compleat safety, all attempts which could be made against it being to prove rash and vain, as the effects proved afterwards : A great Train of Artillery, and of all things requisite for War ; a quiet People, and obedient at the beck of their Nobility ; and a constant and resolute mind in all the Nobles to demonstrate all the proofs of worth and love towards their Country. But that which followed afterwards in their defence of the City of *Padua* against the Forces of all the Princes of the League, will suffice to prove, that the Commonwealth was not so weak either in Counsel or in Power, as to have recourse to that last extremity of making that City tributary, which had maintained her first freedom for above the space of a thousand years. Say, I beseech you, was not the Commonwealth powerful by Sea, and sufficiently valued by all other Potentates, before she had any State in *Terra*

firms? Nay, she was oft-times seen to neglect occasions which were offered of making acquisitions in *Terra firma*, thinking her self safe and powerful enough without them.

What was it then which could move them to make themselves Servants and Subjects, who had no reason to doubt not onely their liberty, but nor their chieftest; most antient, and most proper Dominion, which was that of the Sea, for the preservation whereof, as affairs stood then, they had no reason to make such haste to *Cæsar* for friendship? Who can with reason blame the advice, as the condition of things went then, of giving and yeelding that up to *Maximilian* which could not as then be kept from him; to wit, some of those Cities in *Terra firma* which he pretended right unto; since some agreement ensuing with him by such concessions, and injuries ceasing on that part, the way might be opened to straiter, and more particular and advantagious conventions with the same *Cæsar*, who was naturally desirous of novelties, whereby the Fortune of the Commonwealth was again to be raised up. And this counsel tried afterwards with others had good success; when they joyned in a new confederacy with the same French against *Maximilian*, who scorning their friendship, would not listen to their propositions. These were the counsels, these the actions of the *Venetians*, from whence, some would take occasion to detract from the praise and dignity of their Commonwealth, and particularly from the excellency of their Government.

But we may better know how injuriously this blemish is laid upon them, if we will examine how other Princes and States did behave themselves, when they were in like adversity; which I do not allege as taxing any one, but to shew the usual course of affairs, by the example of others. Observe what art the King of *Aragon* used to preserve his State, when *Charls the Eighth*, King of *France* came against them in hostile manner. *Alphonso* who possest the Kingdom, having tried the extremity of fear before the danger grew near, out of the meer report of the French Forces, departed from *Naples*, leaving all things at six and sevens, whilst their Army was yet in *Rome*; and *Alphonso* the Son, who had boasted that he would defend himself, and to that purpose had mustered a great many Soldiers, retired with them into the narrow pastes of the Kingdom, without making any triall either of his fortune or of his valor, and yeelding rather to the Fame, then to the Forces of the Enemy, suffered them to take free and quiet possession of that most noble Kingdom. But *Frederick of Aragon*, who was reinvested in his State, by the favor of the people, and by the assistance of other Princes, with which the *Venetians* did readily joyn, what use did he make of other mens labors, and of his own fortune? Soon after the Kingdom of *Naples* was assaulted, by *Lodowick King of France*, and by *Ferdinando King of Spain*, at which assault being much disconraged, he would not lsten to the advice of his Commanders, who advised him to keep the field, but made some slender provisions for the Towns, and soon after, thinking more how to escape, then how to defend himself, he fled into *Iscbia*, and went from thence into *France*, and put himself into the power of the same King his Enemy, contenting himself rather to live a private man in peace and safety, then to reign in trouble and danger.

But what shall we say of the *French*, who boast so much of their valor, and glory in War? How easily when they met with the first misfortune, did they suffer themselves to be bereft of all they had before so happily acquired in the Kingdom of *Naples*? And that so hastily, as it seemed that they had freely yeelded up the possession of so many, and so noble Cities to the victors, the *Spainards*, by agreement, and as it were in reward for the day which they had won. Nor is this the only example; since we have seen the same *French*, who were fallen with such fervency with thir Forces into *Italy*, and had with miraculous prosperity recovered the

State of *Milan* but a little before, resolve suddenly to forgo all that they had won, and to retreat to beyond the Mountains, after the rout which they had received from the *Swizzets* at *Novara*; the succour which they met withal by the way as they fled, not being able to make them halt. Who was more famous then for dexterity of wit for the managing of weighty affairs, then *Lodovico Sforza* Duke of *Astilane* yet when a great deluge of War came upon him, what use could he make of all his Artifices? Could he shew that constancy and generosity which he had many times before publickly boasted of? The onely news of the league made against him, by *Lodowick* King of *France*, and by the *Venetians*, did so astonish him, as losing all understanding, and leaving his Affairs unprovide for, he resolved at very first, upon what ought to have been his last and most desperate aduice, to fly into *Germany*, foregoing the defence of that State, which being once lost, he did afterwards in vain seek to recover.

But in this point I may help my self in looking a little more backward, and trying whether the gallantry of the antents, so much commended, did produce other effects then those that I have spoken of. The *Romans*, who conquered the whole world, met sometimes with adverse fortune, wherein let us see how they behaved themselves; for he is very timerous who is not bold and generous in prosperous affairs. In what peril and hazard did *Brennus* Prince, and Commander of the *Galls Senones* put the City of *Rome* after the defeat given to the *Roman* Army, under the unfortunate conduct of the *Fabii*? no man thought of making any defence, but sought how to save himself and the best things he had, in the *Capitol*; their houses, and walls were abandoned, and the very gates left open to the *Enemy* by the *Roman* Soldiers, who fled into the City to save themselves; and had not the good genius of that Commonwealth, which was preserved for greater things sent *Carcius Camillus* to succour it, the rising glory of the *Romans* had even then been extinct.

But what shall we say of things that happened afterwards, when their Fame grew greater? Did not the *Romans* lose possession of all *Italy*, after the rout given them by *Hannibal* at *Cannæ*? Did not the Cities belonging to their friends and confederates rebel every where? And did not they themselves give over all hopes of defending them? the resolutions taken by the Souldiers, shewed what the flight, what the fear of the conquered was. For some, whilſt they were yet in their own houses, rendred themselves prisoners to the Conquerors; others withdrew to the *Sea* side, intending if they could have the benefit of shipping, to go to some other Prince, and seek out a new Country? But with what despair the Citizens of *Rome* were posleſt, when they heard the news of this misfortune, in how great confusion all their Orders were, may be conceived by what *Livy* relates, who undertook not onely to write the History of the Commonwealth, but to celebrate with perpetual praise the fame and merit of her Citizens. And it was credibly believed (for as much as we hear) that those valiant men, unaccustomed to know what fear was, were stricken with such amazement, as if *Hannibal* had known as well how to make use of victory, as he did to overcome, the ſo great, and ſo long continued fortune of *Rome*, had not onely been hereby interrupted, but totally ſuppreſt. And these very ſelf ſame *Carthaginians*, who had ſo long, and ſo ſtoudy contended for glory, with their rival, the Commonwealth of *Rome*, when they tasted of adverse fortune, went astray from their former generosity, and ſuffered themselves to be born down by extremity of despair, for after the defeat which they had received by *Sea* by the *Romans*, they inclined to yeeld up unto them the Islands of *Sicily*, and *Sardinia*, and to make themselves tributary for ever to the Senate and people of *Rome*; and afterward being overcome in Battel by *Scipio Africanus*, they fell to final ruin. But why do I instance in ſo many examples? Are not

these sufficient to prove, that the valiantest and wisest men are strangely terrified at great and unexpected misfortunes; and that when Armies are lost, which are the instruments whereby States preserve themselves from the evils of War, good Counsels must cease, as not able to keep off other greater evils which do usually follow after that a Battel is lost.

Therefore out of the above-mentioned reasons, and by what hath been done by others upon like accidents, every one may be clearly satisfied, that the misfortune which the State of *Venice* underwent by reason of the ill-fought Battel of *Giaradada*, ought not to detract any thing from her other praises: For her subsequent actions, by which with singular constancie and generosity she recovered what she had lost, render her by the joint consent of all men truly glorious.

The Fourth DISCOURSE.

Whether the Princes of Italy did well, or no, to assault the Army of Charls the Eight, King of France; when after having gotten the Kingdom of Naples, he hasted to pass over the Mountains.

Amongst those things of sad remembrance to *Italy*, the passage of *Charls the Eight, King of France*, to the Conquest of the Kingdom of *Naples*, may be numbred amongst the saddest, and most recent: For ever since that time, the Transalpine Nations have had a power in *Italy*; and the greatness of the Italian name, which began at that time to be raised up again with hopes of greater glory, all the parts of *Italy* being under the command of our Italian Princes, return'd to such a declination by this blow, as it could never since recover its pristine majesty: But that which most afflicts the minds of those who are any ways generous, is to think, that this most noble Country fell into such misfortunes through the fault of her own men; and that the Italian Princes, to satisfie their own disordinate desires and immoderate ambition, did call in Forein Nations to the prejudice of *Italy*; and little valuing the truer and greater dangers, they stood basely looking on, and suffer'd this their common Country to be rent in peeces by Foreiners. The French Forces did at this time pass into *Italy*, by which she had not for a long time been molested, being called in by *Lodovick Sforza*, and maintained by other Italians: But ere long they were all aware of their ill-taken counsel, being touched by the danger more at hand, by reason of the French-mens great felicity; which as it might have been foreseen further off, so was it not now so easily to be remedied. They therefore joined all of them together afterwards in confederacie for the safety of *Italy*, and to oppose King *Charls* his designs: So as after the acquisition of *Naples*, as he would return into *France* by the same way which he had come in, with his Army, which was notwithstanding much less numerous in men, he was opposed by the Army of the confederate Princes, as he came to the banks of *Tarvis*, who meant to hinder his passage, and to fight his Army. For a little before, the Pope, the King of the *Romans*, the King of *Spain*, the Commonwealth of *Venice*, and the Duke of *Milan* had joined in confederacie to this purpose; the *Venetians* having been the first mo ioners thereof, and express Ambassadors from all the aforesaid Princes had met in *Venice*, where the League was concluded and published. This resolution

was at those times generally commended, as being generous, and suiting with the honor of *Italy*: But notwithstanding, there wanted not those then who desired they had been more moderate; nor will it be now from the purpose to examine this business, so to draw some secure document for times to come by a diligent examination of the things done, and to know whether they were really such as deserve praise and imitation, or whether there was any thing more to be desired therein: For they appear to be attended with that wisdom, without which no action, though perchance it may have good success, deserves either to be praised or imitated by wise men. The taking up of Arms to drive the *French* out of *Italy*, was doubtless a resolution as much to be commended in the Italian Princes, as some of them were blamed for calling of them in, and others for assisting them to the common shame and prejudice. But how these Arms were to be made use of against them, and whether it was well done to hinder them when they were marching away, and to stop their passage, and force both the *French* and themselves to come to a Battel, is somewhat a difficult case, and which may admit of divers considerations.

It is an antient and approved proverb, That a Bridg of Gold ought to be made for an Enemy that flies. And this is grounded upon solid reasons; for no Battel can be fought without much hazard and uncertainty of success, since there may happen many unthought of accidents, wherein the use of wisdom is excluded. Therefore where to join battel is to be thought a good advice, the condition of affairs must be such, as that a man be not necessitated thereunto, but makes it his choice, and comes to it with greater hopes of overcoming, then fear of being worsted; and likewise the advantage must be more that is to be expected from the Victory, than the prejudice which depends upon the loss thereof. By thus measuring the carriage of these affairs, by these rules, we may the better know what judgment to give thereof. If we consider the state of affairs before the Armies drew near, there appears no necessity of fighting at that time: For the King of *France* led his men back over the Mountains to their own homes, without prejudice or injury to any one; so as the meeting him to stop his passage, and give him battel, proceeded from election, and from the determinate counsel of the Princes that were Confederates against him: But what the end of the combat was like to be, and how the business was ballanced, might be guess'd at by many particulars, before a stroke was struck. The King of *France* led along with him an Army consisting of *French* and *Switzers*; the former excellent for the Horse-Militia, and the latter excellently well disciplin'd in Foot-service: So as the Italian Militia was confess'd by all men to be far inferior to both these; for they had wholly lost all their antient excellent institutions, and had wanted true discipline for many years, being by formerers bereft of their antient military glory. But the much different impressions wh ch were in the Soldiers themselves, was of great importance upon this occasion. The *French* were haughty, and puffed up by their success at *Naples*; they slighted the Enemy, their very name seeming to have infused so much terror into all the *Italians*, as that neither Princes nor People had dared to oppose them, but afforded them free and safe passage every where. On the contrary, the *Italians* accustomed only to such Wars as were made in *Italy*, wherein little valor was shewn, and less discipline, without almost any loss of blood, as if it were for meer shew and sport, were to fear the unusual encounter with the *French*, and to boot with their valor to apprehend their prosperity, which had made the way so easie to them to so great and so noble an acquisition. The Kings party was likewise favored by the Kings own presence, and the danger which his own person was in; which occasioned no small daring in the French Soldiery, some being thereunto stirr'd up by their natural love to their King, others by hopes of reward, and others for fear of punishment. But of all things else,

the diversity of the cause ought to be of greatest moment. For the *French* had no hopes of safety, save what lay in their Arms, being in an Enemies Country, the way in their return home very difficult, by reason of the craggy Mountains though they should meet with no impediment by the Enemy; the Army of the Colleagues suffered not under the like necessity, for being at its own home, it might be sure upon any adverse fortune to have safe receptacle in every City. Moreover, the *Italians* were incited to fight, onely out of a desire of honor, or of revenge, and this was much more in the Princes and Commanders, then in the common Soldier; which things being well considered, might by reason of what is the usual issue of such actions, cause rather doubt, then hope of victory, if they should come to a day of Battel; or at least might make it appear, that businesses were so equally balanced, and so doubtful, as where there was no inforging necessity, to pursue a business so full of danger, w^s not worth the while. We must now consider the advantage, as also the disadvantage which might happen upon the good or bad success of the battel; which though it be in all affairs doubtful and uncertain, yet out of the aforesaid respects it was now both those in extremity. We will say that the then chief moving cause was, to drive the *French* Army out of *Italy*, and to restore those of *Aragon* to the r Kingdom, out of which they were driven by *K. Charls*. The confederate Princes might in all liklihood have compast this their intention by other more safe, and more secure means. For what disturbance might they meet withal, in the enterprise which they were to endeavor against the *French* in the very Kingdom of *Naples*, from that Army which hasted to pass over the Mountains, and was to dissolve of it self? And say that those people should be routed and defeated, should therefore the Kingdom of *Naples* be disposed of according to the pleasure of the Italian Victors? No certainly, for the King had already left strong Garisons there of his best Soldiers to secure it. The victory could no: be so great, and favorable for the *Italians*, but that they must have lost some of their men; so as if they had a mind to attempt any thing upon the affairs of *Naples*, it had been better for them to have gone with all their Forces upon that enterprise, then to give battel to those, who did not any waies oppose their design, since when they should have overcome them, they were to go with that Army, lessened by the Battel, and wearied with marching, to the main busyness of taking the Kingdom of *Naples*, where the things offered at by *Ferdinand* would have had easier success if he had entered the Kingdom with greater Forces, and as he was willingly received by the City of *Naples*, whither he might come at first with those few men he had, so would the rest of the Cities, willingly have revolted from the *French*, and have put themselves under the obedience of *Ferdinand*, if they had seen he had Forces sufficient to defend himself, and to make good their rebellion. But say that the Colleagues would have secured themselves yet better from the *French*, to the end, that their intentions upon the Kingdom of *Naples* might not be hindred or diverted; had it not been better for them to go with the Army of the league to find out Monsieur *d'Orleans*, who at the same time had possesst himself of the City of *Novara*; to drive him out of *Italy*, together with those of his party who had settled themselves there, then to follow those, who did of themselves that which w^s most desired by the league, to wit, hasten back over the mountains? Nay, it may be further said, that unless the *French* should be necessitated, as seeing their King in danger; as also that Army which was pursued by the *Italians*; they would not peradventure have sent at that time more men into *Italy*, and Monsieur *d'Orleans* would not have had any occasion to have possesst himself of *Novara*, which did afterwards redound to the great prejudice of the Colleagues, and particularly to the busyness of *Naples*: For part of those Forces which were promised and intended to assist *Ferdinand* in the recovery of the Kingdom, marched to the recovery of *Novara*, out of desire whereof,

Lodewick *Sforza* did at last draw himself out of the league. Whence it appears, that it was rather revenge, or vain-glory, then any just reason which the Princes proposed unto themselves in this their confederacy, that moved them to resolve upon fighting the French Army.

But let us now consider more particularly, what of advantage, what of good the Colleagues might have got, if they had had the better of that Battel. The best which they could hope for, for all these their pains and dangers, could be nothing else but the routing of those Forces, which were not likely to make War any more in *Italy*; and the *Italians* had then no reason to think of any Transalpine Affairs. It may be the person of the King, who was then in the Army, might peradventure be considerable, if he had fallen into the power of the Colleagues; But both his life in that hurly burly was exposed to great danger, and say he had been taken prisoner, he might have found many waies how to escape. And say althings had fallen out according to the wish of the Colleagues, what would the *Italians* have gotten by having so great a Prisoner, but the drawing upon themselves an inundation of Foreiners, which would still have put them into greater troubles and dangers? That warlike Nation, which was at this time more then at any other, devoted to their King, would not have sat down by such an indignity, such an injury without revenging it with their own Forces, and by drawing other Transalpine Nations who wished not well to the glory of *Italy*, especially in Military Affairs to joyn with them.

Let us see an example of this in what followed the next Age after; where we shall find that the imprisonment of King *Francis*, though taken by so great a Prince as was *Charls the Fifth*, to whom none of the Princes of the League, no not the whole League it self was to be compared, produced nothing, but longer, and more heavy Wars, which ended not till the conquerors had yeelded many things to the conquered. But on the contrary, let us imagine into what ruine *Italy* would have fallen, if the Army of the League had been routed and defeated, the Enemy being in the State of *Milan* wherein are so many and so noble Cities, for defence whereof there were no other Forces on foot, then those which were to hazard themselves in that Battel; and to raise another Army which might be able to make head against so powerful enemies, and so victorious, would be a busines of some time, and very hard to do if not impossible. And if the very name of the *French*, and the fame of their Forces had made the way to so great a victory easie to them, and so easie the conquest of so noble a Kingdom, what mischief had they not reason to expect, if by the discomfeiture of that Army, the Forces, not onely as formerly, of the Kings of *Aragon*, should have been beaten of whole *Italy*, and also such forein Forces as could be ready to afford any succor, for in that Army were all the Soldiers, that the King of *Spain* had in *Italy*? So as there was not any State which upon such an accident could promise it self security. Affairs then standing upon this foot, who can praise the advice taken by the confederates, of fighting the *French*? But on the other side there want not other reasons to plead for the honor, wisdom, and maturity of the *Italians* in this action, to boot with that noble daring which can by no means be denied them, it is very likely that the flourishing condition, and prosperity of *Charls King of France* began at that time to make him hated and suspected not onely by all the Italian Princes, but also not very acceptable to the King of *Spain*; insomuch as he who had called him into *Italy* did already repent his rash advice, and he who did not withstand him, blamed himself for his slackness, and irresolution: so as they agreed all together to abate the so great power of that King, and to curb his prosperity, and his thoughts of further achievements. If then the King had been suffered to return without any let, safe and triumphant into his Kingdom, was it not to be feared, that the *French* not content with

with their having got the Kingdom of *Naples*, would pass over the Mountains the next year again with greater Forces? to what danger would the Dukedom of *Milan* and *Tuscany* have been exposed? upon which States it was known that the *French* had set their minds, neither would they have spared the rest, if they had had any opportunity offered them of advancing further.

And if the *Italians* should have seemed but to doubt their beating those Soldiers, who were but the remainder of an Army which had first past the Mountains, and had left a good part of their Forces in several Garrisons in the Kingdom of *Naples*, many whereof were likewise dissipated through several accidents; what hopes had they to withstand their entire, and much greater Forces, with which they were to return the next year on this side the Mountains to new enterprises? Nor had they any reason to despair of victory, since the Colleagues had an Army for number of men much greater than the Enemy, commanded by experienced and valiant Officers, well provided both of *Cuirassiers* and *Light-horse*, well disposed to all actions, and which were to fight with people opprest with fear, and who may be said to have almost run away already of themselves; especially the advantage considered which the assailants for the most part have. It was further considered, that the French Army had done nothing whereby to be dreaded, or to cool the courage of other men; since the *French* had not only not met with any occasion of fighting, but had not so much as seen the face of an Enemy; since the Enemy was the rather to apprehend this encounter, for that it was unexpected, they being accustomed to find all passages open, not needing to make their way by the sword. Nor was the advantage small which they might promise unto themselves, by beating a victorious Army, and a warlike Nation, the person of so great a King being also in that Army; wherefore in such a case, the French-mens courage was rather to fail, than to avail them. And it was to be beleaved that the Enemies to that Crown wou'd the sooner appear against them, as the Emperor *Maximilian*, *Henry* King of *England*, and that *Ferdinand* King of *Spain* would continue the more fit to the *Italian* confederacie. Then what courage, or what hope of succour wou'd those French-men have, who were left behind for the defence of the Kingdom of *Naples*? and the City of *Novara*, which though it were back'd with the Kings men, who to this purpose kept his Army a long time together after the Battel, was reduced to so great straits by the Colleagues, as the King was compelled to yeed it up upon Articles to *Sforza*; would it not soon have been taken by the sole reputation of the victory? Neither would this have been an occasion of dissention (as afterwards it was) amongst the Colleagues, and which bereft them of the chiefeſt advantage which that confederacie could hope for.

These are the Considerations which we may conceive did move those Princes to resolve upon following the French Army, and to join battel with it. But that which amongst such diversity of reasons seems more answerable to reason, is, that the Battel was not occasioned out of an absolute resolution and resolute advice, but happened part y out of necessity, both Armies being already drawn very near, and partly upon a resolution taken by the Commanders upon the very place. But the Princes of the Leagues trueſt intention was to necessitate the King of *France*, when he should ſee ſo great a preparation for War to be made against him, to hasten his departure the more, and to enforce him to draw ſo many more of his men from the Kingdom of *Naples*, that ſo he might make his paſſage the ſurer. And that the Kingdom not having ſufficient Garrisons to defend it, might the more easily fall into the power of the *Aragoneses*, for whom the ſame Colleagues were preparing a Fleet by ſea to assault it. Nor was it judged by the example of things formerly past, that the States of *Italy* were free from the insolencies of the *French*, unleſs the Princes of *Italy* ſhould either put themselves into a poſture of War, or if they ſhould

should keep their Forces far distant from the way whereby the King was to return for *France*; since in his former passage to the enterprise of *Naples*, though he was more necessitated to make hast, and had greater need of making himself Friends more by favor than by force, he had notwithstanding used strange novelties in *Tuscany*, which the *Florentines* did much resent. And who could have ascertained that he would not do the like in his return, in all other parts, where meeting wth no obstacle, he might meet with opportunity of pleasing himself, or procuring any thing of advantage?

The Colleagues seeking to provide for these mischiefs, & rather to shun new inconveniencies, than endeavor to repair their past losses, they thought it the best course that their Army should follow that of the Kings, so to keep him in perpetual jealousy and suspicion, and hinder him if he should make any attempt; hoping likewise, as they had like to have done, that this was the way to make the King come to some good agreement with them, which had been often endeavored, and not without hopes of good success; even when the Camps were very near together. But the Colleagues, incited either by the Armies being so near together, by the desire of glory, or hope of victory; or perchance being incourag'd so to do, as it usually falls out when the Enemies Army is reduced to straight passages, they fought the *French*; the Commanders of the League's Army, were then to have considered, that they had more reason to hope for victorie, than to fear loss in that daies fight, as the effect did in part prove, it being the common opinion, that had not their own men been put into great disorder, by their own light-horse, who fell too soon to pillage the Enemies Camp, they would have had a full and glorious victory. But though the business should have succeeded otherwise, they knew the state of affairs to be such, as the victory on the Kings behalf could not occasion them those great mischiefs, which upon such an occasion have been considered; the Kings Forces not being so great when most entire, much less being much weakened by the conflict, as could prove very formidable. Such like events may teach us not to attempt such things in which it is hard to resolve, and wherein the profit which may accrue is very doubtful; nor to bring our selves to such a condition, as the necessity of putting on another resolve, bereaves us of choice. Nor will it be a less useful precept for Princes, to have a great care, and to be very well advised in chusing their Commanders, which are to have the chief imployment in great enterprises; for if their nature and customs be not conformable to the thoughts and intentions of the Prince, it is in vain to give them any Instructions or Commissions; for oft-times a resolution is to be put on upon the main concern, wherein a mans natural inclinations may prevail over whatsoever strict command which the Commonwealth of *Venice* had experience of particularly in this daies fight, in the Marquis of *Mantua*, and some years after with much more danger and damage in *Bartholomio d' Alviano*, at the Battel of *Giaradada*; in both which personages, natural ardor and too vehement a desire of glory, prevailed over the Senates wise and moderate counsels.

The Fifth DISCOURSE.

Whether or no the Forces of Leagues be fit for great Enterprises.

AMongst those things which fall into discourse when people talk of weighty State Affairs, and of War enterprises, one, and a chief one, is that of Leagues, and Confederacies, in which divers Potentates do joyn, either out of some particular design of their own, or for their better securitie, or to abate the power of others. And the weaknes of Potentates who are wanting in the antient military worth and discipline, hath been the occasion why we read of more examples of such unions, in these latter times, then we have heard of formerly. So as now adayes, as also in some later times past, when any great enterprise is debated upon, recourse is forthwith had to Leagues, by means and vertue whereof, it is usually thought, that greater ends may be compassed, then can be hoped for from the peculiar power and vertue of any one onely State; and chieflie to curb and keep under those Forces which do threaten whole Christendom with most danger and damage. Those who speak in the behalf of these Leagues, and who heighten the hopes thereof, use these or the like reasons.

First, because reason, & natures self doth teach us, that the multiplication of the force and vertue of the movers, makes the motion the greater, and more powerful; and that power and perfection which in humane affairs is denied to one alone, is easily found amongst many. There is hardly any one so weak, or so little befriended by the gifts of nature or fortune, who may not be some help to another, by adding that little which he hath to the much more of the others. This is the cause why in humane actions, and especially in such as are of the nobler sort, the perfectest are those which are most compounded: The best harmonie is composed of differing Tones of Voyces. The perfectest State Governments (alwaies provided that they be essential and not meer Idea's) are those which being composed of the Three best, do comprehend the perfections of all the Three; and it is easie to observe the like in many other things. And Aristotle, when he would shew the perfectiōn which proceeds in every thing from this concourse and union of many, doth instance in the example well known in those times of publick banquets and entertainments, where those wherein many were employed, some in one thing, some in another, proved more noble and sumptuous, then those which were made by any one onely, though never so wealthy Citizen. Let us then gather by this, that such Forces likewise, wherein several Potentates do concur, for some noble and important action, where every one lends his assistance and advice, will be fitter to achieve any great enterprise, then those of one onely, though never so great a Prince.

In War there are several Offices, and several imployments, whereunto we see that one Nation is not so proper (be it either by reason of the several influences of the Heavens, or through custom which is a second nature) as is another: So in this mistery of War, several people prove proper for several imployments. In pitcht Battels, the *Dutch* and *Switzers* have exceeded others, and have purchast most fame; The *Italians* have been alwaies esteemed for making assaults, and storming of Cities; and the *Spaniards* are held better then others at defending a strong hold, by reason of their undergoing labor and disquiet, and for their dexteritie in military actions.

actions. Others are better at Horse-service then on foot, as the *French*, others are good at Seafaring, and at Maritime Discipline, as the *Genoese*, *Portuguese*, and *Venetians*; and others have been particularly addicted to other exercises. So as those who are able to employ several people, and several Forces, as Leagues may do, (especially if they be made between puissant Princes) may have great designs; for they shall have wherewith to offend, and defend, both by Land and Sea, and numbers enough of Soldiers, fit to undertake and accomplish whatsoever Enterprise. But besides this, many things are requisite for the maintaining a long War; Arms, Ammunition, Victuals, Money, and other things, the which no one State can sufficiently furnish, at least not without much incommodeity, for any long time: but where many joyn together, and every one furnisheth somewhat which they most abound in, the enterprise is sure not to be impeded, nor retarded, for want of any thing, nor for the difficulties which are occasioned thereby. Moreover, for great enterprises, as they cannot be so soon effected, so are they subject to the hazard of ill success, when they depend upon one onely Commander, who when he is lost, there is never another of equal authority, valor and experience left to succeed him; for there are but few of those that are fit for much pains-taking, and for management of great affairs. Insomuch as that State is very happy, which in more then one Age meets with a generous and warlike Prince; and that Prince is very fortunate who when he will not follow the Wars in his own person, hath a Subject of his so qualified, as becomes him to be who is to command an Army, when the War is difficult, and of importance; which is the cause why we often times see great enterprises which are well begun, precipitate into great disorders and ruines.

The death of *Alexander the Great*, without any legitimate Heirs fit to undertake the Government of such an Empire, and of so weighty affairs, kept the *Macedonians* and *Grecians* (of which two Nations his valiant and unconquered Army did consist) from following his prosperous course, and from conquering the West, as he had done the East, and which whilst he was alive, he had proposed to himself to do. The *Carthaginians* chiefest ruine arose from the want of Commanders; for having placed their hopes in one onely *Hannibal*, they were forced to send for him back out of *Italy*, to defend themselves in *Africa* against *Scipio*; and his fortune forgoing him, when he was beaten they knew not whom to betake themselves unto, to uphold their tottering Commonwealth. But in Leagues there is no such hazard run; since the best Commanders that are in any of the Confederate Princes States may be imploied, and the Princes themselves may serve upon an urgent occasion; so as one Commander being lost, another may be found to succeed him, of as great excellency and worth. For every State hath usually in all Ages had some one man more eminent then the rest, unto whom in greatest extremities they have recourse. So as a League, if we suppose it to be like a well Fabrickt humane body, may, since it hath the strength of many Dominions united in it, be resembled to *Briareus* for strength; for as he had a hundred hands, to make use of as he pleased in several actions, so many do lend help to such a League, and make it stronger and fitter for any undertaking. Moreover when we have to do with a very powerful Prince, as it falls out in great Enterprises, if we will weaken his strength, we may endeavor chiefly to keep his forces divided, and imploied in several parts, for so they are lessened, and become less apt to make resistance; but as this will be hard for a single Prince to do, though a great one, for he who will drive another man from his own home must be much stronger then he; so is it more easily done when many are confederates together, and this not onely because several Forces joyned together, prove the greater (as hath been said) and several Armies abounding with all things necessary may be therewithout framed, but for

the commo' iousness which several confederate States have, of assaulting the Enem-
ies Country, at one and the same time, in several parts. Wherefore when any
great and difficult enterprise was to be undertaken (not to speak of antient times)
but of more modren ones, against the *Saracens*, and the *Turks*, two Nations, which
have governed and dominetered in these latrer times with great fame and force,
recourse was had to Leagues, to *Crusadas*, and to the unions of Christian Princes,
by means whereof notable things have been done against those cruel Baiba-
rians.

How many Princes, how many several Nations join'd together in the time of
Pop: *Urban* the Second, for the recovery of the Holy Land? About Fifty thou-
sand fighting men were raised, commanded in chief by *Godfrey of Bullen*, who
gained so many and so famous Victories, and so worthy of eternal glory; this holy
League having regained more then a hundred Cities in *Asia*, which were possest by
the *Saracens*. And in the t me of *Balawin* the Third, King of *Jerusalem*, wh:n
the Emperor *Conradus* and *Lodovick* King of *France*, joining together with other
lesser Princes, went themselves in person against the said *Saracens*, did not they do
excell:nt exploits, though couzened and be rayed by some Lords of *Asia*, they
could not continue on their enterprise with like success as at the first. And hath
not this last Age seen one of the most signal and illustrious Naval victories that was
ever heard of? which was the fight at *Lepanto*, which was won from the *Turks*
by the League of the Christian Princes. But let us add somewhat more in pursuit
of our former considerations. Great:nt enterprises, though happily begun, are oft-
times left imperfect, when they depend upon the Forces of one only Prince; for the
rest of his neighboring Princes, either out of envy, or fear of his greater prosperity,
take up Arms against him to make him give over the hopes of further acquisitions,
and bethink himself of defending his home-affairs; and to keep the scales more
equal between him and his neighbors, and to take away the jealousies of State,
which are of all other things most dangerous, and whereof we have infinite
examples. But when a weighty War is to be undertaken by the Forces of many
Joint-Potentates, this suspition ceascs; for Leagues are usually made with other
Princes and neighboring States, or with such as are concern'd in common interest.
And this Amity or Con' federacie doth not only secure those States with whom the
Confederacie is contracted, so as the one fears not the other; but it preserves each
of them from the injuries that any may go about to do to any of the Confederates.
For one State supporting another by reason of their convention, things are so well
and stoutly govern'd, as People not being able to worst them, keep from molesting
th.m, knowing that by offending any one Confederate, they shall draw upon them
the Forces of all the rest, and hasten their own ruine. Every one of these Princes
may then by reason of their strait conjunction and confederacie with others, more
boldly and more resolutely undertake and accomplish any whatsoever enterprise,
without danger of being civ:rted by sny particular interest of his own. And all these
Considerations are better confirm'd by many notable examples. *Greece* was as-
saulted by *Xerxes*, that powerful Prince of *Persia*, with an infinite number of men
both by Sea and Land; almost all the several People of that Province, united and
confederat'd together against this so great a warlike power: And such was the
efficacie of this un on, as that though one only *Greece* was to withstand the Forces
of almost all the Eastern Nations who were flock'd together to that enterprise, but
still under the Imperial command and conduct of one and the same King *Xerxes*,
they did not only make their part good, but repulsed so puissant an Enemy, much to
his own prejudice.

The associate War which happened in the time of *Marius* and *Sylla*, wherein
many Associates and Confederates of the *Romans* did conspire together against the
Common-

Commonwealth of *Rome*, though the Confederates were all of them but weak people, as the *Maruceni*, *Vestini*, *Sannites*, *Lucans*, and other of their neighbors, yet was this War held one of the most dangerous that the people of *Rome* did ever sustain: For these people had join'd themselves together with much fervor, to revenge themselves of the Roman Nobility, who had first promised them, and then denied them the liberty of being Citizens of *Rome*. And in these later Ages, whole *Germany* having confederated together against the Emperor *Charls* the Fifth, was able to raise so numerous an Army, though all the German Princes did not concur therein, as did much perplex and endanger *Charls*. Which examples prove what many Forces, though weaker being taken apart, can do when join'd together, against one potent Prince. These then may seem sufficient reasons and examples to ground a favorable conclusion in the behalf of Leagues, and to make them be held a strong and powerful means to order great enterprises by, and to bring them to a good end.

Yet there be many good Considerations which may be alleadged on the contrary part; so as he who shall mind realities, and not what the magnificencie of name or preparations do promise, will doubt much whether these Leagues and Confederacies do really prove what they appear to be. It is most certain, that as the truest perfection consists in union, and that whatsoever will partake of that, must be reduced to this; so may all our humane actions prove the more successful and perfect, the more reducible they are to this unity; and if it happen to some sometimes otherwise, it is because those some are not capable thereof either of themselves, or because their corrupted customs will not suffer them so to be: But it is not to be denied, but that in all humane actions, chiefly such wherein great affairs are concern'd, and more chiefly in matters of War, after mature advice taken, sudden execution is requisite; and that it is necessary to reduce all things as much as may be to this unity: So as the sovereign authority consist in one only, and not in many; for the multiplicity of those that concur (especially by way of party) in the same action, doth not help, but rather disorder and confound. Then look how much harder it is to reduce things to an unity in a League, the less gallant do they prove, and less fit for prosecution of great affairs: For they contain, and almost naturally, such contrarieties, as must occasion the sudden corruption thereof. Several are the thoughts of several men, the customs of Nations different, and (which in this case is of most importance) the counsels and resolutions by which confederate Princes govern themselves, do not only differ, but are for the most part contrary, according as State-jealousies are apt to breed occasion of falling out. The powerful desire after Rule never suffers right to be known, nor people to be therewith contented: It is therefore to be observed, that in all Ages the greatest and most signal actions in War have been done and accomplish'd by the worth and prosperity of one only Prince, or at least of one sole Potentate, with a series of divers Princes and Captains who have commanded therein. *Alexander* the Great, the Commonwealth of *Rome*, *Charls* the Great, and in these latter times the Ottoman Empire, not to mention many others who have been great and potent, though not altogether so highly cry'd up, did all of them arise to that height of glory and power by the power and worth of one only Command, with the true and proper military discipline of each of them, and under the conduct of one and the same Principality. On the contrary, Leagues shew their weakness at the very first sight: For company and multipl city denotes always imperfection, and in this particular makes it be known, that those things wh ch a Prince or a Commonwealth cannot by reason of their weakness do of themselves, and by their own Forces, they seek to effect it by the company and help of others. Wherefore (as it hath been said) in this respect Leagues have been more frequently used in these latter Ages, then of old: or many

many Princes and States are failing in military worth and courage, and not able of themselves to do any notable action; so as one Nation, or one Prince not being able to overcome another and all of them wanting the excellencie of good Orders, he who hath at any time endeavored to advance himself by some design, hath been forced to have recourse to the advantage of Leagues; of which *Italy*, since by reason of the declination of the Western Empire, she hath been divided into so many members, and Seignories, hath in particular afforded many examples, which may serve to teach whatsoever belongs to these Leagues: whereof we do not read of any great good effect which hath ensued at last, or at least which have continued long in their first prosperity; for their Forces, though powerful enough of themselves, when met withal by contrary respects, and wearied in their first attempts, have soon gone but lamely off. And he who shall well consider such particulars as are most necessary in great undertakings, will easily see how badly they do correspond in Leagues. Deliberations would be wise and mature, but not slow and unseasonable; execution would be speedy and bold; counsels are oftentimes to be taken upon unexpeſed accidents; the end of all ought to be one and the same, though the Offices, Degrees, and Authorities be different; the respect and aim one and the same, whereunto all resolutions do tend; to wit, the safety, glory and the greatness of that Prince or State, for whom the War is made; the reward and honor one and the same, and alike the loss and shame, so as the possibility of having means to lay the fault on another, do not retard the doing of what is fitting.

These are things which have alwaies been hard, and rare to be found; yet they may the more easily be met withal in an enterprise which is undertaken by one only wise Prince; or by one well governed Commonwealth; But in Leagues all things run counter byas to these important affairs. It is not alwaies generofitie, but fear which makes a Prince take up Arms, which likewise makes others joyn with him; who other wise do much differ from him in desires, and interest: but that brant being over, and every one being in their former particular, and more natural condition; he who dreads War beedes to idleness, and willingly takes all occasions to change War for Peace; and he who was become a friend by reason of some contingencie, not out of any good will, discovering his real affection upon some other occasion, or by reason of some change, returns to be not only as formerly, an Enemy, but more inveterate then before; so as these Ties of Common interests being soon loosened either by particular interest, or by some other affection, hatred, confusion, and disorder doth thereupon ensue.

The Moralists say, That friendship cannot long continue between those where one and the same thing is not interchangeably given and received; and that therefore true friendship is only found, where the end is not that which is advantageous or delightful (because equal correspondencie is not usually there) but what is honest, which alwaies is, and does still continue the same on all behalfs. In the Friendship or Leagues of Princes, every one hath his own conveniencie, and particular benefit for his aimed at end, and then the like of others only so far, as by accident it may square with his. But it commonly falls out, that what makes for one, makes agaſt another; so as the same things cannot please all: wherefore a thousand accidents do easily cause diversity of opinions, contentions and breaches, so as hardly any League hath been able to preserve it ſelf any long time. It is also usually ſeen that no man minds what is recommended to the care of many; and therefore in Leagues, which are fastned together but with weak Ties, whilst one doth either trust upon anothers provisions, or is ill ſatisfied with others omissions, men neg'eſt their own duties, and ſtudy more to pick a hole in anothers coat, then to mind his own business. The ignominy which may infue upon ſuch defaults, and the

the loss of reputation, which use to be great incitements to a noble mind, are not so much valued in things which are undertaken and negotiated by many together, because the way lies fair to excuse ones self, by laying the fault upon another, or at least the fault is lessened by others being sharers therein.

Thus that common benefit, which is so magnified and cried up, and which ought to be their onely object, is found onely in a certain fancied Idea, and in a *potentia remota*, or in a vain and useless appearance, whilst none endeavor to reduce it to its true, essential, and perfect being, by laying aside their own proper and peculiar advantage, and by directing his actions to the common good of his Colleagues. So as he who shall duly consider what the first intention is of making a League, and with what degrees it is proceeded in afterwards, and to what ends it is directed, will by many evident examples find it quickly so transformed, as though it meet not with any external forces, it easily dissolves and moulders away of it self. Leagues made by Christians against the Turks have oft-times in particular met with these impediments and difficulties; the League between Pope *Alexander* the Sixt, and the three most powerful Kingdoms of *Europe*, the Kingdoms of *Spain*, *Fance*, and *Portugal*, and the Commonwealth of *Venice*, was stipulated with great hopes and noble intentions; the *Venetian* and *French* Fleet came into the *Archipelago*, where they had some prosperous success; but the forces of the other Colleagues were in vain expected the first year, and it ended the second year before it had fully effected any thing, by reason of the discords which arose between the Crowns of *France* and *Spain*, which were occasioned by the division of *Naples*, so as these Princes turned their Arms each upon other, which were intended against the Infidels. The league made between Pope *Paul* the Thrid, the Emperor *Charls* the Fift, and the Commonwealth of *Venice*, against *Sultan Soliman*, likewise ended almost as soon as it was begun; and it is too well known, as being of reuent memory, what occasions of victories were thereby lost, and out of what respects. But what greater thing could be expected from any League, then from that which God blest with the famous victory at the *Curzolari* Islands? Yet how slight a matter was able to retard the glorious achievemeuts which were with reason to be expected from thence, when a slight suspition of the *Spainards*, that the States of *Flanders* might be molested by the *French*, by reason of the going of the Duke of *Alanson*, the Kings Brother towards those parts, was sufficient to keep back the Fleet which was destined for so great affair in the *Levant*, and to make the best season of the year pass over without any advantage; whereupon all other things fell into great disorders, and the League was quickly terminated. Neither can this natural motion of Leagues be so stopt by any means or endeavors, as that all the Colleagues may have the same intentions in preserving it.

What greater reason can one Prince have to promise unto himself the continuance of friendship and fidelity from another, then had the Commonwealth of *Venice* to expect, first, from *Lewis* the Twelfth, and then from *Francis* the First, both of them Kings of *France*? Since to keep from any waies violating the friendship and conjunction, which she held with the former, she drew upon her the Forces of *Maximilian* the Emperor, and exposed her State to so much labor, and danger; and did so long maintain a great part of the expence of a weighty War, first, to free the Seconds own person from Prison, and then his Sons; yet (as usually affection prevails more in the minds of Princes, then common reason, or justice by which private persons govern themselves) *Lewis*, breaking off his antient Capitulation, which he held with the Commonwealth, was a great means to make all the Princes of *Europe* conspire against her; and *Francis*, as soon as he had made what advantage he could by the agreement, laying aside all other respects, made peace for himself alone with the Emperor, leaving the Commonwealth

wealth exposed to great toil and danger of War. So as when any stedfastness is found in any Colleague, all that is to be said, is, That as he that doth observe it deserves to be praised for his fidelite, so he that doth rely too much thereupon, is not to be much commended for civil wisdom. But it may be moreover considered, that many times the Colleagues begin to square but badly in the very beginning of their agreement, which tends much to the prejudice of the common interest. Whilst the last League against *Selinus* the Turkish Emperor was in treaty, and when it was so high time to relieve *Cyprus*, it was long and importunately argued in *Rome*, where they were first to employ the Forces of the League; and some of the Spanish Ministers were so blinded with their particular interest, as they pro-pounded and stiffly maintain'd it to the very great prejudice and loss of time, that as soon as the League should be fully agreed upon, the Forces thereof should march to the Sea-coasts of *Africa*, to take in such places as they thought might make most for the advantage of *Spain*; not weighing that whil'st they should leave their Enemies powerful, with the Fleet safe and entire in the *Levant*, it was very vainly done to think of getting such things, which though they should succeed well, must be to no purpose, and must quickly prove unfortunate, as experience shewed afterwards, and which reason could not perswade before.

But if these peculiar respects be at first concealed, they break forth in the process of time, and work sometime worser effects in such of the Colleagues as are either weakest, or do confide most in the Confederacie. *Ferdinand* King of *Spain*, though falling off from the other Colleagues, he joined with great offers and protestations with the Commonwealth of *Venice*; yet when the City of *Brescia* was recovered, he would keep it for himself, and appropriate the first fruit of victory to himself, which by the former, and by renewed capitulations was destin'd to others. *Pope Clement* the Seventh, the Commonwealth of *Venice*, and the Duke of *Milan* join'd together in League against *Cesar*; but their ends were, if not apparently contrary, at least intrinsically differen'. The King of *France* desir'd by all means to free the Crown of *France* from some prejudice which he had done it by the former agreement with *Cesar*, and to set his Sons at liberty, who were left with him in nature of Hostages: But on the contrary, the other Confederates chief endeavour was, to take the Dukedom of *Milan* from *Cesar*, and to secure *Italy* from his power. The enterprise was begun with prosperous success, the Italian Princes doing readily what became them; but the King of *France*, when he knew how to obtain his ends by another way, and began to suspect the Colleagues constancie, did neither make War on the other side the Mountains, nor did he send his Forces into *Italy*, as he was bound to do: Whereupon the League which was made with great preparation, with good beginning, and better hopes, ended in an agreement, which was voluntary and advantagious on the Kings behalf by the recovery of his Childr. n, but inforced, and not over-secure on the behalf of the other Colleagues, who fell short of their conceived hopes, being abandoned by their Friend and Confederate, the King.

To know then the truth amidst this diversity of reasons and examples, we must distinguish and consider apart for what occasions, and with what respects every League is made, what the end therin proposed is, and upon what terms and conditions it is concluded; for by these particulars we may the better know what good or bad may be expected by joyning together in League, and whether the League be likely to be of short, or of long duration. Sometimes Leagues are made by Princes or Popularities out of necessary defence, and to provide opportunity for their own safeties; the Confederates obliging themselves by particular and stated obligations to defend each others State, when they shall be assaulted by any others from without: And such Leagues as these have proved profitable, as having respect to the preservation of Peace, and to a certain and honest end; and whil'st nothing

thing but the common interest is treated of, so as they have all the same object, as well in maintaining, as in making the Confederacie. The Confederacie made between the Pope, the King of *Naples*, the Commonwealth of *Florence*, the Duke of *Milan*, and other lesser Italian Princes, did long preserue the Peace of *Italy*, and was for a while very advantagious for the Colleagues; for the only drift thereof was to constitute some assured bounds to every of their powers, and to settle them in a just temperature, making the Confederates thereby the stronger and more able to withstand any one that should attempt any thing against them. Sometimes again Leagues are made for more necessary self-defence, and which must suddenly be actuated; to wit, when a State is assaulted by one more powerful, and that the neighboring Princes, lest themselves might suffer if they should permit a neighboring power to grow too great by the ruine of that State, do take up Arms jointly for the defence thereof, in whose defence they know their own safeties are concerned, since they might soon incur the like danger, if they should not keep him at a further distance from the others home. And such a League may also at first do gallant and memorable things, if it so fall out that the condition of affairs being altered in the same League, and the Colleagues interests becoming different, they will advance further with those Forces, and with more full intentions to ruine that Foe-Potentate, and take occasion by joining in League to increase in State and power. When these respects, and their contraries already handled are considered, these Leagues do usually lose all their efficacie, since they fail in their chiefest and surest ground-work, when the truest conjunction fails, which is that of Princes minds, thoughts and designs, whence conformable actions, and such as are of great efficacie and worth do arise.

Almost all the People of *Greece* join'd together to defend themselves against *Xerxes* his Forces, a mighty King of *Persia*, who came to assault them with an innumerable Army; and they got that famous Victory by Sea at *Salamis*, which furnish'd them at the same time with prosperous successes at Land, where they put the same King to flight: And *Greece* was preserved at that time by vertue of that League from so great a danger, against which it appeared almost impossible that she could defend herself. So likewise in these latter t.i.nes, the Pope, and *Philip* King of *Spain* join'd with the Commonwealth of *Venice* in defence of the Kingdom of *Cyprus*, (to whom that Kingdom, as part of her Territories, did chiefly belong) when it was assaulted by powerful Turkish Forces; and having put together a powerful and numerous Navy, they bore away that famous and singular Victory, which will be celebrated in all Ages; the Turkish Forces were routed and shattered at Sea, and their honor and courage lessened: But when all this was done, what other thing did the victorious *Grecians*, answerable to the hop.s which were expected from that their so great Victory, the whole fruit whereof at their return home ended in the dividing of the booty? So also the Christian League by Sea, did not only spend the rest of that Autumn, a fit time for any enterprise which they could have undertaken, after the honor they had won in the aforesaid Victory, in dividing the prey, and in other matters of small moment, but also spent all the next ensuing Spring and Summer idly, without being able so much as to keep together, so to keep the Enemy from recruiting, to the great, notable, and woful example of what we are now in treaty of, and to shew that the Forces of Leagues are weak, though made between potent Princes. The purchase which is got, or which is hoped for, cannot be so equally divided and agreed upon, but that some of the Confederate Princes will happen to have a greater share then the rest; and every increase, b:it ne'er so little, doth easily cause jealousie, or at least envy in the rest. Almost all the Potentates of *Europe* convened together in the famous League of *Cambray* against the Commonwealth of *Venice*, allured by the hopes of being able to divide her

noble, rich, and flourishing State, which was so much a more prevailing object in the minds of the confederate Princes to make them endeavor by their joyn Forces to suppress the Commonwealth, and bereave her of all her riches. But as soon as the Colleagues first design began to discover themselves, and begot jealousies and suspicion amongst them, insomuch, as the very same Princes who had conspired together to ruine the Commonwealth, did soon assist and succor her, being become bitterer Enemies one to another, and amongst themselves (each others greatness becoming formidable and hateful to their companions) then they had been before out of the same reason to the *Venetians*, against whom they had joynly taken up Arms.

It was not hard, though not very reasonable, for *Lodowick* King of *France*, and *Ferdinand* King of *Spain*, being blinded with the same desire of enlarging their Territories, to joyn together in driving the *Aragonians* from out the Kingdom of *Naples*, but afterwards they did as easily disagree, touching the dividing of what they had got; So as the League might help to bereave others of that Kingdom, but other Forces were requisite for the appropriation of it to ones self, and thereunto the proper and peculiar vertue of the Militia, and of good counsel was likewise required. Leagues use likewise to prove advantageous when many Potentates take up Arms against one new Prince, who is yet but weak, and not well settled in his State; as was seen by the example of the League made by the Princes of *Italy*, against the *Scalligers*, and certain other petty Lords or Tyrants; for Leagues being of some validity in their beginning, and not meeting with any stout resistance, may at the very first effort have ruined the Enemy against whom such Leagues were made, but when they have to do with a Potentate of esteem, though he be inferior of himself, to the power of the Colleagues, they have not produced any great effects; as may be known by divers confederacies made by the Princes of *Italy*, against the Commonwealth of *Venice*, against which, as being become formidable to them all, though all *Italy* hath more then once taken up Arms, yet she hath been able to defend herself against such forces; for the first Efforts being withstood, the rest proved less difficult, by reason of the usual weakness which Leagues are soon reduced unto. And it might have succeeded so with her likewise, in the times of greater danger in the Leagues of *Cambray*, had not *Alviano* with his unseasonable resolution, of immaturely hastning on the Battel, drawn that ruin upon the Commonwealth, which she might easily have escaped by temporising, and the League have been dissolved thereupon, as it was not long after.

Now by reassuming all these considerations, these general and true Conclusions may be therewith asserted; that Leagues may prove beneficial, either when they aim simply at defence, and at the maintaining of Peace, by the reputation of such an union; or when one that is not able to defend himself by his own particular Forces, is actually assaulted by one that is more powerful then he, and whom he is not able to resist of himself. For if no other good be got by such unions, yet the busines is spun out the longer, and there may be a way found out to deviate imminent ruine, by diversion. But he who will confide too much upon such Unions, or be less diligent in negotiating those Affairs which of himself he is not able to do, will soon finde he is deceived; nay if he be not the more cautious, and circumspect, he may become a prey as well to him who appears to be his friend, as to his formally declared enemies. Whence it is inferr'd that to make Leagues out of a meet and voluntary election of increasing Territories, is very uncertain, and falacious, yet may prove good if many who be strong and powerful joyn against one that is weak; but at last the fire is greater which breaks out amongst the Colleagues themselves, then that which they carried home to another mans house. But that

that a State which is already grown great and powerful, may be opprest by the strength of Leagues, unless it begin first to totter by reason of its internal disorders, from what the experience of so many past passages teacheth, and from reason which is corroborated by custom, is a thing which no man ought to promise to himself, unless he delight in flattering himself with vain and prejudicial hopes.

There remains yet some things to be stated which have formerly been alledged in the behalf of Leagues, lest they may get more credit amongst men then they deserve. To that then which was said, That the multiplicity of the movers, make the greater motion, and things are better done by many, especially things of the highest nature, then by reason of the imperfection and weakness of our humanity, can be effected by a few, it may be answered; That it is true, that the assistance of many is requisite to the affecting of great things; but it is also as true, that for the right carrying on of affairs, it is requisite that the second causes (to speak in terms of natural Philosophie) should be subordinate to the first, as is seen in the Order and Government of the world: So doubtlesly no great enterprises can be effected without Armies, Commanders, and a thousand other necessaries; but by how much the more all these are constituted under the power of one alone, by which their order and union is the greater, the work they take in hand will prove so much the more excellent and perfect. A Prince, though single in what he goes about, is not forbidden the making use of Soldiers of several Nations in his Militia, to the end that he may have an Army (as hath been said) fitter for any military action, in businesses which are at once undertaken against several States, so as all of them be to be understood as Enemies, though they be not confederates; but the truest and surest rule in this case would be, to be so careful and diligent in training up, and in disciplining a Prince his own Militia, as that he may be able to provide for all actions of War, out of men of his own Dominions, as we see those have done who have done the most glorious actions. The same may be said of other things belonging to War, for which a wise Prince ought so to provide, as that he may rely upon himself, and not upon the friendship of others. As for the assertion, that Leagues do abound in Chieftains fit to command Armies; this proves not alwaies true by reason of the scarcity of excellent men which hath been found in all Ages; or say that such be to be found amongst confederate Princes, they use to cause more of discord and contention, by reason that every one pretends to have the supreme command, and chieftest honor in the Militia; and more of prejudice to the Leagues, then of profit or advantage. And if it be found that some Leagues have effected great matters, it hath happened (though but seldom) where the particular respects, which we have mentioned, have concurr'd. But in the fore-named unions made by Christians against Infidels, no good reasons can be given which do sue well with the business now in hand, if we speak of Leagues according to the ordinary acceptation of reason of State; for such Princes or People as were signed with the *Crociata* had all of them but one onely respect and affection, which was more prevalent with them then any other, to wit, their zeal to religion; therefore their Forces not being onely kept together by that so powerful bond, but even their souls, more heavenly then humane rewards being proposed to them, they might work miraculous effects: though they could not, even in this case, altogether shun those disorders which are caused by the association of so many, and by the multiplicity of sovereign Lords, and of Nations. The same may be said of other Unions, as of those that did associate the *Romans*, and of the Hans Towns of *Germany*; for amongst these certain particular respects did concur, which were common to them all, no respects of States concerning differing interests, and other things, which have been considered in Unions which do truly and usually bear

this name of Leagues: For when, though against Infidels, any enterprises have been attempted by Leagues, out of other reasons, and other humane respects concurring more principally therein, what success they have had, and how different, though usual to Leagues, may plainly be known by other examples already spoken of.

The Sixth DISCOURSE.

Why modern Princes have not done actions equal to those which were done by the Antients.

THERE are some, who praising only the actions of antient times, do equally blame all modern deportments, and hold them in little or no account; as if the way were block'd up to those who are born in our days, to keep them from arriving at any height of glory. Others on the contrary labor to heap our present Age with all manner of praise, and to compare it to the most celebrated and most cry'd up former times; affirming that the antient worth is sprung up again in these our days, and in our now modern men, which come no: short of, nor differ from the former times or men, save in the veneration which is given to Antiquity. They celebrate the ingenuity of modern men, for the excellencie and perfection unto which they have brought many noble Arts and Sciences, which were obscured and of no esteem in former times; particularly that of the Militia. In which respect, by the so many new-found ways of Fortification, and expugning strong Holds by their Engines, and by other very miraculous Inventions, it appears that the industry of Modern men hath not only equall'd, but in many things much exceeded that of the Antients; and that the glory of many excellent Professors of the most esteemed Arts shines clearer in the present Age, for that they have not only sufficiently improved that of the Militia, but also Architecture, Painting, Sculpture, and other noble Arts and Disciplines, which are adornments to Civil life, and have drawn them out of obscurity whereto they were hidden for a while.

I do not differ so much from the opinion of these men; nor do I think that other mens actions ought to be so much heighthned, as that through a foolish modesty or ignorance we should undervalue our own, when they deserve praise. But as for Military actions, which as they are the most perspicuous to the eyes of all men; so are they most commended, or blamed by the universality of men; when I call to mind the warlike actions done by the Antients, and those done by our Modern men, methinks that those do so far exceed these, as they can hardly admit of any comparison; though these latter Ages, as they have produced more excellent Wits in other Disciplines, so also may they glory in the valor and generosity of some Princes, no less great in worth then in Forces. But that which peradventure affords no less cause of wonder, and which affords particular matter for this discourse, is to consider whence it is that modern Princes, though some of them have been generously minded, and of much experience and worth in military affairs, of great possessions, and strong in power, yet have they not been able to bring to pass such enterprises, as for their weighty consideration, for the shortness of time, or for the easines wherewith they were done, can walk hand in hand with those of the Antients; amongst whom we see one only *Alexander*, one *Pompey*, one *Cesar* to have subjugated

gated many entire Provinces, and conquered many Nations. And not to go further in search of the like examples, since one Age alone, very neer this of ours, can easily furnish us with them: Were not the Emperor *Charls* the Fifth, *Francis* the First King of *France*, and (if will pass by the errors of Religion) Sultan *Solyman* Emperor of the Turks, Princes great, and valiant in all acceptations? in whom so many endowments both of Nature and Fortune did concur, as hardly any thing remained to be desired in any of them, to make and constitute a potent Prince, and an excellent Commander, fit to undertake any action, how great or difficult soever. What was it that *Charls* with his undaunted and dreadless spirit did not undertake? Who was ever known to be more ambitious of praise and military honor than *Francis*, never weary, nor satisfied with toiling in Arms, and in leading Armies? *Solyman* was so fervently bent upon purchasing glory in the Wars, as his age, though very great, was not able to asswage it; for he dyed in the Field amongst Soldiers, when he was eighty four years old. These great Princes were so puissant, and so remarkable for the number of Soldiers which they led to Battel, for military Discipline, and for all that belonged to War, as their Age had no cause to wonder at; nor to envy any preceding times, which were famousst for such affairs. Yet he who shall particularly examine their actions, will find they come far short of the famous acts of the Antients, and that they correspond not with the fame and opinion of such Princes, and of such Forces. For if we shall consider the deeds of those few aforesaid, not to mention so many others, what, and how many were the things done by *Alexander* the Great, who having in so short time vanquish'd the powerful Persian Empire, victoriously overran the whole East, and made the terror of his weapons known to People almost unknown till then, and yet died whilst he was very young? How many Cities and Provinces did *Pompey* and *Cesar* bring under the Roman Empire? The first conquered and subjugated *Pontus*, *Armenia*, *Cappadocia*, *Media*, *Hiberia*, *Syria*, *Cylicia*, *Mesopotamia*, *Arabia*, and *Judea*; things which though done, seem incredible: And the other, though he did not overrun so great a space of Land, did no less admired things, if we will regard the condition of the conquered; He quell'd the warlike *Switzers*, *French*, and *Dutch*, and made so many and so fortunate expeditions, as by his means only above eight hundred Cities were brought under the Goverment of *Rome*.

What can be alleag'd on the behalf of these modern Princes, which may compare with these for military glory? *Charls* the Emperor led sundry times puissant Armies upon several undertakings; but what was the fruit that he reaped by his most famous Expeditions? The greatest and most victorious Army which he ever put together, was that wherewith he withstood *Solyman*, when he came to assault *Austria*: yet he never departed with it from before the walls of *Vienna*; so as all the Trophy of Victory which he got there for so much expence and labor, was only not being overcome; for his Army never saw the Enemies face. The Wars of *Germany* were very difficult in this behalf; yet therein he contended not with any Prince, whose Forces were of themselves equal to his; nor were they made out of election, or hope of glory by new acquirements; but out of necessity, and for the defence as well of his own person, as of the Empire; and all the good he got thereby, was only the restoring the affairs of the Crown to the former condition, so as the Empires authority might not be lessened.

The Wars made so long between *Charls* the Emperor, and *Francis* King of *France*, with no less hatred then force, did oftentimes weary both their Armies; but though *Cesar* had several times the better; yet at last the power of *France* was not diminished, nor the greatness of *Charls* his command made any whit the larger, so as he was master of so many, and so ample States rather by his right of inheritance, then by means of War; the enterprises of *Tunis* and *Algier* in *Africa*, might

greater appearance of generosity, the business being very difficult, with great courage, and much danger, and wherein the glory ap- pere then the advantage; yet the unhappy success of the one, did honor and praise won by the other; and these undertakings did produce no greater effects then the acquisition of one or two Cities, and one of the chiefest of Africa: whereas one onely *Scipio* subdued *Carthage*, the Head of so great an Empire, and brought all those Regions under the *Roman* Eagles.

The Acts done by *Solyman* were somewhat greater then these, but not to be compared to those of old; nor peradventure will they appear to be very famous, if we shall consider his power, and the long time that he lived Emperor. He consumed much time, and many men in *Hungaria*, making many expeditions against it, and yet got but one part thereof, which was none of the greatest Provinces neither. He wan the Island of *Rhodes*; but what glory could redound to so mighty a Prince by overcoming a few Knights, who were weak of themselves, and who were not succoured by others? And yet he was therein assisted more by fraud then by force. He past with his Army into *Perſia*; but though he might fay with *Caſar*, *veni, vidi*, yet could he not add *vici*; for as he with great celerity over-ran a great part of the *Perſian* Empire, and caine to the City of *Tauris*, so not being able to fix in any place, or establish any conquest, he retreated to within his own Confines, having left the greatest part and the best of his men in the Enemies Country, routed and defeated by divers accidents. These things then, and many other the like, give just occasion of wonder, and incite curious wits to search out the trueſt causes of ſuch diversity of ſuccesſes.

Amongſt which, nay, in the primary place, the different means of warfaring in those times, and in these may come into conſideration, wherein if we come to more particulars, we ſhall meet with the uſe of Forts and Strong Holds, which are become more frequent in theſe our Ages, then they were in former times, the art of building being doubtleſly in greater perfection with us then it was with them. There is hardly any State or Country now adaiſes, wherein there are not many Towns and Cities, either assisted by natural ſituation, or else by art reduced to much ſafety by many inventions found out by modern Profefſors of Fortification, ſo as almost every place is ſo fortified as it is able to hold out with a few men, againſt many; and he who will in theſe times enter into another mans Country with an Army intending to poſſeſ himſelf thereof, muſt first win all the Castles and strong Holds upon the Frontiers; for it were ill adiſed to advance forwards and leave ſuch places behind them, ſince his viuctuals may be thereby hindred, and he may ſeveral waies ſuffer much damage and be greatly diſturbed. Moreover to be riſter of the field, & leave the Cities and Strong Holds unreduced, would be but to labor hard to get poſſeſſion for a few daies, which being founded only upon the For-ces of a field-Army, when that ſhould beworſted, all things formerly won, muſt of neceſſity fall of themſelves. Hence it is, that ſince much time muſt be ſpent in lying before a Fort or Citadel, and that many men are requisite to take it, and all this often-times in vain, the attempts of modern Princes meeting with this diſſiculty, are not ſo ſoon nor ſo ſadly compaſt, as they were by the Antients who met not with ſuch obſtaclcs. And how can it be expeſted therefore that many great viqories ſhould be won, ſince they meet with ſo many rubs by means of theſe ſtrong Holds? whereof we ſee many clear examples, in the actions, of the afore-mentioned Princes.

The Emperor *Charls* made War ſeveral times with numerouſe Armies againſt the King of *France*, propounding great matters unto himſelf, which proved all buſt vain at laſt, by his having met with ſtrong Cities well muunted, ſuch as required much

much time and labor to take them ; wherefore though his success in War was sometimes prosperous, yet it came so late, as he hardly got any advantage or benefit thereby ; as was seen when after much time spent, and many men lost before the Fort of St. *Desir* which was seated in the midst of *France*, whither he was fortunately advanced, though he reduced it to his own power, yet was he at last forced to come to agreement with the Enemy (as finding his Forces much weakened by that acquisition) that he might fall upon another Enterprise. The same, and for the same cause, beset *Francis* King of *France*, who having sent his Son the *Dolphin* with powerful Forces to the *Pyrenean Mountains*, to the end that he might break into *Spain*, promising himself easier success therein, by an unexpected assault, and because he had assaulted at the same time other parts of *Cesars* Dominions with other Armies : The *Dolphin* being at the very first to take *Perpignano*, a Fort placed upon those Frontiers, he there met with such, and with so many difficulties, as this sole encounter was sufficient to keep those Forces from penetrating any further.

Solyman being entered with a powerful Army into *Hungarie*, intending to pass into *Austria*, wasted so much time in expugning the strong Hold of *Buda*, as it proved the safety of that Country, and chiefly of *Vienna* ; before the which he was in that respect the longer a coming, and by this delay afforded the defendants the more time to provide for their own security, so as the City being of it self very tenable, it may be said that she did not only save her self, but by the preservation thereof, all *Austria*, and other Provinces of *Germany*, were preserved then, and several times since. So likewise in the War which was made by the same *Solyman*, against the *Venetians*, though he was come thither himself in person, with powerful Forces both by Sea and Land, yet his Forces being repulst by the Fort of *Corf*, which was forcibly, but in vain attempted by the Turks, he was forced to withdraw from before it ; whereas without the help and advantage of such a strong Hold, both the Island of *Corfee*, and other places belonging to that State must have submitted to so great and warlike a preparation. By reason then of these difficulties, and such occasions, the undertaking of later times have proved less glorious for matter of action, than those of former daies. When *Alexander* had overcome in Battel *Darius* the powerful King of *Persia*, he soon made himself Master of his whole Kingdom, and passing further into the Country, even to the ocean Sea, he found the way so open, as the only difficulty he met withal, was the overcoming of those Fortresses of Rivers and Seas which nature had furnished the Country with : Insomuch as those who writ his actions, speak but of two strong Holds of any importance, about which he was necessitated to spend some time amongst the *Indians* in his victorious over-running so many Countries. But *Pompey* made such way in following *Mithridates*, and in planting Trophies of victories, in all places whereby he past in so many Eastern Provinces, amongst people that he had rather march'd over, then over-come, as it may be easily conceived that he met no where with any impediments by strong Holds, which were able to stop the course of his victorious Forces. *Cesar* found it somewhat a harder business to subjugate those people of *Europe*, with whom he was to fight ; but this was more out of the nature of the situations and the savageness of the people, then by reason of any stout resistance made by any well fortified Cities ; yet in the space of Ten years he compleated so many victories, as he subjugated Three hundred several sorts of People.

If these, though great Princes, and most valiant Commanders, had been put to the expence of moneths and years in the taking of one only Fort, certainly their achievements would have been fewer, and their glory not so much cry'd up. This was manifestly known by the example of other Ages : For it may be observed, that

The so great progresses of War have been made chiefly in the Eastern parts, where at all times (peradventure by reason of the largeness of the Country) the use of strong Holds hath been least had; so as not only *Alexander* the Great, and *Pompey*, both of them more famous then all other Commanders, but some of the Roman Emperors have by their Chieftains subjugated spacious Countries in a short time: And in later times, *Selymus* the Great Turk by the same reason was able totally to subjugate the Soldan of *Caire's* Empire; For having had the better in many Battels, and not meeting with any strong Hold to withstand him, the whole Country which was under that Empire fell as a prey into the power of the *Turks*, who were Victors and Masters of the Field. But such acquisitions, as they are very easie to be made, so are they but seldom peacefully possessest; which was the cause why the Roman Emperors could never so govern those furthest Eastern parts, but that either by the Inhabitants themselves, or by their neighboring Kings, tumults were continually raised: So as it behoved them to subjugate the same Provinces several times. But if these difficulties of winning Forts and strong Holds did retard the course of Victories, certainly they ought not to lessen the praise of modern Princes and Commanders; but when they deserve it by their own military worth and industry, as great discipline, cunning, constancie, and suffrancie is discovered in this sort of Militia, and as such acquisitions are more stable, and less subject to the various fortune of War; so the fewer actions of these men may for glory and praise be justly compared to the many of the others, wherein perhaps they would have equall'd them, had it not been for the concurrence of such differing accidents and respects.

But if we shall continue to examine other parts appertaining to the Militia, we shall find that the diversity of effects hath proceeded from the diversity of other things. The invention of Guns is so new and so miraculous a thing, so out of the way of all War-Engines which were known and used by the Antients, as it may well be believed that this must needs have made a gret alteration in the managing of the Militia; and the use and invention of Gunpowder is so increased in these times, and so variously multiplied and perfected, as it may be said that men make not War now adays with steel and iron, as they were wont, but with fire. Then this formidable Instrument of Artillery, which makes so great and irreparable havock, is the reason why Commanders proceed with more caution in giving Battel, and seek to spin out the War in length, to reduce the Enemy to some necessity; and that sing more Art, and trusting less to Fortune, they spend more time in bringing their enterprises to an end, but do it with more security. Wherefore we seldom hear of pitched Fields in these days, wherein whole Armies fight with all their Forces: And hence it is, that the Forces of such as defend an assaulted Country not being to be vanquisht, nor much weakened but with time, unless they want fitting defence, no great progress is made therein, which is not done more by time and industry then by open force. Where likewise it is to be weighed, that the necessity which is now adays put upon Armies of bringing along with them a great Train of Artillery, all their proceedings must be much more slow, and without them they can neither keep themselves from being offended by the Enemy, nor yet can they undertake any enterprise, wanting such Instruments without which no Town nor place of importance can be taken.

Let us wind about a little, and see what hath been done by the Antients. What a voyage did *Pompey* the Great make in the pursuit of *Mithridates*? He with his Army overran abundance of new Countries, continually conquering and subjecting them, with as much ease, as if he had gone to visit them upon pleasure, and not to wage War with them. When *Alexander* the Great would go into *India*, he made his Soldiers leave all the Booty which they had got in *Persia*, and all their Baggage behind

behind them, and choosing out some of his nimblest men, he with them made that long and difficult journy, and sent many back, thinking that a few (but those valiant) Soldiers, would suffice him for that purpose ; for in that Age, 'twas only worth and power which bore away the weightiest affairs. So as such Princes and Conductors of Armies as had a strong and able Militia, as was that of *Alexander the Great*, and that of the *Romans*, not meeting with any strong Holds to withstand them, nor with any Soldiers of like worth and experience as they were, nor which could withstand their assaults, they suddenly bereft the Countries which they assailed of all defence, by worsting their Armies wherein their sole security lay, and so made themselves easily masters of them ; and by the reputation which their men won, and the terror which they caused in their Enemies, who had no where whereunto to flee or to have refuge, they made one Victory make way for another, so as they might in a short time lay the ground-works of those great Monarchies which the World doth now so much wonder at.

To these things it may be added, That the chiefeſt strength of the Antients, and that wherewith they attēved their chiefeſt actions, lay in their Infantry, which could easilieſt and with greatest expedition winde about every where, and be made uſe of at all ſeafons. But changing their cuſtom afterwards, ſo as thoſe that com-manded great Armies would have their Foot aided continually, and back'd by good ſtore of Horſe, they could neither begin, nor finiſh great enterpriſes, as made beſt for them ; being to conſider the Season, the Country, and other conve-niencies, and their Horſes being to have meat, which they could not always, nor in all places come by. Wherefore now that by reaſon of the greatness of their Empire, the *Turks* Confinis are ſo ſeparated, and ſo far diſtant one from another, it may be hoped that other Princes may reſt the quieteſt, and the more ſecure from their incuſions, for that their Land-forces conſiſting much in Cavalry, they cannot move ſo ſudden-ly, nor lead on their numerouſe Armies ſo eaſily nor ſo com-modiouſly, nor do ſuch no-table things by Land ; and which the ſelf-ſame reſpect may make it be doubted that they may bend their ſtudies more to Sea-affaers.

Together with all theſe reſpects, the condiſion of Times and of Potentates is not ſliſtly to be conſidered, if therein we meet with a generous Prince, and one that is deſirous of military glory. For if he chance to make triaſ of his arans and. worth with a Prince of equal, or not much inferiour State, valor, and military diſcipline, he cannot hope by any power he hath to make any great acqiuſitions, be-cause he will meet with a just counterpoife to his worth and power : For though he may peradventure be puffed up with ſome good ſucceſs, yet is he not ſure but that he may have ſome adverſe fortune, whiſt his Enemy is ſtill ſtrong, though as yet woſted. What did *Francis* King of *France* leave unattemted to get footing in *Italy* ? how many Armies did he lead thither ? how much treaſure did he ſpend in thoſe attempts ? when was he ever weary or ſatiſfied with warfa-ring ? Yet being withſtold by the Emperor *Charls* the Fifth, who was of equal force and worth, and wiſeſt to keep the *French* out of *Italy*, all his endeavours proved vain, finding it very hard to get any thing, and imposſible to keep what he had gotten, that State being befriended and back'd by too great Princes. Whence it was, that by reaſon of the reſiſtance which each of theſe great Potentates made againſt the other, knowing that they could not much exceed one another, and each of them hav-ing an eye upon the affaers of *Italy*, they both of them did ſtill much endeavor friendſhip and conſeſderacie with the Princes of *Italy*, and chiefly with the Com non-wealth of *Venice*. For, what neither of them could effect of themſelves, which was to keep the others Forces ſuppreſſed in *Italy*, they thought they might the eaſi-lier do it, by joining with ſome other Italian Potentate ; ſo the many Wars which happened between them, and chiefly in *Savoy*, and in the State of *Milan*,

must at last be ended by agreement without any advantage to either party, both their Forces being weakened, but neither of their hatreds or emulations slackned; though *Charls the Fift*, by the unexpected death of *Francisco Sforza*, did at last reduce that State to his Dominion.

Hence it was also that *Charls and Solyman*, greatly fearing to encounter each other, did very much shun the having to do together, and to hazard that glory to the uncertain events of War, which they had with so much labor arrived at. And this was the cause why *Charls* though he was a bold and valiant Prince, when his Brother *Ferdinand* was in great danger by reason of *Solymans* Forces, resolved impotunately to pass into *Africa*; for being resolute that he would not march against *Solymans* Forces, nor contend with them, he would witness to the world that it was neither labor nor danger, that kept him from turning to the defence of *Hungary*, and *Austria*, which were then assaulted by the Turks; but because he esteemed the busines of *Africa* very necessary. And when a greater necessity wrought it so that they were to take up Arms one against the other, and that numerous Armies had taken the field, yet they kept still aloof off, the fear, and apprehension which each had of the others powe; and fortune being alike; so as at last so great an accumulation of Soldiers disbanded, neither party having seen the face of an Enemy; whilst *Charls* would not give way that his Army should go from before the walls of *Vienna*, to go find out the Enemy, nor would *Solyman* advance further to meet him, though he had at first publickly given out that he went from *Constantinople* to fight with *Charls* the Emperor before his own doors. So as you may clearly see, that it was the counterpoise of these two great Princes of one and the same Age, which kept their Forces confined within certain bounds, which for their valor and other respects might have carried the Trophies of victory into the furthest remote Countries.

Now on the other side let us examine the condition of Times and Potentates with whom those famous Commanders of old had to wage War. *Alexander the Great*, found the Kingdom of *Persia*, wherein he successfully made his first expeditions, for extent of Empire very rich and powerful, but wherein was an ill disciplined Militia, and commanded by unexperienced Leaders, and men of no valor; wherefore exceeding the *Persians* in worth and discipline, though he came short of them in numbers, he may be said to have been better then they for matter of War, and therefore willingly imbraced all occasions of joyning Fattel with them. And for what concerns the Eastern Kings and Nations, which he afterwards brought under his power, who knows not how unfit they were for War; of themselves weak, not joyned in confederacie for common defence, nor sustained by strong holds, nor by the strength of a well ordered Militia? Insomuch as the greatest glory that can be attributed to *Alexander*, is for the generosity of his mind, which moved him to venter upon so many enterprises, in desert and almost unknown Countries, rather then for that he overcame great difficulties in fight, and brought them to an end.

The same almost may be observed by the things done in the Eastern parts by *Pompey the Great*. It is true that *Cesay* met with greater difficulties in the things he did in *France* and in *Spain*, for he waged War with people who knew how to manage their Arms, and who were till then thought unvanquishable; wherefore he spent more time there. Yet these Provinces were divided into many Kings and Popularities, none of which were very strong of themselves, nor were they very secure by the assistance of others to make them able to resist an Army of veteran, and excellently well disciplined Soldiers, as was that which was commanded by *Cesar*: So as it seems we may with reason conclude that if these cried up Commanders had met with powerful and valiant Armies, able to be compared with theirs, and that

that these had been guided and upheld by the experience and worth of great Commanders, their fames would certainly have been less, nor would they have so easily have assubjected so many Countries, and erected their Trophies of victories in so many Regions as they did.

But besides all these considerations, we may perhaps with reason weigh, the arts and waies which these antient Warriors made use of (to boot with what belonged to the Militia) to make their acquisitions and glory the greater: for he who shall consider their actions, may therein discern so inflamed a desire of praise and glory as it seems this was the onely thing which they propounded to themselves for reward of all their labor and danger, and for the end of all their undertakings; for they have left many noble examples behind them, not onely of military valor, but of equity, clemencie, temperance, and of other glorious vertues which assisted them very much in winning favor, and affection with the people, and likewise the love of many of those very Princes who were overcome by them.

Thus we read of *Alexander*, that he confirmed their Kingdoms to many *Indian* Kings whom he overcame, and did increase them to some others; and being contented with obediency from them, and receiving such things as were necessary for his voyage, he seemed rather to aspire after the glory of new acquisitions, then to reap any advantage by what he had already won: But *Pompey*, not like a victorious Chieftain in War, but rather like a Friend and Arbitrator, composed the differences between those Princes of the East, restored the antient Lords to their Kingdoms, and gave new States to such others as did deserve them. Insomuch as it was from his liberty that *Pharnaces* was to acknowledge the Kingdom of *Bosphorus*, *Antiochus*, that of *Sileuia*, *Tygranes*, the Kingdom of *Armenia*, *Ariobarzanes*, that of *Cappadocia*, *Diotarus*, the like of *Galitia*, and did onely reduce such Countries into Provinces, and make them immediately subject to the Senate and People of *Rome*, wherein he found no legitimate Lords and Masters, as it fell out in *Syria*, *Judea* and some other Regions. It was by reason of these proceedings, that many People and Princes, did voluntarily submit to the Empire of *Alexander* and of the *Romans*. Wherefore *Darius* when he was overcome by *Alexander*, admiring his great Continencie and Humanitie, prayed the gods that if the fall of that Empire was destined, the glory and succession of the Kingdom of *Persia* might fall upon *Alexander*. All histories are full of such examples of worth and vertue in things done by the *Romans*; But now adayes Princes and Commanders do but little mind the imitation of these men, and wage War, not out of a desire of glory, as did those magnanimous Antients; but onely out of revenge and cruelty, or else to turn all the fruit and benefit of Victory upon themselves leaving nothing safe nor entire to th. conquered. Whence it enues that they who fears these extremes, desperately resolve to do their utmost, and hazard all, rather then to submit themselves to the power and discretion of those on whom they see their ultimate ruine depends. By this means, proceedings march a flower pace, and all acquisitions become more difficult, so this immoderate desire of having all things for their own service, working a contrary effect to their intentions, keeps the Confines of their Dominions more narrowly bounded, and thereby lessens their glory which they seem to aspire so much at. If then our Princes and Chieftains will walk in the waies of the Antients, they will finde that Justice, Clemencie, and moderate Empire, are stronger and more secure Engins to take strong Holds, then those wh ch they in these times make use of. And if they be not faulty in the true worh, they will find sufficient valor and discipline in their Soldiers, to bring to pass whatsoever great Enterprizes, and to exalt their name to such a height of glory, and so illustrate themselves and their Age as they may in all things be deservedly compared to the famousest and most cried up of the Antients.

The Seventh DISCOURSE.

What the cause is why Italy hath enjoyed so long Peace and Quiet in these latter Times.

HE who shall call to mind what troubles *Italy* for a long time hath suffered under, which after the passage of *Charls* the eighth, King of *France*, till the Peace made at *Bologna*, was for the space of thirty five years continually infested with bitter Wars, and subject to all those greater evils which the wickedness of man hath found out to his own undoing, may justly think her very happy in this present, and the last preceding Age, wherein after so long a combustion she hath enjoyed so happy and quiet a Peace: For though in this time some little sparkles may have broken forth, yet have they not spread much, nor lasted long; but being confined within some small circuits, the greater and more noble parts of *Italy* have remained safe and untouched by this flame. Wherefore those *Princes* who this mean while have had the government of the several States of *Italy*, are certainly much to be praised, and the people of *Italy* are chieflie to acknowledg so great a benefit from their wisdom and vigilancie. Yet because there have divers accidents happened, which have opened the way to *Princes* wherein to walk directly on to this right end of Peace and Concord, it may be worth the while, particularly to examine from what causes this good hath proceeded; for thereby it may likewise be known how the like may be preserved.

It is a Proposition sufficiently known, and indubitably true, that *Sublata causa tollitur effectus*; Take away the cause, and the effect which proceeds from thence will cease. Wherefore by truly examining the causes from whence the Wars and molestations of *Italy* did proceed, we may perceive how these ceasing, she hath remain'd in that peace and quiet, which may be said to be the true, proper, and most natural condition of a State; all other workings in a good Government, and even War it self being ordained for Peace: whereby as Cities and Kingdoms enjoy Civil felicity, so must that State be most perfect, wherein the perfectest workings are exercised to the most perfect end. Peace is of it self introduced into a State, by taking away the impediments which do disturb it, just as health is introduced into our bodies by taking away those ill humors which keep them from their perfect and natural condition. Now if we will take into our consideration, whence as from the principal occasions, that *Hrmony* (if I may so call it) which the Concord of the Italian *Princes* had so long produced, and preserved with such liking and consolation of all men, was spoil'd and corrupted, we shall find that two affecti ons which do usually accompany Empire, and which at this time grew very powerful in some *Princes*, were those roots from which so many mischiefs did afterwards put forth, to wit, Fear and Ambition; Fear of losing ones own State, Ambition of possessing what belongs to another. The fear of the King of *Aragons* just indignation made *Ledovic Sforza* think upon Novelties, made him have recourse for help to *France*, and made him believe that was best for him, which proved his ruine: But it was ambition of adding new Territories to that Crown, and glory to himself, which made *Charls* the Eighth, King of *France*, but young both in years and experience, think upon nothing but how to effect his desires, by accept ng of *Sforza's* proffer of passing into *Italy*, which proved the Sepulchre of so many Soldiers, and of so many gallant Commanders of that warlike Nation, by the so many Wars which arose

rose from that Spring-head, and which brought no other advantage to the Authors.

But let us make a little further enquiry. The so famous, and as it may justly be termed, so pernicious War to all *Italy*, made by the League of so many Christian Princes, who had all conspired the ruine of the Commonwealth of *Venice*, whence did it arise but from these two wicked seeds, Fear and Ambition? Many Princes apprehended the greatness of the Republick, which was already much increased by the prosperous success in War wherein she was associated by the *French*, whereby she was become very formidable, especially to the Princes of *Italy*; wherefore they all desired her abasement for their own security. Nor was the Emperor *Maximilian* totally free from this fear, who had learnt by late experiance how powerful the Forces of the Commonwealth were grown, which had bereft him of some Towns belonging to him. But *Lodovick* King of *France* (the thirst after Empire being always unquenchable) growing still more desirous to posses the whole State of *Milan*, whereof he had already gotten the greatest part, and repenting himself that the Cities of *Cremona* and *Giaradada* were fallen to the *Venetians*, was egg'd on by this spur of Ambition to join in conspiracie with the other Princes against the Commonwealth, which had so lately and so many several ways deserved so very well at his hands. After these ensued many long Wars, though not equally grievous, which had many various and uncertain events, and which were fomented and maintain'd by these seeds of all discord, fear and ambition. When the greatness and power of the Emperor *Charls* the Filth was increased and confirm'd in *Italy*, the Commonwealth apprehended that her State in *Terra firma* would not by reason thereof be very safe: she therefore willingly took up Arms, accompanied by the *French*, to secure herself from the danger she conceived she lay under by reason of the continual neighborhood of a greater and more powerful neighbor, by having a particular Prince of that State, who might be Duke of *Milan*. *Francis* King of *France* desired likewise to see the Emperor bereft of that State, but out of other respects; to wit, because his ambition was such as would never suffer him to give way to the fortune of *Charls* the Emperor, and to see *Charls* so much superior to him, especially in *Italy*, where his Predecessors the Kings of *France*, and he himself with no less fervencie, though with worse success, had labored so long, with such expence, and with the loss of so many men, only to retain and keep some Territories.

This was the tree, from which the boughs or sprouts could not be so fast cut off, but that one War soon succeeded another; wherewith *Italy* was long perplex'd, till in the year 1529. the Princes being tyred, and the People ruin'd, agreement was made in that famous Meeting at *Bologna*, in which so found foundations of the peace and quiet of *Italy* were laid, as they may almost be said to have continued till now, with fair hopes of longer continuance. For though for thus many years there have been some commotions in *Italy*, made both by her own Inhabitants, and by Foreiners, yet in respect of the calamities she underwent in those former Ages, they may rather be termed uprokes then wars. This condition of affairs and of affections being changed, and the materials being removed by which the fire of war was fed, *Italy* remained in great tranquillity. Soon after this introduction of Peace, the State of *Milan*, by the immature death of *Francisco Sforza*, who left no issue behind him, fell into the power of *Charls* the Emperor, and afterwards into his son *Philip's*; in which Princes no such respect concurr'd as lately have been mentioned, whereby the peace of *Italy* might be troubled, as it had been before: For these Princes, by reason of their other great possessions, being peacefully Masters of so fair and noble a part of *Italy*, as is the Kingdom of *Naples*, and Dukedom of *Milan*, they had no reason to trouble the peaceful condition of affairs, either out of any apprehension of their

their own businesses, or out of a desire to enjoy what appertained to others. They were freed from fear not only by the friendship solemnly established, and ratified by the other Potentates of *Italy*, but much more by their own power and greatness, and the knowledge that to intrench upon one, might easily move all the rest, and afford occasion of bringing forein Forces into *Italy*, whereby to disturb their own settled possession of so large and noble a share thereof, kept them from dreaming upon the possessing of other mens estates. So likewise the Commonwealth of *Venice* was at this time in such a condition, as being only to covet peace, she might hope to enjoy it safely, because she was neither so great nor powerful, as to hope after new acquisitions, being counterpoised by greater Forces in *Italy*, who upon the least discovery in her of taking up Arms, would oppose her, and not suffer her to increase, to their prejudice; neither was she yet so weak, as she might dread being easily opprest by others, so as to secure herself from such a danger, she might be constrained to think upon novelties, or to procure new Friends. The *Church* Territories, being secured no less by the reverence due to religion, then by force of Arms, remained safe and quiet; nor had the Popes any reason either to fear their own affairs, nor yet to desire a greater temporal estate; for having recovered many Cities which the *Church* had formerly lost, discords being ceased, and the faction wherewth she had been troubled being almost extinguished, and the authority of the *Barons* of *Rome* being moderated, that holy See was in a condition of as great dignitie and safety, as she had been at any time before; and Duke *Cosmo de Medici*, Duke of *Florence* being allied to the favor and friendship of a potent Prince, wherin he was very fortunate, was safe enough; and being likewise a new Prince in *Tuscany*, he was to think, as he wisely did, rather how to settle himself well in his noble Dominion, then to dream of becoming the Author of new Wars, and of increasing his State.

Hence it was that the Forces of these greater Potentates being ballanced and their thoughts tempered, all occasions of making any great change or alteration of States in her was taken away, such as had hapned in the former Ages, through the commotions of the very Princes of *Italy*. As for such dangers as might happen from abroad, *Italy* was at this time secured by various accidents. If we shall first consider the Empire, from whence her greatest troubles had often times come, those Emperors knew very well, by what had succeeded to *Charles* in the Imperial dignity, that they had not Forces sufficient wherewith to betake themselves to forein enterprises out of any particular interest or ambition, without the help of *Germany*, which was but little inclined to increase their power and authority. But (though the moderate minds of those Princes, which was always inclined to Justice and Equity must be greatly praised) the eminent danger their States lay in by reason of the Turks Forces, was above all other things able to keep them from thinking of molesting other mens States; which Turks, being so near and so powerful neighbors, have kept them busied and molested, and in a condition of thinking rather how to secure their own affairs, then to increase their fortune by new acquisitions, not onely when they were forced to take up Arms for the defence of *Hungary* and *Austria*, but even in time of peace, and greatest security. The *French* I must confess have been more intent to trouble the peace of *Italy*, on which they had a long time set their minds, out of a desire to get some footing there. But though the Forces of that flourishing and powerful Kingdom were very formidable before these Civil Discords, yet experience hath shewed that their attempts, when they have had none to receive and to uphold them in *Italy*, have caused more dread then damage; for their Armies being to be furnished with all necessaries from a far off, they have been overcome by weaker Forces, and oftentimes by their own wants. Therefore because in these later times, when they past over

over the Mountains, they were not confederate, as formerly they had been, with any great Potentate in *Italy*, therefore have they been able to tarry there but a while, nor have they made the noise of their Trumpets be heard a far off, though they have never let slip any occasion out of a desire of Novelty and glory; so as all those who have at any time been ill satisfied by the Imperialists, and then by the *Spaniards*, have been easily received into friendship with them. Thus was the defence of *Sienna* imbraced, a City opprest by the severe Goverment of *Cæsar's* Officers.

Thus were the *Ferneses* taken into protection, to keep them in their possession of *Parma* and *Piacenza*, out of which the Emperor would have driven them: Thus was the Prince of *Salerno* listned unto, who by his favor, and the insurrection of the people furthered the hopes of great acquisitions in the Kingdom of *Naples*. Thus *Paul* the Fourth met with good correspondencie in *Henry* King of *France*, as soon as he discovered himself to be ill affected towards *Cæsar*, and that he would take up Arms against him; for he hoped to attain those things by the friendship and conjunction of a powerful Prince, and one, who according to his desire, was apt to commotions, wherein he had had but ill success at the same time in *Italy*, by reason of the weak assistance of the *Senesi*; but all this while, and upon all these occasions, it may be truly affirmed that these were rather Tumults then Wars; which (as hath been said) was occasioned chiefly, for that such a disposition of mind and of affairs, was found in the Princes of *Italy*, as they did not much, nor all at a time interest themselves in these Wars. And though some of the Popes did busie themselves therein, yet since these Wars were not treated of as any thing belonging to the Church, or immediately appertaining to the Apostolick See, they were neither favored by the other Princes of *Italy*, nor yet imbraced by the succeeding Popes, with the same thoughts, because their ends, nor interests were not the same; nay they did rather endeavor to appease, then to foment them. And those who were the raisers and furtherers of these novelties, and of the coming of forein Forces, being weak of themselves, and not being seconded by any, they could not long make good the War, not having sufficient Forces of themselves, nor being able to make such use of the Transalpine Forces, but that they were exceeded by those who opposed them, and who were of greater force and friendship in *Italy*; as was particularly seen in the Wars of *Sienna*, which lasted longest, and were the foremost that happened in these latter times. For the *French* having no other receptacle in *Italy* then what was given them by the *Senesi*, who had called them in, and being stoutly opposed by *Charls* the Emperor, who was stronger by reason of the many opportune aids which he received from the Duke of *Florence*, they could not long continue, nor fix their abode in *Italy*. In which occurrences the State of *Venice* may justly challenge no small share of commendation. For that notwithstanding the so many offers, and pressures made unto her, to take up Arms, and to make use of such occasions as presented themselves, to augment her fortune, she notwithstanding, with less aspiring thoughts, but certainly with very wise and safe advice, continuing in her newtrality did rather endeavor by her many good offices to withdraw fewel from the fire which had already burst forth in *Italy*, then to make it flame the higher by intressing herself therein, and by joyning with either party. Whereby she did not undoubtedly advantage herself onely, but whole *Italy*, where she being one of the chief Potentates, by keeping quiet and newter, not inclining to either party was the reason why the Imperial and *French* Forces, counterpoising each other, could not effect any of their designs, which might have proved prejudicial to the liberty and peace of *Italy*.

Hence then it ensues, that the best advice for the preservation of this peace and quiet of *Italy*, is to keep affairs so equally ballanced, as that the Princes who have

Dominions there, may neither have reason of fear, nor of ambition, which (as hath been said) have in former times been cause of her perturbances. In which happy condition she will still continue, if the Princes of *Italy* shall know so to moderate their desires, and ke: p themselves so closely annexed together by an union of mind, and by good intelligence, that the one may not fear the other for any desire of novelty which may be found in them, nor discover themselves to be so weak by their divisions as out of the easiness of the prey, ambition may move others to aspire after their States.

The Eighth DISCOURSE.

Whether Citadels and Strong Holds, much used by our modern Princes, be commodious, and of true safety to a State, or no?

Forts and strong Holds are of late grown into so great esteem, as Princes seem now adaiers to mind nothing more then these for the security of their States. Yet this busines may admit of such various considerations, as it is not peradventure easie to be discerned, whether a Prince that is thus advised be in the right way to effect that which he propounds unto himself, which is, the securing of his affaers. To know then what ought truly to be thought in this case, we must first consider what this art of Fortification is of it self, on which so much study, and expence is bestowed, and whether it be grounded upon such undeniable principles and reasons, as by means thereof the benefit at which it aims, of preserving Cities and States in safety, may be expected from it. Certainly this first consideration admits of no smal doubt or difficultie; for we are taught by modein exper ence, that all the waies whereby a strong Hold may be assaulted and taken, are not yet so well known, as being reduced under general terms, as that it may be asserted, that thereby an art is found out which contains all sorts of possible offence, and which is governed by a certain and true rule to effect the intent thereof, and to come to the perfection thereof. Nay, rather we find to the contrary, that the professors of this Art do not agree well in their principles; and that time makes it subject to such alterations, by reason of the new waies which the wit of man finds out as well for offence as defence, as it seems it must be confess, that this is not in reality a true art, or at least, that it is so imperfectly known and used, as that strong holds are but a weak foundation for the safety of a State, though they be never so many, and be in esteem by military men. For, say nothing else does it, the experience of more then one Age doth evidently prove, that in a short time they become vain and useles; since a Fort which was formerly greatly esteemed, and held to be almost impregnable, hath now by the invention of new engins, and waies of opugning it, lost that reputation, and is thought little less then ridiculous: and it may be beleeved, that the same may betal any strong holds which are in these daies built, by reason of the new waies of offending which many do daily with much study and industry labour to finde out.

Whence it is that Princes find they have often spent much time, workmanship and moneys, in a busines, which in time of need can but little avail them; and if they wil reap any benefit thereby, they must continually be at new expence both of monies and men, keeping them continually busied in new works and Fabricks, adding alwaies, or altering many things about their Forts, to fit them to the use of

the present times and Militia. But give it for granted, that such strong Holds may be brought to rather an imaginable, then a possible perfection and security, certainly they are no way serviceable of themselves, but are like dead and useless things, which have need to be as it were inanimated and be made useful by good Garisons, who may keep and defend them.

And if otherwise, they serve for the conveniencie and service of the Enemy: which makes it yet more questionable, whether strong Holds be a greater safety or weakening to a State; and where there are many and very great ones, the doubt is made the greater; since so many Soldiers must be employed in their defence, as if the Prince be not very powerful, he shall hardly find Forces sufficient to keep several Armies (as they may be termed) on foot, some within the Forts, and some in the Campagna. Nor can it be made good, that strong Holds are of themselves sufficient to secure the whole State; for though they may entertain the Enemy for a while, and stop the first brunt of an impetuous assault, yet at last, unless they be back'd with Forces from without, and timely succored and relieved, being overcome either by power, length of time, or necessity, they must yield and fall into the power of the Enemy: which cannot be denied, no not by the very Professors and Favourers of Fortification. And yet it cannot be denied, but if a Prince have sufficient Forces to keep the Field in his own Country, he may thereby keep himself from being injured; for men do not easily put things to hazard, where they think to meet with stout opposition, and the only opinion and reputation of such Forces, is able to keep off the greatest dangers: For the Enemy who did design to assault such a State, becomes jealous and doubtful, nor is he bold enough to enter far into such a State as is guarded by a good Army, and chiefly in situations (such as are almost in all Countries), as are naturally fortified by Hills, Vallies, or Rivers, where it is hard to enter, and harder to retreat. And if any well experienced Captain command over such Forces, he will be likely enough to defeat the Enemy, without endangering himself, by keeping him from victuals, and so employed and busied in sundry ways, as he shall neither be able to keep long in the Country, nor much less employ himself in the taking or sacking of any Cities: since he knows he is hourly subject to surprisals, and to be run over; and strong Holds securing nothing but those quarters where they are situated, they do not secure the State, if they be but a few; and if many, they require all the Forces for their own defence, and leave the Enemy master of the Field, to the Prince his prejudice, and the Peoples despair. So also, if they be but little ones, and incapable of such Works, and so many men as are requisite to make them hold out long, they and the Soldiers which defend them are lost; and if they be great, and contain large plots of ground, as is most in fashion in these days, they may be more perfect in themselves, but they need so many men to defend them, as those Forces which ought to be employed for the safeguard of the whole Country; or a great part thereof, are bounded within a little compass, in defence of some City or Citadel. And yet these very Soldiers, when drawn out into the Field, may do much better service; for being fashioned into the body of an Army, they become as it were a moveable Fort, which secures at once many Cities and a great Tract of Country: nay, by these the Enemy is much dismayed, and the troubles and danger of War are kept far from a mans own home. For (as hath been said) diversions, and preventions may be made by these Forces, they may be carried into another mans State, and set another mans house on fire, before it take head in ones own house; but he who placeth his safety in strong holds, puts himself into a condition of being at his Enemies disposal, in whose will it lies to choose what shall make most for his advantage, with great prejudice to the opposing party: For he may either pass by the Forts, over-run the Country, enrich his Soldiers by booty, impoverish the Subjects of that Country which

which is assaulted, and cannot be relieved, by reason that the Forces thereof are dispers'd and imploid in the defence of the strong Holds; or if he will make any certain achievement, he may sit down before any Fort, and without indangering his own men, whilst he shall live upon the Enemies Territories, he may in time, take it by siege, and effect his own desires (for as hath been said) no strong Hold can promise it self long safety where no succour is ready at hand.

But let us come a little closer to the busyness, and let us suppose that these strong Holds may be brought to such a condition as they may be assuredly able to resist any open force which shall come against them, and not be deceived in that their beleef, as often times they are; How can they secure themselves from treacherie, and from such dangers as they may be subject unto by the negligence of Soldiers, or falsehood of the Commanders that have the custodie thereof? in which case the Princes danger is so much the greater, and more irreparable, for that his Enemy is in the Dominions, in a well munited seat, from whence he cannot hope to drive him, without much labor and difficultie. But in greater Cities wherein are a multitude of people, and where these cautions and suspitions are not to be found, others no whit inferior to these do arise; for such quantities of victuals is requisite to feed the many men that are therein inclosed, as no Prince is able to provide for so, as may serve them for a long time; and if this fail, to what end serves Walls, Weapons, or Soldiers? To this may be added that the safety of such strong Holds, does in a great part depend upon the pleasure of the people, who being of themselves naturally fickle, do often favor forein Princes out of very slight reasons, and sometimes out of a meer desire of noveltie; and plot by sedition, and by open force against the present State, and deliver themselves, and the City into another mans power: And though they may afterwards repent themselves of their folly, they know not how to mend it, when a powerful Army is within the City Walls; nor can this be done by him who defends the State, because he cannot keep so many Forces together as are able to defend several places at once, and because loving his Subjects, as a legitimate Prince ought to do, he is loath to destroy a City of his own though whole Armies be therein.

But if the State be open and not pestered with Fortifications, though it may the more easily be lost by sudden assaults, or by ill affected Subjects, it will be the more easily regained; and as soon as the Prince who is deprived thereof, shall have means to rallie his Forces which by misfortune may have been beaten, he soon makes head again, and recovers what he had lost, the Enemy not having any safe hold wherein to abide. And of this there are many apparent examples. If the Commonwealth of *Venice*, in the times of her greatest calamitic, had had her State in *Terra firma* so well provided of strong Holds, as now it is, she might not peradventure have run so great a misfortune, she had not so soon lost so many and so noble Cities as she did; but it may be alleadged on the contrary, that if in that evil Crisis of affairs wherein she was brought to such adversity, she had had so many important Forts as now she hath, and that they had fallen into the power of the Enemy, she woul'd not certainly have so soon recovered her losses, and restored herself into her pristine power and greatness as she did. We likewise see the State of *Milan*, which fell so often into the power of the *French*, it staid not long under their Dominion, for not finding any strong and Royal Forts, wherein they could make any safe abode, nor having time to erect any by reason of their continual Wars, or for want of monies, the defenders of that State did often times prevail; and every accident, either of the change of the peoples minds, or of their Enemies increase of Forces, were sufficient to drive them out: Which would not have happened if they had but once been Masters of any strong Holds, from whence they could not have been expel'd, without a long and hard siege. *Guido Ubaldo D.of Urbino*, a Prince but

but of small Territories, but very wise, and well experienced in War, moved by these respects, after he had recovered his State which was formerly taken from him by Duke *Valentine*, he resolved to slight all the strong Holds that were there, knowing that they could not at first preserve his State unto him, and when hee should lose it, they would make the difficultie of regaining it the greater.

When *Charls* the Eighth, King of *France*, going to win the Kingdom of *Naples* past through *Tuscany*, the Forts which the *Florentines* had built for their own securitie, were the very things whereby they were most indamaged, and these falling into the power of the *French*, whose Forces they thought they were not able to withstand, they put the *Florentines* to vast expence, and made them undergo great slavery, out of a desire of recovering them. Whereas if that State had lain open, the King, who was bound upon other enterprises, passing forward, would no waies have troubled the affars of that Commonwealth. The like, and almost out of the like respect, did afterward befall Duke *Cosimo*, when the Emperor *Charls* the Fifth would keep some Castles belonging to that State in his own power, which should otherwise have been left free to *Cosimo*; and which was the occasion of that saying, *Che le forteZZa sono i ceppi della Toscana*, That strong Holds are the fetters of *Tuscany*.

These are the greatest mischiefs which strong Holds use to bring with them; but there are others not altogether so grievous, but more certain and irreparable. For who can deny but that the excessive charge which Princes are at, not onely in building Fortresses, but mors in muniting, and guarding them doth sufficiently exhaust the publick Exchequer, and necessitate the disbursing of such moneys in times of peace, as ought to be kept for the more urgent occasions of War. And certainly he who could see what vast sums the Commonwealth of *Venice* hath spent for some late years past in making and muniting so many Forts both by Sea and Land, would be very much astonished, and would confess that so great a mass of treasure would be sufficient to provide for any War how great soever, and to withstand for a good while any potent Enemy. It may peradventure likewise be said, and not untruly, that whilst a Prince reposest much confidence in being able to maintain his State by means of these strong Holds, and by the assistance of a few Soldiers, he is not so careful as he ought to be of other things which belong to the M.ilia, which are notwithstanding real and secure foundations of a State. The *Lacedemoneians* would not therefore suffer their Cities to be begirt with a wall, because they beleeved that by the thoughts of such securitie, their Citizens would become more careless and negligent in managing their Arms, by sole means whereof they thought that the Forces of an Enemie might and ought to be kept afar off. Which that wise man would likewise infer who said, That the walls, which ought to secure a City should be made of iron not of stone. And a *Spartan* being demanded by an *Athenian*, what he thought of the walls of *Athens*? answered, That he thought they were very handsome for a City which was to be inhabited by women; inferring, that it is not necessarie, nor honorable, for able, valian: men, to secure themselves from their Enemies by such means. It is likewise usually seen, that a Prince, who thinks he shall be able to curb his Subjects, to govern them and rule them as he pleaseth by means of Bulwarks and Castles, and that therefore he needs not the love of his Subjects, is much less mindful of those things which become a good Prince, and which purchase affect on. Yet we are taught by many evident examples that the peoples love or hatred is that which doth most preserve unto him; or bereave him of his State, and makes them more ready or backward to render him obedient; as is of late seen in *Flanders*; which so many Fortresses, and Armies hath not in so long a time been able to reduce to the devotion of its lig:mate

Prince. And it may generally be observed, that such Governments as have lasted longest, have been preserved, not by the advantage of strong Holds, whereof some have not had any, but by virtue of a good Militia, and of the Subjects love.

The *Romans* were accustomed, when they had won any new Country, to send new Inhabitants thither, who being placed either in the antient Cities, or in others built by themselves, they called Roman Colonies; and by these mens valor, as People devoted and obliged to the Senate and People of *Rome*, out of remembrance of their des. rt, and in gratitude for the good which they had received, they easily kept the new Subjects in loyalty to the Commonwealth, and the Countries which they had won by their Arms, in obedience. The which, being moved thereunto by the same respects, the *Venetians* did likewise in *Candia*, sending many of their own Gentlemen thither to make Colonies, and to defend and maintain that Island. But the *Turks*, in a very violent manner, but answerable to the custom of their Government, do almost totally destroy the antient Inhabitants of their new-gotten Countries, chiefly the richest and the most noble, from whom they take their Lands and possessions, and give the revenues thereof to be made use of by the Sold ery, making *Timari* thereof (as they term it) which are Pays or Revenues assigned over to the Soldiers, upon condition that they are to maintain a certain number of Horse, by which means they keep a great number of Warriors continually on foot, who serving for Garrisons for the safety of the new acquired Country, are notwithstanding always ready to serve in any other place, and upon all occasions as they shall be commanded; to the greater benefit and safety of the State, than Forts and strong Hold's can do to those other Nations which make most use of them. But other Princes, who have had greater abundance of Territories, if you will respect their Inhabitants, did use to leave great store of Land upon their Confines desert and unmanured, as at these times the *Persians* did upon their Confines towards the *Turks*, to render it more difficult for a numerous Army to pass through them to their prejudice, or in case they do, to make any long abode there: which hath often been of great use to them, as hath been seen, when very mighty Armies have been led on by the Ottoman Emperors against the Persians, they have most commonly been wasted and destroyed by their own sufferings and wants.

From these things it appears it may be inferred'd, that there are other Arts and ways which may much better do that for which Fortifications were first found out, and for which they are now a-dies so much used, especially amongst Christian Princes. And yet if we will face about, some other, and those no contemptible arguments will be found, which will plead for the very great advantage which Princes and States receive from Fortifications. It is most assuredly certain, that to secure a mans self by all means possible from offence, is a precept not only taught by Reason, but dictated by Nature, which, as it were by some occult and miraculous coun'el, hath pleased to divide those Nations by a long series of high towering Mountains, and to secure them from the injuries which the diversity of Climate hath produced in their several affections and customs, and consequently a certain natural enmity; and hath likewise provided in all parts more eminent seats amongt Mountains, and more inclosed ones amidst Vallies, wherein the Inhabitants may preserve themselves safe from the force and violence, which the stronger use to exercise upon the weaker. So as Fortification may be said to be an Art which doth imitate and help Nature, because her operations are like those of the others, and do sometimes reduce the workmanship of Nature to more perfection and use. And though this be not grounded upon so certain principles as those of the Sciences, yet doth she govern herself by a kind of Reason in such things wherein she is versed.

And thus much may serve to prove that she deserves the name of Art; neither ought she to be ever a whit undervalued, because new things and new rules are daily found out by the industrie of those that study her, since it is proper to natural and eternal things to keep themselves always in such a condition, as that they suffer not any alteration. But say what thing it is, which of all humane operations, wherein such certainty and constancie is to be found? No man will notwithstanding say, that men are to live idly, or totally to betake themselves to Contemplation, and despise so many Arts, which are the ornaments of Civil life, because we cannot proceed therein by way of demonstration to one only and certain truth. Nor can it be said that this Art of Fortification is of late invention, for it is very antient, and hath been known almost in all Ages, and by all Nations; but sometimes in lesser, sometimes in greater perfection, according to a certain variety and vicissitude which Time causeth as well in Arts, as in all other things. The Antients had their Forts, and Engines of War to take them, which by a general name they called *Tormenta*: Amongst other Engines which served to batter down Forts, the Rams were much known and used; and we find mention made of many other sorts of Instruments belonging to the offence and defence of Cities; and of these some so miraculous, as their force may be said to cause no less wonder, then do our Guns now adays. To this purpose we read, that when *Scipio* would vanquish a certain City in *Spain*, the Defenders thereof threw certain Irons over the walls, so artificially ordered, as they therewith drew up such of the Enemies Soldiers as came neer the walls, to the top thereof. And it is related of that famous *Archimedes*, that he invented an Engine which was used in defence of his Country *Syracusa*, by which an armed Gally might be raised by force out of the water, and drawn up on the Town-walls. How can it be then said, that such Art of Fabricking was unknown to the Antients, if they used such study and industry in defending and in oppugning Forts? Nay, many of their most cry'd up Commanders have been praised particularly for this; and the *Romans*, who were very excellent at all things belonging to the Militia, were very good at this also, and did thereby preserve their State, which they had almost lost by fighting: For *Hannibal* in his prosperous course of victory, was forced to keep so long, and spend so much time before some small, but strong and well-walled Castles, and Colonies of the *Romans*, as the safety of the City of *Rome* was in a great part attributed thereunto.

But to speake no more of these antient proceedings, do we not see that many Forts and Castles have been built in not many Ages ago in many places, and chiefly in *Italy*? Which though the use of Cannon renders now of no use, yet compare such Fortresses with the manner of warfaring in those days, and they may be held almost equal to ours, or at least they shew that men did study as much then to secure themselves from being injured by the Enemy, and the better to maintain their States and Territories by that art, as they do now. The so many Sieges and beleaguering of Cities, whereof mention is made in all Ages, do clearly prove that the use of Fortification is of very antient use, and hath been continued in all Ages, though it be now reduced to much greater perfection. Now if we shall consider what advantage is made by Fortifications, we shall find them to be many, and of great importance: For it is sufficiently manifest, that a Country wherein are no strong Holds, is alwaies in apparent danger, and left almost at the discretion of the Enemy; who whilst they may safely at unawares enter thereinto, not meeting with any obstacle, have it alwaies in their power, if not to prejudice the main affairs of that State, at least to vex the people by fire and rapine, of whose safety and preservation the Prince ought alwaies to be careful.

We may find sad example of this by the late and well known passages of the Country of *Friuli* in the late Wars which the State of *Venice* had in *Terra firme*, being

being totally destitute of strong Holds, it became a prey to whosoever would assault it; insomuch as it was not onely ruined and destroyd by regular Armies, but by such as passed tumultuously over the mountains; the Inhabitants thereof being only so long secure, as the *Venetian* Army was permitted to remain amongst those Confines; but as soon as being summoned from thence, upon other occasions, it behoved to be gone from thence, the Enemies returned again to fresh and secure depredations; which will likewise befall any Region which is not defended, and maintained by Fortresses. And where the members of a State are far asunder, if it must be defended onely by the Soldiers sword, many Armies will scarcely be able to secure it; whereas by means of strong Holds, the same people who are able to defend them, will likewise serve in a great part to preserve the Country; as well because many of the Inhabitants may there finde safe refuge, as likewise for that is no good advice nor usually imbraced by good Commanders to advance forward, and to leave the Forts of the Enemy placed in fitting parts upon the Frontiers behinde them, the State is preserved from greater dangers. As on the contrary, the State wherein there are no strong Holds, though it be provided of a good and valiant Militia, yet must it depend upon the various chance of War, and hazard all upon the uncertain event of Battel; and if any thing of misfortune befall, the whole Country is left to the discretion of the Enemy, and the Armies not having any safe place whereunto to retreat are totally defeated by one rout; as it happened in the last Age in the Soldan of *Cairo's* most famost Empire, which Soldan being overcome in several Battels by *Selymus Ottoman*, and wanting time to rally his Army, and strong Holds whereunto to have refuge, did in a short time lose his whole Kingdom and the Empire of the *Mammalucchi* was overthrown; which was before very famous for military discipline, and esteemed very secure, by reposing its safety in the valor of strong and able men.

To this may be added; That strong Holds do not onely secure States from these most hazards of adverse Fortune, but make very much for the keeping ir away, and often-times they reap the intention of true securitie, without any hazard; for when he who intends to assault a State, shall consider that his attempts are likely to prove tedious and difficult, and that it is doubtful whether he shall be therein victorius or no, he does not so easily fall upon the busines; but when the War is once begun Fortresses do assuredly sufficiently keep from comming to join Battel; for the assailant will not easily hazard himself upon the danger of a pitch'd Field; because he sees he shall be debarr'd the chief fruits of Victorie (which is the getting of some City or place of importance) by strong Holds: And so also he who is assaulted, the more he sees his affairs in a good posture by the means of strong Holds, the more he endeavors to prolong the time, to the end that he may defeat him by his own incommodities, without much use of weapons: Whence it is that in these times, wherein the perfection of fortifying is much increased, field Battels are seldom fought; for to fight makes not for the advantage of either of the parties out of the above said considerations; Since the wit and industry of the Commanders seems to prevail over Fortifications and do in a great part take that uncertainty from War which useth to be found therein. In the condition of the present affairs and times, it is also seen that as much time is spent in the taking of one onely Fort, as in former Ages; and when another manner of Militia was in use, was spent in taking in whole Provinces. Which peradventure is likewise the cause why the Princes of these later Ages, though some of them have been very powerful and valiant, have not made any great progress in all the Wars which they have made: Wherefore it seems it may be affirmed that Fortification is a very noble and excellent Art, because it helps to compass the ultimate and true end which ought to be the aim of War in a well regulated State, to wit, peace and securitie.

What is then to be resolved upon in this diversitie of allegations ? It is a true and general rule, that all things cannot suit with all things, nor ought we in the actions belonging to civil life to seek for that which is simply, and of it self good, for it would be in vain to do so ; divers things prove useful to divers ends, and to divers persons, and they ought to be accommodated to the condition of times, quality of customs, and to other particular accidents. Therefore the same manner of proceeding in the Government, and preservation of their States becomes not several Princes, but several waies. Such Princes as have large Dominions, and powerful Forces, may securely repose their safety in their Militia, and Soldiery, they have no great need of Castles or strong Holds ; and if they will have any , it may suffice them to have them placed upon their utmost Confines, to secure their Country from sudden incursions, and for the opportunitie and securitie of such Garisons as such Princes use to keep in their provinces; which are furthest remote, and at a great distance from their Imperial Seat ; as the Roman Emperors did in former times, and as the *Ottoman* Lords do now, who trusting in their own power, do endeavor much more the taking of Forts which do appertain to other men, then the making of new ones themselves, which they stand not so much in need of, for that their greatness keeps them free from being injured by others. But lesser Princes ought to govern themselves by another rule, and stand more in need of strong Holds ; for not having any large Territories, nor much money to keep a great many Soldiers continually in pay, what they cannot do by force or reputation, they do by the advantage of Fortifications ; for they keep what belongs unto them so well guarded by a few Soldiers , as sometimes the Forces of any whatsoever powerful Prince are not able to pluck them out of their nest, nor yet to bereave them of any part of their State : Whereof we have had many examples in these later times, and amongst the rest, the defence of *Malta* is very remarkable, which being assaulted by the Forces of so great a Prince as was *Solyman*, the few Knights of *Malta* were so able to defend it, as the Turks were forced not without some shame, and much to their prejudice, to quit it, after having spent much time, and lost many men before that Fort.

And the Turks having learned by the experience of others, the good of strong Holds begin now to have a better esteem of them, then formerly they have had, especially in places furthest off from the Seat of the Empire , where all things necessarie cannot be provided for, but in a long time, and with much inconveniencie. They have to this purpose built many Forts in the parts which they have lately gotten in *Persia* ; and have therein done very wisely ; for whereas the former *Ottoman* Emperors, reaped no good by their enterprises upon *Persia*, but as soon as their Armies were withdrawn, the Country which they had over-run, but not gotten, returned to the obedience of its former Lords, now, by degrees from time to time, they have by their Forts so confirmed themselves in the possession of such places as they have once taken, as the *Persians*, being a people little verst in the expugning of strong Holds, have but small hopes of ever driving them out from such spacious Territories, first gotten by force of Arms, and afterwards by such means maintained by them, & by a safe possession secured unto them. So as the use of Fortresses are sometime according as place and occasion shall serve of no small service, not only to pe. tie Princes, but even to the greatest. But as for the number of these strong Holds, for the time, form, and other accident, which ought to be observed in the building of them, no such certain rule can be given as can serve all men at all times. Only this may be said, that a wise Prince ought to consider herein, not only what he designs to do, but what his Estate, and what his Forces are ; otherwise that which was intended for a cure and sustenance, may prove poison and ruin to the State. As when a Prince will make such, and so many Fortresses, as that by

reason of too great and inconsiderate expence in time of Peace, in maintaining them, he must of himself consume; then that will prove true which hath formerly been considered, that a Prince of no great fortune, not being able to garrisonise or furnish so many Fortresses with things necessary; nor to draw forth the body of a well-adjusted Army into the field, in greatest danger of War, will find he hath not secured, but increased his own dangers, and hath put the total of his affairs in great disorder and confusion.

Fortresses then, as all other things in a well ordered Government, ought to be disposed of with good judgment, and a well regulated temper; so as their number and greatness may be proportionable to the condition of the State, and of the Prince his Forces: They must not be placed idly in all places, but only upon the Frontiers, and in places fit for that purpose; and so as the natural situation of the place may assist Art as much as may be, and be also thereby assisted; for such Fortresses may be maintained in greater security, and with fewer Soldiers. But above all things, all possible care must be had, that in time of greatest need they may be succor'd; for no Fort can hold out long against a great force, unless it be supplied by new Garrisons, Munitions, and with all other necessaries. It is also very advantagious for Fortresses, that there be good store of good Earth or Mould within them, whereby they may several ways accommodate themselves for defence, according as the approaches to take them are made; and also to have ready opportunity to use the benefit of many retreats, and to gain time, which is the proper and greatest conveniencie for Fortresses. So as if fitting provisions and respects be had, Fortresses so built will prove advantagious for a Prince or State, not only in the opinion of Soldiers, but even of Statesmen: But when they are made without judgment or art, it is not the fault of the Work, but of him who knows not how to use it, if such good effects do not ensue thereupon as are desired: Which happens not only in strong Holds, but in all other things, which being ill used, lose their efficacie. Thus then those arguments are easily answered by these distinctions, and by what hath been alledged in the behalf of strong Holds, which might at first occasion any doubt: For the Art of Fortification ought not to be despised, because it hath not alwaies been the same; rather it ought to be so much the more esteemed, because we see it grows every day to greater perfection by new inventions, and by experiences. Thus it fares also with the Art of building of Ships and Houses, with that of Sculpture, Physick, Painting, and of all other excellent Disciplines, which (Experience being the best Introductress) did not arrive at such excellencie and estimation suddenly, but in proces of time.

And notwithstanding, this Art of Fortification hath in this our Age gotten some more settled Rules, and (as a man may say) more certain Principles, since the use of Patteries and of other manner of Attaques introduced by modern men, whereby she doth govern herself in the whole, and in every one of her particular members, in form, distance, proportion of parts, and in other things, which are alwaies the same, where the seat will permit it. Variety of noble Wits have added so much of ornament and of perfection of late to this noble Profession, as all doubts which may be put whether there be a true Art thereof, or no, are evidently cleared: And though sometimes she may vary by reason of the diversity of situations, or by any other accidents which cannot be comprised within one and the same Rule, this ought not to detract from the dignity of the Artificers thereof, then it doth from the Polititian (who certainly is the chiefest Architect or in all our Civil operations) to proceed by probable arguments, and oftentimes alter his advice, that he may fit his actions to the circumstances which do accompany them. Nor doth it follow, that such an Art should be the worse thought of, because it doth not alwaies compass its end, which is the preservation of such a City, or such a Country where such

Such Fortifications are erected ; since that likewise depends upon various accidents, which no humane art or wisdom is able to foresee nor when foreseen, to provide alwaies by any industry a due remedy against them. It may as well be said, men ought to forbear building of Ships, and deprive themselves thereby of the Traffick and Commerce which is held with far distant Countries, because many Ships perish in the Seas. The Physitians care doth not alwaies cure the sick party ; the Orator doth not alwaies compass his ends by his perswasive oratory : Ought men therefore to forbear Navigation, Physick, or Perswasion ? If a wicked and perfidious man betray a Fort unto the Enemy which was recommended to his trust, ought this to be attributed to the evil and imperfection of Forts ? What thing is there so good, as may not be abused by wicked men ? 'tis only Virtue which hath this priviledg ; all other adornments of Humanitie would be extinct, and expell'd the World. If a Fort be lost for being badly garrisoned, ill defended, or by some other sinister accident ; ought the fault which is committed by the Prince his negligence, the Commanders ignorance, or by the Soldiers cowardise, be laid upon the defect of the Fort, which is of it self well made ? But say, I beseech you, are such disorders and dangers as may arise in a State, by want of care in a Prince, by the perfidiousnes of Commanders, or cowardise of Soldiers, become so peculiar to Forts and Citadels, as the same by the same occasion may not happen in Armies, and in all other defences howsever attempted ? Wherefore then by seeking for such perfection in Forts, as is not found in other things, shall we by the los of that advantage which may be thereby received, and is often received, leave the State in the hands of Chance, and to the discretion of him who doth design to assault it. Nor ought it to be said, that strong Holds shculd be despised, and the whole safety of the State be placed in the Militia, as in a thing of firmer foundation, because it is not every Prince that can alwaies keep an Army in pay, nor would this be sufficient to keep a State from unexpected assaults, which hath many several Confines. Moreover, he who placeth all his hopes of securing his State in Armies, and in openly fighting his Enemies, must oftentimes (as it hath been said) hazard all to Fortune, and put himself upon the danger of a thousand accidents ; and unless Field-forces be back'd by strong Holds, and equal to those of the Enemy who doth assault them, they must remain idle and of no use : For not being able to withstand the shock, what can they do else but retreat, and suffer him who shall be stronger to make himself Master of the whole Country ? whereas by the help of Fortresses, a few are able to resist many, and to gain time, the only true remedy of him who is the weaker, and who is to resist and withstand the Forces of one that is more powerful.

Nor ought the example of the *Spartans* be of any validity to perswade the contrary, who would not secure their Cities with Walls, or any other Fortifications, because having only to do with other people of *Greece* who were weaker then they ; they thought themselves safe without such helps ; and that by doing so, they purchased more praise and reputation : But when they were to wage war with the *Persians* and *Macedonians*, who were powerful Enemies, even they sought to put themselves in a posture of defence, by having recourse to narrow paslages, and to keep off the Enemy, assiting the natural situations of the places by Fortifications. Moreover, the *Spartans* had but small Territories, and but a few places to guard ; and were much given to the Militia ; so as they who will reap advantage by following their counsels, must be Lords of Cities, all the inhabitants whereof must be Soldiers, and all of them desitous to preserve the State, as were the *Spartans*. But the reason why the Duke of *Urbino* did slight some of his Forts, was peradventure because he knew himself too weak to defend them ; and besides, because he thought it better not to invite others to wage war with him, either out of a jealousie of them, or out of a desire to make themselves masters of them, he being to consider all

Forces as they related to his, or if he would make use of other mens assistance he must depend upon them. And for what concerns the strong Holds of *Tuscany*, it may be said in the first place, that it was the imprudencie of *Pietro de Medici*, not the Castles which did trouble and disorder the *Florentines*: And secondly, that it may be Duke *Cosimo* would not so easily have gotten *Caſar* to have confirmed him in the possession of that State, had it not been that he might thereby secure himself of his faſh in that new Dominion; But the accidents which may occur are ſo many, as it is impoſſible to comprehend every particular under one and the ſame rule. And is it not a vain thing to affirm, that strong Holds ought not to be made use of, because if it ſo fall out as the State which wants them be lost, it may be the more easily recovered? For that is no more then to expose a mans ſelf to mortal wounds, out of hopes that when he is hurt he may find a cure. And what Prince can affiſe himſelf that though he hath been negligent in muniting his State with Forts, his Enemy when he ſhall have made himſelf Master of his State, will not fortifie ſuch ſeats as he ſhall find commodious for his ſafety.

But if it be ſaid, that a Prince grows wicked, covetous, and cruel towards his Subjects through his too much confiding in strong Holds, it is not easily to diſcern that theſe ſo far remote affairs have any thing to do with the vices of the mind, and if they ought to be taken into ſuch conſideration, the reaſon would reach no further then to Castles and Citadels; but in greater and more impoſſible Fortifications, the Prince is ſo much the more bound to preſerve the love and loyaltie of his Subjects, in that he stands in the more need of them for the ſafety of the City thus fortified, for if it ſhould fall into the Enemies hands by the peoples rebellion, the losſ would be the greater. But it may be the conſideration of expence which that Prince puts himſelf unto, who buiſls many strong Holds, may ſeem to bear more weight with it then any of the reſt, whereas his chief care ought to be, to accumulate treasure in time of peace, againſt Wars ſhall happen; to which it may be anſwered, That States cannot be preſerved without charges and expence; and that if a Prince ſhould go about to procure the like ſecuritie to himſelf by his Militia, as he doth by his strong Holds: he muſt be at infinite more expence, and ſuch as none but great Kingdoms and Empires are able to undergo. But if a Prince proceed therein with ſuch temper and judgement as hath been ſpoken of, and which is alſo reuiſite in all things elſe, he can incur no danger by Fortifications, of running into thoſe disorders and neceſſities, which many careleſs men, and ſuch as know not how to govern do fall.

We will then conclude, that Fortifications are very uſeful in all States, but chiefly in ſmall ones, and in thoſe more then any others, which have many Confines, and powerful neighbors, for ſuch States have need of good guards, and have not wherewith to keep Armies perpetually on foot, as the Turks do in theſe times, nor to make Desarts as do the *Persians*, nor to iuſtitute Colonies in ſeveral parts, as was the cuſtom of the antient *Romans*; and if the Commonwealth of *Venice* did imitate them therein, it was but once; and with more deſire to the ſelf-inhabitants of the Island of *Candia* at her devoſion, then to defend it from forein Forces; But now that the Turks power is grown ſo formidaſle, it would be altogether unuſeful, and not of any moment, without ſtrong Holds, and a well paid Militia; therefore the care and ſtudy which Princes take more in theſe latter times then they did formerly in Fortification muſt needs be praifeſed by whomever conſiders things with a right judgment.

The Ninth DISCOURSE.

Whether the Opinion of Pope Leo the Tenth were good or no, and his counsel safe, of driving forein Nations out of Italy, by the help of other Transalpine Forces.

Italy had been molested with Wars by forein Nations, almost continually for the space of Thirty years, when in the time of the Popedom of *Leo the Tenth*, she seemed to have some hopes of quiet, and of enjoying some better condition, after her so many and so grievous vexations and ruines, which had called to mind the unhappy memorie of the former calamities which she had undergone by the invasion of the Northern Armies. But the wounds of the late evils remained yet uncured; for two noble members of this Province were fallen into the hands of forein Princes, the State of *Milan* being at the devotion of *Francis King of France*, and the Emperor *Charls the Fifth* being possest of the Kingdom of *Naples*; which Princes being now weakned and weary with so many Wars, so as the one could not exceed the other, and having at that time their thoughts elsewhere bent, being governed more by necessarie peradventure then by their own wills, they seemed to rest satisfied with what they did already posses in *Italy*, and that they would suffer her to enjoy at least some rest after her past molestations.

In this posture of Affairs, Pope *Leo*, who had often negotiated with several Princes about the busines of Arms, and had endeavored (as he said) the liberty of *Italy*, and chiefly the preservation of the Dukedom of *Milan* in the Government of the *Sforza's*, was much displeased to have the power of strangers any longer continued, and particularly that the Church should be bereft of two noble Cities, *Parma* and *Piacenza*, which were become members of the State of *Milan*. Therefore with a haughty and generous mind, he resolved not to prefer an unsecure quiet, before some present troubles, so to shun other molestations and dangers, which he thought might grow the greater by such a peace, in future, if not to himself, at least to the Church. And knowing that he should not be able either of himself, nor by joining with other *Italians*, to drive forein Potentates out of *Italy*, he resolved to join with some foreiners against some other foreiners, with design (as he said) that when some of them should be forced to forgo *Italy*, it might be the easier to expel the rest.

Leo having thus put on this noble and generous resolution, it may seem to merit praise by all men, as to the intention; but as for the means he took to compass it, it is not so easily to be agreed upon, for many and weighty respects do concur thereunto; for some of which, this action may seem to be as wise, as glorious; and if we will reflect upon other some, there will appear much more of difficulty and danger therein, then of security and hopes. That all Transalpiners might be driven out of *Italy*, was a thing desired, and not without cause by all *Italians*, and which ought to be his chiefest care and endeavor who had such Territories, degree and authority in that Province, as *Leo* had. The antient dignity of the *Italian* honor seemed to appear in the Popes majesty, and in the splendor of the Court of *Rome*: but as for the effecting of this business, it did plainly appear that all the power of the *Italian* Potentates was too weak; since two great Princes and warlike Nations, had for many past years, though with various fortune, got footing there, and still kept their possession, so as their power could suffer no disturbance, but must be confirmed

and consolidated, and must become more formidable to the Church, and to all the Italian Princes, unless it were by some of the same forein Nations. If the sole Forces of the Italian Princes, when *Italy* by reason of a long Peace did flourish most, were not sufficient to stop the French Forces, which were then but new in those parts, and but meanly assisted; what reason was there to believe, that this Province should ever be raised up again of herself, and should by means of her own Forces return to her pristine fortune and dignity, after having been so long vexed by cruel Wars, and having lost two of her noblest Members.

Wherefore though to administer fresh fuel, as it were, to this fire of War, as would be done by the authority and Forces of the Apostolick Sea, if they should join with *Cæsar*, or with the King of *France*, might be troublesome and dangerous, yet might it be beneficial, or at least hopeful, since it might so fall out, that the fortune of War being various, and subject to unexpected chances, some good effect might ensue thereupon for the liberty of *Italy*; the Forces of those Princes who did oppose her, growing much the weaker, or else by their growing weary of the work, and by their turning themselves to some other undertaking. Whereas on the contrary, to suffer them to settle there, and to get in time greater authority over the people, and more love to the States which they had gotten, was a certain and irreparable ruine, and an utter abolishing of all hopes of ever restoring the States which were possesst by strangers into the hands of the Italian Princes. But the fear lest both these Princes, who were grown so powerful in *Italy*, might join together against the Territories of the Church, or those of other Italian Princes, to divide them amongst themselves, as had happened not many years before, when the Emperor *Maximilian* and *Lewis* the Twelfth, King of *France*, who had been formerly at such great enmity one with another, grew good friends by dividing the Lands between them which belonged to the *Venetians*; might chiefly perswade the Pope to quit neutrality, and to side with the one or the other of these Princes. *Leo* knew, that upon many past occasions he had done things not only of but little satisfaction, but of much disgust to both these Princes and Nations, more particularly to the *French*, who were alwaies jealous of his cunning; so as great emulation growing in them both, and a desire of commanding over all *Italy*, and finding that affairs were so equally poised between them in this Province, as the one could not much exceed the other, nor make any new acquisition, it was with reason to be feared, that being void of all hopes of having the Pope to side with either of them, from whose friendship they might for many reasons expect very considerable assistance, they might at last convene together to the total oppression of the Liberty of *Italy*. Nor was *Leo*'s Neutrality in this conjuncture of time and affairs able to secure him from such a danger, since he had formerly openly declared himself and taken up Arms in company with others; and chiefly since the *French* knew, that he was no waies pleased with their Dominion in *Italy*, as well for the common affairs, as for his own particular dislike that they had possessed themselves of the Cities of *Parma* and *Piacenza*, which were returned to the obedience of the Apostolick Sea by his Predecessor *Julius*. So as the Churches State, and that of the *Florentines*, which was under the same Popes protection and government, grew to be those alone which were exposed to the injuries of all men; for the *Venetians* were still firm to the *French*, and the other lesser Princes adhered some to the fortune of the *French*, some to that of the Imperialists. It was then the most useful, safe, and requisite counsel, to join in friendship by particular and reciprocal obligations, either with *Cæsar*, or with the King of *France*: By doing which, to boot with security, many good effects might follow, to wit, that the adverse party being supprest and driven out of *Italy*, that party which should yet remain there as friend, and free from the jealousie or rivalship of any forein Prince, was likely to afford a long Peace (a thing very

Very necessary in respect of the many late afflictions) and such accidents might the more probably happen in process of time, whereby *Italy* might more easily free herself from the servitude of one only Lord and Master, then she should have done from the like of two; it being unlikely that two Principalities should meet with one and the same fortune, at one and the same time. But if nothing else of good had happened during this discord and contention between these two Princes, their States must be subject to the expences and troubles which do necessarily accompany War; so as some revenge would be had upon these foreign Nations, for the so many calamities which they had brought upon *Italy*; and that saying of the Scripture would be verified, *To revenge a man upon his Enemies, by other Enemies.*

The Emperors of *Rome*, when the Empire began to decline, and the antient Italian worth and discipline was almost lost, they not having Forces sufficient of their own to withstand the Northern nations, made use of the Soldiers of the same Northern nations to drive their Fellow-foreigners out of *Italy*; as particularly of the *Goths*, of whom they had several times great numbers in their Armies. But say that one of these foreign Princes could not have worsted the other, though assisted by the Apostolick Sea, even in this condition of affairs hopes would not be wanting, whilst War should continue between them: For after having long wrestled together, especially since the quarrel arose out of hatred and warlike emulation, it was not unlikely that they would rather quit the Territories which they held in *Italy* to some third persons, then to yield one to another, so as it might remain in their own power: Concerning which surrender, particularly of the State of *Milan*, many Treaties had been formerly. *Leo* had likewise a very fresh example of councils taken by the Venetian Senate, which in the same case was confirm'd by experience to be very wisely done: For that Senate finding that their State was fallen into great misfortunes, and reduced to so low an ebb, as she was not able to recover of herself, they joined with some of their very Enemies, against other some of their Enemies; whereby they did not only separate them, but did revenge themselves much to the prejudice of those that they had excluded from their friendship, and did thus recover the State which had been usurped from them. But *Leo*'s advice was afterwards the better approved of by the particular issue of this very business: For having after many several cogitations of mind join'd in confederacie with *Cesar*, the City of *Milan* was taken from the *French* by their joint-forces, and the Cities of *Parma* and *Piacenza* were recovered to the Church; not without great hopes, had it not been for the unexpected and unfortunate death of Pope *Leo*, that the *French* should have then been totally expuls'd out of *Italy*, and *Maximilian Sforza* reinvested into the State of *Milan*, according to agreements made by the Pope, which would have greatly secured the liberty of the Church, and of whole *Italy*. Which when it should have so succeeded, there was reason enough to hope, that the *French* would join in driving the *Imperialists* out of the Kingdom of *Naples*, being satisfied (without any other reward) with having revenged themselves for their received injuries, and with seeing the *Imperialists* reduced to their condition, for what concerned the affairs of *Italy*. And it might be hoped that this might the easilier be done, by reason of the far distance of *Cesar's* Territories, and by reason of many ill humors which began already to grow in several places; whereby he might be necessitated to bend his Forces and thoughts elsewhere, and leave his affairs in *Italy* but weakly defended. *Leo* then may seem to have grounded his counsels well, like a wise Prince (as he was) upon good foundations, for as much as may be effected by humane wisdom, where so many other accidents do concur. Yet were there not wanting some who did greatly blame this resolution of Pope *Leo*'s, taxing him with inconsiderateness, because being led on by vain hopes, he had unnecessarily imbroil'd himself again

again in War: And if we shall look more narrowly into this business, we shall find that many Considerations were wanting; which may raise at least some rational doubts, whether the Pope were more to be praised, or to be blamed for this action.

It is most certain, that War in it self is troublesom to Princes, grievous to the People, and subject to many various and uncertain chances. So that as every wise Prince ought alwaies to avoid it, where there is no express necessity, it appears that this Prince ought to have had it in more horror then any other, in respect of the times, and of his degree and place, which ought rather to have made him endeavor peace and quiet between Christian Princes. The Dominion of the Church was by his Predecessors means arrived already to such a largeness, as it might seem better to become the Succeeder to augment the safety thereof by procuring friendship with other Princes, and by a constant neutrality, then to expose himself to new troubles and dangers, by adding more States thereunto. *Italy* having been much afflicted, and brought in almost every of her parts to great misery and calamity, for having been the seat of War for the space of thirty years, did not onely much desire peace and quiet, but did chiefly expect it from the Popes counsels and actions, by reason of his supreme authoritie, and of the zeal he ought to have born to the publick good.

How could it then deserve praise, that when forein Princes seemed to be inclined to suffer *Italy* to remain quiet, he should afford them occasion and means of imbroiling her in new troubles and calamities; which were certainly to insue by re-assuming Arms, where the advantage which might thereby be gotten was very doubtful and questionable? But, that which in this case is chiefly to be considered, is, that *Leo*'s intention being to drive the foreiners out of *Italy*, and to vindicate her liberty, he should have chosen some good means to have done it. Many antient and modern experiences might have taught him, how hard a matter it might be to keep the *French* on the other side of the Mountains. The *Romans* were not more troubled with any other Nation then with the *French*, in treeing *Italy* from forein invasions; for she was oft-times assaulted by them, and many of her parts possest by them, and the Empire it self was endangered by their Forces. And of late years since the passage of *Charls* the Eighth, though they had proved variety of fortune, yet kept they still the same resolution of waging war in *Italy*, and of keeping footing in this Province, not being frighted from this resolution by any misfortune how great soever; but being once beaten back, they returned with great fury to seek out novelties; and at this very time that we now speak of, they were possest of the Dutchy of *Milan*. Therefore to secure himself from the *French*, it was not sufficient to drive them once out of *Italy*; for the Forces of that large Kingdom being still very powerful, and they being alwaies prepared for novelty, their desire bore them chiefly thereunto, where it had done formerly, so as *Italy* remained still exposed to new incursions, and subject to the miseries of War. Therefore this intention of Pope *Leo*'s, of keeping the *French* long out of *Italy*, could not peradventure have been compassed but in a long procces of time, and with much variety of success, no, not though *Italy* had been all of a peece, and in greater power and prosperitie then she then was.

Whereas at this time the Commonwealth of *Venice* being now returned to great power, was joined in confederacie with the King of *France* by vertue of antient Capitulations; nor was it to be hoped for, that out of any uncertain hopes, and of long expectation, she should easily forgo such a friendship: And as for other Princes, they were but weak, and their ends not constant nor conformable. And on the other side, *Cæsar* was very bare of monies, and had many other irons in the fire, so as the greatest weight and care of managing this War was likely to fall un-

to the Popes share, wherein if he should slacken never so little, all that had been done would have been to no effect; and those places, which by reason of this confederacie with the Church, were taken from the *French*, would quickly and easily have fald into their han^s again. But say that *Charls* had been able to have imployed all his Forces about this businels, the greater they had been, the greater share would he have pretended in the businels: and the less able had the Pope or any others been to oppose his Forces.

Charls the Great, a Prince of excellent worth, freed *Italy* from the slavish yoke of the Northern Barbarians, driving the *Lombards* from thence, who had had the chief command there for Three hundred years; but he would therefore make the greatest advantage thereof unto himself, creating his Son *Pipin*, King of *Italy*; nor ought any of *Charls* his promises to be thought sufficient to shun such a danger, to which it was known he was much more moved out of a fervent desire to draw the Pope into this confederacie of excluding the King of *France*, then that he had any waies quitted his desire to the Dukedom of *Milan*. What reason was there then to beleve, that when *Cesar* should be become more powerful in *Italy*, and should have driven out the *French*, he should likewise be expell'd from thence, when his Territories and Authority should be there the greater? It is rather to be beleved, that by his increase of power, *Italy* should be in a worse condition, and the danger thereof the more, for whilst these two Princes stood upon equal terms, and with an inveterate mind did counterpoise one another, the other States were the more secure, it being unlikely that any one of the parties would permit that the others should increase, or be heighthned by the ruine of any of the Princes of *Italy*; but he that should be assaulted by one was sure to be assited by the other; so as *Leo* ought chiefly to have endeavored in this conjuncture of affairs to have kept these scales even by his neutrality; for whilst the businels stood thus, it behoved the very Enemies of the *Italians* to value their Friendship, for their own good, and for the preservation of their States.

It is not easie to decide whether it did really conduce more to the good of *Italy*, that the Pope should continue in his neutrality, or by his joining with some one of these forein P^rinces who at that time had so great an influence upon *Italy*, the success being to depend upon many very much differing accidents; for since humane wisdom is not able to provide against them all, she cannot find any secure way which leads to that destin'd end. Let us say then (still keeping our selves within some general rules) in the first place, that to join in friendship and confederacie with a more powerful Prince, and one who is a near neighbor, when the increase of power is intended by this conjunction, is never to be done without danger, nor ought such a resolution ever be taken but out of great necessity; especially not by such Princes, who are not so weak, as they need a leaning stock, nor to depend in all things upon the event of anothers fortune. Now *Leo* had no such reason to forgo the little quiet which he had then purchast by plunging into a Sea of Leagues and Confederacies, which are very hard to be laid fast hold of with Princes of great power, desirous of glory, who pretend the same things, and between whom War is not so easily ended, as it is reassumed. The Churches Patrimonie was sufficiently secured by the majesty of Religion, by Pontifical power, by the monies which by many waies she may be supplied with, and by her Dominions, being at this time much enlarged by *Fulius* the second. So as *Leo*'s intention is to be praised for having his thoughts so carefully bent upon the Libertie of *Italy*. It is likewise to be desired that he had had either more judgement or temper, to know and chuse an opportune time, and a fitting occasion; and yet it is likewise a general rule, that to wait for the advantage of Time, when Affairs are upon great streights, do usually bring notable advantages, and sometimes by new and unexpected waies.

Italy was long under the obedience of the Western Emperors: If at that time when their power and authority was so great, the Popes would have call'd in forein Forces, and made use of them to reduce the Government of *Italy* under the Churches power, or else into the hands of some other Italian Princes, *Italy* would in the first place have certainly been given in prey to the insolencie of foreign Soldiers, and at last she would peradventure have been brought to a worse condition. But by temporising, such occasions arose, as the Church increased her Dominions by certain lawful Donations without the shedding of blood, and all *Italy* remained subject to her own proper and particular Lords; and the Western Emperors being long vex'd and troubled by the Wars of *Germany*, were forced to forgo the affairs of *Italy*.

Moreover, though *Cæsar's* fortune and power was then very great, yet was it subject to great alterations, by reason that he was a new Prince in his Dominions, because that they were far divided one from another, and for that many were apprehensive of so fast increasing greatness. So as many more opportune and better grounded occasions might peradventure arise of compassing such an intent, and the War made against him by the *Germans*, which tended so much to his danger, might prove such a one. By making fit use of which accidents, *Cæsar's* power might receive a rebuke as concerning the affairs of *Italy*, if the French forces had been any ways received, or that the *Italians* had been of the same mind as formerly they had been more unseasonably. Therefore to separate the friendship of the *French* totally from the *Italians*, as *Leo* did for as much as in him lay, discovering a double injury to them, since the King of *France* might think that fraud was join'd to ill will, could not be but an ill-taken advice. He had done better to have somewhat allated their power as to the affairs of *Italy*, then to have quite extinguish'd it, till the *Italians* might get some better light how to recover their liberty. The *Venetian* Senate took another course, though they had therein the same intent: For whilst the affairs of these two Princes, *Charls* the Emperor, and *Francis* King of *France*, were in the greatest heat of War in *Italy*, they would apply themselves to each of their fortunes, and according to the condition of time and affairs, they often changed friendship; being still constant in their aim, which was to keep their Forces as equally ballanced as they could, and that they should both be weakened by their contention one with another: But when occasion was offered of failing upon one without too much advantage to the other, (as it did in the last War made by the *Venetians* in *Italy*, after King *Francis* was let out of Prison) they stood firm and resolute, not being easily perswaded upon any conditions to lay down Arms. For on the one side, *Cæsars* power did decline by reason of many adverse chances, and the affairs of *Naples* were in great confusion and danger: And on the other side, the affairs of *France* were not much bettered as to the prejudice of the liberty of *Italy*; for a chief Article in this Confederacie was, That the State of *Milan* should be restored to *Francisco Sforza*, as at last it was. But *Leo* in this conjuncture of affairs did precipitate himself into friendship with the *Imperialists*, and drew the enmity of the *French* upon him, so as his danger became almost equally the same, whatever event the War should have; and the sequel did more demonstrate this by the imprisonment of *Clement*, and by the slavery which *Cæsars* greatness threatened to all *Italy*.

So as it appears to reason, and by the sequel, that a noble and magnificent fabrick, as *Leo's* proposition touching the freeing of *Italy* from the subjection of Foreiners, was really to be esteemed, was not built upon so true and solid a foundation as was able to support so great a weight. But for the present, after many various accidents, the condition of affairs may be esteemed either good, or at least less bad; forasmuch as *Italy*, through *Philip* the King of *Spains* great wisdom and moderation of mind, hath

bath enjoyed a long and peaceful condition, and flourisheth now as much as she hath done in many preceding Ages, to the Peoples great comfort, and to the singulat praise of the late Princes.

The Tenth DISCOURSE.

Whether the Counsel taken by the Emperor Charls the Fifth, and by his Commanders, of not parting from the walls of Vienna, when Solyman was come with very great strength from Constantinople to assault it, deserve praise, or blame.

ATwo great and famous Princes, not only for the largeness of their Dominions, but for their particular warlike valor, the Emperor *Charls* the Fifth, and *Solyman Ottoman* the Grand Signior of the *Turks*, did both of them flourish in one and the same Age; so amongst the most memorable things of those times, the stupendious preparations for War made by the above-named Princes in the year 1532. was most remarkable, and variously thought of. All possible means was used by both of them, and the whole World put into Arms; so as the fortune of these two Empires was judged to depend upon the worth and prowes of these two Armies. But the success did no ways answer the fame of so great Princes, and the noise of the preparation; for neither did the Imperial Army stir at any time from the walls of *Vienna*, nor did the Turkish Army come within many miles of them.

Now since more recent businesses have recalled this to memory, it may prove no unuseful Consideration to represent what of praise, or of blame may be given to this resolution put on by the Emperor *Charls*, and his Commanders. Many were of opinion then, and the same may now be thought, that in this case, or in the like, the managing of War in this manner, standing only upon defence, and expecting to be assaulted by the Enemy, did much withdraw from the reputation of the Christian Militia, which was already much in the wane, and was sufficient to awaken fresh spirits and boldness in the *Turks* to undertake any thing the more easily against them in the future; since the flower of all the Soldiery of all the strongest and most esteemed Nations of Christendom, being assembled under the conduct and auspice of a mighty Prince, the Head of all Christendom, and in a busines of such weight, which had drawn the eyes of the whole World upon it, not any the least thing was put forth against these Enemies, no Army brought to face them, nor put in a posture of seeming really to desire battel; none of their Forts were assaulted, no Country of theirs prejudiced: Why were so many valiant men brought from their own homes into far distant Regions? why such expence? why such preparation for War? Was it that so strong and flourishing an Army should rot and moulder away about the walls of *Vienna*? What could have better decided the question which till then was disputable, in behalf of the Ottoman Princes, and of the Turkish Militia, and against the true honor of War, which our Princes and Soldiers have long laid claim unto, and sometimes atchieved, then after so great a preparation of Arms, after so cried up an enterprise with intention to quell the Turkish forces, to halt so long, and to so little purpose, not knowing what resolution to take, but that that Camp, then which no former Age had for a long time seen a greater, nor a more noble one, should stand still, like an unmoveable Fort? Being overcome by truth,

we must confess that the hopes of Victory for Christian Princes was lost, or at least brought to this pass, as not to lose, must be termed Conquest; but neither could this be done by taking this course.

No Christian Prince had usually so great and so settled a Militia, as could continually maintain such an Army in the field, as was at this time put together with much pains and industrie; so as by drawing out the War in length, they might think to weary and disorder the Enemy, and finally to overcome at last. But on the contrary, the Turks, who have continually a numerous well ordered Army, may easily upon whatsoever occasion send forth very powerful Armies to vex the Christian Princes, taking sometimes one place, sometimes another, without ever quitting them, or being driven out from them: whereof there hath been so many proofs already made, whilst we do nothing but make a defensive War against the Turks, as till this time hath most commonly been done in this very busyness, and by those very Princes who managed this War; the experience whereof hath been too evident, and too much prejudicial, by the affairs which unhappily befel King *Ferdinand*, whose whole Army being cut in peeces in *Hungary*, and the noblest Cities of that Province totally lost, might teach for certain, that whilst the Turkish Forces should remain safe and intire, the danger of *Vienna*, and of the other Cities of *Austria* and *Hungary* was not quite over, but onely deferred for a season, which delay might peradventure prove unfortunate, by reason of the weaknes wh ich is brought upon the Forces of Priaces by long lying idle, and especially those of such Princes as keep not a continual Militia on foot. Whereas the Turks, who have an Army alwaies ready and well paid, and who by making one War continually spring from another, keep them alwaies well disciplined, might at another time with greater Forces assault the same Territories of the House of *Austria*, as it happened not many years after. So as had they not been freed from greater, and more eminent dangers by *Solyman's* death, the authors of this advice might have repented it, and all the rest might have had cause of greater sorrow, for having lost so far an occasion of making trial of the valor of Christian Commanders and Soldiers in a pitch'd Battel; whereas we want not clear and memorable examp. s, how far the true zeal of Religion, and a noble forwardnes hath been often favored from Heaven with prosperous success; as when divers Princes of *Europe* crost the Seas to wage War with the *Saracens*, and to recover, as they did, the holy Land from the Infidels, driving them out of divers Cities of *Asia*, whereof they were possest.

But these are not the sole examples; for he who shall call to memorie greater actions done by famous Commanders, will know that they were well advised when they assulted the Enemy, not waiting for him at their own doors; since the advantages, and damages are great and evident which do accompanie those who manage the War divelishly in this principal point. He who assults the Enemy within their own Confines, enheartneth his Soldiers, infuseth fear into the Enemy, carries all losse and danger from his own home to that of his Enemy: But he that stayes expecting that the Enemies Forces should come home to him, minding onely to withstand him, encourageth the very Enemy, and makes him the more bold and insolent, puts his own Subjects in despair, by making them maintain their own Armies, and exposing them to the rapine of the Enemy. Moreover if any adverse chance befal whilst the Enemy is in the bowels of their State, all that they have is made a prey of, and irrecoverably lost.

We read of *Cyrus*, in whom we have the character of a most excellent Commander, that King *Cyaxares* being encamped in his friends Country, and staying there to expect the Enemy, he advised him to change his resolution, and to enter the Confines of the *Assyrians*, and set upon them at their own doors, and shewing him

him the advantage he might make thereof, perswaded him to do so; by which means he got a notable Victory, worsting a great many of the Enemy with a much lesser number. It was alwaies *Cæsars* course, who was the true Master of good Militia, both to pre-occupate the Enemy, and to be the first that should assault, when Battel was to be given; thinking that the courage which the so doing infused into the Soldiers, did to boot with other benefits, help much to the getting of the victory; wherefore he taxed *Pompey* of an error, because he did not so in that famous Battel of *Pharsalia*. The *Romans* understanding that *Hannibal* was coming with a powerful Army to prejudice them in *Italy*, though the first defence was made by mountains and craggy situations which he was to overcome, yet they thought fit to fight him before he could get into *Italy*, and so keep the War the furthest off them that they could. But *Scipio* not being able to bring him to Battel, though he met with him at the banks of *Rhodanus*, as soon as they heard that the Enemy was got on this side the mountains, the *Romans* would not notwithstanding withdraw their Armies, as if they had been afraid to come before the walls of *Rome*, which *Hannibal* gave out he would assault, but sent their men with the same Consul *Scipio* to beyond the River *Po* to fight him, wisely knowing that the danger doth increase so much the more, by how much nearer the Enemy approaches to the heart of the Country. And the same *Romans* understanding afterwards that *Asdrubal* was coming with a great Army in *Italy* to assist his Brother *Hannibal*, they resolved to meet him beyond the River *Metaurus*, to prevent the Enemy, knowing that to eschew this danger, was to occasion other great dangers. Thus the victory gotten over *Asdrubal* bereaved *Hannibal* of the victories which he was likely to have gotten, if the *Romans* had been slower, or less resolute in encountring the Enemy. The Imperial Commanders ought to have taken the same advice, and might have done it; for the Turks must make a much longer march into *Hungary* and *Austria*, then we to assault their Confines, which are now grown too near us. Moreover the Turks chiefest strength lying in their Horse, which cannot march till the earth afford fodder for their Cavalry, and being to come out of hotter Countries into a colder Region, they cannot without much difficulty and incommodeity march into the field in the first season of the year, as others may do, whose condition doth differ from theirs, both in the condition of Militia, and in the temperature of the Air, wherein the first skirmishes are to be made.

So as it appears to be very strange, nay, indeed a very great wonder, that having made so great a preparation for War, they would not so much as in thought pre-occupate the Enemy, and enter into the upper *Hungaria*, from which Country they might have been furnished with many commodities, and upon occasion, secure themselves by a fortunate day, a long time from Turkish Incursions; for it was not likely that by *Solymans* departing that year wi hout having done any thing, he should forsake the Guardianship and protection which he had taken upon him of the King of *Hungary*, but rather aspire to make himself Master of that Kingdom, as he did, being more encouraged thereunto by the weakness and backwardness of the Imperialists, who if when they had done their utmost, had done nothing at all, and the Turks knowing that *Charls* the Emperor being imploied in other very considerable Wars, would not be alwaies able to afford his Brother so great assistance, was not this a great incitement to them quickly to renew the War, to the greater prejudice and danger not onely of *Hungary*, which *Ferdinand* laid claim unto, but even to the like of *Ferdinands* own Territories: and not long after the fact it self shewed what might have been foreseen by reason; for *Solyman* could not onely not be perswaded to quit the protection which he had taken of his Pupil King *Steven*, but before he should come to any accord with *Ferdinand*, demanded tribute from *Austria*; and the cond tions both of War and

Peace growing daily worse and worse, the greatest part of *Hungary* being lost after the notable discomfitures of the German Armies at *Essechlo* and *Buda*, and the other part continuing still in great danger, the certain loss was known which did redound unto them by not hazarding a Battel at this time, when the feds and hopes were at least alike on both sides.

But say that this had been too rash, or too difficult a thing to have been effected, what hindred them or dissuaded them from passing through their own Countries, and marching with their Army to between *Dava* and *Sava*, a Country which had not at all been prejudiced by the late Wars, and therefore fit to furnish their Army with victuals, and where there are many mountainous seats, which were advantagious for the *Imperialists*, and incommodious for the *Turks* in respect of their Cavalry; whereby they might have preserved two Provinces, which were Patrimonial States of the House of *Austria*, and therefore ought to have been the more carefully kept, *Carinthia* and *Stiria*; which being abandoned, were left a secure prey unto the *Turks*, who utterly destroyed them by fire and sword, endangering likewise the loss of some of their chief Cities; for the way would have been block'd up, and kept *Solyman* from coming thither, if it had been first possessed by the *Imperialists*; and *Solyman*'s reputation would have been much lessened, if he had tarry'd behind, leaving that Country untouched, which he was come to assault with so great an Army. But to do as the *Imperialists* did, to keep so many men with so great a Train of Artillery and all necessaries for War, barely to defend one City, which lay not open, but was beginnt with walls, which was held to be a strong Fortress; and which being but meanly provided of men, had formerly repulsed great Turkish forces; what was it, but by this new and prejudicial example to confirm the *Turks*, and even our own men, in the opinion, that the Christian Militia was inferior to that of the *Turks*, and that our Princes, being intent upon their own defence, and not without some fear to employ their utmost endeavors therein, were for their parts to suffer the *Turks* to enjoy their large Empire in peace and safety? Which the Ottoman Princes have brought to so vast a greatness, not by letting their Forces lie idle, and by being content to defend that Title which they had gotten at first, but by going every where to find out the Enemy, fighting him upon all occasions, and by making their way by their swords into other mens Countries. How oft have the *Turks* entred into the Confines of *Persia*, nay, wrought themselves in even to her inmost parts, chiefly intending to come to a day of fight with the *Persians* Armies, which they have often effected; though the *Persians* were rather to be feared, than to be despised, for their antient honor in War, and for the manner of their Militia; and yet at last they have in these last Wars got safe possession of the chiefest part of this most noble Kingdom.

What then is more to be said, but that if this way of proceeding have proved prosperous to those that have walked therein, he who takes another way walks on towards destruction, and either through ignorance, or too great a thirst after quiet and security, involves himself into greater troubles and difficulties? And though the loss be made by peace-meal, which may peradventure make it appear the less, yet at last the whole falls into more certain, though a later ruine. And to speak of more modern affairs; how had not only the Commonwealth of *Venice*, but several other States of Christian Princes been preserved from the Turkish power and insolencie, if the League's Fleet, shunning all occasion of fight, had retreated without that famous Victory of *Lepanto*? But it was afterwards more clearly seen, that *Charls* his intent on in this War was far from joining battel with the *Turks*, either that he would not hazard his glory and honor, or manifestly confess himself inferior to *Solyman* in Forces, when *Hungary* and *Austria* being assaulted at another time by the same *Solyman*, in stead of succoring or assisting his Brother who was in emi-

nient danger; he went to try new adventures in *Africa*, of a much more inconsiderable nature. If a day of Battel be ever to be had, what else was there to be done to keep off the ruine which doth threaten Christendom every day more and more? He who hazards, may lose; but he may also win: And he who stands idly, and does nothing, whilst he endeavors security by uselesse means, does by degrees daily fall into new dangers, and doth as it were voluntarily (but for certain, basely) submit himself to the yoke of a grievous and unworthy slavery. If *Germany* and *Italy* had been so forward to furnish men and monies for this enterprise, (the authority of so great a Prince who was the chief Author and Head thereof, being considered) as upon other occasions which did happen not long after, these assistances might have been sooner hoped for. When were the whole Forces of *Germany* seen so united, as they were at this time? Nay, it was rather to be doubted that many seeds of discord were to grow, which were already spread abroad throughout this Province, by reason of Religion and State-policie, whereby *Germany* might be weakned and divided. From whence then was there any good to be hoped for against this so formidable Enemy, if so great a preparation for war proved altogether vain and uselesse? The condition of present Times, and of long Custom, will not suffer us now to hope that we may see what formerly fell out in that famous Council of *Cleremont*, that at the words of an Hermitte, at the bare exhortations of a Pope, Christian Princes and people should readily take up Arms against the Infidels, being content for bond of firm union to be all of them signed with the sign of the Cross. But now when any such thing is treated of, such disputes are made upon every point, every one looks so much to their own particular ends (not measuring things aright, nor minding the common interest in comparison of their own) as Leagues and Unions being contentiously handled, slowly concluded, and untimely dissolved, there comes no good of them.

Wherefore it cannot be said, that they thought by delay to reserve occasions prepared for Victory, to which the Cause which was then in hand ought not a little to have excited them; to wit, the maintaining of King *Ferdinand* in his just pretences to the Kingdom of *Hungary*; from whom, without any right, and unprovoked by any injury, it was attempted to be taken. Very shame should likewise have been able to have made them not suffer so miserable a spectacle of such devastations and ruines as were made by the Barbarians in *Carinthia* and *Stria*, whilst they stood looking on with so great an Army; at which the Imperial Commanders being at last moved, they went about (though late) to revenge these injuries; and their boldnes being assisted by fortune, the Freebooters were routed, and almost quite discomfited in all places where they were assaulted. So as it appears it may be pleaded by this late example, that they might have done greater things, if they had attempted it. Moreover, so many military men might very well have known what advantage might have been gotten by giying Battel, since in this posture of affairs great rewards were to be expected from the Victory, and but small losse, had they been beaten: For the Christian Army, if victorious, might have penetrated into the *Turks* Dominions; where there are no strong Holds, save some few upon the Frontiers; and not meeting with any obstatces, might have marched even to before *Constantinople*, planting their Trophies in sundry places, by one sole Victory. Whereas on the contrary, the *Imperialists*, upon any adverse fortune, had many strong Holds whereunto to have retreated, and by maintaining them, might have retarded the course of the *Turks* victories, and have recruited their broken Forces. But say, I pray you, who could assure the *Imperialists* that they should avoid the hazard of a Battel? Was it not rather to be believed, (especially if we will consider the boldnes of the *Turks*, who are wont to meet but with weak resistances) that answerable to what they gave out, they would advance and force the Christians to give

give Battel, as the Voyage taken by *Solyman* did promise, who kept not within his Confines, but was entred into the Imperialists Country, so far as some of his Horse Troops made inroads even to *Newstat* a Town standing in the same Champaigne Country, and not far from *Vienna*? And say that being assaulted by the Enemy, they had been forced to fight, who can deny but that both before, and after the conflict, the businesse would have proved hazardous to the Imperialists, since they were to fight at their own homes, and in their own defence? For great is that astonishment which is caused by the bold coming on of an Enemy, and men are alwaies readier to run away there where they have best means of saving themselves; and in case of adverse Fortune, the danger is greater when the Enemy is in the bowels of the State; and if the inhabitants overcome, the less good redounds by the victory, because the enemy hath time to rally, and to defend himself. These were therefore notable disadvantages, which were unaviodable whilst the Imperialists Camp remained fixt before the walls of *Vienna*, and thereby made themselves to depend upon the Enemis resolution.

Notwithstanding all this, he who shall duly consider the present condition of the Affairs of the Empire, of the Militia, and of all other things which belongs to such a businesse, may peradventure be of a different opinion, and judge otherwise, and if not commend, at least excuse the resolution taken by the Imperialists, of not parting with their Army from before the walls of *Vienna*, and from the River *Danubius*. That the Turkish Empire is very great, and potent, is a thing too well known by us to our cost; but the care how to prevent the maladie and weakness into which Christendom is fallen by the greatness of such an enemy, hath been so long in cogitation, as to use violent means, might bring ruine upon her, rather then procure her safety. Christian Princes have not in this age a settled, well disciplined, well ordered Militia, and kept in perpetuall pay, as the Turks have, and as the *Romans*, and some other Empires have formerly had; Whence it is that numerous Armies cannot be raised without length of time, and much difficulty; and for want of continual exercise, by which the Soldiers of one and the same Nation have been known to be able to supply every military Office, recourse must be had to several Nations, for men fit for several actions in War; so as it is thought that either by natural inclination, or by antient Custom, or by meer opinion, every Nation is best, some for one thing, some for another; as also because there are but very few in any place, who are well instructed in Military affairs. For no Militia is entertained except it be in time of need, or some few who are kept in Garrisons, with little or no exercise.

The charge also of assembling Soldiers from several, and far distant Countries, as also all things which belong to War, is much the greater; and whereof not any one State of our Princes is compleatly furnished. So as put all these together, it is from hence, that when any enterprise hath been to be taken against the Turks in these times, with numerous and powerful Forces, they have not been able to be got together in any reasonable time, nor well ordered; which delay arising from necessity, hath hindred our preventing the Enemy, and our assaulting them at their own doors. But particularly, is it not very well known, that at this time whereof we now speak, *Cæsar* was to assemble Soldiers from so many Nations, subject to other Dominions, and to joyn together the Auxiliary Forces of *Germany* and *Italy*, as in doing thereof so much labor and time was spent, as before the Imperial Army was mustered at *Vienna*, *Solyman* was already come to *Belgrade*? so as, to have resolved upon preventing the Enemy, and of assaulting his Confines before the arrival of his Army, was impossible, though it had been thought expedient to have done so; nor ought reason to prevail over experience; and this so much the less, for that there wants not other reasons to prove that the Turks are readier at their

their couns'l, and speedier at their executions, then we can be. But let us suppose that all prolixity and difficulties therein might have been helped, and that it had depended upon the free-will of the Imperial Commanders to assault the Turks within their Confines; say, I beseech you, what design could the Imperialists have had to enter into the Enemies Country? Should they perhaps have stood idly expecting the shock of the Turkish Army, if it should advance towards them? or if *Solyman* should not have advanced, but have shunned the encounter, should they have marched on and forced him to fight? Or should they have endeavored to have taken some of the Towns, or Forts which were held by the Turks, by assault; and carry the prejudice home to him, who would have brought it to them in the defence of another man? Let us examine all these things, by considering the last proposition.

In what place should the Imperial Army have incamped, which would not have been very incommodious for them, and far off? they were not yet absolutely posseſt of divers Cities upon the Frontiers of *Hungary*, as they were afterwards. But let us argue the business in general; if the place were weak which they should assault, what honor should they win thereby? Or would the advantage of such an acquisition have been answerable to the expence; and to the expectation had of such an Army? Besides, such purchases are to little purpose; for such places are soon regained by him who is master of the field; and if the Imperialists would have attempted the taking of any strong place, and should not have effected it soon and easily, to how great danger did their Army expose it self? they must either raise their siege, with loss of honor, and with those other bad consequences which follow in such like cases; or else they must keep their station, and be cut in pecces, when a powerful Turkish Army should come, and find the Imperialists scattered and busied about the taking in of strong Holds; as afterwards fell out upon the like occasion of *Buda*, which might teach Commanders, with what temper they are to proceed when they fall upon such affairs, and when they have to do with a potent Enemy. But it may be yet more strongly urged, that whilst the Turkish Forces should keep themselves safe and intire, the Imperialists had but little hopes of keeping what they should happily have gotten. Were not *Modone* and *Corone* recovered from the Turks by the Imperial Forces, under the Ensigns of the same *Charls*? yet these very Towns were soon after abandoned, and forsaken, because they knew they were not able to maintain them against the Turkish puissant Forces. Have not the Imperialists and Spaniards made oft-times many attempts in *Africa*, and had good success therein? Yet in whose possession are these very places now, which were gotten with so much charge and danger? Did not the Turks soon repossess themselves of those places from whence they were driven? The League made against the Turks in the year 1537. wherein the fame and forces of the same Emperor *Charls* were interested, did it not win *Castel nova*, a Fortress fit for their greatest designs? But how long were we able to keep it, though it were strongly garrisoned? These experiences may serve to shew, that the good gotten by such cost and labor, hath not at last proved any thing, save dishonor in forgoing what was gotten.

But to fall upon the other head; If the Imperial Army should have continued incamped in any strong situation of the Enemy which they might have taken, without attempting any thing more; how world it have been in any better condition, then it was when incamp'd before *Vienna*? rather on the contrary, the danger was greater and more evident of falling into mighty disorder, especially for want of victuals, by their going from the Banks of *Danabius*, from whence alone they could have been safely and opportunely furnished therewithal; for they were to provide for the victualing of a great many, and the Enemy did abound in Horse, whereby

whereby their succors might have been cut off. It may peradventure be alledged, that they might have preleived a great tract of Country from the inroads, plunder, and firing made by the *Turks*. But first, they were not certain to make this advantage, the Country being large, and exposed to such accidents as these; nor were they able, without dividing their Forces, to supply all places: And the *Turks* seeing this place well guarded, if they should have taken their way above the *Danubius*, as they did beneath it towards the *Alps*, finding the fields more large and open in those parts in *Moravia*, *Silesia*, and *Austria*, they might have made larger inroads, and with less danger: whereas having quartered themselves in the mountainous situations of *Stria* and *Carinthia*, they might at least revenge the injury, and in some sort preserve their honor by killing many of them, who being disbanded, were gone to pillage the Country.

It is commonly advantagious to advance towards the Confines of a State, where the Passes are narrow and difficult, either by the ruggedness of the situations, or by reason of *Forts* upon their Frontiers, so as the *Enemy* may be by these advantages kept afar off. But what was there in King *Ferdinands* States, which could perswade him to take this course; the Country being large, open, and where many *Armies* would not have been sufficient to have kept out an *Army* which was resolved to enter, as these did? But it may be said again, that this was not a loss which would counterpoise (as might very well have happened by reason of their own inconveniences) the breaking up of that *Army*, whereon the defence of King *Ferdinands* States did relie, and which was of so great a concernment to all Christendom. And it may be also added, that the further the *Imperialists* had advanced, whereby they might the better have met with the *Enemy*, and have fought him, if they should not afterwards have done it, their fear would have appeared to have been so much the greater, and that they had repented to have proceeded so far; whereby they should not only no. have increased, but have lessened the reputation of the force and worth of that *Army*. But for what concerned their marching forward to encounter the *Enemy*, with a resolution of giving him battel at his own home, at which the Considerations made to the contrary do seem chiefly to aim, it is a business of so weighty, and so numerous consequences, as it deserves to be well examined. It is a general Rule, That it is requisite the *Affailant* should have greater Forces than he who is assailed, or at least equal Forces: And is there any one so blinded with desire, as that he does not see the *Imperialists* disadvantage in this behalf? *Solyman* brought with him an *Army* consisting of One hundred and forty thousand fighting men, and almost as many men more for other Camp-occasions, furnished with *Artillery* and all other Requisites for War, an *Army* verit in Victories, and which was then to fight in the sight of their Lord and Master, a fortunate and valiant Prince; and who are promisid by their Law, that whosoever dies fighting for his welfare and glory, shall be eternally rewarded in heaven: An opinion which hath much advantaged the *Turkish* affairs in point of War. Entire obedience, excellent military discipline, patient undergoing all wants, and great toil and labor, are things whereunto the *Turkish* Armies are accustomed; in vertue whereof it is, and not by chance, that they have had so many victories: And it was the opinion of all men, that these things did at this time abound in that *Army*. Now on the other side, the *Imperial Army* was far short of this in numbers, the fighting men not exceeding the number of Fourscore and ten thousand, whereof there were but Thirty thousand Horse. It is hard to say what men might promise to themselves from the Commanders and Soldiers gallantry, since no precedent nor subsequent trial hath been known to be made against this *Enemy*: Marry, such disorders as are usually seen in our present *Milicia*, might easily be therein seen; the *Spaniards* mutinies before they were come to the *Camp*, the like of the *Italiants* after their arrival, great and open

open hatred amongst the Nations which were in the same Camp, as if they had been in two Enemies Camps, insomuch as they were like to fall together by the ears more then once, the *Spaniards* and *Italians* being jointly highly incensed against the *Dutch*; the Commanders at variance amongst themselves, envying one anothers glory, raisers of commotions and disobedience amongst the Soldiery, as was seen by the last of punishments inflicted upon some of them. Now what the issue in likelihood might prove betwixt two such Armies as you have here described of the *Imperialists* and of the *Turks*, any man may judge, who is capable of ordinary reason, without any further experience of War.

But to proceed to the other heads: What situation could there be chosen which was not disadvantageous for the *Imperialists*? The parts of *Hungary*, *Wallachia*, and of the neighboring places where the Armies were to meet, consisted all of open *Champaigns*, where most assuredly the Horse (wherein the Turkish Camp did so abound) have the better of Foot; and worth is overcome by numbers, where the lesser Army may be circumvented by a greater multitude, and better use may be made of Horse, which may either advance where they find advantage, or retreat without any prejudice where they cannot withstand the Enemy. Therefore the Imperial Commanders knowing the disadvantage thereof in that situation which they had taken, though they were secured by the City of *Vienna*, and by the River *Danubius*, yet they stood alwaies with their Squadrons in order for any assault; their Foot was divided into three great Squadrons, whereof one stood firm in the midst, and betwixt this and the other two were the Horse quartered, so as they did inclose the whole body of the Army, which was surrounded and secured by great store of Artillery. Another reason may be added, which is, That in case of misfortune, the *Imperialists* Army might suffer a greater discomfiture then that of the *Turks*; for it would be harder for the former to keep any of their Foot entire, or *Gens d' Arms*, then for the *Turks* to preserve their Light-horse, which were always ready according as occasion should serve, either to charge, or sustain a charge, and save themselves. Wherefore it may be said, that the hazard was not the same, and therefore not to be put to the trial, as affairs stood. And if it be advantagious to assault an Enemy at his own door, the affording rest to Soldiers, whereby to be the better able to withstand and to repell with victory those who come to assault them, and are wearied by their long march, and the inconveniences thereof, hath also something of good in it.

Nor must we be govern'd by examples wherein the same accidents meet not; for general Rules are not to be observed at all times, and especially not in War, which is subject to so many variations. If *Cyrus*, and the *Romans*, when the first went to fight the *Assyrians*, and the other the *Carthaginians*, had been in that condition as those were of whom we now speak, we may perswade our selves (such was their known wisdom) that they would have done otherwise: And if the *Romans* chose to meet *Hannibal* first on the other side the Mountains, and afterwards at his first entrance into *Italy*, it may be said, besides the diversity of accidents which counsell'd them so to do, that our Princes have no such Militia, nor so ready, as the *Romans* had, nor had they means of recruiting their Armies so soon as the *Romans* could do in case of adverse fortune; and that they were able to maintain so many Armies, not only in *Italy*, but in *Spain*, *Africa*, and *Greece*, at the same time when *Hannibal* was in *Italy*, shews, that as they were forward in giving Battel, so they knew how to supply themselves again: which the *Imperialists* could not at this time have done, if they should have lost that Army, which they had taken such pains to assemble together from so many several parts. It is acknowledged, that to put ones self upon the hazard of a Battel, is a thing which is done by wise Commanders, when they are back'd with another Army, which may afford them means of fighting a

second time, or at least whereby they may easily recruit in case of adverse fortune ; else a whole State is adventured upon one only Battel. As for the success of the Battel of *Lepanto*, it was accompanied with some accidents which are seldom seen to happen : For the *Turks* gave our men battel, which was willingly entertained by us, because we might make use of the advantage of the Venetian Gallions, by whose Artillery their Fleet was divided and scattered, before they could come to a further conflict. But the next year, the condition of affairs being altered, they took another course : For the *Turks*, who were taught by their former bad success, not being willing to join battel with our greater Vessels, and our men being wisely well-advised not to divide nor separate their slighter Gallies from the greater, as finding themselves either weaker therein, or at least not stronger, there was nothing done, though the Fleets were several times very neer. In this point likewise, the Land-Militia, and that of the Sea doth differ ; for as for Sea-fights, the Christian Forces are in number equal in Shipping to the *Turks*, but sufficiently beyond them for matter of worth and discipline : Marry, in Land-Armies the *Turks* do far exceed the Christians in numbers ; and as for valor and good discipline, they cannot as yet be accounted inferior, unles we will, to detract from the Enemy, add to our own shame, as having been so oftentimes beaten by so base and unexpert men. But howsoever it be, we cannot but have a great esteem of the Turkish power, which their continued prosperitie hath made so. What reason was there then that a new Army, made up of so many several Nations, wherein the Soldiers did hardly know their Captains, and were much less known by them, who had not as yet done any military act jointly, nor well learnt how to know, nor follow their colours, not acquainted with the Country, and wanting all those things through which, by the true Art of War victories are gotten, should advance, and give Battel to an Enemy so formidable both for fame and forces ? nor can the event of a set Battel be truly judged by what befel those of the Turkish Camp, who disbanding from the rest, went, though in great parties, to pillage the Enemies Country, the business not being any thing alike ; the *Turks* had the disadvantage of the Countries situation, of being loaded with prey, of being in disorder (as commonly befalls those who go to plunder, not to fight) and of other accidents. But besides all this, he who relates this business, mentions not any baseness in the *Turks*, but saies, That notwithstanding all these disadvantages, they defended themselves generously to the utmost of their power :


But what did the same *Solyman* (who cannot be denied to have been very valiant, and greatly experienced in matter of War) though he had all the advantages that have been mentioned ? he did not advance with his Army as near us, as he might have done, nor did endeavor to enforce others, nor to be enforced himself to fight, but rather went out of his direct way, which he had taken to come to *Vienna*, and kept for the most part in strong and commodious seats, as between the two Rivers of *Sava* and *Drava* ; and if a powerful and vain-glorious Prince, who professed that he had undertaken that War meerly out of a desire of glory would make use of hæsitation counsels, where the consequences were so great and so heavie ; how would it have becomed *Charls*, a Prince no less wise then valiant, and who was necessitated by many other important affairs of some other States of his, to leave *Germany* suddenly, as he did, to have put himself upon the dubious events of Battel, whereby to indanger almost his whole Fortune ? When *Marius* was sent against the *Cimbrians*, who were fallen down into *Italy* (which was thought to be as considerable a War as any that the *Romans* had made) the same circumstances concurring thereunto, whereby to infuse terror, as do now to make the Turkish Forces so formidable ; as crueltie, barbarism, the great number of the Enemy, and the fame of the victories which they had won ; the

the wise Commander would not (though many occasions had offered themselves, and that he was taxed by the unexperienced, of timorousness) come to a pitch'd field with such an Enemy till for many moneths space he had kept the Army accustomed to the performance of duties, and to Military actions, and chiefly till he had acquainted them with the aspect of the Enemy, and how to have the better of them in light skirmishes, which were not notwithstanding attempted but upon great advantage.

And if *Ceser* used to prevent the Enemy, and to be the first that should assault; it is to be considered that he commanded a veteran Army, of whom he had by long Wars had much experience. So as the same example is not to be made use of in a new and tumultuous Army, and of so different conditions. But let us likewise consider what were the reasons which made these two Princes take up Arms; for by the first rise of Wars the reason of their administration, and the good means whereby to conduce them to a good end, is best known. The War was offensive on the Turks behalf, undertaken with great surquedrie, and with great hopes of victory and glory; *Solyman* having propounded unto himself to revenge the injuries done by *Ferdinand*, then King of *Bohemia*, to *John King of Hungary*, who reigned under his Guardianship and protection. But whether this was his true intention or no, or but pretended, that he might possess himself of the Kingdom of *Hungary* (as afterwards he did) it was most certain, that he could not compass his end of beating the Forces of these two *Austrian* Brothers, *Charls*, and *Ferdinand*. *Ceser* on the other side, being usually distracted and busied, as now in particular, in other Wars, had betaken himself to this, to defend the assaults which were threatned his Brothers Territories, as also the honor of his family, or rather that of all *Germany*; or, to confine ones self to narrower bounds, it may be said, that this contention of War did particularly concern the oppugning, and the defence of the City of *Vienna*. *Solyman*, who had formerly little to his honor, been driven from before the walls of that City, professed to return thither with greater Forces, being firmly resolved to reduce it to his power, and to challenge the Emperor to a pitch'd Battel. *Charls* on the contrary, having brought his Forces about that City, had propounded unto himself the keeping of it, and to frustrate this so great furie and boasting of *Solymans*. Now then, whilst *Vienna* was preserved, and that she was kept free from all dangers, and that *Solyman* was so curbed and frightned by the Imperialists Forces, as that he durst not advance, or make good his word which he had publickly professed, did not the Imperialists effect the business they had taken in hand, without the effusion of blood? Did they not preserve their own honor, and do service to all Christendom? If this Army (as the success of Battel is more uncertain and dubious, than any whatsoever other humane action) had received any notable defeat, when would this wound have ever been cured? The afflicted body of Christendom must have its wounds long kept open, and have still ulcerated more and more. How would *Cesars* particular Enemies have been encouraged to fall upon his Territories, and to have endangered and molested his own particular affairs, whilst he should have shewed courage enough, but little good counsel in defending another mans right, which did not immediately concern himself? Had the Turks in former times been made retreat to their own Confines, as now they were, without having made any acquisition, they had not been masters of so many Christian Kingdoms, as now they are. And had their Forces proved still vain, their Militia would have been imbase, and they would have been discouraged from troubling others without any good to themselves; which peradventure would have been the safest and surest way of weaking so great a power as that, by temporizing, affording them thereby occasion of growing idle, and of falling into domestick disorders, so as they might the

more easily have received a blow, and have been overcome both by cuning and force. Nor will it avail to affirm the contrary, as if the future dangers and troubles had been certainly to have happened, or that they might have been made greater by a new commotion of War; for it was more answerable to reason, that when *Solyman* should have done his utmost with his whole Forces, assisted by his own presence, he would have suffered the Estates of *Austria*, and of *Germany* to have remained quier, if King *Ferdinand* had rested content with his own Patrimonie, and with the Kingdom of *Bohemia*, together with the hopes of succeeding in the Empire, without intricating himself in new troubles, by obstinately maintaining his pretences to the Kingdom of *Hungary*, drawing thereby the fury of the Turkish Forces upon him, as he often did. So as King *Ferdinand* and his Councillors are more to be blamed for those many mischief; which ensued afterwards, and for those which we are still threatened with by the so near neighborhood of the Turkish Forces, than *Charls* the Emperor and his Commanders. For they seeing King *John* taken into so powerful a protection as that of the *Ottoman* Empire, so as it was impossible to put the *Dutch* in possession thereof by driving of him out; all anger and ambition ought to have been laid aside, contenting themselves rather with the neighborhood of so weak a Prince as the King of *Hungary*, then with that of so powerful and formidable a Potentate, to whom four Empires and eighteen Kingdoms do yield obedience.

These things may be on all sides variously considered, as various Judgments may be given on those actions which are not of a settled, ordinary, and natural condition, but which through various accidents do flore up and down, as it happens in counsels concerning War. The truth is, that the Forces, hopes, fears, and almost all other consequences of these two Empires were (as it were) equally ballanced in this behalf: So as it was a work not discernible by humane wisdom, or by any true grounds, whether to have come to a pitch'd field, or to abstain from doing so, would have been the better advice. In either of the Armies, the Flower of the Militia of the warlike Nations both of East and West was assembled, a vast number of Soldiers, excellent Commanders, most valiant Princes, and of as great renown as any of whatsoever former Age, and who had both of them won famous Victories. Great were the rewards, great the inconveniences, which were proposed on all sides according to the various success of such a days fight; immoital glory, shame not to be rased out, high hopes, greatest fears. So as it is no wonder if in this parity of objects which presented themselves before the eyes both of the *Imperialists* and *Turks*, a Battel, for which both parties were prepared and disposed, did not ensue. In which case he who will detract any thing from the *Imperialists* in not daring to fight, must praise their wisdom as much, and their mature advice; it being a Rule generally approved of by the universal consent of all men, That where the busines is doubtful and difficult, we must rather adhere to that which holds us from doing any thing, then to what eggs us on: For, *Had I wist*, comes too late, and is always to no purpose; whereas whilst things are whole and entire, place is left for new Counsels.



PAULA PERUTA

A
Gentleman of VENICE
HIS
SOLILOQUIE;

Wherin he makes and takes a brief examination of the whole course of his Life.



HAT do I do? What think I? What do I look for? My Age hastens already apace to the end of my life, and I mind not that end of Glory to which I am ordained. Those good things which I must shortly forgo, stand alwaies fixt before my bodily e:es, and I turn not the eyes of my mind towards those things which are prepared for me to injoy eternally; it is high time to know my error, and then to amend it. Old Age which useth to dead the affecti:ons of the flesh, ought now to quicken the zeal of the Spirit? O my soul summon thy

thoughts about thee, which have straid so long in the affairs of this world; know thy noble condition, and the true end for which thou wert created; Let all things that proceed from thee be worthy of thee. Throw from thee that vail, which as if thou hadst been blind, hath made thee go groping and groveling through the waies of worldly desires, in danger of falling into the ditch of some habitual sin; whereby it would have been the harder for thee to rise again, and reassume the right way. Great are the acknowledgments which thou oweſt to thy Creator, who hath made thee out of nothing; made thee ſo much more noble then the ſouls of all his other creatures, he made thee partaker of ſo many excellent gifts, chiefly of liberty, whereby thou maist increase the merit of thy good works, as he never ſuffers his grace to forſike thee, which thou mayſt very often be aware of, finding remorse of conſcience as often as thou falleſt into any ſin, and ſo many inci:ations to excite thee to the deſpifal of earthly thi:ngs, and to the love of ſuch as are celeſtial, as certainly thou art very much unworthy ſo great a benefit, if thou doſt reſiſt it any longer, or elſe a very bad friend unto thy ſelf, if knowing the tru:ſt good, thou chufest to deprive thy ſelf thereof.

Aſſuredly,

Affuredly, if I shall take a true scrutinie of my life, I shall find that I have made my self a recepracle of all vanity ; Thou who oughtest to have been a temple of perpetual prayer, of immaculate goodness, of pure love to divine things. I do not consider my first and tender Age, wherein the use of Reason being but weak, that which ariseth from thence is not much considerable ; yet the tears and crying to which those very years are subiect, might afford me occasion when I was greater of contemplating the mistery, and of knowing that the condition of this worldly life, whereinto I was marching was but a valley of tears, a fountain of misericie ; Wherfore I should have taken the greater heed not to have suffered my self to be in-snared in the love of those things, where Wormwood lies hidden under Honey, and where weeping attends alwaies nigh upon laughter. In the Pueritia, which succeeded mine Infancie, I did not accustom my self (as I ought to have done) to labor and sufferings, to humble and devout thoughts, whereby the power of the flesh might have been weakened, and the soul exalted ; but I was detained by pleasures and effeminacie ; I betook my self so to follow and love vanity, as I began to suck in whit corrupt customs taught me, more then what was learnt me by my Tutors. I thought Riches, Honors, and all worldly Greatness, to be the garnishings wherewith men, and chiefly such as are nobly born, ought to adorn themselves ; I called the lives of such as lived better, and more retired from the world, meer madness.

These conceptions grew more firmly fixed in me afterwards, when passing through the other Ages, I saw them praised and practised by mens common consent, and chiefly by those who were esteemed the wifest, and most happy ; so as it was harder for me to pluck out those thoughts from out my heart, which had in process of time taken so deep rooting. But if I reflect upon the years of my youth, which are as it were the Spring of our Age, on which every thing seems to smile, and doth, as it were grow green, what can I remember which may make me satisfied with my self, or from whence I may affirm, that I have gathered such fruit, as I would now in my old age be fed withal ? As I first entred into my youth, I was, as it were challenged and defied to a gallant wrestling by the fences, and worldly delights, and parted from them very many times overcome, seldom with the victorie. I betook my self to my studie, and chiefly to that of Rhetorick, and of Philosophie ; wherein having the luck to light upon excellent Masters, I made some advancement ; I will not say, that now I am sorrie for it, for the fear least the time that I imploied therein might have been spent worse : but surely, I cannot deny but that I did thereby foment that affection which doth sometimes prevaricate better, to wit, to the desire of praise, and of self-estimation. Knowledge doth oft-times puff up him that is master of it, so as he forgets to glory in the Lord : I dare not say I possessed it, for hardly could I taste the waters of the over-flowing fountains of learning, through the shallowness of wit, and other affairs that I was busied in ; yet man doth easily flatter himself, and attributes unto himself more then falls to his share. Which is the cause why ambition is seen to get into all places, yea even into their most secret retirements who forsake the world, being a vice which is the harder to be cured, for that it keeps close and hidden. But what shall I say more ? What could I answer, if I should be asked what fruit I reaped by these my studies ? I might peradventure say, that the little of Philosophie which I learnt hath more awakened my understanding in knowing the truth of things.

But say I pray, what need hath he to have recourse to the candle-light of humane knowledge, who hath the bright Sun-shine of Grace in him, and to whom infallible truth is revealed ? I did for awhile give my self to study Moralitie, wherein I took such delight, as I wrote a book therof, which I was afterwards perswaded

to print, and so to impart it unto others: I learned how to become morally good; it is true I did; but is not the first precept in this knowledge, that the doctrine of manners, is it of self very vain? For it consists in doing, in action, not in knowing; it had been much better, that setting his commandments before mine eies, who is the true and real Master of that Christian life which I live, and have yet to live, I should have imployed my time in observing the precepts of the divine Law, rather then in collecting the Documentis of Philosophers; who wanting the taste of that truest, chieffest, and most excellent vertue, which divine love doth so much the more afford, as it is the more ardently inflamed, applied themselves to a certain mediocritie, which is better discerned or known in their Idea, or in their writings, then in the affections or actions which they go about to moderate. Afterwards, when I was come to mans Estate, being commanded so to do by him whom I ought to obey, and it being a thing also which I my self did much desire, I betook my self to write the History of my Country, a good and gallant work. But what proportion can the good reward which I hoped for thereby, bear with the pains I took, which was truly very great? Had I spent part of the time and study which I employed therein, in the reading of divine Books, I cannot doubt but that I should have been inflamed with the love of spiritual things, which for so long a time I did so little relish. And to pass by other things, I cannot deny, as best knowing mine own intrincical affections, but that whilst I labored so much to celebrate the fame and glory of others by these my Writings, I often felt within my self a certain tickling and delight out of the hope which I flattered my self withal, and wherewith I nourished my thoughts, that by these my labors I my self might likewise reap some honor; and (as the Poets say) live in my fame after my death. Oh gross vanity! and when this affection (with which I must confess I was sometimes drunk) gives place to reason, I acknowledge, that amongst all vanities none is greater then wordly glory; which is vain, because man glories of that which is none of his, for he hath received every good thing, especially the endowments of the soul, from God: Vain, because it is nothing of it self; it hath no true existencie, it is made up of various opinions of men, and of theirs most, who know least; Vain, because it reflects upon that which is not in us, upon that which is a trivial and common accident, to wit our Fame, the memory whereof we do with so much vanity desire to propagate. Tell me thou humane soul, which art so much inamored of this bare shadow of good, which doth not at all belong unto thee, if after thou art departed out of this world, thou couldst have any thing to do with humane affections, what good would this false glory do thee, which thou dost so much dote upon, as thou dost sometimes lose the way which leads to true heavenly glory? If thou shalt be damned, and in the eternal torments of Hell, thinkest thou that the satisfaction of this thy glory shall be able any waies to ease those immense and unconceivable Torments? and if thou shall be fixt in heavenly bliss, what need in that abode hath he of worldly glory, who is glorified with eternal glory? who is satisfied, who is content, who is for ever blessed? But since I examine mine own waies, I return to consider my life.

Some few years since I gave my self to the government of my Country; wherein I found the way so plain and easie, and the favor and grace of my Country so far above my merits, as I soon got into great Honors, and into the chieffest Imployments, which I still continue in, and do employ my time. But my Talent is so small, as though I spend it all, I know it is but little. And if I spend all, how can I, according to humane respect, be blamed? Or what reason have others to complain more of me, then I have of my self? Since so little a part of my life remains, or almost none at all, wherein I may recollect my thoughts, what time have I to think of my end? to repent me of my sins? to endeavor amendment? and yet I see I am not diligent in doing any thing. The most troublesome, yea, and the

the most contented thoughts wherewith my mind is now incumbered, will vanish as a shadow, or as smoak before the winde, and shall be withered as flowers by the Suns beams; and yet whilst this mind of mine is continually involved in these affious cares, it is so filled with the fantasms of those things wherein I employ my self all the day long, as I must meditate onely upon them, and though unwillingly, have them alwaies before mine eies, at all times, in every place, and upon all occasions: So as all contemplation of nobler and better things which I sometimes turn my self unto, is alwaies mixt with these base affections, and troubled with these clouds of worldly thoughts.

Alas, how hard is it to serve two Masters, God and the World? The world measures its actions by its worldly respects; he who makes that his stay, who lives according to that, can make no new laws to himself, but must govern himself by those which are commended, and practised by those who walk in the waies of the world. But how far different from these are Gods waies? Patience, Humility, Poverty, Obedience, Self-denial, and the giving over of all worldly care, are things which are abhorred by the worldly wise, but otherwise to God. How badly do the fallacious rules of worldly wisdom agree with the instructions of true Christianity, especially those of this corrupt Age, wherein heavenly and divine things are often troubled and confounded with a certain vain name of Reason of State. Crowns, Empires, Kingdoms, and all power is given by God; and though the weakness of our reason be such as it cannot penetrate into the infinite abyss of his wisdom, yet does he dispose and order all things with certain and infallible ends, though unknown to us. Therefore unless that great, and omnipotent Lord God, by whom Kings do not onely reign upon earth, but the earth it self is sustained and held up with a miraculous equality of weight, do not keep the City, how vain is all this your learning, O ye wise men of the world? and you Princes, how vain are all your Forces to maintain your Lordships and States? Thou, whosoever thou art, who dost manage the weightiest affairs of Principalities, put thy heart into the hands of thy God, and he will infuse worthie and becomming thoughts into thee; He will give thee true Wisdom and true Fortitude. The World builds nothing but Towers of Babell; nor is it aware thereof, till its desig-s, and many years labors, being overthrown by its own confusion, it sees its rashness laid low; and those thoughts which aimed at Heaven thrown down to Hell.

But I return again unto my self. I see that these many years past wherein I approach to old age, I employ my time in studies, thoughts, and imployments, of differing natures in themselves, but all conformable to what tends to my prejudice. For they robb'd me of my rest, have still oprest me with many cares, and led me astray from more holy desires, to which, if I had bent my mind in time, I might hope now to sit and feed at the Table of those true good things which now I want. What do I then do? What do I think? What do I expect? Why do I not change my thoughts and exercises, if I know that those wherein I have hitherto spent my time do me no good; nor for all the labor I have taken, have made me a whit more happy then I was at first? Nay, I may say, they have made me more wretched, since I have consumed the greatest part of my life wofully, and without any profit. Do I peradventure hope, that whilst I my self do not change, the nature of those things wherein I am verst should alter? That trouble should turn to delight? That the Affairs of the world, so full of anxious cares, should turn to the peace and solace of the soul? That worldly good shall assume a new vertue of making their possessors well apaid and satisfied? That these brackish waters of the pleasures of the Age, of which the more we drink, the more we are athirst, should become sweet and savory, and afford any true delight or content? Men who

who are blind in what concerns their own good, are wont to pervert the nature of things; to make them their Masters who are given to them to be servants. Such are the goods of Fortune, as the common people call them, because they know not how to raise themselves up to the knowledge of that mystery whereby their supreme Author and free Donor doth dispense them. But what greater misery is there then this humane felicity? The true Lord and God is made known unto us, and yet we continue to adore the Idols of Avarice, Ambition, and Vain glory: Look but upon those huge heaps of ruine which thou maist every day see in the City of *Rome*, who was once the Queen of the World, where are now her immense treasures? Where the majesty of her Empire? Where the pomp of so many Triumphs? the memory of so many victories? all these, being made the prey of time and death, lie buried in these ruines. But thou who livest by other precepts, and who hast a truer knowledge of thy eternal life, and eternal death, consider better what the nature of these goods are, to which thou hast been sometimes carried, with a less moderate affection, by the torrent of continual custom. If they be not of great worth, as truly they are not, why dost thou so much love them? Why endeavorst thou so much to be master of them? Why dost thou dread the loss of them so much? And if they have any thing of good in them, why dost thou not call to mind how soon thou art to forgo them? How comes it to pass this our happy worldly man is not aware, that if the increase of these goods could make him happy, he makes himself miserable, whilst through overmuch loving them, he is more intent upon purchasing the little which he lacks, then in enjoying the very much which he possesseth, whilst the fear of loosing it doth continually molest his mind? a greater vexation then, which the soul hath none, because it hath no bounds. We look upon their outside only, and are enmored of a certain handsome, but vain appearance which is in them, taking them for the guides of our life. But if we would consider their inside, and discover the deceipt and couzenage which is woven therein, we would shun them, as some holy men have done, least we be by them, and with them hurried down into Hell and damnation. We have our happiness within us, and seek for it elsewhere. He who will search his own house well, what wealth shall he find there whereby to enrich himself with precious treasure, which is hidden from us because the darkness of our affections leads us astray. If thy heart be fraught with pure thoughts, if thy soul be purged of all earthly passions, so as the rays of that true and lively Sun which is alwaies ready to illuminate thee, may penetrate thereto, thou shalt soon discover there jewels of such virtue, price, and worth, as thou maist thereby purchase the worlds peace and heavens glory. Thou shalt find those affections which now rage tumultuously within thee, become quiet and obedient to reason; and those dissonant sounds which do so perturb thy mind, will agree with so just proportion, as they will make a sweet harmonie in thy soul, and will prove a refreshing to the troubles of the world, a figure of heavenly melody, and of the glory of Paradice. O you Fathers, you good and holy Fathers, who being within your Cloister live in peace and quiet, far from the World, and the cares thereof, not only in your persons but in your very thoughts; if there may be any affection found without affection, and envy without sin, I do assuredly envy in you those your leisure times, wherein you give yourselves wholly to prayer and meditation; an idleness, which is true busines, true entertainment, and the true nutriment of the soul. What are Crowns, Scepters, and to be clothed in purple, but bonds whereby to keep those miserable ones, whom the world terms happy, fastned to perpetual vexation, and troublesome cares? With you, O Fathers! it is that peace doth inhabit; peace which keeps you at quiet within your selves, keeps your Affection obedient to Reason, and your Reason a devout hand-maid to God. How can he who lives in the worlds Militia, taste of

these fruits of true peace ? So full of cares, and destracted with so many thoughts: Who is continually to combate with those Enemies who wage within him, to wit the affections of worldly things, to the which we our selves, do as it were furnish Forces against our selves, by finding out new objects, and new materials whereby to increase them. We worldly men will feed the soul with meat which belongs not to her, wherefore it is no wonder if we be never satisfied, and if one appetite beget another even *in infinitum*; You, you are they who teach us by your lives and examples, that nature is satisfied with a little; and that man can never be said to be rich by abundance, nor poor by want; other goods, other endowments, other ornaments are requisite then those the world seeks after; the further a man advances therein, the further he finds himself entred into an intricate and confused Labyrinth, and after having made a long voyage, he findes himself further from his journeys end then when he first set forth. But I perceive that I praise *Mary*, and follow *Martha*; I know which is the right and safe way, and I take an intricate and dangerous way to lead me to my desired end. I am busied, sollicited, and troubled with many things, and yet I know that one thing is onely necessarie, that there is but one thing which can so become the companion of my lite, as it will never forsake me. I serve the world, and being given over to cares I entertain them more and more; love of Children, Household government, administration of goods, the Commonwealths businels, are things which I would fain free my self of; but I neither know how, nor when to do so. I endeavor to be less affectionate in having to do with worldly things; to taste them for nutriment, not to be drunk with them; but how hard is it to fix the slippery appetite so, as it fall not from the use to the abuse of those things, whereunto it is continually excited by the provocation of its perpetual companion, Sin ? He who stands alwaies near the fire, though he thrust not himself into it, so as he be burnt and consumed, yet he must feel a troublesom heat; and which is worse, the soul which is outwardly warmed with these earthly affections, freezes inwardly for what concerns divine things: Prayers grow luke-warm, alms-deeds scarce, fastings not usual; and in brief, the thoughts of the soul are choaked by the cogitations of the body. Yet I am much comforted, that I find in my self continually a desire of becoming better; which is a sign that I have not lost the princidles of well doing, and that I am not given over by the immense grace of my Creator. Though I sail through the troublesom Sea of this world; though my actions and thoughts flote up and down, not knowing where to find a Haven to put into; yet (thanks be given to God) this ship of my soul which contains many precious wares in her which were assignd over unto her, hath not made shipwrack. The integrity of communication, puritie of conscience the knowledge of the truest good, things which I have not used according to their worth, are yet preserved at their true price and value; so as they may one day enrich my soul. Thou my Lord, thou my Creator, thou my Redeemer, to whom my thoughts are better known then to my self, let this my reverent affection be acceptable to thy charitie; through thy great goodness pardon my impefections, and supply my defaults by thy infinite merit, so as I may totally despise these earthly things; free me from these fetters, keep not mine eyes fixt upon the earth, but turn them unto thee that art the *summum bonum*, and my souls sole felicitie; since thou knowest far better then my self what way I had best walk in to purchase salvation. If I be called to take pains in this State, and to use my talent in this Civil life, do thou, O Lord, so assist my weakness by thy great grace and goodness, as that acknowledgments may onely be made to thee, the Author of all my goodness for all my happy succseses; thine be all honor and praise; and suffer me not to lose that reward of my worldly labours, which thou thy self hast bin pleased that I should purchase by undergoing them in thy name, and by pisecting all my Actions to thee. Grant, O Lord, that I may

so think upon my mortal Children, as that I may not forget thee, my eternal Father, govern thou all my Faculties so, as I may know thou gavest me them, that thou preferrest them to me, and that it is my dutie to make use of thy Graces; that I may love my earthly Country, yet not so, as to make less esteem of my heavenly Country; that I may serve and obey my Commonwealth with integritie of conscience, with an intention to serve her, and not my self, and for thy glory, not for mine own. This is a miraculous work of thy hand, and which is onely to be acknowledged from thee. She is the onely example, in having for so long a series of years, preserved her self in Libertie, in Power, and in the true Religion: therefore if I cannot with fervor of spirit serve thee immediately, grant yet that I may serve thee not unworthily nor unusefully in this most excellent creature of thy making. And since it now falls to my share to serve my Country in this holy City of *Rome*, as her Ambassador to Pope *Clement* the Eighth; Grant that by serving this thy Vicar upon earth, I may serve thee the better, who art the true and supreme Lord of Heaven. Of thy great goodness give me that which I do not deserve, accept of my good will, for the good works which I ought to do; and infuse thy Spirit into this thy Vicar, the common Father of thy People, and Shepheard of thy Sheep, who is so full of zeal and charitie; so as that he may be able to draw this weather-beaten ship of Christianitie out of the storming Sea of these troublous times, and that she being gotten into the Haven of peace and safety, may with hands lifted up to Heaven say, *This is the day which the Lord hath made, let us rejoice therein, and let us always bless his most holy Name.*

FINIS.

ENGLAND

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